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MANAGING MODERATION: 
THE AKP IN TURKEY AND THE PKS IN INDONESIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Moderation does not constitute a monolithic model and the difference in the moderation 
process will influence the way a political party manages its internal dynamics. The cases of 
the AKP and the PKS show that both have different levels of moderation due to the 
different contexts of their social and political environments. The AKP has to deal with an 
extreme interpretation of secularism in Turkey that influences the party’s members to 
refrain from any confrontation with secular strongholds. The PKS has more freedom to 
express its ideology in the Indonesian democratic political system; hence the party is able to 
develop internal organisational procedures and programmes based on religious principles. 
To anticipate difficulties arising from from moderation, the AKP uses an organisational 
approach to give space for open and dynamic internal management and reduce the role of 
ideology significantly. The PKS still utilises its ideology in managing the impact of 
moderation by defining religious values as principles of organisation in parallel with 
organisational principles. Both parties are relatively successful in convincing their members 
to trust the party and its leaders in different ways. Party vision and personal charisma are 
more apparent for the AKP, although the PKS has to rely on interpretation of ideology as 
the main source of trust. By placing more emphasis on organisation, the AKP employs 
definition of violation toward party’s rules and decisions based on an organisational 
approach. In contrast, the definition of violation in the PKS relies on both religious and 
organisational principles. As a result, the AKP implements policies to dismiss members 
based on unambiguous principles with relatively insignificant opposition. The PKS has to 
deal with complaints of dismissal since the policies are taken based on interpretation of 
procedures and reasons. It is also proven that the AKP is able to convince voters by 
offering programmes to meet popular demands without relying on a religious agenda. 
While the PKS has been successful in developing an effective and solid party, it still has 
many problems in gaining support during elections as its pragmatic adjustment moderation 
also generates confusion internally and externally.  
 
 
Keywords: substantial moderation, pragmatic adjustment of moderation, trust, 
                  decomposition, party leader, alienation, conversion 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
I.1 Background of Study 
In studies of political parties, the role of ideology has been widely discussed especially in 
its relation with democracy. For scholars from the rational choice tradition, based on 
Hotelling’s (1929) and Downs’s (1957; see also Hindmoor 2006) arguments, ideology does 
not fit well with the demands of the public, so that a rigid ideological stance would only 
make the appeal for public support more difficult. In this argument, public political 
preference is closely related with the economic rationality which forces a political party to 
moderate its ideological standpoints. It then becomes more problematic for any party that 
still preserves a strong ideological position, especially one whose core values are 
conflicting with democratic principles.  
Sartori (1976) opposes that proposition by offering an anti-system party to 
categorise political parties that still preserve ideology as their identity in a democratic 
system. He argues that the existence of an ideological party can be based on acceptance of 
the democratic process and following its general rules. However, he agrees with the central 
argument of rational popular support in influencing the direction of anti-system parties. 
Anti-system parties could either preserve or reduce their ideological standpoints with with 
two possible tendencies, centrifugal or centripetal routes. The former takes place if parties 
maintain the ideological stance with very limited chances to obtain popular support. 
Conversely, the latter goes in a different direction to move toward the centre and apply 
political moderation.  
On the centripetal side, an ideological party that works within a democratic system 
has to sacrifice some if not all of its ideological stance to integrate with the system, and 
making a move toward the centre to win elections. That process is called political 
moderation, which is when a political party with a radical position, platform or ideology 
moves to a median position (Sanchez-Cuenza 2004). Some examples of moving toward the 
centre as reflected in the cases of Italian PCI in the 1970s, the Spanish Socialist Workers’ 
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Party (PSOE/Partido Socialista Obrero Español), the German Social Union 
(DSU/Deutsche Soziale Union), and the Communist Party of Russian Federation 
(CPRF/Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii; KPRF). The Italian 
Communist Party (PCI/Partito Comunista Italiano) did it in the second half of the 1970s 
when the party built a coalition with the Catholic Democratic Party (DC/Democrazia 
Cristiana) and other parties to form a government (Amyot 1981 and Urban 1978). To some 
extent, the tensions in post-Soviet Russia’s Communist Party are the result of the party’s 
efforts to redefine its ideology and attract more votes by adapting a position as a social 
democratic party like their counterparts do in Central Europe (Urban and Solovei 1997). 
The term political moderation itself seems subjective and problematic when it is 
used as a working concept in Political Science. One of its problems as a concept is to find a 
solid definition of the moderation process. The definition of the term is perceived as 
challenging if not ambiguous (Whiting 2011), especially in developing a method to 
measure the process. Sanchez-Cuenz (2004) offers a definition by looking at a party’s 
willingness to get involved in elections and respect for voter preferences. His definition 
suggests that the central role of voters in favour of a median ideological position gives a 
pressure to the reduced radical policies of a party. In contrast, Schwedler (2006) requires a 
deeper understanding of a party’s ideological preference. For Schwedler, it is important to 
examine the party’s behaviour in order to assess any change in its ideology. Those two 
different understandings of moderation, the role of median voters and party’s behaviour, 
generate problems in measuring moderation. Each definition has to develop its own 
method, by looking at policy preferences or policy outcomes.  
The problematic nature of political moderation is even more challenging when the 
concept is applied to the Muslim world. Al Anani (2011: 1-2), for instance, states that it is 
difficult to develop a common stance on moderation because one position may be seen as 
moderate by some and extreme by others. As a result, he suggests using the concept 
cautiously, especially in relation with Islamism. His warning is basically based on the fact 
that policies of major countries toward the Muslim world, especially Islamic movement and 
its variation in forms, tend to be subjective. Al Anani’s warning on the application of the 
concept in the Islamic context reflects the fact that the concept itself was developed mainly 
in the context of anti-system ideology. It is not a coincidence that the tradition of recent 
studies on moderation is studies on socialist or communist parties in Western and Eastern 
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European countries. The various cases of moderation in these regions are very different 
from cases of moderation in the Muslim world. A recent study conducted by Wheatley 
(2011: 2) for instance argues that the concept is ‘flawed’ when it is used as an operational 
concept in the Muslim world. 
In relation to Al Anani’s concern, the problem of the concept is also due to 
difficulties in defining the starting point of moderation itself. If moderation is attached to 
any organisation which abandons violent means, it will be difficult to apply the concept to 
Islamic organisations or movements that commit to the democratic system from the 
beginning. This is relevant to the application of the concept to the AKP and the PKS in this 
research because, the two parties do not have any record of using violence. Accepting 
democracy itself is part of the willingness to reduce ideological rigidity, as Capoccia (2002) 
has noted.  
Wickham’s examination of the Wasat Party in Egypt provides a useful way forward. 
For her, ‘abandonment, postponement or revision of radical goals’ along with ‘substantive 
commitment to democratic principles’ are sufficient conditions for an institution to be 
categorised as a party of moderation (Wickham 2004: 206). By using her proposal, it is 
then possible to categorise the AKP and the PKS as parties with certain aspects of 
moderation. The two parties at least have committed to work in a democratic system as 
shown in their participation in numbers of elections. In addition, Wickham stresses that the 
moderation of an ideology then can be examined by looking at the changing of it, either by 
abandonment, postponement or even only revision.  
Both the AKP and the PKS reflect at least a revision in different degrees of earlier 
ideological preferences. For the PKS, it is clear that the party tried to moderate its image in 
front of the voters in the 2004 election after gaining limited votes in 1999. After three 
national elections, its commitment to the democratic process is still evident. It is different in 
the case of the AKP, despite its successful winning in the last three national elections. The 
party does not have a formal image as an Islamic party as it denies any relation with Islam 
as an ideology and it gives commitment to democratic and secular political practices since 
its foundation. So, there is no changing of ideology to reduce its significance of moderation 
only a substantive commitment to democracy. However, ‘moderation’ can still be attached 
to it due to role of its founders who were members of political parties friendly to Islamist 
ideas, the RP and the FP. Erdogan himself, the leader of the party who served as governor 
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of Istanbul under the name of the RP, declared that he had taken away his clothes and 
changed into new ones (Heper and Toktas 2003).  
Whatever the prevailing debates on the concept of moderation, sacrificing some 
aspects of an ideological standpoint is clearly a necessity condition for moderation. 
Sacrificing ideological platforms is never an easy choice and could potentially bring a party 
into trauma. Sanchez-Cuenza notices that internal tension is likely to occur between 
ideological and pragmatic cadres. Within a wider political context, the tensions will confuse 
the party’s loyal supporters. In an advanced democratic political system, such a potential 
trauma can be managed through a democratic institutional process within the party. 
Negotiations between two competing groups seem to be more difficult to undertake in a 
newly democratic state. A political split might be a common outcome to the dispute.  
The communist parties in the former-Soviet countries have experienced the 
dilemma of preserving communism as their ideology. The collapse of the communist 
regime was not necessarily followed by the disappearance of communist parties in each 
country since democratic procedure has allowed them to survive and compete in the 
electoral process. However, to survive in the democratic system also requires a degree of 
flexibility in preserving their ideological stance. In that regard, the struggle of the 
communist party in democratic post-communist Russia provides a good illustration.  
 After nearly two decades of democratic system with regular electoral process, the 
Communist Party of Russian Federation is still struggling to cope with the new system. As 
an opposition, the party must double its efforts to reformulate its ideological positions and 
win elections. To do so, the party must confront problems pertaining to ideological 
changes, practical strategy, and the need to maintain social support. Traditional and senior 
voters who have a long attachment with the party remain the major basis of support. 
However, the party has to deal with the fact that the younger voters and even some of their 
traditional base supporters from the working class demand more attractive political 
platforms which communism has failed to provide. Changing ideological interpretations to 
a more nationalistic taste might be necessary to widen the support basis but it is not always 
effective as the party needs to consider the potential rejection from its traditional 
supporters. Forming a new party, a move made by those who perceived Zyuganov as an 
ineffective party leader, does not always provide a good solution. However, lack of an 
effective solution to manage the moderation contributes to a long multifaceted crisis and 
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uncertainty, as clearly demonstrated in the party’s defeat in the 1999 presidential election, 
despite its major improvement in the parliamentary election for the seventh Duma in 1995 
(March 2001: 281). 
The activism of the communist party in a democratic system has long been regarded 
as problematic by many scholars. Some have argued that as the representation of the 
working class, the party is expected to confront the capitalist agents through revolutionary 
means, a political stance perceived as incompatible with the nature of the democratic 
system. Unless there is a change in the ideological interpretation, the party will never gain 
an opportunity to fit into the electoral process. As shown by cases in France, Italy, and 
Spain, the change to Euro-communism made possible of theses parties in the political 
system.   
The dimension of crisis as experienced by many communist parties in the Eastern 
European context is only one of the two-sided aspects of moderation. The other aspect 
relates to the fact that a party must manage the process in order to survive in the political 
arena. Otherwise, the process will bring the party into multi-dimensional crises. Therefore, 
the ability to build a model of management that can handle the political process effectively 
will keep the party solid. A party without a strong management model will end up in acute 
crisis. Conversely, a party with a strong model management possesses better odds in coping 
with the traumatic process of moderation. As a result, a manageable moderation within a 
party is what is needed. 
The study of party management in the moderation process, therefore, is critical to 
the understanding of successful moderation. However, this remains a subject of study that 
receives inadequate attention from scholars. The lack of study in managing crises in the 
moderation process is reflected the studies of Orbell-Fougere (1973) and Maor (1997). The 
study by Orbell-Fougere mentions the management of party moderation by reviewing 
various models of management, but the reviewed models are not specifically models of 
managing moderation. Meanwhile, Maor’s study deals narrowly with models of party 
organisation and their development in the context of leadership and its relation to a solid 
and active party organisation. Therefore, the study of how a party manages the moderation 
process is still a rare case and this study will try to fill the gap, with particular reference to 
the Muslim context. 
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Figure I.1. 
Moderation and Its Relation with Crisis 
 
I.2 Moderation in the Muslim Context 
The problem of communist party in Russia and elsewhere has initiated interest in an anti-
system analysis in recent years, especially by scholars who focus on the existence of radical 
ideology in a democratic system (Capoccia 2002) and its connection to the moderation 
process (Sanchez-Cuenza 2004). Initially, the anti-system analysis was seen in term of its 
contradictive nature, where on the one hand such a party seemingly opposed the basic value 
of democracy, yet, on the other, used democracy as a political ground for its activities. An 
effort to adopt and apply a more positive meaning of anti-system as a concept (Keren 2001) 
has raised the possibility of utilising it more constructively, even though its contradictive 
character cannot be removed easily. It can provide a useful framework to understand the 
role of ideological party within a democratic system.  
There is a widespread perception that any Islamic activism is not compatible with 
democratic practice and values. Both Islam and democracy are perceived as two different 
entities that cannot possibly work together, as argued by Lewis (2002), Kedourie (1994) 
and Huntington (1997). Therefore, in this perspective Islamic activism in the form of a 
political party cannot be seen as a possible route to integratie Islam with democracy since 
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the former brings the idea of the supremacy of God’s law over man-made laws, while the 
latter does the opposite. Therefore, any political party whiche embraced Islamism would be 
regarded as an undemocratic element, almost similar to Sartori’s category of anti-system 
party.  
In the context of Islamic political parties, Capoccia argues that an Islamic party can 
be categorised as an anti-system party. However, rather than categorising them into a single 
monolithic category of anti-system, he introduces a category of accommodating anti-system 
party. He notes that this accommodating category is applicable in some Muslim countries. 
Unfortunately, he does not develop a deep analysis for implementing this concept to 
understand the dynamics of the accommodating anti-system concept in Muslim democratic 
countries. It seems that the concept is only applied to identify the phenomenon in the 
Western countries without providing objective analysis in the Muslim world. However, his 
sub-concept of accommodating anti-system parties might become an entry point for 
acknowledging the phenomenon of Islamist or Islamic parties that are integrated within the 
system of democracy.  
The theoretical discourse of anti-system party that includes Islam as a factor leads to 
an analysis of cases in Muslim countries. As the concept gives a notion of the anti-systemic 
character of Islamic political parties, it also brings into the discourse of moderation the 
dimension of trauma, conflict and crisis. Some scholars mentioned the tendency of 
moderation in many political activisms in Muslim society. Kramer (Guazzone 1995) notes 
cases of moderation with reference to Ennahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt (now form a political party:  the Freedom and Justice Party), the Islamic Action Party 
in Jordan, and the al-Islah party in Yemen. She notes that there is a reluctance of many of 
Arab states to become a fully-fledged democracy as the regimes consider that political 
liberalisation provides an opportunity for Islamic movements to gain political supports 
from society and eventually this would be used against them. Developing a solid 
assessment of moderation performance in the Arab world is, therefore, problematic since 
democracy is not a common practice. The problem of democratic performance is also 
evident in the case of Jordan and Yemen when Schwedler tries to analyse the moderation 
process of the Islamic Action Party and al-Ishlah in both countries. It is true that a new 
interpretation of Islam is one of the significant factors for moderation in both cases; 
however the lack of median voters in a more open political space is absent since Jordan and 
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Yemen are still dominated respectively by the King and the military. To reduce the problem 
of democratic deficit in Arab countries, some scholars offer a recommendation to analyse 
party performance of moderation in the context of non-Arab countries (Guazzone 1995).  
 One of the advantages in observing non-Arab countries, then, is that they offer more 
evidence of the implementation of democratic processes. In this situation, even with many 
difficulties and problems, assessing the moderation process provides a better opportunity 
for political parties or elites that have an attachment with Islamic values to deal with 
median voters. The relationship between the parties and voters in an electoral process is 
essential to the moderation process of political parties with a radical element since it brings 
an incentive to parties that wish to integrate into a democratic process (Tezcur 2009: 1). 
Turkey, Iran, Senegal, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia are some of the examples of 
significant Muslim countries that experience some aspects of democracy. More 
importantly, there are some cases of moderation in those countries that have been studied 
by scholars such as works on the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and 
Development Party) in Turkey (Goymen in Hasan 2007), the PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia 
or Islamic Party of Malaysia) in Malaysia (Abdul Rahman in Hasan 2007) and the PKS 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party) in Indonesia (Collins and Fauzi 
2005).  
The AKP is a particularly importantcase: a party with an Islamic background that 
won massively three consecutive national elections (2002, 2007 and 2011) to form a single-
party government for three consecutive periods. From the outset, the image of Islam has 
been associated with the party and raises serious anxieties among the Kemalist strongholds 
about its political motives. The Kemalist accused the AKP of being home to religious 
supporters who aspire to challenge the state ideology of secularism. The party denies the 
allegation, stating that there is no relation with Islam as the basis of the party. The party 
claims to put Islam into the private domain rather than as a collective objective to hijack 
democratic institutions for the purpose of Islamisation. The party claims that the main 
concern is to provide better services for Turkey and maintain democracy for more freedom 
of expression under the ideology of ‘Conservative Democrat’ and the programme of 
‘Development and Democracy’.  
The party presents a good example of moderation within the democratic process, 
with significant median voters seeking new hope for change against the poor performance 
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of other political parties. However, learning from the experience of the RP (Refah Partisi or 
Welfare Party) and the FP (Fazilet Partisi or Virtue Party) that were banned from politics 
respectively in 1998 and 2001, the risk of military intervention is also significant in making 
the image less Islamic. Thus, the moderate outlook of the party is a product of the 
democratic process and pressures from the secular strongholds which confirms the 
Sanchez-Cuenza’s belief in the importance of a conducive political environment. There is a 
strong element of abandonment of ideology on the part of its prominent founders as a result 
of political interaction with the environment. Hence, the formal abandonment itself is a 
result of a long process before the foundation of the party. The process goes back to the 
early political involvement of founders of the AKP with the RP since the 1980s.  
The situation faced by the AKP in moderating its expression is different from that 
faced by communist parties in the post-Soviet countries. However, in both situations, all 
parties are equally presented with the risk of crises as a result of working within a 
democratic system while at the same time adapting some aspects of their ideological values 
in managing their internal moderation. There will be potential situations that lead to tension 
and conflict because of ideological change. There is also the possibility of crises arising due 
to oppositional ideological interpretation among members. The outcome of irresolvable 
crisis is a split that might produce at least two different parties to compete for electoral 
votes. After a decade of its existence, the AKP has suffered a minimum level of tension, 
although a small number of those who are not supportive toward the party’s policies 
eventually left the party. Therefore, the party has not undergone any major crisis since its 
foundation in 2001. On the contrary, the AKP has been able to show harmony and solidity 
among its activists.  
Similarly, the PKS also successfully manages to show an image of harmony. Its 
political activism does not raise any public alarm and major internal division leading to a 
political split is minimal. There are cases of internal criticisms but in general most party 
members are loyal to the current leadership. The party is known to be effective armed with 
disciplined activists who work enthusiastically. After changing the party’s image, the PKS 
gained significant voters in the 2004 election winning 7.34 per cent of votes to claim 45 
seats in the parliament; it increased to 7.88 per cent adding 12 more seats in the 2009 
election. Despite an indication of stagnation due to decreasing support in major cities, more 
seats signified its success in attracting more votes from more provinces than before. The 
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achievement, to some extent, is a by-product of a moderation project following the shift of 
its jargon and programmes from a palpable Islamic party under Partai Keadilan (PK) —the 
predecessor of PKS— in 1999 toward a ‘clean and care’ image in the midst of other corrupt 
and selfish political parties (Permata 2008: 27). The achievement is also outstanding 
compared to other stagnant or less successful Islamic parties and the reformist/nationalist 
Muslim-based parties. 
 
I.3 Manageable Moderation 
The solid image of the AKP and the PKS causes the inquiry on the way both parties have 
managed moderation and dealt with tensions and possible crises resulting from the process. 
Despite tensions, and even conflicts or crises, both have become relatively stable parties 
confident to sail through the sea of the moderation process and eventually harbour political 
success at all levels. Therefore, a study of internal management of both parties is important 
with a view to identifying models or strategies of management utilised in that process.  
Based on the two cases of the AKP in Turkey and the PKS in Indonesia, I argue that 
moderation can be managed, and through a combination of management models, any 
tensions and conflicts can be minimised. In other words, the process of moderation for an 
ideological party does not have to be severely traumatic as featured in some cases of 
communist parties in the Eastern European context. For that reason, this study focuses on 
the application of different types of model in managing moderation.  
The theoretical exploration in managing moderation identifies different strategies 
mentioned by scholars in different cases. The model widely applied in comparing two 
parties covers the dimension of leadership, decomposition, trust and conversion-
replacement, by which parties are able to direct their respective activists to a relatively solid 
and effective organisation. A latest model, proposed by Carsey and Layman, is a 
combination of two different strategies. In practice, and as seen from the case of the AKP, 
it does not have to be a connected model since replacement can also be conducted in 
various ways. Through a combination of the models of management, parties can manage 
the impact of moderation and even emerge into relatively more solid and effective parties 
with a minimum level of tension and conflict.   
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Conversely, I also wish to highlight that different levels of moderation might result 
in different ways of applying management. The relevant factors and their relative 
relationships with regard to the AKP and the PKS are shown in Figure 1.2.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I.2. 
Models of Strategies to Manageable Moderation 
 
 
The AKP has developed a more oligarchic leadership consisting of some prominent 
figures, with Erdoğan as its leading dominant person as the founder and the leader of the 
AKP. He is the most important figure of the party and many observers believe that one of 
the main factors of AKP’s victory over three consecutive elections has been the trust of the 
Turkish people in him (Aktay 2009). However, his figure is not the only determinant factor 
in the triumph of the party since the shifting preferences towards political system (Sayari in 
Sayari & Esmer 2002) and the existence of a new middle class (Yavuz 2006) are also 
significant.  
The PKS does not represent a case of strong personal leadership. Initially, it even 
suffered from a lack of prominent figures who could promote the party in politics. 
However, the strength of the party is not determined by an individual leadership but rather 
depends on its collective ability to maintain solidity during the transformation from a social 
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movement to a political party. The collective character of the PKS in arriving at important 
and crucial decisions is located in the Shura Assembly (Majelis Syura’) that consists of 99 
members. However, the head of the Assembly plays an important role in the decision-
making process which is more informally inherited from the party’s organisational 
character as a mixture of political party and Islamic movement.  
Meanwhile, decomposition is the strategy to deal with vocal PKS members who 
demonstrate opposition against the moderation process as agreed by the party’s leader. The 
practice is to dismiss members who cannot accept moderation on the basis of different 
interpretation of party ideology. This strategy is quite successful thanks to the high level of 
trust among the party’s activists. The PKS develops a strong education process for its 
cadres, alongside a system of instruction in basic and advanced Islamic teachings through 
which trust in other members can be highly maintained. Every member has to be attached 
to a small group that meets routinely and is supervised by a higher-ranking party member 
(halaqah or usrah). Trust is internalised through various group activities so members can 
understand the mission of the party. In contrast to the PKS, the AKP does not install a 
specific and intensive religious programme for its cadres. However, as an individual, every 
new member of the party has to show their commitment to certain values as such praying, 
fasting and honesty. It is not regarded as an expression of ideology, rather an expression of 
admiration toward the tradition of Turkish society. In fact, the most important factor for the 
trust building in the AKP is its vision and the appeal of the leader. 
I am convinced that those models of management applied by the AKP and the PKS 
contribute to their solidity and effectiveness. This study tries to demonstrate, as will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapters, that moderation can be manageable through different 
strategies so that the negative impact of moderation can be minimised. However, it is also 
important to recognise that both parties apply a different level and nature of moderation. By 
detaching itself from its more Islamist predecessors, namely the RP and the FP, the AKP 
has significantly abandoned a strict ideological preference. The absence of ideology of the 
AKP, and the focus on the vision and the leadership has pushed the party to develop a more 
inclusive platform that is open to members with different backgrounds. This is useful to 
appeal for more votes. The PKS also tries to lesen the image of an austere Islamic party in 
order to become more appealing for voters in elections. The difference is that the PKS is 
still an Islamic party and its efforts to move to the centre of the political continuum are 
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mainly a move enable it to win elections. Hence, both parties have a similar motivation: to 
survive in politics and win elections by considering the preferences of median voters, as 
indicated by Sanchez-Cuenza. However, both parties are facing different challenges in their 
attempts to maintain soliditarity. In the aspect of substantive moderation the PKS, unlike 
the AKP that abandoned ideology, has still preserved Islam as its formal ideology. In 
Wickham’s terms, it can be said that the PKS applies ‘revision moderation’ while the AKP 
conducts ‘abandon moderation’. 
This research aims to compare the way the AKP and the PKS manage the 
moderation process by looking at different strategies of leadership, trust and 
decomposition. Based on the comparison, this research argues that different applications of 
strategies in the moderation process reflect different types of moderation. The AKP has to 
convince its supporters who used to support the RP and the FP that the new approach is 
better for the future of Turkey and at the same time appeal for wider support from society. 
Therefore, the AKP relies more on the members’ trust in the party’s vision and its leader, 
with minimal decomposition efforts and a strategy of conversion. In contrast, the PKS has 
to provide a legitimate explanation that its new direction is not against any religious 
principles, due to criticism of the party’s interpretation of moderation. The PKS develops 
trust in ideology combined with the role of the party’s leader; so that decomposition, along 
with an alienation strategy, plays a more important role. 
 
I.4 Methodology  
The comparative method is applied in this research to analyse the applicability of the 
moderation concept in different cases. Since the concept deals with ideology in politics its 
application to parties with an Islamic background is worhwhile undertaking. It is important 
to analyse the dynamics as well as the ways and means by which a particular party involves 
itself in democratic games. To enhance the internal validity and generalizability of this 
study, comparative research is essential because the method can be ‘tested with reference to 
the diverse manifestation of human behavio[u]r’ (Murdock in Holt & Turner 1970: 5-6). 
Based on that assumption, Turkey and Indonesia are selected as case studies in comparing 
the phenomenon of Islamic activism in the form of political parties in the democratic 
system.  
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 Comparative politics analysis is usually applied to the theory-building projects 
because of its application of quantitative method of analysis which is capable of replicating 
and predicting (Sanders in Marsh & Stoker 2002: 56-7). By using a large number of cases 
with statistical analysis, a more general theory can be generated. However, comparative 
study by using qualitative method is also possible. As Peters (1998: 141) has shown in his 
study, there are many studies of comparative politics that use qualitative method with a 
small number of cases. Indeed, a study of a single country using a similar method can also 
be applied to generate a certain theoretical significance. For example, a study conducted by 
Lijphart (1975) in the Netherlands has generated a concept of ‘consociational democracy’ 
that is useful to be applied in divided societies and countries. A single case study can also 
be categorised as comparative study as long as it applies a similar theoretical framework 
that applies to wider analysies (Peters 1998: 3).  
 This study uses a comparative method in terms of comparing two different cases. 
The cases of the AKP and the PKS can be classiefied as within-case comparison involving, 
in Peters’s (1998: 10) description, ‘analysis of similar process and institutions in a limited 
number of countries, selected for analytic reasons’. ‘Within case’ study has advantages in 
reducing the complexity of variables ground at the state level with its historical, cultural, 
and economic background, while at the same time some of those factors can be analysed to 
provide useful understanding. In doing a small-number comparative analysis, a careful 
selection of cases is essential to avoid groundless comparable analysis (Landman 2000: 
201). In this study, two conditions have been considered as comparable factors of selecting 
the AKP and the PKS, namely the similar tendency of having manageable moderation, and 
the availability of a stable procedural democracy in a Muslim country. The last condition is 
important because it is related to the efforts of both parties to deal with voters’ demands 
which are usually not in favour of a firm ideological preference. 
The application of democracy itself has been in doubt in both countries. Turkish 
democracy has been interrupted four times by the military that tried to control politics and 
eventually withdrew after changing the constitution (Özbudun 1983). Meanwhile, 
Indonesia has just started its democratic consolidation after more than three decades of 
authoritarian regimes, and with many problems such as the existence of patrimonial 
behaviour within the modern institutions (Webber 2006). However, despite those 
considerations, Turkey is known as the Muslim country that has applied a democratic 
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system over prolonged period since 1946, which at least has given the opportunity of 
having a multi party system with competition for political power. Indonesia itself is 
admired as a Muslim country which has applied the democratic system with three 
substantially democratic elections in 1999, 2004 and 2009 (Ananta et.al. 2005: 34). The 
fact that there is a significant tendency of popular acceptance of Islamist party in both 
countries on different levels has strengthened the selection of the countries in the research. 
Both parties have a similar tendency of moving toward the centre along the political 
continuum in each democratic system. It is true that the system applied in both countries is 
still facing many obstacles. The legal process against the AKP by the Constitutional Court 
has been criticised as undemocratic treatment by part of the state towards the popular 
governing political party (Akyol 2008: 14). However, in both countries at least a procedural 
democratic system has been applied and in the objective of this study, the existence of a 
stable electoral process is significant in forcing parties to moderate themselves.  
 The AKP officially does not identify itself as an Islamic party or even a party of 
Muslim activists. The party’s elites have repeatedly denied any juxtaposition with Islam. 
However, their background of involvement with the Milli Görüş (National View 
Movement), a movement based on Islamic values, and with Islamic parties such as the RP, 
suggests their link to Islamic ideas by a different approach. It is also a fact that a majority 
of the RP activists supports the party even though they are not the majority supporters of 
the AKP. While it is problematic to term the AKP as Islamist, the label can be conveniently 
applied to the PKS as the party officially declares Islam as its ideological basis. Therefore, 
developing a term for both parties is essential and will take place in the next chapter. The 
discussion of the term ‘Islamist’ will also be used as a basis for the analysis of some of 
Islamic activisms which have a tendency of moderation within a democratic system. 
However, in comparing the two parties, there is also an aspect that has to be 
considered. Both parties do actually not share an entirely equivalent character. It is different 
with the PKS which declares Islam as its ideology so that it is comfortable for some to 
categorise it as Islamist; the AKP is more problematic. There is a different range of labels 
attached to it from Islamist to Muslim Democrats or Conservative Democrats to give a wide 
range of interpretations of the party. In fact, the party was declared in 2001 to accept 
secularism as its foundation rather than Islam to give a contrasting character with the PKS. 
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Therefore, the two parties can be seen as different, therefore uncomparable, institutions 
which may downgrade the significance of the comparison itself.       
 In the comparative method, difficulties in comparing different institutions can be 
resolved by identifying the similarity or dissimilarity of two or more different entities 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970). This is known as ‘most similar system design’ or ‘most 
different system design’ (Landman 2003: 33-4). In concept, the techniques apply to the 
comparison of countries, but it is also possible to shift it to do a comparison of institutions 
within countries by applying similar principles (Landman 2003: 34). 
 Therefore, comparing the AKP and the PKS which have different characters is 
possible in theory as long as the variable of comparison is carefully identified. What makes 
the two parties comparable is their performance in the electoral process. Although the PKS 
has not won election and formed the government as the ruling party, as in the case of the 
AKP, it has moderated its appearance in front of the voters. The PKS has often been 
compared with the SP (Saadet Partisi), which is perceived as the successor of the RP 
(Refah Partisi) and is heavily influenced by Necmettin Erbakan, because both parties have 
a relatively similar character based of the transformation of Islamic movements into 
political parties. However, in the context of moderation, giving attention to median voters, 
as proposed by Sanchez-Cuenza, is a more significant factor. In short, the AKP and the 
PKS have brought some common outcomes as parties that committed to democratic 
practices.  
This study has collected data from party activists at three different levels of activism 
within the political parties, namely the upper-, middle- and lower-level activists. Each level 
of activists is seen in the context of managing the moderation at each respective level. In-
depth interviews were seen as the main method in obtaining data on the aspects of 
leadership, positive-decomposition and trust. In view of the difficulty in choosing 
representative activists, the snowball technique was applied to find suitable sources. Since 
qualitative research requires an understanding of a phenomenon, the technique was 
considered appropriate in identifying and finding relevant sources. Hence, the informants 
from each party were recommended by other members. Recommendation was given on a 
basis of knowledge of the subject of the research.  
 The field research was conducted in two different time frames for each party. The 
total number of figures who will be interviewed in each party was at least 30 representing 
21 
 
 
all levels of activists. For the PKS, the interviews and observations mainly took place 
between May and December 2008. During that period, interviews were conducted to cover 
the party cadres from three different levels, including unrecorded interviews. The 
unrecorded interviews were written as field notes.  Additional interviews were conducted 
on different occasions with PKS elites and other members who visited London in May and 
July 2010 and January 2011. There was also the opportunity to visit three different regions 
outside Jakarta (Central Java, West Java and Yogyakarta) in order to look at problems at 
the local level.     
 Field research in Turkey was done through three different visits to the country. The 
first visit in April 2008 was to familiarise the researcher with the situation and to develop 
initial contacts with important persons and organisations. The second visit in October and 
November 2009 provided a good chance to conduct discussions with researchers and 
Islamic social organisations. The last visit in December 2009 and January 2010 gave more 
opportunities to interview contacts in the AKP. During the field research, there were at least 
26 recorded and unrecorded interviews. The different number of informants for the AKP is 
due to the limitation of communication, especially in conducting discussion or interview 
with mid- and low-rank members. Hence, informants had to be selected more carefully.      
 In some circumstances, observation provided a means to understand the dynamics 
of each party. In Jakarta, there were opportunities to attend gatherings conducted by critical 
members of the PKS on several occasions to observe their ideas and activities closely. This 
was also with the case of the AKP, when interviews and discussions were combined with 
observation of some of the party’s activities. Of particular relevance here was the 
programme to enlighten members’ insight on politics and economy. Other information 
related to legal process of the internal party dynamism was obtained from relevant 
documents such as newspapers, reports, and the party’s constitution, structures, speeches 
and documents. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  
ISLAMISM AND MANAGING MODERATION 
 
 
 
II.1. The New Face of Islamism? 
 
II.1.1. Defining ‘Islamism’ 
The term Islamism is usually taken to refer to views that Muslims should consciously 
choose Islam as a doctrine to guide their way of life. The definition proposed by Ayubi 
(1991: 67) tries to differentiate between Muslims who see Islam as a doctrinal 
consciousness in defining life and those who simply see being Muslim as a minimum 
identity. It also excludes those who are practising the Islamic traditions as pious 
individuals. This definition seems to have been accepted by other scholars in identifying 
individuals or groups within the Muslim society who hold a particular view of Islamic 
doctrine and try actively to implement it in society, and incorporate it in a political 
movement. Their efforts to implement such ideas may conflict with the existing political 
authorities or social institutions, which they see as targets for change. They may be 
prepared to use violent means. This tendency towards confrontation and use of force has 
led many scholars to label the movements as radical and militant. 
The basic doctrine itself, defined as Islamism by Guazzone (1995: 4), is an ideology 
which provides a common denominator to guide the disciples’ political action. The 
ideology is grounded on two pillars, which are: (i) the belief that shari’a or Islamic law 
provides complete guidance to regulate all aspects of human life and (ii) the idea that 
political organisation is needed to achieve the Islamic ideal of society (ibid: 10). Dekmejian 
(1995: 41) mentions eight characteristics of Islamist ideology that envisage developing the 
ideal ummah based on Islamic faith, in which leadership is guided by the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah as a universally applicable system. To realise such a system requires efforts from 
Muslims by sacrificing themselves. In that perception sacrificing life (or death) is a noble 
way in order to claim a place in heaven. In its broader definition, Fuller (2003) offers a 
definition of an Islamist as someone who ‘believes that Islam as a body of faith has 
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something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the 
contemporary Muslim world and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion’.  
It seems that the definition of Islamist and the ideological basis of Islamism focus 
on the existence of certain ideas to challenge existing political regimes and international 
forces. It is rooted in the history of the decline of Muslim civilisation and political power 
when Western colonialism and imperialism were at a peak of political, military and 
economic supremacy. This highlights the aspect of portest towards political, economic and 
social order influenced by Western ideas as the source of the decline aof the ideal society 
based on Islamic faith. In her explanation of the rise of Islamism in the Arab world, 
Guazzone (ibid) notes that the aspects of protest arise in the context of cultural 
contradiction, crisis of legitimacy and inadequate economic development in a growing 
society. The dimension of contestation is, in fact, intensified by the reactions of many 
political regimes in Muslim countries where Islamists have been excluded from the political 
arena, or when allowed to exist but with many restrictions. Certainly, the anti-terror 
campaign led by the US and the UK has escalated the dimension of confrontation involving 
Islamists. One of the reasons why Western governments have rejected Islamists has been 
the fear that, once in office, they may become un-friendly towards the West and affect 
Western interests in Muslim countries. For example, the Iranian revolution is seen as 
creating a political entity ‘aggressive’ to the West (Takeyh 2006).  
 
II.1.2 New Trend 
While it seems to be difficult to find different aspects of conceptual understanding on the 
term of Islamist, yet some scholars have noted the new tendency within Islamism. Demant 
(2006), for example, mentions the third wave of Islamism with two different faces: terror 
and peaceful process. If the first face is characterised by death, blood, destruction and 
anger; the latter shows the peaceful process of growing Islamic influence in social and 
cultural spheres. Some of the projects of Islamification of social and cultural spaces might 
fail due to the reactionary policies of regimes, such as the banning of the FIS in Algeria 
following its election victory. However, there are also trends to develop an Islamic outlook 
in the system through social, cultural and economic processes. For instance, Bayat (2007) 
describes the growth of public space for citizens to actualise their cultural and social 
expression in the city parks, theatres or community centres. Despite the reaction of the 
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mullahs and the Revolutionary Guard towards the popular expression of Iranian citizens, 
the notion of being citizens with the rights to express themselves has caused the emergence 
of a new social outlook even under the strict moral control of the state. Contrary to Iran, the 
growth of Islamism in Egypt is not always based on political or ideological dimensions. 
There has been a trend to implement Islamic practises based on moral influences taught by 
populist preachers. In Bayat’s terms, the post-Islamist phase ends the ‘confrontational’ 
character towards established authority. Therefore, the use of force or violence that often 
characterises the Islamist has disappeared. Bayat’s terminology to some extent supports the 
dimension of an Islamist that Ayubi has noted before. Becoming a more peaceful Muslim 
in practising Islamic values means moving beyond the position of an Islamist.     
Jones (2007: 229-31) also agrees with Bayat’s idea of the end of Islamism when a 
group of Muslims reject the idea of using violent means and becomes involved in the 
political system. Such is the case with the AKP as a ruling party in Turkey which scored a 
massive election victory and saw its leader, Erdoğan, became Prime Minister, with 
Abdullah Gül later becoming President. Since coming to power, the AKP and Erdoğan 
have resisted the benefit of Islam as their identity or symbol. The party and its members are 
simply ordinary politicians who are supported by the people because of their ability to serve 
the people as citizens of the state irrespective of their religious or ethnic identities. The 
representation of the Islamist in the political arena through a more peaceful performance 
and a universal language of citizenship, public service, welfare, taking care of the less 
fortunate, and development is a new face of the Islamism; or in Shadid’s terminology ‘the 
new politics of Islam’ (2002) and Baker’s ‘the new Islamist’ (2003). 
The turning point of the Islamist from revolutionary to reformist (Rubin 2003) 
through moderation raises again the question of the definition of the term Islamist itself. As 
mentioned before, the ideology of the Islamist is basically the development of an ideal 
society of ummah based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Consequently, the definition cannot 
be attached to the new face of Islamists who were legally active in the political arena using 
democratic means of popular support through the electoral process, as they consciously 
leave out any symbol of Islam in their political activities and abandon any violent 
strategies. There is also an apparent contradiction of implementing the ideal society of 
ummah based on the Quran and the Sunnah which may have to change the democratic 
structure of a state. The debate over democracy and Islam has been widely discussed and 
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there are at least three different responses from Islamists that Islam and democracy are 
contradictory, similar, and similar but different (Esposito and Piscatori 1991). The first 
point of view argues that they are contradictory because they are perceived as two different 
entities, which cannot be reconciled under any condition. In contrast, there are also 
perceptions that the two are compatible, so that Islam can work in democratic system. 
Meanwhile, the latest sees both as entities with some similarities as well as differences. In 
this context, many scholars have strong anxieties about the possibility of replacing 
democracy with another political system generated from Islamic roots. Even for Islamists 
who have shown their ability to work and survive within the existing system, some may 
still question their enthusiasm to support and maintain a democratic system while in power 
(Kramer 1998).  
In other words, based on that conceptual definition, it is difficult to refer to those 
who are willing to participate in or have been struggling in the democratic system with a 
peaceful strategy without any intention of replacing democracy itself as Islamists. It is the 
reason why many scholars try to avoid using the term Islamist to describe them. In fact, 
there is a need to develop another concept to represent them in many discourses of 
Islamism to avoid ambiguity with the new phenomenon. It will not be a problem if the 
Islamist movements who have transformed themselves into political parties or joined 
formal political institutions are represented by a such term; such as the FIS in Algeria, 
Ennahda in Tunisia, al-Islah in Yemen, the Islamic Action Party in Jordan, the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, the PAS in Malaysia, or the PKS in Indonesia. Even with their 
apparent Islamic characteristics, they have a dimension of moderation (Kramer in 
Guazzone 1995; Schwedler 2006; Embong 2007). However, it will be difficult to identify 
those who do not formally attach themselves to any Islamic symbol. To some extent, the 
Wasat Party in Egypt has a dimension of Islamism because of its ‘strong relation’ with the 
Muslim Brotherhood as previous members of the movement. Nevertheless, instead of 
continuing in the footsteps of its seniors in the Brotherhood, the younger Muslim 
Brotherhood activists who established the Wasat developed it as a more inclusive political 
party by offering significant positions in the party to non-Muslims (Shadid 2002). The 
example of the Wasat might not be convincing in this debate due to its uneasy relation with 
the Muslim Brotherhood in its foundation. The social influence of Muslim preachers in the 
country has led to a significant increase in religiosity among the middle and upper class 
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citizens. The term is also problematic when attached to the Iranian reformist camp under 
Khatami which challenged the conservative status-quo. The latter case is not a 
confrontation with an impious regime but rather a restrictive interpretation of Khomeini’s 
vilayat-i al-faqih. For Bayat, these are not the cases of Islamism supported by Islamists, but 
rather a post-Islamist trend. 
 
II.1.3 Different Case of Islamists 
The AKP in Turkey represents a different case of Islamists whereby the party developed 
social networks to serve the people and occupy political positions on behalf of their 
constituents. It is the character of a social movement inherited from two previous, more 
Islamic, parties, the RP and the FP. The party’s landslide victories in the last two elections 
of 2002 and 2007 do not change its representation as a people’s party rather than an Islamic 
party. Many observers have noted the Islamic background or character or dimension of the 
party because the AKP cannot be easily detached from the RP and the FP. The AKP leader, 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was a mayor in Istanbul as an RP member and Abdullah Gül 
challenged Recai Kutai for the FP leadership before leaving the party. Another argument 
regarding their relation with Islam is the fact that the AKP captured the RP and the FP’s 
supporters, indicating its relation with previous Islamist parties (Tepe 2005: 295). 
However, the AKP clearly declares that it is not an Islamic party. The party is 
merely a secular party with secular characteristics; even if it consists of religious or pious 
individual Muslims who are not, according to the party, against the principles of 
secularism. It does not have any attachment to Islamic ideas, identifies itself as 
conservative democrat and also demonstrates its position as a non-Islamic oriented party. 
The AKP rejects the idea of representing the ummah as a symbolisation of an attachment to 
Islamic idea in building a new civilisation under Turkish leadership. Rather than supporting 
the more Islamic ideas of the Millî Görüş (National Vision Movement, the backbone of the 
RP), the party supports the EU (European Union) accession process and integration with 
international market agendas, in contradiction to the character of the movement.  
The AKP’s support comes from people who have gained services from the party, 
which have been built up through the RP and the FP’s social service activities in many 
social occasions, such as weddings, funerals, engagements, or caring for the sick (Shadid 
2002; Arat 2005: 81). The big earthquake of 2002 also showed the ability of party activists 
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to provide better services than the government. Such may also be the case with similar 
Islamist parties or groups in other countries which maximised the absence of the state in 
providing social and public services to the people from whom they get significant popular 
support. This condition is again in contrast to the nature of Islamist movements which 
prefer to use violent means that failed to maximise mass support (Kepel 2004: 1-2). 
Another case of the new face of the Islamist movement outside the Arab World can 
be seen in the PKS of Indonesia. This party is a unique phenomenon of an Islamic 
movement transformed into a political party and active within the framework of a newly 
democratic state. To some extent, the dimension of Islamism can be applied to the party 
since it is formally an Islamic party based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah. However, the aim 
of the party in joining the formal political arena is not to change the nature of the state but 
to serve the need of the people relating to their religious activities such as pilgrimage and 
education within the idea of a secular state. Unlike other Islamic political parties, the PKS 
tends to support a more substantial interpretation of an Islamic state based on the Madinah 
Charter principles. Therefore, as long as it shows respect for religious ethics, any form of 
political entity is acceptable including the democratic secular state of Indonesia. The way it 
attracts supporters is also quite similar with the AKP through social service activities within 
society, including in places which have suffered disasters. Many have suggested that the 
shift in its strategy, from the Islamic symbolism of the Partai Keadilan (PK) in 1999 to a 
people-centrist performance in 2004 was only a strategy to get more popular support rather 
than a reflection of a changing ideological interpretation. The criticism is true from the 
aspect of democratic pragmatism that is also relevant to other ideological parties. However, 
the new dimension of religious interpretation was also obvious in the case of the PKS in 
supporting the democratic process and secular state and keeping the struggle over the 
implementation of shari’a within the framework of democracy.     
 
II.1.4. Conceptual Boundary 
The difference between the AKP and the PKS is clearly on its formal basis of ideology. 
Formally the AKP is not an Islamic party. However, there are apects of Islam that can be 
referred as expression of Islam in its activities. Hence, many perceive the party as using 
Islam as basis of policy preference. In the language of the AKP, supporting the right of 
veiled-women to study in the university, work in public institutions, or conduct effective 
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public service is a reflection of the party’s constituent pressure. In the same way, the 
language of the PKS is based on ethical messages of Islam mixed with its commitment to 
serve the people. However, the AKP also holds religious ethics and even projects symbols 
reflected in their members’ behaviour. The image of Islam can still be seen in the 
actualisation of its women activists who wear headscarves, even though the party does not 
give exclusive attention to them. The conflict between the party with the secular supporters 
took place in the context of reactionary response to the EU headscarf decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights, the restriction of the circulation of alcohol by the party’s 
municipal leaders, and efforts to separate men and women in the public space (Onar 2007: 
278-81).     
Therefore, there is a problem in identifying the activism of a group of individual 
pious Muslims in a democratic system with the language of social and public service for the 
people to support the continuation of democracy whether they are Islamists or not. Yavuz 
denies that the AKP is a representation of an Islamic movement and its success in politics is 
not a model of its adaptation into a new situation (Yavuz ed., 2006: 2-3). He argues that 
once a group deliberately denies the character of Islam in its actions, it is clearly not 
representing Islam. Therefore, according to him, the AKP and its members who have an 
Islamic-rooted background cannot be categorised as Islamist. Other writers in this camp are 
Daniel Pipes and Robbert Woltering. Woltering argues that there are no moderate Islamists 
at all due to their main objective of changing the society and replacing its social and 
political system with an Islamic one. To this end, replacing the political system and the 
regime is essential. Once a person categorised as ‘Islamist’ enters the political system, he or 
she has to change the system drastically or accept the system completely (Woltering 2002: 
1133-4).      
It can be seen that some writings utilise the term Islamist to refer to the AKP’s 
predecessor the RP (Gulalp 1995; Taniyici 2003) for showing some characteristics of pro-
Islamic orientation such as its disagreement with the expulsion of Islamist army officers, 
closer ties to Iran, its support for easing the restrictions of headscarves in universities and 
civil services, disputes over the building of a mosque on Taksim Square, and the anti-
regime slogans from the crowd in “Jerusalem night” in early 1997 (Narli in Rubin 2003: 
125-35). The term Islamist is also mentioned by another writer in describing the Islamists 
in Turkey as pursuing radical strategies outside the formal political arena (Karmon in Rubin 
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2003: 41-68). However, applying the term Islamist to both cases of the AKP and the PKS 
according to Dekmejian’s typology and Ayubi’s definition of Islamist is problematic. 
Dekmejian does not refer Islamist to any political parties even in the category of gradualist-
pragmatic (Dekmejian 1995: 57-60). Hence the term Islamist has no clear boundaries to be 
referred to.  
 
Table II.1. 
The Position of the AKP and the PKS 
with regard to Some Aspects of Ordinary Muslim and Islamist 
 
Defined by Aspects of Ordinary Muslim AKP PKS 
Ayubi Muslim as minimum identity No No 
Practising Islamic tradition Yes Yes 
Individual pious Muslim Yes Yes 
 Aspects of Islamist   
Derkmejian, 
Fuller 
Belief in faith Yes  Yes  
Ayubi Islamic doctrine in shari’a  No Yes (based 
on popular 
support) 
Ayubi, 
Derkmejian, 
Guide the way of life Individual Yes  Yes  
Collective No Yes 
Fuller In contemporary context Yes  Yes  
Guazzone, 
Derkmejian 
Develop an ummah or ideal Islamic society No  Yes  
Implementation 
(Fuller) 
Ayubi Social Movement  No Yes  
Guazzone Political action Yes  Yes  
 Legal 
political 
organisation  
Political 
party as 
secular 
organisation 
Yes  Yes  
 Islam as 
legal basis 
No Yes 
Ayubi Against political authorities No  No  
Dekmejian Sacrifice (to death if needed) No No/Yes 
Ayubi, 
Derkmejian 
Tendency of confrontation 
and violence (leading to the 
terms radical, militant and 
terror) 
No  No  
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The Table II.1. shows that some aspects of Islamism can be attached to both the 
AKP and PKS, such as the idea that one’s faith should be the guidance for Muslims in the 
contemporary context. Both parties also express the need to conduct political activity in 
order to achieve the objective of their faith. However, the case of the AKP is different since 
the role of faith is only at the individual level. Since the AKP as a secular party is not the 
expression of collective action, the boundaries of the role of faith for members of the party 
as individuals and as a collective is quite ambiguous. This is parallel with the idea of 
developing the ummah or Islamic society which puts the AKP in a different position to the 
PKS. The latter party believes in the development of Islamic society, but one that uniquely 
will be achieved through the democratic system.  
To avoid problematic definitions of Islamism, some writers have tried to use 
different terms such as post-Islamist (Bayat 2007), Muslim activism (Esposito and Voll 
1996), reformer Islamist (Rubin 2003), political Islam (Roy 1994; Fueller 2003; ICG 2005), 
and Islamist politics (Ismail 2001 & 2003; Entelis 2004). They develop these terms to cope 
with the wider context of Islamists who enters the political arena and accept the political 
structure as the framework of their activism; even if the system does not offer full 
competition under an authoritarian regime’s control (Pratt 2007). However, most of them 
cover activism in the Arab world and tend to give less attention to activism outside the 
region. Those who give attention to activism in Turkey also offer many interpretations, 
from a rejection of the term Islamist with regard the AKP (Yavuz 2006), new thinking on 
Islamism (Cavdar 2006), Islamic-rooted party (Tepe 2002), moderate Islamist (Onar 2007), 
pro-Islamic party (Turam 2007), Islamic party (Göymen 2007), to Islamist (White 2002). 
From the terms attached to the AKP, it can be assumed that the debate over the activism of 
individual pious Muslims within the formal political arena as shown by some members of 
the AKP is still ongoing with no solid agreement among the observers. The debate itself 
has shown the anxiety of the observers toward the seriousness of the party, regarding, not 
only its existence, survival and success in the democratic system, but also in supporting the 
existence of the democratic system itself. The fact that Islamic preference as an individual 
consciousness is in contrasted to Turkey’s ‘extreme’ secular system has developed an 
imagination of strong Islamic representation of the party, which has been perceived as 
incompatible with democracy and will replace it at once in power (Kramer 1998: 25).  
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 If the AKP faces strong suspicions of its Islamic agenda within a secular political 
system, the PKS confronts little political pressure regarding its ideology. It is true that some 
of the party’s opponents in the political system, especially nationalist and religious parties, 
have questioned its commitment to the democratic system and highlighted its basic agenda 
of working toward a nation state based on Islamic principles. However, the consolidation of 
the democratic system after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998 has allowed many of 
the new political parties to adopt Islam as their ideological basis. Within this political 
context, Islamic political parties, including the PKS, have an opportunity to convert their 
alternative policies, based on an interpretation of Islamic principles, into concrete 
programmes. Therefore, the concern that they have a hidden agenda, namely replacing the 
system with a more Islamic one, is not relevant. Islamic parties are similar to other parties 
in terms of offering programmes to the people, hoping to gain popular acceptance, which 
will allow them to occupy strategic political positions.  
Nevertheless, for the PKS as a political party, the term ‘Islamist’ is also 
problematic. The party has developed a strong public appeal and provided social services to 
build political support from the people. The performance of the PKS is quite similar to that 
of the AKP in terms of working within the democratic framework of a secular state and 
using the electoral process to get access to political structure. However, the former has 
formally declared Islam to be its ideological basis, while the latter rejected any 
symbolisation of religious ties except the expression of representing the people. The AKP 
has no implication of religiosity in its policy interpretation based on democratic principles; 
meanwhile the PKS has to deal with the ‘conflicting’ ideas of Islam and democracy even 
when the party believes that those two ideas can work together (Matta 2010). One of the 
conflicting natures of democracy is that it provides an opportunity for any kind of laws to 
be passed when supported by the majority in the parliament or the people in a referendum. 
However, democracy also grants Islamic parties a chance to perform within the political 
arena as a model of moral politics for the people and, therefore, to influence them. The PKS 
believes that Islamic values can be formulated as the law of the land through the formal, 
democratic, political process and by focusing justice as the substance of law itself (Majelis 
Pertimbangan Partai PKS 2008: 519-26).  
 Both parties also share the same experience of rethinking their position in the 
political system. The AKP, according to Cavdar (2006), has undergone a process of 
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‘political learning’ by which the leaders of the party repositioned its ideological basis to 
adopt a ‘fully’ democratic party like its counterparts in Western democratic systems. Some 
writers then compare the AKP with the Christian Democrats in Germany to describe it as a 
party of individual believers (Hale in Yavuz 2006). To some extent, the PKS also 
underwent a similar process, but without changing its ideological basis as a result. The 
failure of the PK, before it transformed into the PKS, in 1999 to pass the electoral threshold 
gave the party a stimulus to change its image from that of an openly Islamic party to a 
populist party by promoting itself as ‘clean and caring’. Of course, the two parties are not 
comparable in their ideological bases. However, the different political context made the 
AKP rethink its strategy so as not to confront the principles of secularism of the Turkish 
state. This is different to the PKS which exists in a more ‘friendly’ political system for an 
Islamic party. Still, the AKP enjoys a more competitive political system in which the 
process of repositioning its political stance can be made through the electoral process. At 
this point, if the PKS removed Islam as its ideological political basis, it might have the 
same image as the AKP in developing a new face of an ‘Islamist party’ in non-Arab 
Muslim countries.  
Scholars find it a ‘surprisingly difficult’ to define Islamists who turn to electoral 
activism due to the paradoxical character of the vision of moral-based society based on 
shari’a (Kramer 1998: 25-7). The best possible classification uses the notion of 
moderation: that a moderate Islamist party has to accept democratic principles, including a 
commitment to pluralism and civic rights. Therefore, a truly moderate Islamist party should 
meet two conditions: the ‘abandonment, postponement or revision of radical goals’ and a 
‘substantive commitment to democratic principles’ (Wickham 2004: 206). 
However, even with the two dimensions, the concept of a moderate Islamist is still 
seen as a doubtful definition (Kramer 1998: 42). One of the possible reasons for this comes 
from the dimension of ideology. Wickham’s definition still allows for a wide range of 
positions regarding ideology; from a complete abandonment to temporary postponement 
and revision. Within that broad definition, there will be a variety of Islamist parties that can 
be categorised as moderate, despite their different attitudes. Such differences may have a 
huge impact on the different perspectives of each party in regard to conducting moderation.  
There is also an indication that the unclear definition, coupled with concerns and 
suspiciousness of Islamists in the political process, was basically developed through the 
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experience of ‘moderate’ Islamists in Arab and North African countries where there have 
been persistent records of political repression. Paradoxically, these groups then became 
seen a threat and representation of the ‘green menace’. It is unfair to attach such concerns 
to Islamists in non-Arab countries which have a different experience of implementing 
democracy, so the more nuanced meaning of Islamist must be addressed if it is to deal with 
non-Arab Islamic activism (Bubalo and Fealy 2004: 46). One of the differences of 
democratic implementation outside Arab countries has been the real the possibility of 
changing the government through the electoral process. In this democratic experience, the 
opportunity of managing the state and society at a local and national level may provide a 
chance to see the true face of Islamist parties. There is no evidence that Islamists will 
suspend or change the democratic system while they are in power (Fuller 2003: 29-31). 
From the case of the AKP, a decade of experience as the ruling party is the evidence that 
the party has not changed the basic principles of the secular state. The accusation faced by 
the AKP of takkiye or dissimulation in some issues has to be seen as part of the learning 
process for the party’s repositioning within the system. The ability of the PKS to reposition 
its image is also the result of the different nature of more open and competitive democratic 
implementation.   
If the definition of moderate Islamist is applied to the AKP and the PKS, it is clear 
that the term itself is problematic. Through an exploration of the two parties’ activities in 
politics and the way they treat their members, it is obvious that both have fulfilled the two 
dimensions of moderation. They accept the democratic process and also have different 
positions toward ideology. However, while the AKP has abandons Islamic ideology 
completely, the PKS has tried to ‘revise’ its understanding of Islamic principles which 
makes it different to the AKP. The difference between the two parties has a significant 
impact on the implementation of the moderation process itself. The abandonment of its 
Islamist roots has pushed the AKP to develop different values which are more universal, 
allowing people with different backgrounds to join. In contrast, the PKS is in the position 
of reinterpreting ideology, so that it is still difficult for the party to open its membership to 
everyone, unless new members are willing to join its life-long internalisation process or 
congregation, which is difficult for non-Muslims.  
In the context of moderation potentially triggering ideological tensions, the 
difference is also quite apparent. The AKP does not have any problems with ideology 
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because they have already given up any politics based on identity, except on sociological 
and political grounds. Therefore, religion no longer provides the guidelines for political 
activism in building the party’s institutions and vision, so that tensions based on ideology 
are relatively insignificant. The PKS, meanwhile, is a different case as it is facing criticisms 
and tensions for attempting to be pragmatic without giving up its ideology. The PKS has 
had to deal with internal criticism of its new interpretation of religious principles to 
legitimate recent political manoeuvres. The case of the PKS seems to confirm that 
moderation is likely to lead to internal tensions such as internal divisions (Sanchez-Cuenza 
2004), splits or dismissals (Orbell and Fougere 1973).  
The tension itself is the result of a new policy determined by the party leadership to 
overcome unexpected election results and perhaps also a long process of reinterpretation. In 
general, the efforts produced to deal with electoral outcome are crucial, especially for 
parties that are categorised as seeking either to capture power or to maintain their position 
in government. This research focuses on the impact of moderation. In the case of the AKP 
and the PKS, moderation seems have proved manageable. The AKP has not suffered from 
internal conflict due to ideological disagreement. The PKS actually has faced this problem, 
but the internal tensions have not led to severe divisions or splits and there has been no 
attempt to establish a new party as a result of internal divisions. Therefore, it is important to 
look at the way in which both parties have dealt with the moderation process.  
 
II.2 Moderation and Party Management 
II.2.1. Party Organisation and Party Management 
In political science, the term ‘party management’ is not commonly applied. ‘Party 
organisation’ is more common. Even though party organisation itself is perceived as a 
forgotten study and not taken seriously (Janda 1983: 319), scholars who deal with intra-
party issues are more in favour of applying that term in their work. One possible 
explanation for this tendency is that the term management is perceived as being less suited 
to politics because it is the focus of other sciences, particularly management and 
administrative sciences.  
The study of party organisation has been known as the frontier for the study of 
political parties. Leading scholars in the study of political parties from Ostrogorski to 
Michels and Duverger actually built their reputation on research into party organisation. 
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However, while the study of political parties itself has grown into one of the major studies 
in Political Science, party organisation is still lacking the attention of scholars. Panebianco 
(1988: xi) notices that the study of party organisation still has inadequacies in terms of 
insufficient focus on the complexity of relationship within party organisation since 
Ostrogorski-Weber, Michels and Duverger. It seems that a persistent lack of research into 
the intra-party dynamic remains. Substantial problems in this field of study are still being 
spotted. The approach and perspective in understanding the internal dynamics of internal 
parties is weak (Mule 1997). 
As the study of party organisation itself is perceived as having ups and downs 
(Scarrow 1996; Janda & Colman 1998) concern about insufficient study into intra-party 
dynamism are still relevant. It is not only the problem of rarity of the enquiry itself, but also 
it is a matter of ‘perspective.’ Some of the studies are still dealing with categorisation or 
classification (Enyedi & Linek 2008; Boucek 2009) while others try to apply concepts that 
have been developed by earlier scholars such as oligarchy to contemporary cases (van 
Biezen 2000). Although the latter research has covered the power relations within political 
parties, new perspectives are rarely found. 
If the question of party organisation is struggling for more attention, research which 
avoids a tendency to the parochial, and helps to develop a theoretical framework for 
worldwide comparison -while focusing on micro-level aspects or cases- in terms of party 
management are even more rarely found and used. It seems that the meaning of the term 
has been taken for granted with little appetite for elaborating on its meaning (Hanley 1999; 
Clemens 1998). Unlike others, Aspinwall (2004: 17-21) has tried to fill the deficiency of a 
conceptual framework by giving an illustration that party management is dealing with an 
effort to make a balance between different groups or wings within a party when dealing 
with crucial issues. From his study of the management of British political parties regarding 
the issue of European integration, he formulates the concept as efforts of the party 
leadership in the government to deal with pro- and anti-wings toward the issue and there is 
also a notion of leadership style in this matter. Aspinwall’s illustration directs the substance 
of party management as a dynamic aspect of intra party-activism or an advancement of 
party administrative aspect (Rogers 2005). If that assumption is accepted, further questions 
of its conceptual position related to party organisation can be raised here.  
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The discussion of theorising and measuring party organisation itself has now 
become a major concern for many scholars. Previously, there was a strong tendency to 
bring the concept into the study of organisations generally, where political parties were 
perceived as being organisations similar to others. The latter perpective does indeed 
enanble many internal aspects of political party organisation to be identified such as the 
degree of organisation or complexity, centralisation of power, coherence, and involvement 
which can also be broken down into micro level variables (Janda 1983: 326).  
Even though developing measured variables is important for the analysis of party 
organisation, the need to focus on administrative and structural aspects is also clear. This 
also emerges from recent works on party organisations under the banner of comparative 
politics. The flourishing studies of party organisation in newly democratic countries follow 
a similar trend to apply indicators of the size of party membership, the extensiveness of 
their organisations, the level of professionalization of the political parties, and the attitudes 
of their leaders towards organising (Van Biezen 2003; Spirova 2005: 605). The significance 
of structure toward party activism or performance is admitted by saying that, “….. It is 
clear that it is the mode of organization that will determine if and how effective parties can 
perform the roles in promoting democratic institutionalisation. It is important to study how 
political parties in new democracies organize” (van Biezen 2003: 5). It is therefore 
structural analysis that is still significant in recent studies of party organisation, even 
though the new perspective of neo-institutionalism suggests more independent relations 
between the agents within an institution (Peters 2005). 
One of the issues that may create divisions in a political party is the party’s strategy 
in relations to ideology. The question of whether a political party should be strict on 
ideology or should focus on pursuing public office has been a major discussion from 
Downs (1957) to Strom (1990) and Schlesinger (1994). If the party prefers to pursue 
positions in public offices, winning elections is necessary. However, according to Downs 
and Schlesinger’s proposition, in order to win elections, a political party should 
accommodate voters’ preferences which can be contradictory to the party’s ideology. 
Discussions of party activism in the electoral process, then, have directed scholars to 
develop three different categories of political parties which are vote-seeking, office-seeking 
and policy-seeking (Strom 1990).  
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For an ideological political party, which falls into the policy-seeking category, 
submission to ideological preferences over pragmatic goals of gaining political positions or 
winning elections is critical and may generate tensions, conflicts and even splits among the 
party members. For Strom (1990: 574), in facing intra-party dynamism regarding 
problematic incentives between pragmatism and party guidelines, the focus of party 
activism is mainly on the party’s leaders who are perceived as being unitary and rational 
actors. Based on these assumptions, he can identify strategies applied by the party leaders 
in dealing with different objectives of policy-seeking, vote-seeking, and office-seeking. The 
strategies are decentralisation of policy decisions, impermeable recruitment structures, and 
accountability of personnel -especially party leaders. 
Strom’s proposal has initiated an integrative analysis approach to the study of party 
organisation by using a behavioural approach and giving examples of party leadership 
strategies. However, the exchange model of controlling political parties is also categorised 
as one of the models of party organisation along with other models (Duverger’s mass party; 
Epstein’s electoral party; Kirchheimer’s catch-all party; and Katz and Mair’s cartel party) 
rather than party management (Maor 1997: 96-99). It seems that even though Strom’s 
model has a strong nuance of power relations rather than a structural approach, the term 
party organisation is still more attractive for political scientists compared to the latter.   
Studies of the relationship between party organisation and ideology also illustrate 
that the nuance of structural approach is quite influential. In this subject, scholars have 
discovered that there are different kinds of party organisations, in terms of the structural 
dimension of more ideological parties. There is also a link between ideology and 
organisation of political parties (Enyedi and Linek 2008: 457). Centre-right parties tend to 
have a ‘light organization’ dominated by public office holders and supported by donation 
from business groups, less active members, and a less complex organisational structure, and 
depend on more charismatic leaders. In contrast to the centre-right, centre-left parties tend 
to have large-scale organisation and an active paying membership. Janda and King (in 
Enyedi and Linek 1985: 458) also confirm that there is a distinction in organisational style 
between them, especially on complexity and level of centralisation. 
Later studies have strengthened the tendency to use the term party organisation and 
blend aspects of party management into it. The former term then becomes the conceptual 
umbrella for every aspect of party activism, while the latter becomes out of fashion. The 
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reluctance to use aspects of management in the study of party organisation might be the 
reason for the absence of a consideration of power relationships. A political party as an 
organisation applies managerial relations because it is a place for many political activists at 
different levels to put their interests into practice. That is why their activities can be called 
political activism. For the party’s leadership at every level, the means of synchronizing all 
activists and their interests under a certain regulation is actually the implementation of 
management. The difference between pure management as a science and management in 
politics is the substance of relationships among the activists: power. The perspective of 
political management with power relationships as the basis of activism may relieve the 
deficiency of power relations in the study of party organisation. It is in accordance with 
Panebianco’s concern (1988, xii) that the substantial analysis of party organisation is to 
give attention to the importance of power relations. 
The debates over dynamic relations within an institution reflect the motivation to 
find a better understanding of political behaviour. In political science, the discussions are 
represented in the long contestation among existing approaches, mainly between 
institutionalism and behavioralism, on how to locate the ‘real’ actor of an action. For an 
institutionalist, institution is more important and has a great influence on the people’s 
political actions. In contrast, the behavioralist approach denies such a claim, saying that the 
individual acts autonomously (Dahl 1961). The difference between the two is seen in the 
way of collecting data for analysis, which, in the end, generates two distinct and extreme 
positions. In relation to the examination of two political parties in this thesis, it is practical 
to look at the anti-thesis of both extreme in the form of new institutionalism. Although the 
latter approach originated from institutionalism as a reaction toward behavioralism and 
rational choice theory, there are aspects relevant to the study of party management, 
especially in its relation with ideology.  
The approach is still looking for a solid argumentation and in fact it has not reached 
a single argument in understanding of what the best meaning of the approach is. One of the 
reasons is because the approach suffers from a diverse variety of explanations of the 
meaning of new institutionalism itself (Immergut 1998: 5). This is due to the fact that the 
approach has been claimed by different versions to form at least five dissimilar conceptions 
and methodologies: normative, rational choice, international, historical, and societal 
institutionalism (Peters 2005: 18-22) or rational choice, organisational, and historical 
39 
 
 
(Immergut 1998: 5). Despite the variations of arguments in the approach, the main 
argument of the new institutionalism is relevant for the research as it assumes that 
collective action should be the major approach in explaining political actions. It means that 
individual actions should be related to political structures, defined as ‘a collection of 
institutions, rules of behaviour, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings, and 
archives’ as they turn into major preferences of the action (March and Olsen 1984: 740-1). 
Hence, there are no ‘context-free’ actions as the individuals will refer to the existing 
institutions, including norms and values.  
The practicality of this approach to this research is to give an idea of examining the 
major institutions that influence party members’ behaviour in dealing with the dynamic 
situation of moderation. In the organisational conception of new institutionalism, political 
decisions cannot be understood as aggregations of individual preferences as argued by 
behavioralism by accumulating all single individual actions. In contrast, it believes that 
these decisions are the result of organisational procedures and structures (Immergut 1998: 
16). Other than organisational factors, March and Olsen emphasised the importance of 
norms or values to play as ‘logic of appropriateness’ in shaping the individual’s behaviour 
in particular organisations (Peters 2005: 19). Despite the weaknesses of these arguments, 
the importance of political structures and values to construct collective action finds its 
relevance in examining the dynamic of the moderation of the AKP and the PKS. 
Moderation implies the behaviour of the parties as political actors in directing moderate 
objectives, but there is also a strong dimension of members’ behaviour since the policy also 
relates to ideological implications. In explaining the dynamics of the parties and their 
members, the explanation of both (party and individual) actions will be based on 
organisational structures and procedures as explained in the parties’ constitutions combined 
with an examination of members’ individual preference in relation to the collective 
preference. 
  
II.2.2. Managing Moderation   
Panebianco’s concerns on power relations suggest that management is important in how a 
party leader deals with impacts of moderation. In many cases, severe action from 
replacement to dismissal could become necessary because moderation means a new 
direction that is likely to trigger tensions due to different interpretations. In this 
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circumstance, power is significant because the party’s leaders can use their legitimate 
position as leaders supported by the party’s constitution to replace or even dismiss internal 
opponents. Therefore, it is also a discussion of strategy by which the survival of the policy 
of moderation can be assured.  
Strom has mentioned that the role of the party’s leadership is significant in the 
moderation process. Despite the problem of classification and terminology, the strategies 
offered by Strom as discussed before are actually equivalent to the objectives of the study 
of the AKP and the PKS, both of whose leaderships have to deal with different preferences 
of their members toward certain issues. However, there is a problem in applying Strom’s 
proposal to both cases because it assumes that the party will give space for every member 
to get involved in the party’s organisational process, even for factions which are not in 
favour of the leadership’s preferences. Consequently, the proposal gives an opportunity for 
factions to challenge or change the party’s policies through formal process, although, in 
fact, not all sections of the party may have similar opportunities because there is a tendency 
towards oligarchy, concentrating power in the hands of a small number of the party elites. 
 A similar opportunity is more difficult to find when the dispute relates to 
interpretation of ideology. For critical ideologues among the party’s membership, the 
party’s policy of trying to win elections or seeking office may not be acceptable. However, 
they have a problem in challenging the policy because their power base is not equal to that 
of the party’s elites. Therefore, the relationship tends to be a zero-sum one as the party’s 
leader could freeze the opponents’ membership, hamper their political career in the party, 
or even dismiss them from the party. On the other hand, critical members may oppose the 
policy very critically and accuse the leadership of violating the party’s ideological basis. 
For them, there might be no toleration for the violation and the only solution to resolve the 
difference is the removal of the party’s leadership. In this situation, the medium for both 
sides to compete and contest their ideas is very limited and tends to be monopolised by the 
party’s leader, which holds formal and high-ranking positions in the party, and most 
importantly, monopolises the interpretation of the party’s ideology through internal 
education and socialisation.  
Hence, the party’s leaders need to apply different efforts in order to manage the sort 
of tensions or disputes based on ideological interpretation that are the focus of this study. 
These disputes are basically the impacts of moderation when the AKP and the PKS have 
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attempted to become centrist parties. In this case, the leadership of both parties need to 
offer a new interpretation of ideology that gives legitimacy to the shifting of the parties’ 
direction from policy-seeking to voter and office-seeking. In the context of introducing a 
new direction, Strom’s analysis offers a focus on the party’s leadership as a strategy for a 
political party to deal with impacts of moderation. It gives attention to political 
consideration in dealing with the party’s activists as pragmatists and ideologues. The 
leadership will treat them on the basis of what benefits the party in running government and 
facing election. As mentioned by Strom, the three strategies to deal with pragmatists and 
party guideliners are decentralisation of policy decisions, impermeable recruitment 
structures, and accountability of personnel -especially the party’s leadership. In this 
research, the party’s leadership becomes a variable to be applied to both parties in looking 
at different implementation in dealing with any critics and tensions.  
However, both parties show that the role of the party’s leadership is not the only 
strategy used to maintain solidity at critical times. Both parties also applied other strategies 
by developing trust among members from mid and low-rank levels. Trust is a strategy to 
deal with differences and it has proved to be less painful (McEvily et al: 2003) by 
persuading the party’s members to maintain their loyalty without any force. One useful 
dimension of trust is the “willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the action of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to 
the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” (Mayer et al. 
1995: 712). The term ‘party’ in this definition can be related to any person, group or 
institution that interacts with another. By focusing on willingness, the definition offers a 
better conception to perceive trust as a positive social relation rather than as risk taking. 
Although the definition of trust itself as a concept has many problems, it is still useful to 
see the willingness of party members to accept the elite’s strategy for moderation. During 
the process, there will be a high degree of uncertainty among the members and to some 
extent they will be unable to understand the behaviour and direction of the party. In this 
situation when the ability to control or to perceive the new strategy as part of the party’s 
ideology is crucial, trust will play a significant role in minimising criticisms and opposition. 
What also makes it positive is that this trust can guide the members’ behaviour to conduct 
beneficial actions based on the assumptions that the trusted persons will not benefit from 
others’ weaknesses.  
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In a changing organisation, especially when it is related to the basic principles of 
values or ideology, formal control is sometimes difficult to implement. The legitimacy of 
the leadership may be under question and it may be accused of violating the party’s 
ideology. Unlike decomposition strategy, which is costly and more traumatic, trust 
represents a better, more efficient and less painful, option (McEvily, et.al, 2003: 92). In an 
organisation with a high level of trust, decision making is easy to develop since members 
are willing to accept decisions as well as the reason. In such a situation, the leadership can 
explain to the members within a certain ideological perspectives easily and comfortably. 
Through trust, both sides are “simplifying the acquisition and interpretation of information” 
allowing information to be transferred more efficiently (93).      
In contrast with trust, scholars also recognize that dealing with hardliners can be 
forceful and painful because it requires special treatment to force members to be loyal. If 
the treatment is not successful the party can dismiss them to resume the party’s existence in 
politics. Dismissal, or decomposition, (Orbell and Fougere 1973) is one of the most 
common strategies to deal with those who oppose the party’s decisions and directions in the 
context of moderation. Before applying this strategy, a political party can try to persuade its 
members to change their mind through the more forceful treatment of alienation. This 
strategy is applied in the PKS to deal with members who tend to contradict and dissent 
party decisions and policies.  
The model focuses on a strategy of decomposition when a party expels a certain 
faction (individual or group) within the party which opposes the party’s decision of 
moderation. The reason for the expulsion is to maintain internal harmony and support from 
a segment of voters. Orbell and Fougere explain the reason why the elite of a party may 
decide to expel a prominent elite member who has significant influence and supporters 
either within the party or in society due to his or her commitment to the original ideological 
position. However, the decision is positive for the party that decided to change its ideology 
to adapt to the recent general tendency of its supporters, who currently prefer a more 
centrist programme. It is also important for the party’s activists, since the majority of them 
are loyal to the pragmatist approach. Expelling one faction or a member of the party elite 
who does not support the move to become a centrist party is more useful for the party rather 
than keeping them in the party or parliament whilst behaving contrary to the party’s policy.   
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The decomposition model focuses on the managerial dynamic of a party to deal 
with the impact of moderation and initiates further conceptual analysis of intra-party 
dynamism. One of the objectives of moderation is to maintain a wide range of activists, 
supporters and passive voters after moving toward the centre. Some supporters might not be 
pleased with the decision and the performance of the ‘new’ party and then launch a 
campaign to retain the original ideological position. This tension may trigger severe 
conflicts, which is unproductive and infringes upon party harmony. This is the main 
contribution of the decomposition model, which captures the essential process of 
moderation as a traumatic experience.  
Another contribution of the model is that it offers an effort to describe in more 
detail the categories of activists within the party. According to the model, there are two 
models of activists, called Type A and B activists. The first type represents a more active 
and ideological activist with a strong commitment to the party. Consequently, rewards are 
needed to maintain their loyalty and commitment parallel to their ‘ambition’ to become 
leaders of the party or representatives in the parliament or executive offices. On the other 
hand, the other type of activists is voluntary workers who do not harbour any strong 
political ambition.  
However, this categorisation of different levels of party activist might not be the 
most significant contribution for the concept. The definition of party activist offered by 
Orbell and Foguere is not sophisticated enough to explain how a political party implements 
its strategy in order to minimise the impact of moderation process. One of the crucial issues 
here is that the model has been developed in a relatively advanced political system which 
has different social and political contexts. It is important to consider the different social and 
political context in the context of Muslim countries, which still recognise, at various levels, 
the importance of values or even ideology in their social and political life. The case of the 
AKP and the PKS clearly shows the role of certain values in the society, which have to be 
taken into account, not only Islam as a formal basis but also other societal norms and 
values.    
Another strategy is ‘conversion and replacement’ (Carsey and Layman 1999), 
which applies to a party seeking to change members’ interpretation of moderation as a 
newly direction and at the same time replace those who oppose the policy with members 
who support it. Carsey and Layman offer a more specific explanation of the relationship 
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between activists and ideological change. According to them, there are two processes that 
can describe the process of ideological change of the party’s activists: conversion and 
replacement. Neither concept specifically explains the party’s management of a decaying 
ideology but it may be relevant to the process of ideological strengthening. According to 
them, conversion is a process whereby activists’ ideological preferences are changed 
according to the party’s new direction. Converted individuals or factions will change the 
direction of the party once they are able to dominate or hold key positions in the decision 
making process. Meanwhile, replacement is a mobilisation of newly party activists with 
new ideological interpretation to replace old activists. For Carsey and Layman, the latter 
process is commonly accepted as the major sources of party change (1999: 18). Combined 
with the replacement process, converted members of party elites can manage the process of 
party change by mobilising the new activists with a similar interpretation to replace 
opposition within the party. 
The case of the AKP shows that conversion is applied in different ways. The AKP 
has had to pay attention to conversion strategy since the party abandoned its ideological 
preference and the change had to be explained to its members with a more religious stance. 
However, the conversion in this context is somewhat different to the original meaning as 
offered by Carsey and Layman. It is not the conversion that contributes to the new direction 
of the party itself, but rather it is the changing position of the party’s activists from the 
opposite interpretation to accept a more moderate ideological stance as supported by the 
party elites. There are two dimensions to this change, the individual process as an 
independent reflection upon, and acceptance of, the new interpretation, and the structural 
process imposed by the party as a formal mechanism to give ‘correct’ interpretation to party 
members.  
In the case of the PKS, it can be noted that there is also a particular strategy to 
control its members, that of alienation. This is a strategy unique to an ideological party so 
that it will be less relevant for the AKP. In the discussion of political alienation, the centre 
of analysis mainly focuses on an individual related to his or her environment. From the 
classical tradition of Marxist labour alienation in the economic process to the recent 
analysis of political alienation, alienation is perceived as being a condition of estrangement 
of electorates from the political system. Some of the conditions that describe the situation 
of electorates are distrust in politicians and dissatisfaction with democracy (Borre 2000).  
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Alienation then is seen as a negative effect of unpopular social or political events 
due to misleading behaviour on the part of the system and those who dominate it. In the 
political context the negative aspect is attached to individuals or electorates, their behaviour 
is seen in unexpected actions such as an absence from the electoral process (voter apathy) 
or voting for different candidates or parties (protest voters). The reason for this is because 
there is a gap between politicians as policy makers in government bodies and as candidates 
during an election campaign. There is an unexpected outcome of the political process which 
makes an individual feels powerless, meaningless, normless, and isolated (Finifter 1970: 
390-391) due to the impact of environmental adjustment towards the individual. In the 
context of an ideological party, creating these conditions acts as an effective disincentive 
for those who oppose the party’s change in direction. For members who have a strong 
identification with a party due to its ideology, to be subject to such treatment is difficult. 
Hence, it will discourage any attempts to be critical. 
However, besides the involuntary, externally imposed alienation there is also a 
dimension of self-alienation when an individual feels that ‘because of its very nature, his 
social world is not worth participating in it’ (Olsen 1969: 291). The discussion of 
alienation, then, views the individual’s environment as an insignificant focus of discussion 
in the analysis of political alienation. In certain cases, alienation can be seen as a deliberate 
mechanism conducted by an institution or political authority as a process of achieving for 
certain political objectives. The ‘negative’ outcome for political activists who are not in 
agreement with the leadership’s new interpretation of party ideology is seen as a positive 
result from the perspective of party solidity. The withdrawal of activists who are critical of 
or who disagree with the leadership’s authority is a positive outcome in this matter. 
Therefore, alienation may be implemented by an authority as an effort to purify the party’s 
members from discourses which are seen as unproductive. 
However, in applying this mechanism, the authority runs the risk of provoking 
unexpected behaviour other than apathy or self-alienation. The policy of decomposing 
senior and important party figures may also lead to disagreement within the membership. 
Thus, there is a gap between the leadership and the party’s members which needs to be 
contained in order to control the situation. The emergence of critical members among the 
PKS’s activists is a result of this unexpected and uncontrollable situation which may lead to 
the appearance of wider protest. Unexpected results in the electoral process as experienced 
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by the PKS in the 2009 election and its uneasy relation in coalition with the incumbent 
president may become the basis for wider resentment or distrust. In filling the gap caused 
by the new direction of PKS, the leadership was able to maximise it legitimacy and support 
from most of the party’s members because of a relatively high degree of trust between the 
members and towards the leadership.   
 These strategies will be examined for both parties to explore the difference between 
parties with different levels of moderation. The AKP is assumed to give more attention to 
party leadership and trust in its appeals for loyalty. In different circumstance, the PKS has 
to rely on ideology to maintain loyalty in order to solidify its members. Therefore, the 
Islamic party in Indonesia has more incentive to apply decomposition and alienation 
combined with leadership and trust. The difference in application of the strategies will be 
discussed in the next chapters, especially in Chapter IV and V, which focus on the two 
parties. The next chapter will give more explanation of the history of both parties to 
describe the different processes of moderation and its impacts.  
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Chapter III 
Moderation of the AKP and the PKS and Its Impacts 
 
 
 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter II, moderation is not a homogenous category. It can be 
seen that different cases will apply different grades of moderation dependent on many 
factors. One of the main criteria to examine the difference is the attitude toward ideology; 
whether it is abandoned, postponed, or reinterpreted. Therefore, it is important to look at 
the ideological preferences of the AKP and the PKS to examine their position on ideology. 
As indicated previously, the AKP has shown a tendency to abandon ideological preference, 
while the PKS tends to reinterpret the party’s ideology to meet the need to appeal to more 
of the electorate. 
The other aspect of moderation is the position vis-à-vis democracy. It is surely 
important to examine their position on the democratic process and its principles. However, 
in the context of both parties, it is more important to look at the relationship with the voters 
in the electoral process. The objective of the party in moderating their position is that the 
electoral process is the arena for both parties to respond to public demand, which is crucial 
for the shift in position toward ideology. For the PKS it is a significant factor for 
moderation, where the political system provides a relatively free arena for ideological 
parties to participate in the electoral process to attract as many votes as possible. It is a 
slightly different case with the AKP where the state constitutes another factor as a pressure 
for moderation. However, the AKP relies significantly on the electoral process for its 
strength as the representative of the people in negotiating with the state. Therefore, dealing 
with public demand is also crucial for the political success of the AKP. 
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III.1. Moderation and Its Impact on the AKP 
III.1.1. The Development of the AKP 
Three general elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011 have shown that the AKP has positioned 
itself as a centrist party in the Turkish political spectrum. This position is crucial for the 
party since centrism has consistently been the preference of the majority of the Turkish 
people since the 1960s, as shown in their support for centrist parties and figures such as the 
DP (Demokrat Partisi or Democratic Party) under Adnan Menderes, the AP (Adalet Partisi 
or Justice Party) under Suleyman Demirel, and the ANAP (Anavatan Partisi or Motherland 
Party) under Turgut Ozal. Therefore, the political success of the party cannot be separated 
from its ability to offer the public the image of being a centrist party and maintain this as a 
political basis for its future achievements.  
However, it is quite misleading to see the AKP as a purely secularist party similar to 
other ‘normal’ political parties. Unlike the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or People’s 
Republican Party), which is perceived as the heir of Kemalism and perhaps as a ‘raw 
model’ of a secular party, the AKP has a historical link with Islamist parties as a result of 
the connection of some of its founders with the abolished parties of the RP and the FP. It is 
known that figures such as Erdoğan, Gül, and Arınç developed their political careers in 
those parties before the establishment of the AKP. The connection with those parties has 
formed the basis for allegations from secularist strongholds that the party is bringing 
Islamist ideas into Turkish politics and becoming a focal point for anti-secular activities. 
 The AKP was established by Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç after they criticised the way 
the RP and the FP approached Turkish politics. They saw that Erbakan’s political approach 
and style during his leadership of the RP and his influence on the FP were no longer 
suitable for Turkey’s changing political situation. Erbakan was perceived as a dominant 
figure with a strong preference for Islamic policies. His short experience as prime minister 
from July 1996 to February 1997 following the RP’s victory in the 1995 election showed 
his intention to develop closer ties with the Muslim world rather than the West. This 
tendency led the military to pressure him to step down in a move known as the 28
th
 
February process. For the younger generation within the RP, pressure from the secularist 
camp to resist this apparent Islamic approach in politics was seen as too risky, possibly 
leading to a dangerous situation, and the approach therefore needed to be transformed.  
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 The determination to change the approach was implemented by challenging the 
pro-Erbakan candidate, Recai Kutan, in the election for party chairman in May 2001. 
However, Gül’s candidacy failed and he was defeated by Kutan, who maintained his 
position in the internal election, albeit by the relatively small margin of 633 votes to 521 
(Yesilada in Rubin and Heper, eds. 2002: 69). The failure to weaken Erbakan’s influence 
meant that there was only limited opportunity to take a different line as long as Erbakan 
was still dominant. This situation led to a proposal to leave the party. The closure of the FP 
in July of the same year gave Erdoğan and Gül an opportunity to express their idea of 
offering a new approach in politics under the banner of the AKP, which was officially 
announced in August 2001.  
Establishing a new party has not led to Erdoğan and Gül discontinuing their 
connection with Islam completely. The political background of the leading figures in the 
AKP Gül’s candidacy in the FP election and the more obvious example of Erdoğan’s 
mayoralty of Istanbul under the RP in 1994 - has given the AKP an Islamic hue. Erdoğan’s 
mayoralty was his highest political achievement under the RP after serving as head of the 
party’s branch for the largest city in the country. Similarly, Gül started his political career 
with the RP, entering parliament for the first time in 1991 as a member of the party. Their 
deep involvement with the party has marked their embedded Islamic identity because the 
RP was also regarded as having an Islamic agenda. Erdoğan’s efforts to ban alcohol in 
Istanbul when he served as mayor is an example of their record of promoting a religiously-
related policy that led to suspicions among secularists that their true agenda is to put 
Islamic values in the public space.   
That background has given chances for many secularists to accuse them of having a 
hidden Islamic agenda, or at least given rise to anxiety regarding their honesty in 
supporting secularism as the unchallenged basis of the Turkish state. However, politics is 
not just a game played by the elites. During the electoral process, the most important thing 
is how to attract as many votes as possible. Therefore, the discourse of whether the AKP is 
an Islamic party or not is less relevant than the concern of whether the party can offer the 
public what it wants. It is the electoral process that has been maximised by the party’s 
ability to gain strength, as well as its reputation as a secular, rather than an Islamic, party.  
This was also the case with the RP when it surprisingly won the popular vote in the 
1995 national election. Even political parties with a more apparent Islamic discourse such 
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as the RP understood the character of the median voters in Turkish society. The RP under 
the leadership of Erbakan, the founder of the Millî Görüş movement, also tried to attract 
voters by developing an image as a party for the people through a strong and organised 
network of workers and volunteers which could reach every corner of the country to offer 
something that may help to ease their situation. The women’s wing of the party was a clear 
example of the RP carrying out activities at the societal level to establish good contacts 
with the local people and get involved in every social event from marriages to funerals 
(Arat 2005). It is not surprising then to observe that the AKP has inherited and shaped some 
aspects of that initial moderate character. However, unlike the RP, which only maximised 
the moderate character in its campaign strategy, the AKP has moved forward from that 
level by accepting more from secularism while, at the same time, giving up some aspects of 
religious expression in politics. 
As a result of the disappointment felt by the younger generation led by Erdoğan 
towards Erbakan’s leadership style in the RP and its political prospects, the AKP’s proposal 
managed less expression of political Islamism in Turkish politics. The manifestation of this 
approach under the new party put the Islamic political agenda outside the party’s agenda. 
Islam was seen in term of individual and social expressions. This was reflected in the 
party’s campaigning, which focused on a non-religious agenda to appeal to Turkish voters. 
The AKP’s moderation can be categorised as a substantial moderation since the party’s 
elite has shifted its orientation from religious-affiliated politics and focuses on working for 
the agenda of the Turkish people (Hidayat 2009). It is categorised as substantial since it is 
not only a tactical approach but both tactical and ideological. In Wickham’s terms, the AKP 
is categorised as a moderate party because it has abandoned its ideological preference. 
The foundation of the AKP could be seen as an effort to make a clear distinction 
with the pro-Erbakan camp and to develop a different approach in Turkish politics. One of 
the most important distinctions from its predecessor is that the AKP accepts principles of 
secularism not only in its political expressions and symbolic appearance but also in the 
party’s principles (Tepe 2002). Accepting secular aspects and lessening religious 
credentials is perceived as being the most suitable accommodation in order to survive 
politically and avoid further state containment. In the context of negotiable relations 
between the state and the Islamic camp, the latter, represented by the party, is more 
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prepared to accept the former’s demands (Turam 2007) despite many concerns regarding 
the AKP’s genuine agenda.        
Therefore, the first task for Erdoğan and Gül was to emphasize their detachment 
from the RP and the FP. The establishment of the AKP was surely not enough in the early 
phase of the party for a secular critic who needed political and public assurance as to what 
their ideological stance was. Erdoğan admitted that he has taken off the clothes of the past 
to assure doubters that he has changed (Heper and Toktas 2003). A similar conciliatory 
declaration was offered by Gül when he was running for the presidency saying that he 
would act according to the principles of secularism and promised to support them (BBC 
News, 28 August 2007). For analysts, this strategy of breaking their ties with the past was 
important politically to ensure their survival in politics (Aktay 2009).  
Officially, the party has survived several political manoeuvres to remove it from the 
political arena. At least two such moves have been made; the military’s attempt to discredit 
the party before the 2007 national election and the allegations of having an Islamist agenda 
from Turkey’s chief prosecutor in an effort to close it down in 2008. Both efforts were 
unsuccessful. The first merely boosted support for the AKP and Gül was elected as 
president despite the military’s reluctance to support him because of his headscarf-wearing 
wife (Hurriyet Daily News, 20 December 2010). Meanwhile, the second case was rejected 
because of insufficient support from juries in the Constitutional Court (Turkish Daily 
News, 31 July 2008).  
The success and survival of the AKP since its foundation and during its time in 
power are due to its efforts to propose a moderate strategy and ideological standpoint which 
is crucial to adapt the Turkish political and social circumstances. As noted before, the 
obvious character of the party’s moderation is its ability to accept secularism and lessen its 
ideological standpoint. That aspect of moderation is crucial in the context of moderation 
since it may reduce the contentious reaction from those who oppose the party’s original 
ideological position. With the party’s campaign strategy and its public image the AKP is 
able to offer a more attractive option for the Turkish people. The ability to win elections at 
both the national and local level including a referendum is an obvious indication of its 
success in attracting popular support. 
The study of the party’s moderation process in relation to the voters in Turkey has 
been discussed in the context of political behaviour and electoral process (Çarkoğlu & 
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Kalaycıoğlu 2007), relation to the state institutions (Turam 2007), socio-economic basis 
(Yavuz ed., 2006), and relation to the state ideology of secularism (Tepe 2006, Cizre ed., 
2007). In relation to the moderation theory, there is a body of literature discussing the 
nature of the party. In general, there are common concerns with the nature of moderation in 
relation to median voters (Tezcur 2010a), the outcome of such transformation in policy 
preferences (Turunc 2007) and impacts on Turkish society (Ersoy 2010). Tezcur is one of 
the scholars who tries to explore more deeply into the complexity of moderation theory. He 
argues that the theory is useful in understanding the nature of moderation and the reason 
why a party like the AKP is eager to embrace the ideological shifting and points out that the 
basis of the shifting is the transformation of the leaders’ understanding of ideology (Tezcur 
2010b). It is then important to notice that the transformation reflects the commitment to 
embrace democratic values as seen in the policies of the Department of Religious Affairs to 
transform religious norms and traditions that are incompatible with liberal democratic 
values (Somer 2004). These examples of literatures run in parallel with the basic 
conception of moderation in this research. However, those studies give little attention to the 
internal dynamism of the AKP during the moderation process and the way the party 
develops members’ loyalty during and after the process and this study tries to fill that gap 
through the explanation of the party’s strategies during the process of moderation.   
 
III.1.2. Aspects of Moderation   
III.1.2.1. Attracting Voters and Electoral Triumphs 
The AKP has succeeded in retaining power for the third time after a landslide victory in the 
2011 election, following its successes in the 2002 and 2007 elections. In the latest national 
election, the party gained almost 50 percent of Turkish voters to legitimize its status as the 
majority power in parliament. As such, the party became the first to form a single party 
government at three consecutive elections since the AP of Suleyman Demirel in the 1960s. 
The party also attracted attention since its initial success came only one year after its 
foundation in August 2001. 
Despite its success in gaining wider support from the public through the electoral 
process, many elements of the state and society are still anxious about the AKP’s real 
identity. As mentioned before, these suspicions emerged as the party was established by 
figures with significant previous attachments to the RP and FP, both of which were viewed 
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as focal points for anti-secular elements of the Turkish state. The basis for these accusations 
was the incident when one of its elected Members of Parliament, Merve Kavakci, entered 
the oath ceremony wearing a headscarf,  infuriating secularist members of parliament, who 
attempted to block her way to the podium (Jenkins 2003: 52). 
However, the attraction of the AKP for outside observers is not only its identity but 
also its ability to obtain such massive success in a relatively short time. In explaining the 
achievement, researchers have proposed a variety of reasons for the party's victory, using 
different approaches. The first explanation argues that the emergence of AKP as a dominant 
power in parliament after the 2002 and 2007 elections is a result of changing party 
preferences in the Turkish party system spectrum (Sayari in Sayari & Esmer 2002: 22). In 
the last ten years, scholars have identified shifting trends in voting preference following the 
RP’s victory in 1995, and the success of the DSP (Demokratik Sol Partisi or Democratic 
Left Party) and the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi or Nationalist Movement Party), 
known as leftist parties, in the 1999 election (Gunes-Ayata & Ayata in ibid: 152). The 
success of these three parties has been attributed to the decline of centrist parties, which 
usually dominated the elections and held governmental positions as the legacy of Demirel 
and Ozal. Therefore, according to this analysis, Turkish voters no longer identified 
themselves with any of the centrist parties and shifted their support to other parties.  
Following the shift in the party preferences of Turkish voters, it is relevant to 
consider the reasons behind that shift. According to Sayari (2002: 30), voters’ identification 
with the centrist parties has decreased because of the failure of the government and state to 
meet citizens’ expectations and concerns on a broad range of issues. One of the main 
concerns is economic and social problems, which have contributed to the difficulties of 
daily life for many Turks. The failure to ease day to day conditions has contributed to a loss 
of respect for the government and has significantly affected their willingness to vote for 
political parties and their leaders who run the government. 
As respect for politicians was getting lower, anger among voters was increasing 
significantly and driving them to find alternatives. In this hypothesis, social and economic 
deprivation becomes the main factor for the protest against the ruling government. 
However, the anger of the voters is not always directed at a particular political party but 
indicates a protest against the system as a whole (Yavuz 2006) combined with the rise of 
more transcendental values among the voters that influence their political preference 
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(Sayari and Esmer 2002). The failure of political parties to offer satisfactory policies has 
created the context for advancing this approach among the people. Therefore, giving the 
votes to alternative parties was the direct outcome of dissatisfaction with politics and the 
way in which politicians behaved.  
This situation encouraged people to seek alternatives to previous centre-right parties 
and the result is a relatively high degree of electoral volatility and a tendency for 
personalization of parties, especially in the case of the AKP in 2002. In 2002, when the 
AKP won the election, electoral volatility reached its highest degree of 41.2 percent, 
showing a significant shift of voters from other parties to the AKP (Hazama 2007: 3-5). 
Data from among the party’s supporters shows a shift from traditionally centre-right 
parties, even though the party identifies its position as a centre-right party. However, there 
is no doubt that the AKP basically replaced the position of the RP and the FP. A majority of 
the supporters of these two parties, some 69 percent, voted for the AKP. There was also a 
shift in support of 29 percent of MHP voters and 29 percent of ANAP voters to the AKP. 
Meanwhile, 29 percent of new first-time voters also voted for the AKP (Yavuz 2006: 258). 
This factor is important in the context of analysis in this research, since the success of the 
AKP is also supported by the leadership of Erdoğan. It is a factor that has attracted many 
people to not only give the party their vote at the ballot box, but also to join the party. For 
those who joined the party because of him, the attitude of admiration for him is important, 
to develop respect for the party leader.  
The second factor mentioned in the discussion of the AKP’s electoral achievement 
is the representation of the new middle class within Turkish society who have different 
preferences toward the political system. As noted by Yavuz (2003: 262), the policy of the 
AKP of seeking legitimacy through EU membership to challenge the military or the state is 
vital to appeal the Turkish people, nearly 70 percent of whom supported the accession 
(Dağı 2005: 29). EU membership was seen as an opportunity for a better economic 
situation and also a symbol to normalise the Turkish political system. The status quo is 
represented in the pro-secularist parties and other pro-state establishments such as the 
military, bureaucracy and judiciary, all of which are mainly dominated by the urban secular 
elite who seek to preserve their domination of public life.  
The new middle class emerged mainly after the implementation of economic 
liberalisation under Turgut Ozal in the 1980s. The policy offered more opportunities for 
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small businesses to access capital and markets and thus enabled them to expand their 
economic capacities. It is important to mention the role of MUSIAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve 
İşadamları Derneği or Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’ Association) as an 
organisation of business people to accommodate the new rising bourgeois class as an 
alternative to the long established business group, TUSIAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve 
İşadamları Derneği or Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’ Association). MUSIAD is 
perceived as representing the new bourgeois class who have a strong attachment to 
Anatolian culture, which is more religious than its counterpart. The expansion of their 
economic capacity was enhanced by the economic network of the organisation and due to 
their new-found prosperity they were able to support the activities of more Islamically-
oriented political parties such as the RP, the FP and later the AKP, and began to challenge 
the economic elites favoured by the state and its supporters (Abramovitz and Barkey 2009: 
2).  
In this context, the relation between social and economic changes and Islam as an 
identity and value basis is rather difficult to identify. There are two different extreme 
explanations that can be mentioned here; firstly, that the socio-economic context is more 
significant in directing Turkish people to shift their preference. On the other hand, the 
opposite argument says that the shift in preference is mainly caused by Islam as a 
significant identity embedded in their daily life to develop significant political 
identification. The latter argument then offers the role of Islam as an intangible factor 
which encourages its adherents to act in accordance with the values of the religion. 
Furthermore, their attachment to these values might also encourage them to carry out more 
collective actions in the form of a structured movement. 
However, Yavuz (2006) argues that in the perspective of state-society relations, 
Islamic movements are a result of many factors, between Islam as an essential value for its 
adherents and the context of socio-economic conditions as the basis of constructivist 
argument. Islam undeniably still plays a significant factor as an identity for many Turkish 
Muslims, especially in opposition to the state’s project of secularisation and modernisation. 
Islam is also imagined as a major identity to endorse issues of justice and identity in 
comparison with the strong idea of Turkish nationalism. The existence of Imam Hatip 
schools, which focus on religious teachings, is a good example of the Turks’ willingness to 
preserve their Islamic identity. The schools are perceived by many as a cultural resentment 
56 
 
 
within the education system in Turkey toward the state’s imposing identity (Acar & Ayata 
in Kandiyoti & Saktanber eds.: 2002).  
Nevertheless, to develop an argument that Islam is the only major factor in shaping 
the Turkish behaviour is to downplay the influence of the economic and social context. It 
is, then, difficult to explain the rise of the RP, the FP and the AKP without considering the 
effect of economic and social changes. According to this argument, there was a major 
change in the strength of the more religious elements of society thanks to economic 
liberalisation and an open market implemented by Ozal’s administration in the 1980s, 
which has had an indirect impact on the new social structure of Turkish society. The policy 
offered great access for more religious entrepreneurs to integrate their economic activities 
with national and international markets. Before the liberalisation, they had no access to 
capital and played an insignificant economic role in the market. A new economic class then 
emerged mainly in provincial towns and afterwards penetrated the major cities and set up 
businesses to capitalise their wealth. Using their new affluence, they were able to develop 
their own schools, printing press, newspapers, journals, and broadcast stations. Yavuz 
referred to it as Islamism in parallel with ethnic Turkish revivalism after experiencing 
economic and political liberalisation. The new economic class also developed their 
independence with regard to the state. To express their autonomy from state control they 
used for election as the main instrument of change. Through elections they gained the 
opportunity to express their preference without being controlled by the state. This argument 
is a continuation from his explanation of the rise of the RP in 1990s where he applies the 
same model to examine the triumph of the AKP in 2002 and 2007 (Yavuz 1997: 72-3).  
The argument that socio-economic factors provide a strong basis for the Islamist 
parties is also supported by Nilufer Narli (1999: 42) and Jenny White (2002). They agree 
that there is mobilization of Islamic activists and supporters in Turkish society.  The 
combination of economic and social changes has created an enhanced opportunity for 
Islamists in the urban middle class to mobilise. The economic liberalization of the 1980s 
gave opportunities for marginalised Muslims to move into new socio-economic areas of 
society. However, it should be noted that the socio-economic basis is not the only factor 
affecting their support. There is an interaction between this factor and other factors such as 
political aims, the interests of specific social groups (such as university graduates seeking 
employment), and hopes for resolution of the Kurdish issue (Narli 1999: 43).  
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The AKP has successfully attracted wide public support as well as support from 
former RP and FP voters. The landslide win in the 2007 election with 46.6 percent of the 
total electoral vote (and also in the 2011 election with nearly 50 percent), confirmed wide 
acceptance of the AKP’s ability to stabilise the economy (Kanli 2007) and provide better 
social services when they are in power. The AKP government has indeed managed to 
provide better services in some important areas such as access to medical care. Its 
commitment to speeding up the consideration by the EU of Turkish membership and 
enhancing integration into the global market, combined with domestic programmes to 
develop infrastructure for economic upgrading has affected many aspects of Turkish daily 
life. In Kurdish areas, where issues of separatism and unequal development arise, the AKP 
still gained more than 50 percent of the total vote because of its efforts to reconstruct the 
basic infrastructure needed by local communities (Ali 2011).  
The third factor that contributes to the success of the AKP is related to the issue of 
protest votes. Before the 2007 election, the military released a message on its website on 
the 27
th
 of April as a warning to the public. The warning mentioned a party with an Islamic 
agenda, which is forbidden according to the state constitution. This warning was actually 
part of the effort to foil the party’s campaign for Abdullah Gül’s presidency at a time when 
the secularist party in parliament (the CHP) was absent for the vote for the successor to 
Sezer, the previous president. The secularist efforts to block Gül became the main theme of 
the AKP’s campaign to normalise the Turkish political system. According to one of the 
party’s leaders, the military’s manoeuvring contributed to the anger of Turkish voters. To 
show their discontent against the manoeuvre they supported the AKP in the election. The 
exact number of those who supported the AKP for that reason is difficult to calculate. 
However, it was estimated that around ten percent of the 47 percent of votes that the party 
gained fell into this category (Safuoglu 2009; Aktay 2009).  
The fourth factor that contributed to the success of the AKP was the figure of 
Erdoğan as the party leader (Belcher 2008). Many Turks admit that he is seen as the 
representative of ordinary Turkish people. His father was from the eastern side of Anatolia 
and brought his family to Istanbul where Erdoğan was born, in the Kasimpasa district. 
Erdoğan spent his childhood in Rize, a Black Sea coastal city, until his early teenage years 
when he moved back to Istanbul. In Istanbul he went to school at the Imam Hatip religious 
school, while during his free time he sold newspapers and magazines to support his family, 
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as well as playing football like other teenagers. His background provides an image that can 
be easily associated with the lives of ordinary Turks (Heper and Toktas 2003), which is 
strengthened by his wife’s connection with the south-eastern region of Siirt.  
He is also admired by many Turks because of his ability to change Istanbul 
significantly when he served as mayor after winning the local election in 1994 under the 
banner of the RP. During his administration, he successfully delivered better services, 
especially in transportation, thanks to his experience working in the local transport 
company (IETT or Istanbul Electricity, Tramway and Tunnel). He improved the water 
supply after years of water crisis in the city, and succeeded in making a cleaner 
environment through effective waste disposal. As mayor of Istanbul, he was able to develop 
an anti-corruption image that was admired by many. For many Turks, then, Erdoğan is seen 
as an honest leader with a strong vision capable of offering Turkey a better political and 
economic situation. He is known as a leader who is not reluctant to admit that he is wrong 
publicly, but is confident in his decisions. His willingness to defend his positions is 
respected (Safuoğlu 2009). This makes many Turks believe in him and inspires confidence 
in his leadership.  
From the above factors, it is important to note that the AKP has been successful in 
attracting many Turks by a combination of many factors. The party succeeded in becoming 
an alternative to other parties as it offered better economic promise. Erdoğan’s ability to 
serve Istanbul is a significant factor as he provided the evidence for many Turks that he 
(and therefore the AKP) is able to deliver better services. The Erdoğan factor is not only 
about his ability, but also his trustworthiness person (Aktay 2009). As mayor he was 
perceived as a humble person who was not corrupt. In this context, religiosity plays a great 
role because people see him as an honest person due to his personal commitment to 
religion. It is then difficult to place religion as the main factor in the success of the party 
because it is a complex combination of other factors. However, it is obvious that the party 
and its leader do not seek to attract Turks through religious appeal or jargon as previously 
implemented by the RP. Therefore, ideological preferences do not play a great role in the 
success of the AKP as the party accepts the principles of secularism. 
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III.1.2.2. Ideological Shift 
For Tepe (2005) the willingness of the AKP to accept secularism does not involve a 
capitulation of religiosity before the state. Through their possibility of accessing the state’s 
ceremonies and political processes while in the government and parliament, the party is 
able to penetrate some aspects of religiosity in the state’s symbolic and public space. She 
regards the process of positioning religious symbols in the secular public space as part of 
the sacralisation. She argues that the chance to be more active in politics has given a chance 
for the religious middle class to give a religious understanding to Turkish national 
institutions. One of the examples is that the AKP has tried to give a different understanding 
of secularism by saying that secularism means neutrality of the state toward religion. Being 
a secular state does not mean that the state has the right to intervene in citizen’s private 
lives, including religion. It is not the state’s duty to force all Turkish people to become 
secular as defined by the state. As the party controlling the government the AKP has the 
ability to negotiate with the state even though in some aspects, such as the ban on 
headscarves in universities and the ban on Imam Hatip graduates entering universities, it 
has failed to change the rules. The party is able to show that faith can be expressed publicly 
as long as it is part of private and social, not political, expression.  
The process of sacralisation, according to Tepe, works in parallel with the process 
of internal secularisation by accepting non-religious (secular) values. As an example, the 
party adapts to the secular Turkish state by admitting the national secular symbols as part of 
their identity as well. The acceptance of the Turkish flag as the symbol of independence 
and acknowledging the role of Kemal Attaturk as national hero is part of the process. After 
the announcement of the party’s establishment in a room, with a big picture of the Turkish 
secular state’s founding father, the party leaders went to visit Anıtkabir mausoleum, the 
place where Kemal was buried, to express their respect for him. Therefore, the AKP is 
trying to implement value negotiation between religiosity and secularism by sacralising 
secular symbols and at the same time secularising the party’s identity. 
The process of using secular jargon within the party has taken place by saying that 
the party itself is clearly secular. The party identifies itself as a secular party that is open to 
everyone regardless of their background, ideological preference or religion. However, there 
is a significant difference in understanding secularism from the AKP’s perspective with that 
of other secular supporters in Turkey. For defenders of secularism, being secular means 
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avoiding any religious values in institutions such as political parties or state institutions, as 
well as at an individual level. Different from that understanding of secularism, the leaders 
of the AKP do not say that they, individually or collectively, are secular. The party as an 
organisation can be a secular structure that implements principles of secularism. As an 
organisation, the party does not have an ideology that is imposed on every member with a 
sole interpretation of it. As a consequence, the party cannot be used to implement any 
project to impose secularism on every individual within the party. The secular character of 
the organisation is not paralleled by individuals, who are free to act according to their 
preferences, including being religious people. Erdoğan, for instance, in his speech at the 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies in 2002 said that only an institution can be 
secular, not the people. He said, ‘The average Turk is a moderate Muslim and the state’s 
cultural policies should first and foremost respond to the needs of these people’ (Quoted by 
Tepe from Sontag 2003).  
The AKP has also tried to redefine the meaning of state and nation as inseparable 
from the people. In this definition, the state is an institution created by the people to 
preserve the interest of the people, especially in the context of social and economic 
services. Hence, separating the people from the state is a misinterpretation of the meaning 
of secularism taken from the West. A secular state is not a ‘sacral’ institution that cannot be 
challenged by the people. The party accepts the idea of popular support in which 
democracy, as one of the pillars of the party’s main programme, can exist. This recognition 
of popular support is essential in the context of Islamist movements. As a movement based 
on religion they usually believe that legitimacy is only from God. As a consequence, asking 
for legitimacy from people in electoral process is against the principle of God’s superiority. 
The definition of a secular state as endorsed by the AKP is an innovative effort to deal with 
the interests of the guardians of secularism without neglecting the Islamic roots of society. 
By proposing that interpretation, the party expects to maintain its traditional social support 
among pro-Islamic supporters and at the same time secure its existence in the political 
system and widen its social bases.  
The AKP also introduced a new interpretation of the West, westernisation and 
modern values (Daği 2005: 21). Unlike the general view of Millî Görüş, which saw the 
West as immoral with its capitalistic market system and European Union as a Christian club 
that must be challenged, the party declared its commitment to speeding up Turkey’s 
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accession to the Union soon after winning the November 2002 election. In the campaign 
Erdoğan said, “EU membership is our priority target” and “meeting the Copenhagen 
political criteria is an important step forward for the modernization of the country” (Daği 
2005: 12). The party also maintained the country’s relations with international financial 
institutions, especially the IMF, to help Turkey’s economic stability after the crisis in 2001. 
This policy is very different to the ideas of Millî Görüş, the backbone of the RP, which sees 
these institutions as the representation of market capitalist power to exploit Third World 
countries. At the grass roots level, the members of the movement have shown their 
resentment of Erdoğan’s policy of maintaining close relations with the United States. For 
them, to meet Barrack Obama to represent his position as the president to discuss and 
negotiate many issues is a symbol of Turkey’s marginal position in front of the United 
States that is not acceptable for them (interview with local leader of Millî Görüş in Konya 
2009). 
The AKP moved beyond FP policies. The FP accepted the EU accession process as 
well as universalist issues such as human rights as a sign that it has changed. However, this 
was not enough for the AKP. The party does not only want to accelerate the process but 
also handles other issues relating to religious supporters such as headscarves and Islamic 
education under the Copenhagen criteria (Saatçioğlu 2010). In order to meet the conditions 
for accession, the AKP government has introduced several packages of law to improve the 
country’s record on human rights, which had been one of Turkey’s weakest points 
according to the EU. The headscarf issue was handled by the government by proposing a 
bill to give freedom of expression to practice any religious behaviour and identity. 
However, strong opposition toward the bill made the party decide not to force the issue 
immediately. It seems that the party is focusing more on the ‘Western’ agenda rather than 
imposing an Islamist agenda after they came to power. Therefore, instead of leaning on 
traditional values of anti-globalisation which could erode national identity, the AKP has 
declared its position to integrate with global structures.  
To emphasise that the AKP is a distinctive entity, and especially to convince those 
in the secularist camp, the AKP leaders declared their disconnection with the past in 
matters that can be related to allegations of anti-secular activities. As a prominent leader of 
the AKP with a long history in the RP and subject to accusations of anti-secular activities, 
Erdoğan leads the project of convincing the public that he and other party members with 
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historical connections with the RP and the FP have clearly left the Islamic political 
approach. However, whether he has changed his ideological standpoint is still in debate. 
Those who are still curious about his real beliefs argue that Erdoğan is still the same as he 
was under the political umbrella of the RP. In the 1990s, Erdoğan often criticised Kemalism 
and promoted Islam on many occasions. After he was elected as mayor of Istanbul in 1994 
he publicly made comments that raised controversy. He said, “Praise is to God, we support 
the shari’a law” and “Parliament should be opened with prayers” (Jenkins in Yavuz 2006: 
188). In a speech in 1992 he also said that one could not be both secularist and a Muslim 
(Heper & Toktas 2003: 173).  
Erdoğan is aware of suspicions of his and the AKP’s position toward Kemalism, 
and does not reject his historical background. Nevertheless, he himself has clearly stated 
that everything has changed and he has left everything behind. He no longer uses religious 
terms in his speeches and accepts secularism at the political level to integrate them with the 
history of secular Turkey. He said, “There is no ideological connection of ours with any 
existing party. That’s it. There may be a few among us who had relations with other 
political parties in the past. But we took the garment off and we considered ourselves as the 
DP’s continuance” (Yildirim et al. 2007: 10). The declaration is very important for Erdoğan 
and the party to assure those who are still suspicious of the nature of the AKP, especially 
some of its prominent leaders, due to their previous connection with Erbakan’s camp 
(Aktay 2009).   
In discussing the different image of Erdoğan as the model of a new Islamic 
generation in secular politics in Turkey, Heper and Toktas (2003) believe that Erdoğan has 
not basically changed his ideological standpoint. He still respects Islamic values and tries to 
bring them to the political realm even though he does not want these to confront the secular 
ideas of the state. According to Heper and Toktas, what makes him different from other 
political leaders is his avoidance of terms or symbols that can be differently interpreted by 
others. However, the interpretation of secular itself does not completely deny the religiosity 
of the people. Secular for him means a freedom guaranteed by the state for every citizen to 
practice religious behaviour. He “rejects the interpretation and distortion of secularism as 
an enmity against religion” (Jenkins in Yavuz 2006: 189).  
Therefore, according to this perspective, the AKP is a result of negotiation between 
secularism based on Kemalist interpretation and the religiosity of Turkish people. Unable to 
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influence the state to lessen its interpretation of secularism that is imposed at a state as well 
as individual level as shown by Erbakan’s experience, the AKP dropped the demand to 
accommodate religiosity at a state level. It declared that the party is a secular organisation 
so that there is no religious agenda supported by the party. However, it refuses to adhere to 
the state’s version of secularism by proposing that the individual has the right to practice 
religion according to their individual preference. Therefore, the AKP has shifted the 
confrontation from a state level to an individual level, thus reducing the possible pressure 
from the state’s institutions. For the time being, this strategy has been quite successful in 
allowing the party to avoid state pressure because the party also plays another battle in the 
elections. 
After three national elections, it is clear that the party is leading in the electoral 
process enjoying the support of Turkish voters. Nevertheless, despite the success, the AKP 
still faces a potential threat from secularist strongholds. The closure case submitted by 
Chief Public Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya in 2008 is clear evidence that similar 
efforts can be indicted in the future if the party tries to ignite a battle in the state arena. 
Therefore, the narratives of the party leaders are still located in discourse of the rights of 
the individual rather than at a state level. Nevertheless, the AKP still avoids using religious 
expressions in defending the individual’s rights to practice religious tradition. It is still 
reluctant to use religious terms and symbols to deal with ‘controversial’ issues such as 
women’s veiling, turbans, and the religious symbol of the party (Tepe 2005: 13).  
For example, the AKP tried to lift the ban on headscarves in universities not through 
religious motivation. Before the annulment of the law that has been passed by the 
parliament, the party argued that lifting the ban is considered as an effort to defend people’s 
rights, especially its constituents, to equal opportunity to higher education. Abdullah Gül, 
for instance, supports the right of women to wear headscarves by saying "these are 
individual preferences and everybody should respect them" (BBC News, 27 August 2007). 
Meanwhile, on the issue of alcohol restriction and prohibition in some local areas, the party 
representatives also defend their argument by saying that the policy is not based on 
religious motives but follow similar policies in European countries (Appendix A.4.). The 
two examples show that the AKP tries to avoid any expression that can be referred to as 
religious, even though they are part of religious tradition.  
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However, even though the party officials struggle to explain that it does not have 
any religious agenda, some of the religious symbols have made their efforts problematic. 
For example, because some of the wives of the party’s elite wear headscarves, they are still 
refused permission to attend state ceremonies. On many occasions, President Abdullah Gül 
has had to attend state ceremonies without being accompanied by his wife. He has to attend 
unaccompanied because the military forces are reluctant to conduct ceremonies if they are 
attended by the first lady with headscarf. When he hosted a reception for Republic Day in 
2010 in his capacity as president, the military leaders refused to attend because it would be 
attended by her (BBC News, 30 October 2010). Another reason for their suspicious attitude 
toward the AKP is that a majority of the RP and FP supporters shifted their preference to 
the party. Research conducted by Basleven and Akarca (2008: 17) confirms that 
approximately 82 to 87 percent of former RP and FP supporters gave their vote to the AKP 
in the 2007 election. Because of that, many still perceive the party as a home for religious 
elements to preserve the images of religiosity within the party (Yavuz 2006).  
 In that context, it is important for the AKP to develop a particular ideology distinct 
from being depicted as an Islamic party. The party has proposed an ideology called 
‘Conservative Democrat’ to identify the nature of the party by which a message that the 
party does not support religiosity in public places can be delivered. So, the ideology has 
strategic purposes designed by the party’s thinker, Yalçin Akdoğan (in Yavuz 2006), to 
avoid any religious association in the term conservative. At the same time, the term 
democrat can be used to explain that there is a willingness to support democratic principles 
and accommodate different political backgrounds. It is the ideology of denial from religion 
while at the same time symbolising the struggle to explain a new nature (Dağı 2006: 89).  
Conservativism is seen as characteristic of the majority of Turks, who are associated 
with a political attitude that persists on gradual change, as well as a continuation of moral 
family values in Turkey (Akdoğan in Yavuz 2006: 55). As explained by Akdoğan, who 
formulated the ideology, the concept does not aim to offer a theoretical debate on the 
meaning of the concept itself. It is only a reflection that the party is trying to associate itself 
with the values of the majority of Turks and offer a political approach that is suited to the 
socio-cultural context. This is an approach that is seen as the continuation of the DP, the AP 
and the ANAP, all of which were accepted by the Turkish people, as reflected in elections. 
For many years, religion has been perceived as a moral basis for Turkish tradition rather 
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than a formal expression in the form of shari’a. The efforts to have a more religious 
expression in politics as shown by the RP are seen as vulnerable and unproductive as it 
consists of elements of more revolutionary and destructive change. Therefore, conservatism 
represents the character of moderate Turkish people in perceiving Islam as the basis of 
morality to encourage gradual change.  
Whether the concept of conservativism is compatible with democracy or not is not a 
problem for the AKP (57). Democracy itself is seen as a non-ideological concept and when 
it is mixed with conservativism it does not mean that there will be no support for open 
discourse. What is more important for the AKP is how to implement the commitment to 
represent the majority of Turks in a democratic way. It is a clear message to the secularists 
that there is no objective except to defend and develop democracy in accordance with the 
vision of Kemal. As the ultimate goal, democracy can be used to strengthen the role of 
society before the state while, at the same time, the party has shown its commitment to the 
vision of a secular state. In practice, the AKP succeeded in using democratic means to 
confront the secularist establishment in the deadlocked process of Gül’s presidency by 
asking for an early election in 2007. The referendum in 2010 is also clear evidence that the 
democratic process is the best way to resolve political deadlock.   
By maximising non-religious issues the AKP has gained wide support not only from 
more rural-based and lower classes, but also from urban-based and middle classes, 
especially the new middle class, which has arisen as a result of the economic liberalisation 
that has given opportunity for more rural people to integrate with the economic system. 
However, the established elite and some elements of the middle classes who support a 
Kemalist version of secularism tend to oppose the party. Significant numbers of the party’s 
opponents demonstrated in several big cities to oppose Gül’s candidacy. They are known to 
have ‘different political attitudes and life-style’ to the party’s supporters (Ayata in Akanci 
2007). Nevertheless, the party did gain support not only from pious and rural voters, but 
also traditional centrist voters. The party has replaced the fractured old centrist parties and 
successfully penetrated their traditional supporters with non-ideological programmes that 
were consistent with their needs. 
Therefore, the motives of voters in supporting the AKP are not only dominated by 
religious factors. For many of the new middle class, the AKP may also symbolise the 
opportunity to become involved in and influence a system which was previously dominated 
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by the urban secular class, known as the ‘White Turks.’ Those who are not associated with 
the ‘White Turks’ have been excluded and repressed by the previous extreme secular 
approach which suppressed any religious symbol in public life for decades. Through the 
AKP, the excluded lower and middle classes have the opportunity to compel the system to 
ease the pressure on religious symbols in public spaces. Yavuz (2003) gives an example of 
the empowerment of some Turks with more Islamic influence in the public sphere such as 
in music, poetry and consumer behaviour. This process has given a hope that there is a 
chance to develop a more modern Islamic identity in the Turkish national context. 
 
III.1.3. Impacts on the AKP 
The AKP’s policy of abandoning ideological preferences since its foundation has gained 
significant results. The most obvious achievement is the ability to win elections and control 
the government as well as parliament. The party’s success in becoming the ruling party is 
evidence that the public have given their trust to the party to lead without ideological 
preference and the party’s direction to focus on more practical issues has proven to be 
effective in significantly increasing public trust. Therefore, the decision to abandon 
ideology corresponds with demands of the public who want to see a political party with a 
more pragmatic approach.  
Nevertheless, as a political party, there is a question of whether the direction is also 
supported by all elements within the party. The question is relevant because many still 
perceive the AKP as the home of many religious supporters as the majority of former 
supporters of the RP and FP have shifted their support. Internally, the anxiety is also 
relevant because there are many members of the party at all levels who were also part of the 
two closed parties. Party founders, Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç, were clearly members of both 
parties and became deputies in parliament or mayor to represent them. Some of the middle-
ranking party members whom I met during field research were also previously members of 
at least one of the old parties. There is also research showing that some of the AKP’s 
women activists were also active in the RP (Erdoğan 2006). The women’s wing of the party 
is still strong and dominated by members with headscarves despite strong evidence that few 
of them were nominated by the party (Jenkins 2003: 54).  
Despite their experience with the RP, the FP or the Millî Görüş, opposition toward 
the approach is relatively weak. The absence of an oppositional attitude is shown by the 
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willingness of many members of these parties to accept the approach since the foundation 
of the party. There was a process of negotiation with different prominent figures before 
they decided to join the party, including those in the liberal camp (Yayla 2010). Certainly, 
some of them examined the new direction and programme to determine the benefits of 
being members of the AKP (Denemeç 2009). Some important secularist politicians 
welcomed the offer and agreed to join the party including Kürşad Tüzmen of the NAP, 
Erkan Mumcu of the ANAP, and Koksal Toptan of the DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi or True 
Path Party). Other middle rank politicians also expressed an interest in joining and 
strengthening the young party before the first election. They can be perceived as 
representatives of secularist or nationalist elements to develop the mixture combination of 
the party with the religious element transferred from the RP and the FP.  
At middle and lower levels, there is an indication that most of them were interested 
in Erdoğan’s personal attraction in addition to the party’s vision as expressed by some of 
the informants in this research. In some cases, the process of acceptance and admiration of 
the party’s new direction was determined after joining the party or following at least one of 
the party’s programmes. Some of the women activists found that the AKP has a different 
approach that is more suitable for individual members compared to the RP. They also found 
the benefits of the AKP’s approach for Turkish people considering the recent political and 
economic situation. Other cases show a member of an Islamic social organisation who 
expressed an interest in joining the party after discovering the benefits of the party’s role in 
government for the society. The conclusion was determined after following a party 
programme focusing on political education which is open either for party members or non-
members.  
Those cases illustrate the acceptance of the party’s direction to abandon preference 
on ideology. Even though some of them had been members of the RP, they demonstrated 
enthusiasm with the vision of the AKP. Having drawn a clear line with the SP (Saadet 
Partisi or Felicity Party), the RP’s successor, the AKP does not fail to attract their 
willingness to support and work for the party. The new vision is perceived as being the best 
option for a political party and they are happy with the new approach to politics. As a 
result, they are ready to act in accordance with the party’s vision. Part of this vision is to be 
a party for all Turks, so that they are expected to work in different environments than 
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before such as having discussions and accomplishing party’s tasks with members from 
different backgrounds.  
So far, it has been seen that the AKP enjoys strong support from its members and 
one indication of dedicated support is a lack of tension and conflict. Although there have 
been cases of dismissal and withdrawal in different cases, most of these are related to 
breaches of party discipline rather than opposition to the decision to have no ideological 
preference. The cases are related to moral standards, which is part of the commitment of the 
AKP to represent Turkish tradition as an implementation of conservatism, such as 
pornography and drinking. Another case centred on the inappropriate attitude of one of the 
AKP members towards a leader of an opposition political party.    
In the case of withdrawals, many of them are related to government initiatives 
regarding the Kurdish issue in which the way of managing the policy is also considered. 
For example, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat resigned from his position as Deputy Chairman of 
the AKP in 2008. Even though Fırat’s resignation was not declared publicly, it is thought 
that it was due to his disagreement with the way in which the party leadership chose to deal 
with the Kurdish issue (Uslu 2008). Other concerns related to the leadership’s management 
came from a deputy and a former minister from the AKP who questioned the way the 
policy was being prepared. It is reported that Murat Başesgioğlu and Vahid Erdem 
criticised the process of preparing the initiative because it was designed improperly from 
the beginning and it had no chance of success (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 December 2009). 
These are cases of criticism of the party management preparing policy and not of different 
ideological preferences.  
The case of having a dispute on party management is also found in the withdrawal 
of Erkan Mumcu who declared his departure in February 2005. He declared his decision to 
resign from his post as minister and party member due to his disagreement with Erdoğan, 
despite having served as a minister in two different posts under the AKP. Mumcu left the 
position as Minister of Culture as well as his post as the AKP member to join the ANAP. 
He found difficulties in dealing with the way the AKP managed the organisation and it was 
indicated that he was not happy with the position of Minister of Culture (Turkish Daily 
News, 16 February 2005). 
There are also different cases of withdrawal more related to ideological preference 
which is still related to Kurdish initiative. Days before the voting for the constitutional 
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reform package is conducted Mehmet Zekai Özcan the party’s Ankara deputy also 
announced his resignation. Unlike other cases of withdrawal, the case of Özcan was more 
related to the policies of the AKP on Kurdish initiative which he accused of undermining 
ethnic relations in the country (Today’s Zaman, 13 April 2010). Özcan’s case can be an 
example of dispute toward a different political stance because he is in favour of a more 
nationalistic approach by giving no chance for other identity except Turkism. Nevertheless, 
the case was not significant in terms of its impact in encouraging other members to act 
similarly.  
For the media, especially those that do not support the government, negative 
comments from the AKP’s deputies will be seen as an indication of tensions within the 
party. Nevertheless, for the party leadership these kinds of comment are not a big concern 
since they understand it as expressions of different constituencies (Önen 2010). They are 
confident that freedom of expression or even internal criticism will not bring the party into 
crisis. The fact that the cases of resignation are insignificant shows that the party is still 
manageable. It can be seen from the way other party members show concern regarding an 
issue. The Kurdish initiative issue encouraged some prominent members to leave, because 
they saw it as a problem of method or strategy. For example, in dealing with Erdoğan’s 
statement regarding the government proposal, some members working in Kurdish regions 
said that ‘they will not be able to explain Erdoğan’s recent “love it or leave it” statement to 
the Kurds, which could damage the party in the region’ (Uslu 2008). Despite these 
difficulties, concerns about the leadership’s attitude did not lead them to resign from the 
party. 
As a party that intends to be a party for all, the AKP initiated the character of open 
party which was quite evident when the party was established in 2001. In doing so, the 
party offered the vision to anyone interested to join the party. It also has commitment to 
develop an open partywhich was implemented in the early period of the party since its 
establishment. The commitment was reflected in the party structure to give an opportunity 
for the party board to be chosen by the lower level in the party congress. Some expressions 
from the high-rank party members also articulate the role of the party, party representatives 
in the parliament and members of cabinet to have strong and smooth communication in 
developing party policies. In the party’s early period, the commitment was implemented 
quite seriously, and for some scholars it was a promising start. However, the potential for 
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democratic practice within the party has been reduced by the fact that the party is going in a 
different direction: power concentrated in the hands of a small number of elite party 
members (Tepe 2005: 73-5). The broad span of the three elements meant the party 
leadership found it difficult to control all of the party elements appropriately. The 
appropriate control means that the party leadership needs to have a balanced rhythm to deal 
with their opponents in parliament and also other elements outside state structure such as 
business sectors, the media, and parts of civil society which are still critical of the party’s 
policies. To deal with these challenges, the party leadership has, in recent years, tended to 
implement stricter control over all elements of the party including those in parliament. 
Following the success in securing a parliamentary majority and forming a single 
party government, the party leadership has tended to apply a more centralistic organisation 
in order to exert more control over all of the party members. Following the party’s triumph 
in the 2002 election, they needed a more solid party which could only be achieved by 
tightening the leadership’s control over party activists, especially in the higher ranks. To 
tighten their control of the party members they managed to develop a mechanism allowing 
them to choose more loyal members for leadership positions or those preferred by them, 
alongside the growing role of Erdoğan as the centre of the party (Kumbaracibasi 2009). 
This centralistic tendency has to some extent been successful in uniting the members in 
different levels and positions into a relatively solid political grouping with a unified 
political manoeuvre to confront challenging opposition from secularist camps in parliament 
and the wider political arena. In the strenuous situation of Turkish politics, a centralistic 
party structure seems to be more suitable to conduct more effective political manoeuvre 
where immediate political decisions have to be made.     
However, despite several resignations as well as a tendency of becoming more 
centralistic, the party still enjoys significant support from its members at each level: elite, 
middle and lower. Religious elements within the party form one of the backbones of the 
AKP in support of its recent political stance, even though it is not in accordance with their 
previous experience with the RP, the FP or the Millî Görüş. The key element is that they 
understand the new direction and agree that it is the best alternative available in Turkish 
politics. With that consent, party members will support the party's programmes, even 
though it is not part of religious expression. In this regard, there is a kind of mutual 
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understanding between religious elements at many levels with party leaders who propose 
the new interpretation to conduct politics without religious preference.    
With the new approach, the AKP does not have a hegemonic structure that imposes 
a definitive interpretation of certain issues on all of its members. The party is able to 
provide a space for debate and discussion of every issue at different levels. The space given 
by the party is not dominated by one single interpretation and imposed on every member. 
This simplifies the way the party deals with members from different backgrounds. 
Therefore, the party can emphasise the process of policy preferences which is relatively 
open for different party members to participate. Furthermore, the party can also give more 
attention to members who perform better than others rather than emphasise their connection 
to ideology.  
 
III.2. The Moderation of the PKS   
III.2.1. The Development of the PKS 
III.2.1.1. Early Development 
Unlike the AKP in Turkey, which is known for its electoral success, the PKS’s 
achievements in the political arena are not comparable, since the party has not yet been able 
to become a major player in Indonesian politics. The party’s only notable electoral success 
came in the 2004 election when it doubled its support from 1.4 percent to 7.34 percent. 
Although this could be categorised as a great success, the party’s relatively stagnant result 
in the 2009 election showed its limited ability to develop the capability to challenge the 
major political parties or compete with other parties who have more popular figures. What 
makes the party more interesting than other parties in Indonesian politics is its ideological 
stance and its efforts to deal with the more pragmatic aspects of politics. Much research has 
been done recently to explore the party’s interpretation of Islam and the way the party 
develops its capabilities in gaining electoral votes, despite the PKS’s status as a relatively 
young and secretive Islamic movement. 
It is still difficult to uncover the reality behind the organisation as well as the 
ideology of the party. As a new party established after the end of the New Order era with a 
relatively young membership, there are aspects that are still uncovered. One of the 
interesting aspects of the party is its tendency to become a moderate party. This effort 
proved quite successful at the last two national elections in gaining the party significant 
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numbers of supporters, which has established the party as a medium-ranking political party. 
However, looking at the fact that the PKS is still an ideological party it is difficult, for 
some, to imagine that the party is able to transform itself into a real supporter of 
democracy. Dirk Tomsa (2011), for instance, expresses his concerns regarding the PKS’s 
ability to cope with Indonesian power politics as well its support for Islamist policies. 
Therefore, it is interesting to look at the party’s background. This gives a contradictory 
image of the party, which raises questions as to its true motivation for engaging in politics. 
This is a question that can be answered by exploring the nature of the party itself, as it is the 
product of the transformation of an Islamic movement. Studying the party’s historical 
background, then, has become a subject of interest for many researchers seeking an 
understanding of its unforeseen appearance in 1998 following the end of the Soeharto era. 
The PKS is different from other political parties in Indonesia as it was established 
by an underground Islamic movement known informally as ‘Gerakan Tarbiyah’ or the 
Tarbiyah Movement. The movement had no official name and the members usually just 
used the term ‘tarbiyah’ (education) to express the importance of routine and semi-intensive 
religious training for each member in an effort to refresh their understanding of and 
commitment to Islamic values. Among the members, gatherings of small groups are called 
by different names such as usrah, liqa’ or halaqah. The way of training its members is 
rather different from other, previously-established, Islamic organisations such as 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. The former organisation, which was established in 
1912 by Akhmad Dahlan, usually focuses on social services such as education, health care 
and other social activities. Those who are active in the organisation are usually recruited 
loosely from the schools and universities run by the organisation, as well as some of the 
descendants of the older generation. Nahdlatul Ulama, meanwhile, which was established 
in 1926 by Hasyim Asy’ari, is strongly focused on its religious boarding schools, both 
traditional and modern in the context of the method and curricula, which are to be found in 
many provinces of Indonesia, mainly in East Java.  
Unlike these organisations, both of which carry out tangible activities under a 
formal organisational structure, the Tarbiyah Movement chose to recruit and run its training 
without any official organisational form and operated as an underground movement. There 
were at least two different objectives that influenced the decision by its founders in the 
early 1980s. Firstly, the objective of purifying the understanding of Islamic values inspired 
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by the ideas of Hasan al-Banna was sensitive to political authority at that time. Secondly, 
society in general was immensely suspicious of Islamic movement, since there were many 
incidents involving Islamic movements. The New Order regime in the 1980s was 
particularly sensitive toward any activities related to Islam, especially after the Tanjung 
Priok incident in September 1984 when security forces clashed with a group of people, 
known as followers of religious sermons in the area, demanding the release of their fellows 
and left numbers of them dead. Therefore, recruiting new members informally was seen as 
an appropriate way of avoiding any political and social risks. 
The movement was established in the early 1980s by a complex combination of 
several groups of Muslim activists who were keen to combat the stagnation of Muslim 
society under the oppression of the state. The leaders of the movement were difficult to 
identify since it was a combination of figures from different generations who agreed to 
develop a new kind of religious teaching to spread Islamic understanding in Indonesian 
Muslim society. Most researchers who have explored the early phase of the movement 
agree on several components of the initial figures. They mention at least two elements from 
state universities and graduates of Middle Eastern universities (Damanik 2002; Furqon 
2004), as well as students from LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab or 
Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies) (Machmudi 2005; Furkon 2004), but in some 
individual cases there are also individuals or activists from other Islamic movements or 
organisations, who joined on different occasions. 
The first element mainly consists of the alumni of Islamic training activities run by 
the Salman Mosque at ITB (Institut Teknologi Bandung or Bandung Institute of 
Technology) in Bandung, West Java. The mosque was known as a centre of activities for 
Muslim students who wished to increase their understanding of an attachment to Islam in 
the 1970s to 1980s. An important figure in the development of the centre was Imaduddin 
Abdulrahim as part of his commitment to Islamic teaching. After his experience of an ‘un-
Islamic’ environment at the institute during his studentship from 1953, the opportunity to 
teach at the institute after graduation gave him a chance to initiate Islamic activities among 
the students (Naipaul 1981). Abdulrahim's strong Muslim family background encouraged 
him to have such motivation. His father was a naqib (an Islamic chief lawyer) and head of 
an Islamic school under the Deli Sultanate in Medan.  
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His project was part of the wider effort of Islamic teaching as a new strategy 
initiated by Muhammad Natsir, a former prime minister from 1950 to 1951, and his 
colleagues from the Islamic party of Masyumi, following the failure of political Islam 
during the early part of Soeharto’s reign. His effort to re-establish Masyumi under the new 
regime was refused by Soeharto and due to this rejection, Natsir, the leading figure of 
Masyumi, initiated the new strategy to leave political Islam and concentrate on Islamic 
preaching among the Muslim community through the foundation of DDII (Dewan Dakwah 
Islamiah Indonesia or Council for Islamic Preaching in Indonesia) in 1967.  
Imaduddin, along with EZ Muttaqien, was invited by Natsir to organise training for 
academicians in state universities in 1968. It is recorded that 40 academicians attended the 
training and, through them, Natsir hoped to spread Islamic understanding among university 
students. The attendants then initiated the development of Islamic centres in each 
institution, Imaduddin’s Salman in ITB being one of the most successful in developing 
methods of Islamic training for students. He developed methods of training through his 
knowledge of global Islamic movements as the head of LDMI (Lembaga Dakwah 
Mahasiswa Islam or Institute of Student Islamic Preaching), an organisation under HMI 
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or Muslim Student Association) that focuses on Islamic 
teaching. His position in that organisation led him to join IIFSO (International Islamic 
Federation of Student Organisations) and through its international network he was 
introduced to different ideas and methods of global Islamic movements. Two of those 
which were most attractive to him were Ikhwanul Muslimin and Jami’at Islami.  
 It is believed that Imaduddin was interested in their ideas and conceptual level 
(Damanik 2002: 92). According to this argument, Imaduddin took on one aspect of 
Ikhwan’s tools of teaching new generations through the implementation of usrah, which 
was then developed by his training’s alumni and other Muslim activists into different 
orientations. It seems Imaduddin adopted some aspects of Ikhwan’s training methods and 
adopted them to the Indonesian and Malaysian context. Therefore, his project was unlikely 
to have any relation with the Ikhwan as a movement. In one session in Bandung, Imaduddin 
recited one of Iqbal’s poems to encourage the trainees in Islamic understanding, while in 
another session the trainer guided a simulation of effective communication by using cards 
to show his effort to use as many sources as possible for the training (Naipaul 1981: 341-4).  
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His experience of teaching in ITM (Institut Teknologi Mara or Mara Institute of 
Technology) Malaysia from 1970 to 1973 was an opportunity for him to implement the 
usrah method among Malaysian students and he was admired as an excellent motivator 
who could stimulate young students to become aware of their wrongdoing and then learn 
Islam. However, it is still open to question whether he brought the idea of usrah to 
Malaysia and then implemented it at the time of ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or 
Islamic Youth Force of Malaysia) establishment or transferred it from Malaysia to 
Indonesia (Collins 2003; Damanik 2002: 72-3). Despite that question, the method of 
encouraging motivation and self-reflection among young students is similar in the 
experience of both Malaysian and Indonesian students. One of the PAS leaders explained 
that he was crying in front of Imaduddin following a self-reflection session after night-time 
prayers. The method was also implemented in the Salman mosque’s training and adopted 
by others, and it is also found in one of the Tarbiyah Movement’s techniques. 
Salman’s training activities were popular among the youngsters in urban areas and 
attracted many students from universities and high schools from big cities all over 
Indonesia. The training, called LMD (Latihan Mujahid Dakwah or Training for Preachers 
in Indonesia and Latihan Membina Diri or Training for Self-Education in Malaysia) 
explained the role of Islam as a holistic way of life, not just guidance for ritualism. Islam is 
not just a religion of the mosque, as Imaduddin criticises the concept of ‘religion’ to 
describe Islam, and he tended to use the term ‘din’ to express Islam as a complete guidance 
for every Muslim. 
The popularity of the Salman Mosque was a result of a mixture of the condition of 
Muslims in Indonesia as well as in the international context. In Indonesia, the New Order 
regime was opposed to political Islam after rejecting the idea of restoring Masyumi. 
Soeharto also rejected the possibility of hard-line leaders of Masyumi leading Parmusi, a 
new party to replace Masyumi, and forced the remaining Islamic parties to reorganise 
themselves into one single grouping, the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or the 
United Development Party) in 1973. Another problem for Muslims in Indonesia at that time 
was the initiation of the formalisation of the indigenous Javanese faith (kejawen) and the 
introduction of marriage law to compete with Islamic rule. There was suspicion among 
some parts of Muslim society that strategic positions within the regime were occupied by 
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Christians and nominal Muslim figures, thus leading the regime toward more secular and 
materialistic stands.        
The fact that the government was not supportive of student activism was also a 
significant factor. The policy of NKK/BKK (Normalisation of Campus Life) launched by 
Daud Yoesoef, the Minister of Education following the student protests in 1974 and 1978, 
pushed students to focus purely on their studies. The policy forced the students to study in 
more limited time with a new scheme of curricula meaning that they had less opportunity to 
get involved in more dynamic activism. The other consequences were the banning of all 
student organisations outside university and the government only allowing formal student 
organisations within the universities. The result was the decline of HMI, which was 
affected along with other student organisations, and the students had to face strict control 
from the university across the country.            
In that situation, students tried to develop alternative activisms and transformed into 
small, intensive discussion forums that attracted many critical students. Students who had 
more attachment toward Islam also searched for other alternatives. Salman became the 
destination for students from Jakarta and Bandung, while those in Yogyakarta and Central 
Java gathered in Yogyakarta’s Solahuddin Mosque. Another mosque which became a 
centre for Islamic activities was Arif Rahman Hakim in Salemba, Jakarta, but stricter 
controls meant the mosque had limited space to create more flexible activities. These three 
mosques were the continuation of Natsir’s idea, with Salman Mosque under the supervision 
of Imaduddin becoming a magnet for students who wanted an alternative channel for their 
concerns.  
Global Muslim dynamics also contributed to their attachment to Islamic activism. 
The Iranian Revolution was an intriguing event which encouraged young Muslims to praise 
the struggle against oppression in the name of Islam, even though most of them did not 
comprehend the anatomy of the revolution. The figure of Ayatollah Khomeini was thus 
very popular and his writings, as well as those of other Iranian scholars such as Ali 
Syari’ati and Murtadha Mutahhari, were then widely translated. One of the members of the 
PKS who joined the Tarbiyah Movement in 1984 explains that his appreciation of 
Khomeini led him to read many of Syari’ati’s writings; even though his subject in 
university was maths. Later, he expressed his regret at encountering Marxist elements 
within Syaria’ti’s ideas after he joined the training.  
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His disappointment reflects the search for alternative thought from international 
Muslim sources at a time when the two major Muslim social organisations, Nahdhatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah were unable to escape from the oppression of the state and 
could not be the alternative inspiring organisations for the Muslim political agenda. The 
willingness to find an alternative inspirational activism led some to attend the sermons in 
Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. The preachers who gave sermons in the mosques, such as 
Tonie Ardhie and Abdul Qadir Djaelani, criticised the regime’s policy of introducing 
Pancasila as the single ideology for all organisations in the country. This tension led to the 
‘Black September’ incident on 12 September 1984. 
A local leader of the PKS explained that in the mid 1990s he attended the sermons 
as part of his awareness of the condition of the Muslim society to seek an alternative to the 
regime’s policy (Appendix B.5.). According to him, the sermons were very emotional and 
attracted many youngsters, especially when Tonie Ardhie and Abdul Qadir Djaelani were at 
the podium. His attendance of the sermons was also the result of his reading of Syari’ati’s 
thoughts in finding the spirit of change in society. The event itself led to stricter 
surveillance by the security forces of preachers throughout the country with every preacher 
required to have approval from the local military authority before giving a sermon for the 
weekly Friday prayer or other events. 
This is an example of strong spirit to defend Islamic faith and change society which 
led some of the youth to attend the Salman training. One of the characteristics of 
Imaduddin’s thoughts on Islam was a focus on Tawhid as the basic teaching for the trainers. 
Imaduddin’s principle toward tawhid was very strict as, according to him, smoking may 
lead a Muslim to abandon his or her syahadah, the basic oath to be a Muslim. Smoking 
might lead to the annulment of one’s syahadah when it makes smokers feel happier and 
calmer than does the remembrance of Allah, thus replacing the meaning of Allah as the 
ultimate source of a Muslim’s happiness, hope, courage and fear. He is consistent in 
emphasising this principle, which became one of his main themes in a series of private 
sermons broadcast in the mid-1990s.    
 The understanding of syahadah in the training encouraged the trainees to continue 
the spirit of being true Muslims after the training. Some of the alumni of the training then 
set up an informal forum to discuss the possibility of spreading the understanding among 
other youngsters. However, Salman was not dedicated to building and supervising such a 
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project and some of the alumni then met alumni from Middle Eastern universities, mainly 
from Madinah, such as Hilmi Aminuddin, Salim Segaf al-Djufrie, Abdullah Said 
Baharmus, and Acep Abdul Syukur (Salman 2006: 187-8; Furkon 2004: 132). These 
brought ideas of Islamic movements inspired by Ikhwanul Muslimin and wanted to adopt 
its methods of social movement in Indonesia (Damanik 2002: 97). With a fresh knowledge 
of Islam gained from studying in Islamic universities in the Middle East, as well as new 
ideas and methods adopted from the Ikhwan, they agreed to supervise the youngsters and 
build a new network of spreading Islamic understanding to wider society.  
The discussion among the researchers of the Tarbiyah Movement partly focuses on 
the origins of the movement. For Damanik (2002), the alumni played a significant role by 
giving new knowledge and methods to the devout and eager young activists from Salman 
mosque. The agreement between the two parties was not coincidental since they had 
common objectives, especially in spreading a new understanding of Islam to Indonesian 
society. Each party also provided what was needed in order to achieve the objectives of 
Islamic purification by each side. The scholars had an understanding of Islamic thought and 
methods through a solid network while the Salman alumni provided ‘ideal raw material’ as 
early volunteers and become the first agents to recruit more youth to join the training. In 
this relationship, the Middle Eastern alumni became the major agent for the entrance of the 
Ikhwan’s ideas and methods to Indonesian society.        
For Salman (2006: 188), the argument of the Middle Eastern return is not too 
convincing since they were not the only Indonesians studying in the region and they did not 
come with the same ideas as the founders of the PKS. However, even though it is regarded 
as a weak argument, the attachment of the figures to the Ikhwan’s idea could be traced to 
their relation to the universities where they studied. As mentioned before, most of them 
were graduates of Madinah University, which is significant since it is known as the hub for 
the dissemination of the Ikhwan’s ideas (Machmudi 2005: 61-8). The foundation of the 
university in 1961 was supported by King Saud, who gave financial aid and political 
guarantees for the Ikhwan’s leading figures, such as Muhammad Quthb, brother of Sayyid 
Quthb who was prosecuted by Nasser in 1954. Nasser’s tough policy towards the Ikhwan 
forced hundreds of them to flee abroad to find political refuge. After years of trying to 
persuade the Saudi king, he finally gave them permission to establish a university after it 
was explained that Nasser had manipulated al-Azhar University for his own interests 
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(Rosen 2008: 122). For the King, the university was seen as a chance to challenge the 
influence of the al-Azhar facilitated by the Ikhwan’s knowledge. 
 Having acknowledged that Madinah University became the centre of 
internationalisation of the Ikhwan’s ideas due to the dominant numbers of international 
students, the possibility of the entrance of the Ikhwan’s influence was apparent. 
Nevertheless, whether the entrance of the Ikhwan’s influence was a deliberate manoeuvre is 
still debatable and difficult to confirm. The secretive character of the Tarbiyah Movement 
has made any confirmation difficult, while the leading figures of the movement only admit 
that such influence is the only possible connection between them. The Ikhwan also 
admitted the possible link through the transfer of the movement’s ideas around the world as 
literatures on the ideas are widely spread (Helbawy 2009). Therefore, concerns that the 
Tarbiyah Movement is the representative of the Ikhwan in Indonesia remain unconfirmed.  
  Supported by the Middle Eastern scholars, some of the Salman alumni were then 
trained, supervised and organised into an underground network. To simplify the spread of 
Islamic purification, they produced a simple method of teaching using arrows to describe 
the understanding of Islamic concepts and refering them to specific verses of the Qur’an. 
This method of teaching proved quite simple for the first trained generation of Salman 
alumni to expand their understanding while it was also useful for them to transfer the 
knowledge to their colleagues in universities and schools. The method has proven to be 
effective as a basis for youngsters in the urban areas who lacked the opportunity to study 
Islam seriously at the Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) operated and supervised mainly 
under NU members. They do not have to leave their study as required by the boarding 
school model. While those who want to study Islamic knowledge in the pesantren may need 
to spend the whole of his or her youth studying classical books from different religious 
teachers, most of them are students whose subjects are the technical sciences rather than 
social and religious science (Salman 2006: 178). 
The first group trained by the alumni then tried to develop contacts with other 
Salman alumni to initiate a wider network of training in different universities. This call was 
met by an enthusiastic response from many students as it was suitable to the situation as a 
better alternative to student activism, which had lost its direction under the tight control of 
the universities. The early activities of the movement focused on small study groups 
detached from student activism. These usually concentrated on basic Islamic themes and 
80 
 
 
moral issues straight to the basic understanding of tawhid or aqidah. However, as an 
informal network they avoided discussing domestic political issues and shifted the focus to 
the general Muslim condition and international issues in the Muslim world. The training 
usually took place in mosques, mainly in universities and schools, or sometimes in one of 
the members’ houses or community mosques.  
At this stage, the important role of Rahmat Abdullah was apparent. Even though he 
did not study in any Middle Eastern universities, his knowledge of classical sources of 
Islamic knowledge was comparable with his Middle Eastern counterparts. What made him 
important in the early attempts to make the Ikhwan’s methods more suitable to local needs 
without demeaning its character as a strong alternative capable of changing society in the 
eyes of the young urban Muslim generation (Salman 2006: 189) was his understanding of 
local people, since he had spent his youth in the local community both as a religious teacher 
and actively involved in local youth activism. 
  The small numbers of the first generation involved in the effort of spreading their 
influence had to deal with a wide area of training network in several main universities, at 
first mainly in Java. This led to a very tight schedule for training the growing numbers of 
new trainees, with, members sometimes travelling long distances to give training in other 
cities. Therefore, it was not unusual that their study was sacrificed for the development of 
the training. In some cases, they had to move to another area or province to initiate and 
direct the new training. Following the network’s transformation into a political party in 
1998, some of these became the head of the local party branch. Examples of this first 
generation of trainers in the higher party structure of the PKS are the former president, 
Tifatul Sembiring, who was a student in a private science and technology institute, and Aus 
Hidayat, who is now head of the party’s Organisation Discipline branch.   
At the same time, another entry-point for the influence of Ikhwanul Muslimin was 
LIPIA, an Islamic education institution sponsored by the Saudi government. The original 
objective of the establishment of the institution in 1980 was to teach Indonesians a salafi 
understanding of Islam to prevent the spread of the influence of shi’ism following the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979. However, some of the teachers in the institute had strong 
relationships with the Ikhwan, who were protected by the Saudi royal family. These 
teachers then introduced the movement’s ideas and methods to their students through 
informal contacts. Some of these students were encountering the ideas of the Ikhwan for the 
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first time, while others knew the idea before attending the school. The alumni of the LIPIA 
schools are quite influential in the movement since their understanding of Islamic 
knowledge and, of course, Arabic is ahead of that of other members who only learned as a 
product of their informal training.  
 Like the students from the Middle Eastern universities, not all of those who 
attended the institute were influenced by their ideas. One of those who was influenced was 
Anis Matta, who is now the General Secretary of the PKS (as well as the PK) and who was 
recently elected vice- chairman of the House of Representatives. He is one example of the 
product of this path despite his strong background of activism in Muhammadiyah. He 
explains, in one of his sermons about his youth, that there was something different about 
the idea of understanding Islam and the way the activism was set up. He joined LIPIA after 
rejecting the chance to study at the University of Hasanuddin, Makassar, because LIPIA 
offered financial support. However, to say that LIPIA is purely a recruiting ground for the 
Tarbiyah Movement is misleading because other alumni have different preferences. These 
include Ja’far Umar Thalib, the founder of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warriors), a salafi militia, 
and Ulil Absar Abdalla, a leading figure in JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal or Liberal Islamic 
Network).  
Despite each member’s different pathway of entering and being involved in the 
network, there is a common structurein the training model. Every study group has its own 
tutor or murabbi who trains the members of the group of between 4 and 12 people or even 
more depending on the situation. When the number of a group exceeds the ideal proportion, 
the group is split into two or transferred to another tutor who also works closely with the 
previous tutor. The tutor encourages members of the halaqah or usrah to spread the 
understanding of Islam, not only in universities, but also in high schools. This 
encouragement has created networks between groups from different universities, high 
schools and mosques based on the relationships between tutors and trainers at different 
levels. A member in the movement will then have two functions, either as a trainer or a 
trainee, creating a pyramid model of community with relatively limited links between them, 
especially at different levels. The only close interaction between members comes through 
activities within the group itself with the tutor, or, sometimes, in a gathering involving 
different groups under one tutor. Consequently, members usually only know about the 
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movement from their tutor and do not know other members of other groups from different 
places.  
Although the development of the network was quite slow at first, it gradually grew 
to recruit more new trainees. The number of members that could be recruited was limited 
by the political situation, which meant they were unable to carry out massive and attractive 
recruitment activities. Personal recruitment was the most common method of finding new 
recruits. A documentary film on Rahmat Abdullah (d. 2005), one of the founders of the PK, 
clearly shows the process of this personal recruitment when an already recruited member 
invites his friend to join the training (Sang Murabbi, 2008). Most of the new recruits were 
students from public universities since most of the first trained groups maximised their 
contacts in the universities. The same pattern also applied to the newly recruited trainees, 
who were encouraged to expand the recruitment to familiar environments. One of the most 
fertile sites for university students was their previous secondary schools where they set up 
networks to supervise student organisations as respectable alumni, in some cases making 
new contacts with the students as non alumni to arrange training sessions. After years of 
training, the trainees were pouring into universities across the country and strengthening the 
movement’s presence in the universities.  
 With the more conducive political situation for Islamic social and cultural 
expression in the early 1990s, recruitment became more diverse through formal institutions. 
In universities and schools, training sessions were arranged and organised officially by 
which new members were introduced to the training. Usually, these were organised by 
university and secondary school student organisations offering after class activities. Others 
were arranged in the community, especially in the mosques, as well as social organisations. 
Members who had graduated from education and started work also played a large role in 
spreading the network in their new offices. The movement’s alumni from institutions which 
required working in every corner of the country, such as STAN (Sekolah Tinggi Akuntansi 
Negara or State College of Accountancy) and STIS (Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Statistik or State 
College of Statistics) were significant in this development. By the time of the 1999 
election, the movement already had approximately 50,000 members who helped set up the 
party’s organisation across the country. This is one of the reasons for the movement’s 
ability to rapidly establish well organized PK representation in almost every province. 
Through this web of networks, even though most of them might not know each other 
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except through social activities run by the members, more new members were recruited and 
helped to develop more influential social activism in order to introduce the movement to 
wider society.  
 Inspired by the Ikhwan’s methods, the movement also introduced the stages of 
generating a better society. These stages are known internally as orbits (mihwar), and focus 
on different levels of objectives, mihwar thanzhimi, sya’bi, mu’assasi, and daulah 
(Takariawan 2010), which are implemented successively. The first stage focuses on the 
effort to develop individuals who are strongly influenced by Islamic values in a certain 
community organisation. The organisation functions as an arena where every individual can 
experience an Islamic environment, which is useful for every individual to develop their 
sense of being part of a solid community (jama’ah). The objective of this process is to train 
members who are qualified to carry out dakwah activities embedded with a strong 
individual and communal Islamic character. This stage was successfully implemented 
during the secretive stage of the movement until its effort to set up different social 
institutions related to dakwah and education. 
    The movement prioritised the educational sector. Having been benefited by the 
education system as its main basis of recruitment for generating a devout new generation, 
they acknowledged the importance of the educational sector. The first important 
educational institution was to provide a better understanding of formal Islamic disciplines 
for their growing membership as well as the public. Led by Abdul Hasib, some of the 
members set up a foundation called Al Hikmah in South Jakarta to focus on formal Islamic 
training programmes. The foundation and the mosque were to become the centre for the 
movement’s intellectual and spiritual activism. Intellectual activities included Arabic 
language, tafsir or interpretation of Qur’anic verses, hadith or understanding of the 
Prophetic traditions, tahsin or improving reading of Qur’an, tahfizh or remembering 
Qur’anic verses, and fiqh or Islamic jurisprudence. Through these programmes the 
foundation aims to generate more capable preachers for public sermons in the community.  
In the early 1990s, the mosque became a centre of spiritual activities for the Jakarta-
based members to offer night prayers together, especially at weekends. The mosque was 
usually full with night prayers attended by hundreds of youngsters and members of the 
network. At that time, especially during Ramadhan, there was no space available. During 
the holy month the mosque organised Tarawih and night prayers reading one juz (one-
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thirtieth part of the Qur’an) every night and introducing i’tikaf in the final ten days of the 
month. In the meantime, some of the members also made contact with other mosques and 
Islamic foundations. As a result, the congregations for night prayers were held constantly in 
many mosques which were filled with hundreds of youngsters. Public sermons were also 
held in many locations, the most important of which was at Al-Baraka Mosque in Tebet, 
which collaborated with a famous cleric from the At-Tahiriyyah foundation with Khairu 
Ummah, an organisation for clerics set up by the movement in 1989. Yet again, hundreds of 
youngsters attended the sermons. It was the Khairu Ummah which also provided preachers 
to visit many provinces to spread Islamic teachings among the urban upper-middle class 
(Hasan 2009: 17). Some of these were then entrusted with supervising religious activities in 
big companies. The successful penetration was supported by its network of university 
graduates who worked in different companies across the country.    
The other educational institution was Nurul Fikri, which introduced an integrated 
curriculum of Islamic knowledge into public curricula required by the state. Beginning 
from the primary school level, the foundation has been successful in developing a 
secondary school as well as a boarding school and it has become a highly respected 
integrated school. Its reputation has attracted many parents to send their children to the 
school and this has inspired the growth of similar schools initiated by members of the 
movement in major cities throughout Indonesia. The schools are quite easily recognisable 
since they always put the title IT (Islam Terpadu or Integrated Islamic Schools) in the name 
of each school. The school network now extends to not less than 700 schools across the 
country from kindergarten to secondary level (Hasan 2009: 17) and the foundation now has 
expanded its activities to focus on training programmes for university students to give them 
basic leadership skills and materials along with Islamic knowledge.    
The initiation of Nurul Fikri was part of the process of penetrating the community 
without focusing on religious subjects. However, even though the school model is an 
attempt to achieve more respect in other subjects, the image of Islam was still immense. 
During that period of the early 1990s, the vocabulary of the movement was still dominated 
by the mobilisation and recruitment of new members, which was now taking place in the 
social arena. It was then that the second stage of mihwar sya’bi was emphasised for every 
member. Members were encouraged to get involved in society and seek social recognition, 
especially in the religious aspect. Inviting their neighbours to pray in the mosque was 
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strongly encouraged, especially for males, to open communications with the community. 
With this social recognition, they were able to set up local activities involving the youth, 
mainly based around the mosque. Many different youth activities were arranged in various 
forms including outdoor and overnight activities, along with similar activities run by 
university and high school students under LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus or Institution 
for Preaching in Campus) and ROHIS (Rohani Islam or Islamic Spirituality). The objective 
of this stage was to expand the movement’s influence in society by socialising the ideas of 
the movement and developing strategic efforts to recruit new members.  
 The growing numbers of the movement as well as its influence on the religious 
atmosphere has encouraged the establishment of publications and printing companies 
related to the movement. Among the most influential publications in the early 1990s was 
the bi-weekly magazine Sabili founded by Zaenal Muttaqien, one of the first recruited 
members. Meanwhile, other members were focusing on publishing translations of the 
Ikhwan’s leading figures through several publishing companies. The former MP Abdi 
Sumaithi, since elected as senator for Banten, who translated many of Hasan al-Banna’s 
books under the name Abu Ridho, was linked to Intermedia in Solo, while Tifatul 
Sembiring, the former president of the PKS and Minister of Communication and 
Information Technology, established Asaduddin Press in Jakarta. An institution called 
SIDIK (Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer or Study Centre for the 
Contemporary Islamic World) which focused on international issues was also established in 
1992 by Almuzammil Yusuf, Habib Abu Bakar Al Habsyi and Abu Ridho (Collins 2003: 
9). At this point, the strongest position of the movement’s supporters was the student when 
Tarbiyah activists slowly managed to take over strategic positions of student organisations 
in major public universities. Its solid and relatively well-organised activities made them 
quite successful in gaining the sympathy of other students.  
 The process of penetrating society was taking place along with the ideas of Hasan 
al-Banna, the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin, who said that dissemination of Islamic 
understanding to society is the ultimate goal of revivalism (Dasuki 2009). Therefore, the 
stage of the mihwar sya’bi was also focused on the establishing of many activities that can 
be used to transfer understanding according to the movement. At this stage, there was no 
real possibility of entering the political arena since al-Banna himself suggested avoiding 
any political controversy that may disturb the process. Hence, when the political opening 
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became available after the resignation of Soeharto in May 1998, the only prepared element 
under the control of the Tarbiyah Movement at that time was its student activists. Some of 
the leaders of student organisations who had links with the Tarbiyah Movement joined with 
other student organisationsto force the resignation.  
   It seems that the political opening came too early for the movement to respond to 
the unexpected situation. In the second phase of the 1990s, the movement still focused on 
the objective of the mihwar sya’bi and most of its related institutions and activists were still 
busy expanding their ideas. As a new community dominated by the young generation they 
were not yet able to penetrate strategic positions in most aspects in the country. There was 
also limited attention given to the development of a serious economic agenda for the 
movement. Mihwar mu’assasi as the third stage of the dakwah project had to be responded 
to with limited resources, let alone the fourth stage of mihwar daulah, because both phases 
were still in the theory and vision stage rather than in practice. Therefore, the movement 
had to examine to the political opportunity very carefully before it responded by taking the 
rather uneasy decision to establish a political party.     
  
III.2.1.2. ‘Reformasi’ and Early Disputes 
The decision to form a political party following the fall of Soeharto was a difficult process. 
His resignation marked the starting point of ‘reformasi’ (reformation) to reflect people’s 
demand for change. Reformasi meant a great opportunity for Indonesians to express their 
political rights by establishing independent political parties, something which was 
impossible under the New Order regime. The Department of Justice noted that 148 newly 
established political parties applied for registration following Soeharto’s ouster as 
corporation (Ismanto 2004: 58), illustrating the massive desire to participate in politics 
combined with the policy of President Habibie to ease the political situation.  
The Tarbiyah Movement was not very eager to respond to the political change with 
any political action. They were quite satisfied with the involvement of student activists 
from its network, so the leadership felt that their contribution to the political change was 
enough. However, there were some ideas that the new political openness was also an 
opportunity that had to be responded to quickly for the movement to be formally recognised 
by the public for the wider context of dakwah. Political recognition and involvement in 
politics is a chance to offer an alternative for building the Indonesian society and state 
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through the political process, and this chance became available during the unstable 
transition situation under the new president.  
The idea came from two senior members, Abu Ridho and Mashadi, who felt that 
forming a political party was the best way to realise the movement’s intentions since the 
political system was undergoing a period of change (Mashadi 2008). They thought that it 
was a political opportunity as well as an historic chance, which should not be abandoned. 
According to their arguments, it was a great chance for the movement to make a significant 
contribution to the country within the new democratic political system. According to them, 
the main motivation of the establishment of a political party was ‘morals for politics’ or 
politics based on Islamic morality. It was also a chance to show their position and values to 
the public.  
The idea was initially rejected and, at first it did not gain support in a high-level 
meeting, but the rejection was not final because the meeting recommended that every 
coordinating area consult the members from that area. After a series of discussions among 
the representatives of the 11 dakwah areas in Indonesia and discussions within each area 
there was no definite decision. To break the deadlock a survey was conducted of the middle 
level of the movement’s members. The result showed that almost 60 percent of the 
members agreed with the idea of involving the movement in the political arena by forming 
a political party (Collins 2003). The main intention behind the establishment of a political 
party was that the political situation gave the movement the opportunity to gain political 
recognition and contribute to the development of a new Indonesia in the democratisation 
process. The movement thus entered the third phase of mihwar siyasi ahead of schedule.  
The rest of the membership mainly accepted the decision without any hesitation 
even though they were against the idea of having a political party. In the survey there were 
members from some areas who did not support the idea of a political party; however they 
agreed to establish local representation of the party because the decision came from the 
national level. It means that they felt they had to obey the decision whatever the local 
position. For the local leadership of Central Java province, for instance, the decision was 
accepted without any disappointment. Their acceptance was based on the understanding 
that they are part of the network, so whatever the decision of the central leadership they 
will accept it after giving their inputs or arguments. According to one of the leaders of the 
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local branch, the reluctance of the area toward forming a political party was mainly based 
on the fact that they were not ready yet to enter the political arena (Harris 2008).  
 In training for local political sections for every regency and city branch two months 
after the foundation of PK in the Javanese provinces, most of the trainees were not qualified 
to act as real politicians. It clearly showed the unpreparedness and lack of qualification of 
members from remote areas to deal with political activity. Most of the sections in the local 
party branch dealing with politics and law were occupied by members who had no real 
knowledge of politics and law. Some of them were computer technicians or teachers and 
they were being pushed by the situation to serve for the new political structure. One of the 
local party officials explained that even though he had a good background in law from his 
bachelor’s degree, he had since abandoned it and become a computer trader. He abandoned 
his degree for years due to the informal disregard for law as studied in the state universities 
as secular. For some members, law was regarded as thagut (idolatory), which had to be 
opposed, not to be studied. Now the members had to deal with the arena that they had 
previously regarded with disdain.  
 This clearly shows that basically the movement was not in a position to enter the 
political arena with confidence. Even in the stage of mihwar sya’bi, the movement in 
general had not been successful in penetrating the social structures of Muslim society to 
compete with other established Muslim social organisations. The membership was mainly 
young and dominated by students or pupils, while the more senior members were still at 
middle or lower-middle levels in their professional careers or had very limited access to 
capital for business. The maturity of the movement in the social structure was projected to 
be achieved in 2020 or beyond (Qodari 2000). However, as part of the movement’s network 
there was almost no choice for them to do things in a different way, especially for lower 
level members. 
 For members who had more capacity to express their opposition the situation was 
quite different. In one case a leading figure in Central Java resigned from his position as 
one of the leaders in the province. He originally supported the decision of political party 
activism, but after careful study of materials related to the ideas of Hasan al-Banna and 
Ikhwanul Muslimin he came to the conclusion that a political party was not a favourable 
vehicle for dakwah (Kastori 2008). He also concluded that the mixture of dakwah and 
politics would lead to a difficult situation since politics required a more pragmatic and 
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mundane approach. The consequence of his decision was clear that he was then regarded as 
an outsider and the party did not offer him any position. The only relationship remaining 
between them was informal consultation from some members without any significant effect 
on the party’s activism.  
 A similar case happened with Ihsan Tanjung when he explicitly opposed the 
decision to form a political party (Appendix B.8.). However, unlike the previous case, he 
did not agree with the way that the Movement’s leadership influenced others regarding the 
decision to establish a party. Opposing such a decision was quite severe, even for him who 
was among the second layer of the Movement’s leadership. The party did not develop any 
formal position for him at all as he was regarded as a member who did have any right to get 
involved and contribute to the political project. Although he is still regarded as a member of 
the movement, his only role is in doing dakwah outside the party structure.     
 There were also some members who felt that the decision was problematic, 
especially in the relation of the movement’s basic objective of dakwah with politics. A 
senior member at a provincial level said that in his province most of the members opposed 
the idea of forming a political party (Harris 2008). However, they took the position that 
whatever the decision made by the leadership they would agree and follow. His position 
describes the reaction of most members to the decision, except some of the senior members 
and other critical members. Due to their very limited numbers and the euphoria and 
optimism of the membership as a whole toward the new project they were not significantly 
influential. The only opposing action was made by a second line leader who resigned from 
his position, not because of the decision, but due to the way the decision was made by the 
top leadership. Nevertheless, most of the members agreed to follow the final decision and 
to develop a party infrastructure based on the movement’s network throughout the country. 
It can be said that the acceptance of the leadership’s decision is typical of the movement 
and reflected many occasions within the party activism afterward.   
The party was finally declared on 9 August 1998 using the popular term in Islamic 
politics: justice. It was then known as PK (Partai Keadilan or Justice Party). Many 
observers have difficulties in identifying the basis of the party because other Islamic parties 
are usually based on mainstream Islamic social organisations such as Nahdhatul Ulama, 
Muhammadiyah, DDII as the descendant of Masyumi, a prominent Islamic party in the 
1950s, or other, less significant Islamic social bases. The difficulties are actually natural 
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because of the existence of the tarbiyah movement itself as an informal movement. In fact, 
the party was not built in a vacuum of any social bases, but was created by a new 
generation of ‘young educated Muslims.’ The leader of PK officially confirmed that the 
party’s main basis is dakwah activists in the mosques who have developed their network 
nationwide as well as abroad in Europe, the US, and the Middle East (Ismail in Hassan et 
al. 1998: 30-1). 
 From the beginning of the foundation, the party was known as an organised party 
with its discipline, clean and controlled campaigns attended by mostly young men and 
women with headscarves. The party also did not have any prominent or well-known leader 
within its structure and the president of the party, Nurmahmudi Ismail, was a researcher in 
a government institution who gained his doctorate from an American university. At first, 
the movement sought to establish a broad-based Islamic party in conjunction with other 
Islamic elements. This effort failed due to disagreements on the basis of the party. The 
important Islamic figure of Amien Rais rejected the idea of an Islamic party because it 
would limit the broad plural and nationalistic agenda within the democratic system 
(Sumargono 2008). The failure to recruit Amien Rais to lead the Islamic coalition then led 
the Movement to form its own political party.   
In the first democratic election after the New Order era in 1999, the party did not 
gain a significant amount of voters and failed to pass the electoral threshold of 3 percent of 
the voters and their seven members of parliament joined with another party, the National 
Mandate Party (PAN), to form the Reformation Faction in the House of People’s 
Representatives. Because of its failure to reach the minimum required number of 
supporters, the party transformed to a different party, the PKS in 2004 following the failure 
of some small political parties to amend the threshold criteria.  
The party itself is described differently by scholars as a political party and  as a 
transformed Islamic movement. The latter depiction of the party became the mainstream 
image by placing a significant focus on the transformation process which gives an idea of 
the original identity as an Islamic movement. Initial research by Damanik (2002) was then 
followed by Furkon (2004) and others such as Salman (2006) and Rahmat (2008) who give 
attention to its ideological credence. However, the involvement in politics has given a 
complexity in identifying the true nature of the party. Because of its nature as a transformed 
Islamic movement, according to Mahmudi (2006 and 2008), the party is a unique entity that 
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is difficult to fit with existing categorisation of Islamism. By doing that, the reason for 
political activism of the party can be understood since it is influenced by global ideas of 
Islamism mainly from Ikhwanul Muslimin and its derivation in several countries that gives 
a specific understanding of political Islam. Based on that, he argues that political 
participation is an integrated part of the ‘accommodative approach’ of the PKS as a direct 
consequence of interpretation so that politics and dakwah can work together (2010).  
However, the success of the party in politics is mainly due to its religious discourses 
and policy positions. It is part of its ability to develop its representation as the opponent of 
corruptive practice in different levels of Indonesian politics, locally and nationally (Sidel 
2008). There is also an aspect of successful mobilisation in the grass root level supported 
mainly by youth to work and interact with local residents (Hamayotsu 2011a) which is in 
many cases significant to boost the party’s votes in elections. Hence, the interaction with 
the so called secular elements of democracy has given opportunity for the PKS to shape 
their understanding of Islam in politics. It is slightly different with Machmudi who sees 
accommodative politics as an embedded value which is more related to Schwedler’s 
reference on moderation, Permata (2008) argues that there is a significant influence of outer 
environment to its understanding. Political opening after the fall of Soeharto is an historical 
chance that should be maximised which is then unrelated with what the Tarbiyah 
movement understand. In that contex, the PKS’s experience is then connected with the 
understanding of moderation as a result of interaction with the political system as noted by 
Sanchez-Cuenza before moving to substantive acceptance toward democratic principles. 
Expressed differently, it is said that the PKS accommodate the democratic system due to 
limited options since it does not also have a strong and massive local infrastructure (Sidel 
2008: 27).  
In fact, this image is rather different in the perspective of party institutionalisation. 
Tomsa (2010: 151-6), for instance, emphasises the unique nature of the party. It is said that 
the party has a distinctive organisation compare to other political parties because it inherits 
the network of the Tarbiyah Movement. The commitment of the party’s cadres is very high 
as they are working as if they are in a military structure (Hamayotsu 2011b: 151). In this 
regard, ideology is the basis of the cadres’ attitude since the process of internalisation is 
still preserved as one of the main pillars of the party. Corresponding to that image this 
research also confirms the contribution of the internalisation process to maintain cadres’ 
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loyalty especially in dealing with difficulties during and after the party’s effort to be more 
pragmatic. More than that, it offers a more indepth outlook of how the ideological 
internalisation works as shown in the standpoint of some of the cadres to the policy of 
moderation which is still generally absent in recent writing on the PKS. 
 
III.2.2. Aspects of Moderation 
III.2.2.1. Attracting Voters and Electoral Achievements 
The declaration of the PK on 8 August 1998 marked the final decision of the Tarbiyah 
Movement to enter the political arena based on an internal network basis. Nur Mahmudi 
Ismail was chosen to lead the party after negotiated efforts to establish a single Islamic 
party failed. His appointment was actually rather unfortunate for the new party since he was 
not a public figure as he served as a researcher at BPPT (Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan 
Teknologi or Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology). His name was 
even unfamiliar to many members of the Movement, leading to uncertainty regarding its 
prospect of passing the electoral threshold in the 1999 election. Meanwhile, many of the 
movement’s members were themselves quite anxious as to how to deal with political 
activism to get as many votes as possible. It was this unpromising situation that the party 
had to confront to secure an electoral foothold.  
 Interestingly, the party was quite confident with the social basis that had been 
developed so far. In the 1999 election, only one year after its foundation, the party targeted 
getting 10 percent of the votes. On many occasions the party leadership described the 
calculation of the ‘realistic’ target and convinced the members to do their best. One 
example of the calculation of significant support was the visits to the charismatic leaders of 
Islamic boarding schools or pesantren. In many areas, especially rural, religious leaders are 
regarded as figures to be followed including in politics for political preference. The party 
leadership described the visits as constructive and supportive where the local religious 
leaders accepted their ideas and also supported their efforts to uphold Islamic vision in 
politics.  
As an Islamic party, the PK tried to maximise its image as a party that would 
enhance Islamic values. However, unlike other Islamic parties, the PK wanted to give a 
more modern impression to the public since most of its members were of the younger 
generation with a relatively high level of education. For this reason, the appointment of Nur 
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Mahmudi, an American trained researcher, as the first president was designed to give the 
appearance of a new generation of young Muslims who were able to combine religiosity 
and modernity.  
 As a political expression of an Islamic movement, it was not surprising that the PK 
then developed a strong image of Islam during their campaign as part of their understanding 
of the significance of religion both for individuals and society. The spirit of Islamic 
purification was the basis for the members to support the party campaign, as a result of 
which many of its public gatherings were attended by significant numbers. For a 
completely new party, the ability to attract large crowds in public campaigning was quite 
appealing, especially as the congregation was also peaceful and impeccable. Compared to 
other parties’ rallies which were either attended by too few people or too crowded, and, in 
many cases, led to trouble on the streets, the PK’s way of organising gatherings was quite 
distinctive. However, it is understandable that the party should be able to manage such 
public campaigns since most of those in attendance were part of the Movement’s network.   
The main themes of the party during the campaign were on Islam, especially on the 
willingness to endorse Islamic sharia. Nur Mahmudi, the first president, also expressed the 
eagerness for the endorsement, which was paralleled by the party’s slogans during 
campaigning for the 1999 election. Corresponding with the spirit of advancing religious 
values during their training, the party’s cadres emphasized the message of dispensing 
justice according to Islamic perspectives. The members also supported the party’s 
campaign based on the understanding that the party would deliver the spirit of Islamism in 
society. To reflect the party’s idealism, the PK chose Didin Hafiduddin as its presidential 
candidate. Didin Hafiduddin was known as a Muslim scholar who specialised in alms as 
well as the head of an Islamic university in Bogor, West Java province. As a candidate, he 
represented himself as a Muslim scholar who was not actually prepared for political 
debates. Most of his arguments were based on his understanding of Islamic interpretation 
such as governing on the basis of morals. Anis Matta said that the willingness to reform 
Indonesian society needed a figure who was not only a civilian in contrast to the previous 
leader, but also a religious person (Jawa Pos, 14 March 1999).  
 Although the PK tried to lessen its ideological weight during the campaign, the 
party was still regarded as a stronghold Islamist party. Hafiduddin was a strong figure for 
Muslim scholars (ulama) and committed himself to an Islamic social activism. He stressed 
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the efforts to build a better political system to counter any forms of political 
authoritarianism under the control of any one person. According to him, to express that 
vision, the party should always uphold the name of Allah (God) during campaigning 
(Republika, 28 May 1999). In front of the PK’s cadre, Hafiduddin represented the image of 
the true Islamic party character. The message of eliminating all forms of immoral behaviour 
according to Islam was also apparent such as stopping prostitution and the sale of alcoholic 
drinks.  
It is true that the party decided to apply the term justice, which could be regarded as 
an effort to offer a universal message of Islam. During the campaign, statements on the 
caliphate were minimised to reduce public anxiety. The first president of the party was also 
a scholar, not a Muslim scholar, to represent the aspirations of the youth and the middle 
classes for a better society. However, the idea of mastering Islam as the ultimate goal was 
still quite obvious. The party’s symbol was a black square to represent the ka’bah, the 
building in Mecca as a qiblah for Muslims during prayer and destination in Islamic 
pilgrimage. Although the two aspects of the PK raised a mixed image of the party, as an 
Islamic party, the image of Islam was more dominant in its major themes during 
campaigning. For some, these Islamic aspirations were seen as a willingness to establish an 
Islamic state based on Islamic shari’a.    
The eventual result of the 1999 election was disappointing for the PK for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, its 1.4 percent of the poll was far below its expectation of 10 percent 
and secondly, it was not enough to qualify for the next election. The disappointment could 
be seen in the reaction of many cadres who hoped to get 10 percent of the votes. To relieve 
the disappointment the party released an announcement for the cadres to accept the result 
by stressing that it was a trial from Allah and every cadre should also be optimistic about 
the future of the party. One of the announcements was also found in one of the NF’s 
learning centres since a majority of the teachers were members of the party.  
 Despite the disappointment felt at the result, obtaining 1.4 percent of the votes was 
actually not a failure at all. As a new party without any well-known figures among its 
leadership or a solid social basis, the achievement was better compared to other newly 
established political parties. It is also important to emphasize that the party had only about 
50,000 cadres to support all of its campaign activities. Mathematically, the party was able 
to attract more than twenty times its number of sympathizers, which was quite remarkable.   
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 Beside the fact that the party only maximised the strong image of an Islamic party, 
relatively unknown leaders, and little experience in politics, the demographic profile of the 
party’s supporters also reveals the fact that the PK was only popular among the young, 
educated, urban community. The Table III.1. shows the party’s inability to appeal to the 
rural community in Java who are mostly Javanese, less educated and working in the 
agricultural sector. It can thus be said that the PK is mainly an urban phenomenon rather 
than representative of Indonesian society as a whole. 
 
Table III.1. 
Variables contributing to PK’s vote by region 
Order of importance Java Outer Islands Indonesia 
1 University High-Ed Migrant 
2 Migrant Non/ Low-Ed* High-Ed 
3 Non-Javanese Muslim* Non/Low-Ed** 
4 Muslim Poor* Muslim** 
5   Non-Javanese 
*the impact[s] of these three variables are the same 
** the impact[s] of these three variables are the same 
Taken from Ananta et al,: 2004 Indonesian Electoral Behaviour. A Statistical Perspective, Singapore, 
ISEAS, p. 407. 
 
 Given the strategies previously implemented by the Tarbiyah Movement the 
result was not surprising. Even though they were trying to offer a new approach toward 
Islamism, which emphasised the substantial and universal aspects of Islamic values, they 
could not deny that they were so far only affecting urban society. In the early stages of its 
activism the movement preferred to recruit from the young middle class in universities and 
schools because they had no previous strong attachment with other movements. This 
strategy explains why the movement is more popular in urban rather than rural societies, 
which are regarded as being strongly influenced by religious or cultural ties.  
Unlike the 1999 campaign, in 2003 the PKS, which is regarded as the same entity as 
the PK, conveyed a less ideological message to the public ahead of the 2004 election. It 
retained its identity as an Islamic party but it extended the substantial and universal 
messages of Islamism under the slogan of ‘clean and caring’. The party did not maximise 
the potential of the mass media to reach more voters. In the campaign, the party carried out 
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political canvassing in which every branch at the village or sub-district level visited houses 
in their neighbourhood to make personal contact with the occupants. It is argued that the 
strategy was adopted from the success of the RP in 1995, followed by the AKP in 2002, to 
get more votes by offering a variety of support during the cadres’ visits to houses.  
The result was quite remarkable. The PKS surprisingly got more supporters and 
increased its share of the vote to 7.34 percent. It is surprising since it was the only Islamic 
party to manage to increase its support in the election. The PKS phenomenon therefore runs 
counter to the argument that the performance of Islamic parties in Indonesian politics will 
decline as democracy becomes more advanced. However, many analysts argue that the 
achievement was not the result of the party’s Islamic identity but, rather, that it was the 
effect of the image developed and message delivered by the PKS as a party that strongly 
supports good governance and morally based politics (Dagg 2007: 52), which paralleled 
voters’ demands for change (na Thalang 2004: 331; Ananta, Arifin, Suryadinata 2005: 59).  
Therefore, according to this argument, the PKS’s increased support was actually the 
outcome of a political context whereby the main political parties were regarded as corrupt 
and unable to deliver effective and transparent government. The situation influenced the 
voters to look for alternatives, giving their support to the PD (Partai Demokrat or 
Democratic Party) and the PKS. In this context, the PKS was seen as a better alternative for 
Indonesian politics and it was hoped that the party would be able to endorse change. For 
that reason, the party’s success was not simply the result of its Islamic identity and 
message, but its ability to get support from swing voters. The slogan ‘clean and caring’ may 
reflect an understanding that its Islamic appeal did not necessarily guarantee its electability 
(Watson 2004: 23) to appeal to more rational voters.  
As an Islamic party, it is quite difficult for the PKS to shed its status as an 
intermediate party and establish itself as a major party without the support of more voters 
as it depends on a specific segment of voters only, namely highly educated urban voters as 
well as Muslim votes. According to some analysts, Islamic parties in Indonesia are in 
competition for a specific and relatively limited number of voters who identify themselves 
with Islam and an Islamic vision. The total percentage of the voters in 2004 who identify 
themselves in this way, based on Islamic parties’ support, is around 37 percent. It has to be 
remembered that this group of voters has become the target of many Islamic parties: PKS, 
PPP, PBB, PBR, PKNU, PNU and other smaller parties. Some of the non-officially Islamic 
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parties such as the PAN, which is sometimes associated with Muhammadiyah, and the 
PKB, which has its stronghold of supporters from Nahdlatul Ulama, also compete with 
them for support. 
 The lesson of the 1999 and 2004 elections has encouraged the PKS to capture more 
voters by down-playing its original image as an Islamic party. The 2004 election shows that 
the issue of a less religious image but moral hope was more effective in appealing to voters 
in urban areas. However, the result was not enough for the party to develop into a major 
force in Indonesian politics. The party hopes that the momentum of 2004 may be continued 
in 2009 and assumed that the increasing support for the PKS remains steady. If the 
momentum is still in favour with the PKS it is believed that the support will increase 
significantly. Officially, the PKS has targeted 20 percent of the votes to reach the minimum 
requirement to have its own presidential candidate (Buehler 2009: 59).  
 To achieve that figure, penetration among the wider electorate is necessary and PKS 
tends to apply more pragmatic adjustment of moderation (Hidayat 2009). It refers to an 
ideological party that wants to be a centrist party without giving up its ideology and, in the 
case of PKS, the party still clearly abides with Islam as its formal ideological basis. The 
continued usage of the term ‘partai dakwah’ shows the willingness of PKS to declare a 
religious agenda in politics. Alongside its original identity as an Islamic party, the PKS has 
also developed less ideological images and messages in its campaign strategy.  However, as 
a formally Islamic party, moving toward the centre in the democratic system is more 
problematic. The party will inevitably face questions of whether Islam is suitable for 
democracy or not and also the questions of accepting the idea of a nation state with a 
‘human made’ constitution.  
  In facing the 2009 election PKS has tried to lighten its ideological stance to 
acknowledge people’s awareness. Besides relaxing its ideological image, the party has also 
sought to make its campaigns more attractive. For most Indonesians, public campaigning 
with a musical group on the stage is quite normal, so the PKS now allows popular bands to 
take part in the party’s campaigns. Image building through the media is also applied by 
releasing different types of publicity for different targeted groups. The party’s most 
controversial effort to attract people is to portray Soeharto as ‘guru bangsa’ as part of 
accepting the history of the country, along with some of Indonesia’s important figures (The 
Jakarta Post, 17 November 2008).  
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In order to be seen as more Indonesian, the party has also introduced the cry of 
‘Merdeka’ alongside the typical ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the state’s independence ceremony 
and has acknowledged the plurality of Indonesian society by holding the 2005 National 
Summit in Bali, a favourite tourist destination dominated by Hindus. As a party that wants 
to be more Indonesian, building relationships with all political, social and economic powers 
is acceptable under the idea of building the state together. Based on that principle, the idea 
of building a political coalition with any political party is possible, including with secular 
nationalists and even Christian parties. One example of this more pragmatic strategy was 
exploring a possible coalition with the PDIP, which has a limited record of religiosity, and 
Golkar, which has a long history as the backbone of the authoritarian New Order, based on 
the idea of great narration introduced by Anis Matta, the party’s General Secretary (Hidayat 
2008).  
 
III.2.2.2. Ideological Shift? 
The PKS always refers to itself as a party of dakwah, which has a religious objective, rather 
than just as a secular organisation. It is a continuation of the Tarbiyah Movement as 
dakwah activities to purify the understanding of Islam, an objective which can also be 
conducted in the form of a political party. The party leadership believe that forming 
political parties is parallel with the objective of the Prophet when he changed his strategy 
from that of an underground movement (sirriyah al-da’wah) to open preaching (jahriyah 
al-da’wah) after several years of activities. A political party is perceived as a consequence 
of the development of the movement in many social aspects and uses the momentum of 
political openness or democratisation following the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. It 
is a combination of religious with rational objectives. Forming a political party is also an 
objective of shari’a implemented in a worldly institution as a manifestation of the existence 
of a group of people (jama’ah) (Nurmahmudi in Hassan 1998: 36-7).  
 The PKS also introduced a reformulation of the idea of an Islamic state as put 
forward by Hasan al-Banna. Al-Banna is the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin, who strongly 
inspired the Tarbiyah Movement with his ideas of Islamic interpretation and the system of 
training developed in the organisation. According to al-Banna, establishing an Islamic state 
is compulsory. The PKS is actually aligned with the idea of the establishment of an Islamic 
state, but they want to establish any form of state managed Islamically, rather than insist on 
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the establishment of a formal Islamic state. For the PKS, substance is more important than 
the legal formal aspect. In this interpretation, Islam can accept every form of political 
institution as long as they implement Islamic values. The PKS still recognises the term of 
khilafah Islamiyah that can be applied to every political system as a product of human 
civilisation. Matta (2006: 11) argues that in the era of empire states, Islam still could exist 
even though there were aspects of that political system which were not ideally fitted to an 
Islamic vision. The recent situation is similar whereby the nation state is widely accepted 
by human beings with democracy running the system of the state to relate the 
superstructure of society to the whole society through the electoral process or other forms 
of political participation. Islam can adapt to the situation because of its flexible and 
universal ideas. Hence, khilafah does not mean adopting a construction similar to that of 
Madinah, but, rather, taking the substance of the political process in it and implementing it 
to a different political structure according to the condition of society.  
From that idea, the PKS offers a reconstruction of the concept of khilafah. Hidayat 
Nur Wahid notes that khilafah is political activity in which Islamic values are present in 
developing society, reducing negative behaviour and encouraging a positive attitude among 
the members of society (Furkon 2006: 249). Therefore, khilafah is interpreted as a 
substance that can be applied in every form of political system. A republic or a monarchy 
can be seen as khilafah as long as Islamic objectives of justice, welfare, stamping out 
corruption, and not authoritarian society, with an Islamic mechanism for selecting the 
leader, form the main principles of a nation’s political practices (ibid).  
Similarly, the party also accepted the concept of nation state as the basis of the 
Indonesian state and rejected the idea of a supra-national state based on the Muslim ummah 
as an agreement of every member of society within the state. The PKS respects the 
agreement and there is no desire to impose Islamic values formulated as state law as a 
reflection of the party’s commitment to the superiority of the will of the people. For that 
reason, the PKS prefers to uphold the idea of Piagam Madinah (the Madinah Charter) rather 
than Piagam Djakarta (the Djakarta Charter) because the former offered a pluralistic idea, 
recognising and protecting different communities, while the latter only mentions the 
welfare of the Muslim members of society as its main objective. Piagam Madinah is the 
pact of agreement between the Prophet Muhammad and the non-believers in Madinah to 
ensure stable social and political relations in the city. Meanwhile, Piagam Djakarta is the 
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preamble to the 1945 Indonesian constitution, which mentioned the obligation of every 
Muslim to abide by Islam before being abolished by Muhammad Hatta before its 
declaration.   
 The same strategy is also implemented for the issue of shari’a law. It is regarded 
that the majority of Indonesian society are far from accepting the formalisation of Islamic 
law except in Aceh province, which has a different context following the 2004 tsunami and 
reconciliation with the Aceh Independent Movement. One of the most controversial aspects 
of the law is qishas or cutting the hands off thieves. Therefore, the party sees it as a more 
substantive ethical consideration. The party tends to develop an interpretation of shari’a 
based on its welfare aspect and downplaying its legal formal aspect. The idea of shari’a is 
to provide for people’s needs, both material and psychological, before its full 
implementation. A comprehensive shari’a cannot be implemented in a society that is still 
economically poor and in a state of moral degradation. Suryadarma, one of the party’s MPs, 
said,  
 
How can we implement that law [of cutting off a thief’s hand], while the thieves are 
poor people? How can we implement qishas, while we are the persons who commit 
the illegal practices? Therefore, when we uphold the issues of justice and welfare, 
all of them are basically the nature of the implementation of shari’a (Machmudi 
2005: 102). 
 
Based on that premise, the PKS seems to be implementing a more pragmatic 
moderation by maintaining an ideological identity with less apparent messages and images. 
The party has tried to lessen its ideological burden, which potentially makes it difficult for 
an Islamic party to explain its policies in front of the public. In the debates of the Anti-
Pronography Bill, it is clear that the party is perceived as having an ambiguous stand point 
(Tomsa 2011). The Bill was introduced to prohibit any activities that can be related to 
pornography which is difficult if it is interpreted by using religious values. The argument of 
the opponents is that the interpretation cannot be monopolised by a single point of view. 
Despite the opposition, the PKS supports the Bill strongly and until it is finally accepted by 
DPR (the House of Representative) to show that it remains an Islamic party. In this process, 
the party gives a strong consideration to religious values rather than public opinion in 
general and there is a concern that it is part of efforts to ‘set moral standards and drive 
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moral policy’ (Allen 2007: 113). The confusion is also contributed by the party’s calls on 
the disbandment of Ahmadiyah which is regarded as unusual in the view of the majority of 
Indonesian Muslims (Hasan 2009: 11). 
An apparent ideological appeal in Indonesian politics remains popular, however, it 
may be used to monopolise righteous behaviour. Historically the cases to claim that giving 
support for a non-Islamic party might be regarded as un-Islamic, took place in the electoral 
process. During the New Order era, in the 1982 election, the PPP tried to persuade Muslim 
voters to support the party as an expression of their Muslim faith. The reaction to this 
method of using religious appeal was implemented in two ways. The state exerted pressure 
on all organisations to accept Pancasila as their only ideology, known as policy asal 
tunggal, with those in violation of the policy regarded as subversive. Intellectually, Muslim 
scholars also opposed the strategy by offering the slogan ‘Islam Yes, Party No’ to reject the 
use of Islam in politics (Azra 2000: 312). As a result, the issue of Islam in politics remains 
quite sensitive for many voters, especially the issue of an Islamic state and the 
implementation of shari’a. By lessening the ideological message and image, the party 
hopes that anxiety toward the party will also be minimized. The outcome, of course, is 
more votes in the electoral process.      
   
III.2.3. Impacts on the PKS 
In the 2009 legislative election, the PKS performed better than other Islamic and Muslim-
based political parties, but the 7.8 percent obtained by the PKS was relatively stagnant and 
the party failed to achieve its target. Because other Islamic parties, as well as the majority 
of other political parties, polled fewer votes, the PKS became the leading Islamic party in 
Indonesian politics. The percentage enabled the party to gain more than 10 percent of the 
seats in the House of Representatives, or approximately 57 seats. For the party’s elites, the 
achievement was regarded as a significant success because the party was able to get more 
votes in unexpected provinces (Republika, 26 April 2009).  
However, it is undeniable that the party suffered from internal disputes regarding 
the strategy to add new voters and saw significant losses in its urban bases. Months before 
the election, the efforts raised major concerns within the ranks of the PKS itself. Some of 
the senior members supported by some other members, mainly from Jakarta and its 
surrounding urban areas, are known to have been unenthusiastic with the pragmatic 
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approach and strategy to seek a political advantage as the party’s strategy was seen as 
violating Islamic principles or at least being not Islamic enough.  
 
III.2.3.1. The Movement’s Style of Managing a Political Party 
During the first two years of party activities, almost all of every cadre’s energy was focused 
on previously unknown political activities. After the 1999 general election, when the party 
received only 1.4 percent of the votes, forcing them to form PKS, the party consolidated all 
of their members, strengthened the method of tarbiyah as the basis of their movement and 
developed solid socialisation for every member of the party. It is the essential element of 
the party to produce cadres who understand the party’s policy and are productive in 
influencing and serving the society. Its discipline and good organization are reflected in the 
training programme for every level of cadres and the materials provided for them. 
Basically, the programmes for the party’s activists are not different from the model of the 
Tarbiyah Movement. What makes it different is that the training is no longer a secret 
activity and is held formally under the programme of a political party. Recruitment can be 
carried out openly and is announced by posters and banners on the street or in bazaars. In 
the early 2000s for instance, the PK launched a TOP (Training Orientasi Partai or Training 
of Party Orientation) recruitment programme which was implemented at every level of the 
party. 
 However, even though the party is now able to recruit from among wider society, 
universities and schools still remain important sources of a hardcore of party activists. It 
has been confirmed by party officials in Jakarta that the party still needs the input from both 
sources for its new activists (Appendix B.13.). There are many difficulties in training new 
activists from among older members of society, even though they may agree to join the 
party’s training, such as time concerns as well as their different orientation toward the 
future. For ordinary people who already have a settled family life, political activism is not a 
priority. Hence, their objective in attending the training is only to seek further 
understanding about Islam. That objective also has another constraint in that they only want 
to deal with Islamic guidance in their daily life. For the local party, developing a spirit of 
change, which is the main character of the students’ training, among the ordinary people is 
more difficult.  
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 Due to these difficulties in training ordinary people, the party has developed two 
different categories of activist, which are the core cadre (kader inti) and the sympathizer 
(simpatisan). The core cadre is a term for those who are trained based on the module 
similar to the Tarbiyah Movement, with the emphasis on the understanding of tawhid. By 
giving the understanding of tawhid, the cadre would hopefully have a determination to 
support the party’s durable agenda without hoping for any material reward. Supporting the 
party is parallel with defending their Islamic faith because all the party’s activities are 
aimed to be for da’wah. All of the energy put in to fighting the election is meant to position 
the party as a strong and influential party, so that, through its representatives in the 
executive branch and local and national legislative bodies, it can influence policies which 
are more friendly toward Islam and Muslim society. The party’s ultimate political goal is 
developing a madani society under the umbrella of a unitary Indonesian state. The party 
wants to contribute to the management of the state as Anis Matta (2006) explains, “Let the 
party get a chance to manage the country in our way.” 
 It is a complicated, if not unique, situation for the party to run training by which 
those two very different goals are embedded within the same module. On one side, the 
training wants to introduce an understanding of Islam as a universal religious value for 
every Muslim; on the other hand, the trainers are also encouraged to mobilise their trainees 
to support the party’s political objectives. The latter objective is definitely a political 
activity associated with material benefits such as political position and higher income that 
follows it. Therefore the party usually recruits new members without any political agenda 
within the new training group. The most important understanding for the first stage of the 
training is planting a pure understanding of Islam. There will be no political agenda for the 
new groups. The members of the newly-recruited group will understand by experience and 
interaction that their trainer has an affiliation to a certain party. 
 However, the basic approach is not always implemented smoothly. The local party 
branches are sometimes impatient to mobilise the new young trainees into their programme. 
In one school in Eastern Jakarta for instance, the alumni who have an affiliation to the party 
have struggled with intervention from the local party branch, which wants to control all of 
the young trainees by integrating the network of trainers under the coordination of the 
branch (Appendix B.1.). Even though the branch officials have promised not to include 
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them in any political activities, the alumni remain unconvinced by the offer and have kept 
the training groups beyond the party’s control.  
 The intention of the local branch to integrate the entire cadre in its area is part of an 
effort to put all of the network range on their records, so the local branch is able to figure 
out the numbers of the entire cadre. However, due to different interpretations of how the 
training group or halaqah should relate to the party and the indistinct criteria of core cadre 
and sympathiser, the exact number of cadre in certain provinces is sometimes difficult to 
figure out. One local branch officer in Jakarta said the number has to be revised because the 
official statistics are too optimistic and unrealistic (Appendix B.13.). 
The situation reflects the difficulties faced by the party in dealing with intensive 
training of party activists and penetrating wider society. The party wants to have control 
over all of its activists, whether cadre or sympathiser, and put all of them into a training 
process similar to the previous structure of the Tarbiyah Movement. It can be said that 
integrating the movement’s structure and mechanism into a political party has turned the 
party into a cadre party. At the time of the party’s foundation, it is estimated that the 
movement had around 50,000 members, who became the backbone of the young party of 
PK. Until recently, under the banner of PKS, the President of the party claims that the total 
number of party cadre is approximately 800,000 across the country as informed by Tifatul 
Sembiring when he visited London on 16 June 2008. However, at the same time, the party 
also wants to develop into a mass party by recruiting new cadre and increasing their 
membership. 
The difficulties in integrating two different lines of command can be seen from the 
experience of a local party leader in Jakarta. According to one of his former trainees 
(Appendix B.4.), the district where the local leader lives was led by a party member who 
was still young and had less experience than him. Under this young leader, the party’s 
coordination was ineffective because many local party decisions or directions were ignored 
by many of the members. It is indicated that the reason for ineffective coordination was the 
inexperienced local party leader. His decisions were ignored by the membership, especially 
those who were more senior. Because this situation was actually quite common, the party 
took drastic action to tackle the problem. The leadership restructured the organisation to 
maximise coordination and mobilisation of members’ potential through a policy that the 
party is the movement and the movement is the party itself (al-hizb huwa al-jama’ah, wal 
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jama’ah hiya al-hizb). At the party’s National Summit in 2005, it was decided that the party 
should be governed in accordance with the structure of the Tarbiyah Movement.  
This decision was aimed at coordinating all activities under one solid structure 
within the movement and the party. Therefore, the party’s decision and instruction is also 
an instruction of the movement itself. To implement the policy, the entire party structure 
was changed to reflect the structure and leadership of the movement. Following that 
decision, all  the movement’s coordination also came under the party structure of the cadre 
section to establish a solid and planned level of membership within the structure of the 
party. All of the members came under the supervision of local party leadership to improve 
the coordination in each area. Hence, the trainer of a member will be the leadership of the 
local party structure and reflected into the lowest level of party structure. 
The consequences of uniting the party structure and the movement coordination 
were significant. There was a major project of transferring all of the movement’s members 
to the new trainers according to each member’s neighbourhood. The lowest party structure 
is the DPRa (Dewan Pengurus Ranting or Council of Branch Committees), led by a 
member who has the highest level of membership in a village or regency. The same pattern 
was applied to every level of the party structure up to the national level. Based on that 
pattern, it is likely that the central party leaders were trained by the head of the Shura 
Assembly, Hilmi Aminuddin. The impact of this restructuring was that, in contrast to the 
previous leaders, all members of the party could work effectively as decisions were taken 
by the most senior member, and there was no reason to reject his decision or be reluctant to 
carry it out because he had the legitimacy to ask for loyalty due to his experience and 
understanding of Islamic teachings (Appendix B.4.) 
The spirit of unity which led to the integration of all structures in the PKS can also 
be seen in the willingness to integrate all members, regardless of their background, into a 
unified group. Anis Matta noted that the elite movement and mass movement are not 
something which can be separated but must be integrated (Furkon 2006: 208). His 
statement is an optimistic one, but in fact it is the same vision among other middle-ranking 
cadres. In an internal discussion held by the committee for electoral victory for the party in 
2001 at the PKS headquarters, most of the cadres denied the dichotomy of those two 
characteristics. They believed that the strategy of grouping people in the training system is 
the most effective way to build a better political party as the movement’s core activity. This 
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optimism to some extents indicates the complexity of defining the character of the 
movement vis-a-vis the character of Indonesian society in general. Nevertheless, in some 
points, there are some aspects of the movement’s activity which can be translated quite 
easily. One of the movement’s student leaders still believes that the training model is 
necessary and all positions in the party should be filled by those involved in the training 
process and who have obtained a certain level of understanding and act accordingly 
(Appendix B.1.).  
Based on that understanding, the opportunity for those seeking to join the party 
directly at the upper level or even middle level is limited, because everyone has to first 
undergo the training process. Promotion to a higher level also depends on one’s 
achievements in the training, which becomes the basis of the party hierarchy. Hence, the 
question of inclusive and exclusive party is still significant, as is the consequence of the 
experiment of integration of the movement’s character into political activism. It is also 
admitted by a mid-rank cadre that the party is still in the stage of searching for a suitable 
model of internal system for the unity of the movement and the party structure (Appendix 
B.18.) 
 
III.2.3.2. Internal criticisms 
The party’s pragmatic moderation raised concerns within the PKS itself. Many senior 
members and other members, especially in Jakarta, had mixed feelings - unenthusiastic, 
disappointed, confused and offended - toward the party’s approach to seeking a political 
advantage in the electoral process. These concerns basically reflect the confusion of the 
party's moderate image both in front of the public and in front of its own cadres.  
 Criticism grew significantly, especially after the National Summit in 2005 when the 
party discussed the possibility of resigning from the government coalition following the 
rise of gasoline prices. The change in stance of the party’s MPs, from opposition to support 
of the price rise, raised suspicions that the party made a political deal with the government 
(Tempo, 28 March 2005). Although such negotiation was denied, the party’s image was 
badly damaged due to its support for the new price. The criticisms reached its peak before 
and during the election campaign of 2004. In the absence of any formal activities to 
accommodate this criticism, disappointment was only expressed by individuals, and it is 
difficult to give an accurate figure or percentage of those who were critical, but it is clear 
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that there was growing discontent within the party. One member, writing in 2009, 
suggested that at least 10 percent of the total membership were unfavourably disposed 
toward the leadership (Ja’far 2009). A year later, a party lawmaker mentioned that 
discontented members amounted to approximately 15 to 20 percent (Appendix B.10.).  
 Growing disappointment became a collective interest when some disaffected 
members started to hold informal gatherings to discuss the recent situation. These 
gatherings took place at Al Hikmah mosque in South Jakarta, which was known as the 
centre of religious education and training for many of the party’s members. Monthly 
gatherings were set up to invite speakers who could explain the recent situation, and soon 
attracted more confused, disappointed or outright critical members. The gatherings in the 
mosque were known as KIK (Kajian Islam Kontemporer or Contemporary Islamic Studies) 
and were usually attended by audiences of around 300 to 400. Most of the speakers in the 
forum were critical of the party’s political direction, which was viewed as being more 
pragmatic than morally based. On some occasions, the committee also invited more neutral 
speakers. It is predicted that the gathering was started in the beginning of 2008 and reached 
its peak in the middle of that year. 
 Following these informal gatherings, more forums were set up to arrange an agenda 
to spread an understanding of the recent situation to other members in different areas 
around Jakarta. It started with an intensive two day gathering in Taman Mini Indonesia 
Indah (Beautiful Indonesia Mini Park) in East Jakarta, 5-6 September 2008. The forum 
which was set up to organise the members in attendance was known as the FKP (Forum 
Kader Peduli or Forum of Concerned Cadre). The name actually came from Mahfudz 
Siddiq, a lawmaker from the PKS, who mentioned it publicly when the forum sought to 
have an open hearing. The initial informal name of the gathering was Forum Silaturahmi 
(Hospitality Forum) which was formed following the Taman Mini gathering.  
One of the main items on the agenda was to arrange similar gatherings of the KIK in 
different areas, with the coordinator in each area responsible for organising the gathering as 
well as being the local focal point. One gathering was arranged in a mosque in East Jakarta 
to embrace Ramadhan in 30 August 2008, the main speaker being one of the senior 
members, Yusuf Supendi, who at that time had received a penalty from the party 
leadership. The speech, though, did not mention any criticism at all and there was an 
insignificant attendance. There was also a sermon on Palestine held in Al Azhar Mosque, 
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South Jakarta, in 24 August 2008, organised by well known preachers from the Tarbiyah 
Movement. One of the speakers was clearly not aware of the objective of the sermon as his 
talk was only aimed at encouraging young Muslims to come back to the mosque such as 
were conducted before the establishment of the PK and the PKS. Neither of these sermons 
was recommended event for the party members or supporters and was only attended by less 
than a hundred. If they were recommended, the attendance would be in the thousands as the 
movement is able to mobilise massive numbers of members. 
 One of the initiators of the gatherings managed to run a small but routine gathering 
to discuss the recent situation. He became the routine speaker, but sometimes he also 
invited other critical senior members to speak about the current situation and give their 
reflections on the Islamic movement as a whole. This kind of small discussion activity is 
actually similar to the official training run by the party and the Tarbiyah Movement. From 
the party’s viewpoint, therefore, it was confrontational and illegal, but those in attendance 
argued that they were only expressing their disappointment at the party’s leadership and 
policies, not at the party (or the movement) itself and the project of dakwah Islam. These 
routine gatherings were the main opposition activities since the senior members who were 
critical of the leadership were isolated from party activities. Later, the party cancelled their 
memberships as they were regarded as opposing the party’s decisions. After the change in 
direction of the Forum Silaturahmi, more intensive gatherings were held with smaller 
numbers in attendance. On some occasions, they stayed overnight to meet with a critical 
senior member and the gathering ended with night prayers and preparation for fasting. 
 Those whose membership was annulled were senior members who came to 
Lembang, Northern Bandung, to meet Hilmi Aminuddin directly to express their concerns 
at his leadership in March 2008. There was no discussion at that time because Hilmi 
accepted their concerns without hesitation. However, one of them knew that Hilmi was 
angered by the criticism and their dismissal was part of his disapproval (Zein 2010). Two 
senior members were finally dismissed by the party while others were unwilling to remain 
active in the party for different reasons.  
 The growing criticism is a reflection of decreasing trust toward the leadership. 
According to the critical members their disappointment was mainly due to the lack of 
humility shown by senior members in the parliament and the highest leadership, who are 
regarded as violating the principles of what the movement had taught for decades. It was 
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also stimulated by the party’s recent more moderate policies and move into the middle of 
the political spectrum in Indonesian politics. Uniquely, these critical points are either 
directly or indirectly connected with the previously mentioned figures of creative small 
groups linked with Anis Matta. One example of controversy came when Matta argued 
about the importance of seeking more prosperity to upgrade cadres’ confidence and dignity 
in carrying out political and social activities (Matta 2008). His opinion regarding prosperity 
was challenged by Daud Rasyid, whose writing was distributed informally. Although the 
writing is difficult to confirm, in one of his sermons in East Jakarta in early 12 September 
2010, Rasyid expressed his discontent with the recent condition of the PKS, arguing that 
the party had been heavily influenced by the political situation rather than being able to 
influence it. As a declaratory of the PK, he is a respected member of the Tarbiyah 
Movement, especially after he confronted Nurcholis Madjid’s ideas in the mid-1990s.    
This criticism and disappointment had, to some extent, a direct and indirect impact 
on the party’s performance during the campaign. Those who were not in favour of the 
leadership were reluctant to support activities coordinated by the party to promote the 
party’s programme in the community. As political canvassing became the main strategy for 
developing closer relation with members of the community, the involvement of every cadre 
was essential, especially when critical members had experience and capabilities in making 
good social relations or had a good reputation in their community. It was known that some 
of them were not only reluctant to join the party’s canvassing, but that they were also 
critical as it could degrade the spirit of some younger cadres. One of them who lives in 
Depok, a city to the south of Jakarta even declared his intention to campaign in his 
neighbourhood for people not to vote for the PKS, differing completely from his position in 
the previous election when he campaigned for the party.   
 However, the numbers of disaffected members reluctant to support the party's 
political canvassing for different reasons were insignificant compared to those who were 
still working for the party. Even though some of them were also critical it did not 
undermine their full loyalty. They might have been critical of some decisions or policies, 
but they still remained committed and supported every campaign programme. They did not 
express any opposition and still worked for the party without hesitation. It was good for the 
party since they did not significantly affect the party’s performance because they were still 
happy with the situation and committed to work. Therefore, the main concern about the 
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growing criticism was its impact on the efforts to influence more voters as the reluctance of 
the critical members to support the party during campaigning may deter some potential 
voters. 
III.2.3.3. Confusing Image and Stagnation in the 2009 Election 
The direct impact on the party’s performance in the 2009 election is quite difficult to 
examine. However, since most of the critical and opposing members were in the middle 
rank and some of them were influential, their impact reduced the PKS’s penetration into 
wider society significantly. As a party with a strong and relatively solid political machine at 
the lower level, the PKS has been successful in mobilising their cadres to do door to door 
campaigning. This model of campaigning requires as many cadres as possible to be 
involved with a good quality of communication with people. The reluctance of the critical 
members to support this campaign was detrimental since they also had trainees under their 
supervision. Even though some of them had been dispelled from the party structure they 
still had access to and influence over some of the younger cadres. In addition, they had 
valuable capabilities in communicating and influencing people which the party was not able 
to utilise.       
The burden of the cadres was made even harder when they had to deal with several 
new images and strategies launched by the party. It is not an easy task to explain why the 
party has to make a coalition with candidates who are not in tune with the public’s concern. 
There were several cases before the national legislative election where the PKS supported 
candidates in local elections who had a problematic reputation because of corruption and 
other reasons. Some of these cases came in the local election of South Sumatra (provincial 
election), Central Java and Jakarta (provincial election), and also Semarang (district 
election). In Central Java, a mid-rank party member expressed his concerns at the party’s 
decision to support the mayor of Semarang for a second term by sending a formal letter 
(Appendix B.14.). The concern was not about the cases themselves but the question of how 
the party developed political relations with those figures. The difficulties of this situation 
are significant since the political canvassing was emphasised by the party as one of the 
political contributions whereby its cadre would work as a political machine to campaign to 
every household to secure victory for the party’s candidate. If the candidate has a 
problematic image, explaining the situation is rather difficult, which could also damage the 
party’s reputation. 
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Other messages delivered by the party also contributed to the problem of portraying 
its real image during campaigning. One of the most controversial issues came when the 
party launched an advertisement showing Soeharto as ‘guru bangsa’ or national guru. It was 
controversial and contributed to the confusion, not only for the cadres, but also for the 
public, since the former leader of the New Order regime has a bad reputation for damaging 
Indonesian political life with political repression and spreading corruption throughout 
government. The party’s rehabilitation of Soeharto and Indonesian history under the New 
Order was officially explained by a party official. Anis Matta explained that there was a 
need to develop a new narrative regarding national development under Soeharto. In a 
seminar in the University of Indonesia in 19 April 2008, he argued that in order to do so, 
Indonesia as a nation should consider the previous narrative to learn from its mistakes as 
well as its achievements. However, the reconciliatory motive was a controversial issue 
since the student elements of the PKS, the KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim 
Indonesia or Indonesian Muslim Students Action Unit), and many student activists close to 
the movement had strongly opposed the regime in 1998. The party also had no track record 
of arranging any such reconciliatory effort before, and a meeting with the children of 
Indonesian figures from a broad spectrum of ideology was not convincing. The controversy 
may not have been a big concern for many, but for some among the middle class in Jakarta 
and its satellite cities, it might have been a big concern, since most of the party’s supporters 
in the ballot box in the 2004 election were swing voters who could transfer their vote to 
other political parties. As one of the reasons for the party’s significant increase in support in 
2004 was its image as an anti-corruption party and a new hope in Indonesian politics, 
utilising the figure of Soeharto was bound to be counter-productive in attempting to retain 
their support (Hidayat 2010). Equally controversial was the announcement that the party is 
an open party, meaning that it is a party for all (The Jakarta Post, 17 June 2010). The 
message was unclear given that the statement was quoted without giving a full background 
to it. In fact, it was not an expression of a fully open party as shown in the case of the AKP. 
The PKS accepts non-Muslim members, but they cannot reach a higher level than anggota 
pemula (beginner member) and it is only allowed in particular areas where a majority of the 
population are non-Muslim. Furthermore, there was no decision made to declare that the 
party is open (Appendix B.10.), which confirms that there are confusing messages from the 
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party’s elite to the public, or even party members if there is no further explanation through 
the solid internal network.  
In gaining 7.8 percent of the votes in the election, the PKS was unsuccessful in 
achieving its ambitious target of 20 percent. In fact, it was the PD which achieved that 
percentage, due to the significant influence of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the incumbent 
president. The party also failed to achieve their more realistic target of 11 to 12 percent. 
The campaign was not a total failure as the party was able to increase its number of seats 
from 45 to 57. However, this was achieved at the cost of losing some of their seats in 
certain provinces such as Jakarta and West Java which represent urban voters, especially in 
the capital and its suburban cities (Hidayat 2010).  
The loss of seats in these areas might be covered by growing support in other 
provinces such as Central Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. Central Java is quite 
surprising in that it contributed four more MPs than before. It is surprising since the 
province was not regarded as a major base for the party’s supporters. However, the loss of 
support in Jakarta and its surrounding cities may indicate that the party is losing its 
credibility in the areas that are supposed to be the strongholds of the PKS as shown in the 
previous election. In Jakarta, the PKS surrendered its position to the PD and the PDIP 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), 
becoming the third party with slightly less than 20 percent of the vote. In Depok, which 
was known as a PKS stronghold, the party was beaten into second place by the PD and lost 
around three percent of its votes. Therefore, despite its ability to get more seats in 
parliament, the result of the 2009 election saw the party’s level of support stagnate. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Managing Moderation of the AKP 
 
 
 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the AKP is a party that was built on the 
remnants of the RP and the FP. The party has sought to survive in the Turkish political 
system despite there being a stronghold of secular groups where seek to intervene 
repeatedly. In order to survive under the intense political pressure, the party is therefore 
compelled to apply a pragmatic approach. Nonetheless, such a pragmatic approach has 
posed difficulties for the AKP particularly in describing its stance in front of the Turkish 
general audience rearding their identity and programme, and more so in appealing to the 
supporters of the RP and the FP. The strong attachment to religion and the more 
nationalistic approach of the RP are two key challenges that must be overcome in order to 
have the polity switching their preference to the AKP. 
Putting those difficulties aside and combining its obvious pragmatic approach with 
ideological moderation (Mecham 2004), the AKP was able to maintain significant popular 
support in three consecutive national elections in (2002, 2007 2011). Their accomplishment 
in those three elections was further strengthened by the party’s success to win the popular 
referendum for a constitutional change that was held in 2010. The result of the latest 
national election in 2011 was a clear indication that the party has been able to gain more 
votes than before. It also confirms the shift of ideas from political to social Islam (Dağı 
2008). In the analysis of moderation, changing the identity from more religious and 
nationalistic preferences to a more pragmatic one should indicate some tensions especially 
from and within those who are not in favour with the decrease of religious weight of the 
party. As a matter of fact, the AKP is still able to maintain its solidity and a ‘religious 
element’ within the party and is still committed to the current formula of party identity 
known as Conservative Democrat to work with different groups.  
Accordingly, this chapter will examine some of the party’s strategies in maintaining 
political support from its own members or even expanding its popularity to the entire 
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Turkish society. Based on the theoretical discussion presented in Chapter II, this chapter 
demonstrates that in certain situations particularly when a party tries to change its identity 
(either because of new interpretation of politics or strategy), different strategies might be 
applied according to different levels of moderation. Those approaches are party leadership, 
trust, conversion, alienation and decomposition.  
In this Chapter, the AKP has given more attention to conversion strategy rather than 
alienation with different degrees of application on leadership and trust. It is also clear that 
decomposition is also implemented, but based on a more organisational basis rather than 
ideological. To examine the organisational character, this Chapter explores the party 
structures and how it works to generate members’ trust. Through an exploration of the party 
structures and also the constitution the distinctive characters of the party can be revealed as 
it gives more attention to the contribution of members to its electoral success rather than 
interpretation on a particular ideology. The AKP has abandoned any fanatical ideological 
preference, so a more pragmatic approach has led the party to develop more universal 
values and visions in order to be functioning as a “shelter” for different preferences of 
supporters and members alike.  
 
IV.1. Party Leadership 
Party leadership of the AKP is one of the crucial aspects of its success in maintaining 
internal stability and harmony. Despite risks of having suffered from tensions and splits 
rooted from its deliberate efforts to detach itself from certain ideological preferences, the 
party can still offer an open and institutionalised party structure under a system of 
leadership to run day to day politics. It is widely assumed that the AKP has been benefitting 
enormously from the strong personal leadership of Recep Tayip Erdoğan. This has been 
expressed in such comments as “There’s no AKP without Erdoğan” (Roux 2011) or “He is 
the party and the party is Erdoğan” (Barkey 2011). On many occasions, ordinary, middle 
class, intellectual and political opponents maintained to the researcher that the success of 
the AKP to win numerous local and national elections as well as the referendum from 2002 
to 2011 is simply due to Erdoğan’s persona.  
Moreover, from an informal converstation, a retired military military officer praised 
him as a good leader who has resolved successfully many of Istanbul’s acute problems, 
while a young researcher elucidated that his nature of an honest person suits with the 
115 
 
 
imagination of many Turkish people. Acknowledgements of Erdoğan’s significant role can 
also be seen in many international forums which help elevate the country’s position and 
respect especially in the region. His gesture to abruptly leave a panel attended among others 
by Shimon Perez, President of Israel, at the World Economic Forum, following the latter’s 
inflammatory comments on the Gaza raid was remembered by many as an expression of 
protest and signature of his strong standpoint on Israel’s attack on Gaza in January 2009 
(New York Times, 29 January 2009). He returned home a hero and was welcomed in 
Turkey with a reception of thousands praising his bold action (BBC News, 30 January 
2009).   
Due to his centrality to the success of the AKP, many are also anxious about the 
post-Erdoğan party’s future. Yet, it is considered a common and frequent phenomenon that 
in Turkish politics strong leaders have been influencing the political parties in many ways. 
Furthermore, there is a strong tendency that political parties in Turkey have developed a 
structure of domination by strong leaders (Hale and Özbudun 2009: 44-5).  
Along with the issue of domination, political parties are also constantly faced with 
threats of discontinuity particularly when they are confronted with the struggle to maintain 
their existence in Turkish politics. The case of the AP (Adalet Partisi) is a good example to 
demonstrate the discontinuity of a political party. It had dominated Turkish politics during 
the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, but suffered from military intervention.  It had to 
transform itself into a new party, the DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi) which continued to exert its 
political influence on politics throughout the 1980s, and yet, was once again forced to 
transform itself into another party after suffering a defeat in 2002 election. It did so by 
merging with the ANAP (Anavatan Partisi) in 2007. On the side of ANAP, the legacy of 
Turgut Ozal, who was praised as the influential prime minister from 1983 to 1989 and as 
president until his death in 1993, could not salvage the decline of his party, the ANAP, 
resulting in the exigency to form a political merger with the DYP. 
However, despite serious concerns over the growing influence of Erdoğan and the 
future of the AKP after him, this research maintains that the party’s strong reliance on 
Erdoğan’s influence is not the only key to its success. The party has also been able to build 
a sophisticated organisation throughout the country to reach the people. In order to examine 
the argument, this section will explore both the Erdoğan factor and also the party’s 
institution to identify and explain factors behind the AKPS’s success to secure loyalty and 
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garner support from its members. The first part of this section focuses on Erdoğan as a 
political figure who offers personal influence as well as visions that inspire his party 
members. The second part explores the party’s mechanism which manages three separate 
power sources namely the political party, the parliament and the cabinet and synchronises 
the interests within all political arenas. Again, Erdoğan plays a vital role as the key to lead 
all significant elements to control the AKP through an institutionalised party mechanism 
that provides confidence to all members though an objective, rational and open process.  
 
IV.1.1. Personal Character and Vision  
For his political opponents and adversaries, Erdoğan has been described as a threat for the 
Turkish state. His background as a member of the banned RP has given Erdogan’s 
adversaries a strong reason to make accusations against him. He also served as the mayor of 
Istanbul after winning its local election in 1994, but then imprisoned by the state prosecutor 
who charged him with the accusation of expressin religious symbol during a public event. 
He was also accused of implementing taqiyye or covering his original intention of Islamic 
preference in order to deceive secular strongholds and survive Turkish politics (Mecham 
2004). For them, to declare that he has changed and left his background behind to embrace 
a new appearance with the AKP was not enough. The fact that he also chose a different 
path with the SP (Saadet Partisi) to show his protest against domination of Erbakan’s idea 
could not convince the secularist to trust him fully.  
However, despite pressure from state apparatuses, Turkish politics offers an arena 
of democracy in which the politicians are given opportunity to appeal for popular support to 
confirm voters’ preference towards a particular person or vision. The opportunity to appeal 
for popular support has given Erdoğan a chance to offer his persona and vision that is 
proven to be effective against the secularists. After succeeding in winning the referendum 
for constitutional change in 2010, his vision for writing a new constitution that gives more 
power to the president was still effective to garner more supports in the latest election of 
2011. Even though the party failed to get the majority of seats in the parliament needed to 
amend the constitution without prior consultation with the oppositions, the AKP has been 
able to gain the decisive support of nearly 50 per cent which indicate a strong mandate from 
the public. 
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As mentioned before, the party owes greatly to Erdoğan as a crucial selling point 
during election. Scholars have explained the reasons behind the party’s success and focused 
on the social dynamics of Turkish society as the basis for the success as well as the result of 
political circumstances. However, despite the fact that it represents the emergence of the 
middle class (Yavuz 2006 and White 2002), voters’ protests toward the failure of other 
political parties, and also voters’ anger toward the military intervention, Erdoğan himself 
has become an icon of the people’s representation. 
One of the impressions expressed by many Turkish people in amplifying their 
feelings about Erdoğan is that he is the person who can actually represent them, especially 
for the ordinary Turks. For many decades, Turkey has been dominated by a certain elite 
class to represent and guard the legacy of secularism initially developed by Ataturk. Those 
who opted to have more preference on religion and tradition from the Anatolian rural were 
forced to stay aside from the discourses and activisms of state supported by the military, the 
bureaucracy, businessmen and also universities. The turning point of their domination was 
the economic liberalisation that had opened an opportunity for Anatolian businessmen to 
penetrate the Turkish economy. After years of economic involvement, moer opportunities 
had been widely opened to level the status of the old elite class bay having a university 
degree as well as the urban job market. However, the process of integration between the 
two social classes has been difficult due to the fact that the secularists demand the newly-
formed Turkish class to dismantle all religious traditions and values. At the same time, the 
attachment toward religion is also difficult to remove as part of centuries of legacy from the 
Ottoman period. The clash between the two sides has significantly increased after the rise 
of the RP to offer a more religio-nationalistic vision under Erbakan. Within the Turkish 
political arena, the secularists managed to prevail and won the battle between these two 
camps following pressure to put Erbakan in the position to withdraw from his office as 
prime minister in 1997.  
In the context of struggle between the two sides, Erdoğan emerged as an alternative 
leader to replace Erbakan and the latter’s style of confrontation toward secularism. Erdoğan 
inherited a situation in which the new class (sometimes known as “the Black Turks”) has 
grown significantly, but at the same time a majority of them was reluctant to support the 
Erbakan’s idea of a more Islamic approach in Turkish politics. From the outset of his 
political career in Istanbul, Erdoğan has initiated a different approach of conducting 
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political activism. One of the new approaches was to maximise the outlook of 
professionalism during his campaign to run for the mayor’s office in Istanbul. He did so by 
working closely with young political workers with coats and ties rather than bearded and 
traditional suits. He also initiated to form a women’s wing in the city’s branch of the RP.  
Actually, Erdoğan delivered a rather vague message at the beginning of his political 
career as a politician of the RP. At first, he was known as a person who admired religion so 
deeply as reflected in such expressions of his as “I am for sharia,” “My reference is Islam,” 
and “One cannot be a secularist and a Muslim at the same time” (Heper and Toktas 2003: 
170). Moreover, it is believed that his background as a student of the Imam Hatip School 
has given him deep respect toward Islam and an appreciation of values and respect to older 
people. He was also influenced by Erbakan, when he was active in the RP as a source of 
inspiration. To show his respect for him, he adopted Erbakan to name one of his sons. 
However, he also had a different standpoint to contrast himself with what Erbakan 
had implemented in the RP. He admitted that his experience in the Imam Hatip School has 
influenced his personality as a devoted Muslim. However, he also explained that the school 
had taught him to respect others as well as strengthen his patriotism. Respecting the rules is 
also a value he thoroughly observed during his youth. When he played football, he 
preferred to use shorts rather than long trousers to cover his belly to his knees as 
recommended by Islam. That was his expression of respect of the rules of playing football 
(Ibid: 161-2). It is a rather pragmatic repositioning, a move that is commonly and possibly 
practised in politics. However, he is not a mere opportunist who maximises the 
advantageous situation for his own benefit. For example, his political career in the RP was 
not only built by blindly admiring Erbakan’s charismatic leadership. On several occasions, 
Erdoğan openly expressed his criticisms toward the style of leadership applied by his 
political mentor. He also led a group of the FP members who tried to propose a different 
approach in politics aimed at avoiding future pressures from the state apparatuses which 
could disperse the party’s opportunity in politics.  
Therefore, a decisive decision to establish a new political party that is detached 
from Erbakan’s political legacy was within reason and not unfounded. For example, there 
are also other expressions to show Erdoğan’s admiration toward the rule of law, the 
constitution, the principle of consultation and the equal rights for every citizen. Erdoğan 
believes that Islam will guide one to become a good leader rather than a tyrant, and with its 
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principle of shura, Islam provides a much needed guidance toward an interpretation of 
democracy as a consultation process. He further sees and takes Islam as the guidance at a 
personal level, and it has to be differentiated when a Muslim is active in politics. Politics is 
an arena of admiration toward the rules of law and the constitution; hence, it is 
inappropriate to bring the idea of political Islam into day-to-day politics and enforce its 
implementation through the state’s institutions.  
To show his transformation of ideas, he used the expression of taking off his cloth if 
it felt needed in order to reduce the anxiety of his opponents (Aktay 2009). For his 
adversaries, anxiety toward Erdoğan’s commitment on secularism may be difficult to ease. 
However, for voters who tried to find a new figure that can represent them in politics and 
challenge the long established and dominating secularist camp (known as “the White 
Turks”) that was seen to have failed solving many problems in the Turkish economy and 
politics, Erdoğan was regarded as a perfect model as well as a new hope to revive the 
legacy of Turgut Ozal.  
What is important in this context is that Erdoğan is able to represent the ordinary 
Turkish people. He lived in the Kasimpasa area—known as an area of the middle- and 
lower-classes—and having a long cozy relationship with the people in that area has given 
him a strong feeling of being part of the periphery Turkish. He even categorised himself 
deliberately as a brother who belongs to the Black Turks (Heper and Toktas 2003: 162). To 
show his place in the community, he used to go to the same barbershop and also had 
conversation with many shoppers in Istanbul while shopping for his own needs. His 
attachment with ordinary lives of people in Istanbul has proven to be significant in 
strengthening his credentials and getting more acknowledgments from a variety of people. 
He was and is still known as a religious person and his wife also wears a headscarf. For the 
secular elite, headscarf is a symbol of religiosity that is forbidden to be worn in the public 
sphere.  
Nonetheless, Erdoğan has been admired for many as a successful mayor of Istanbul, 
who during his term is able to solve many acute problems suffered by the city’s residents 
for years. More sophisticated water services and city waste systems are just examples of his 
many successes and, at the same time, more city officers were willing to visit the 
neighbourhoods to listen to the residents’ inputs and complaints. The achievement is part of 
his commitment to put a problem solving approach and pragmatic solution to ensure the 
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people’s happiness which forms an ultimate goal of his work. In contrast to his fellow SP 
activists, he did not put piety as the main factor to resolve more technical problems. 
Instead, he consulted with experts from the Istanbul University and the Technical Istanbul 
University to discuss many issues confronting the city. He also urged his officers to learn 
more about the subjects relevant and necessary in running the city administration (Ibid: 
161).        
As a leader, he managed to offer a different style of leadership. He could act as a 
stubborn person who was willing to stand for something he believed is right. To some 
extent, his supporters welcomed his style as it was part of his efforts to confront his 
opposition. Conversely, he became a brave man who fought for principles. When he 
protested the Israeli’s siege over Gaza, hundreds of Turkish people who shared the same 
feelings as him cheered his stand. However, he was by no means hesitant to express his 
regret once he understood that his objective or judgement was incorrect. Many would 
appreciate his way of admitting mistakes and his character to learn from error. He admitted 
that his style prior to the local election in 2007 has gained the party fewer votes. Hence, 
many suggested that his arrogant style has affected many voters. Learning from that lesson, 
he tried to compose more careful speeches and reactions in front of the public. That was 
also part of his appreciative style of learning from experience. Apparently, it was not a 
problem for him to claim that he had made mistakes before. One of the examples of this 
was to admit that throughout his municipal period, he was unable to build parking places to 
reduce congestion (Ibid: 160). 
Therefore, it was not surprising to find many Istanbul residents gave their 
appreciation to his achievements. For this, strong religious identity was no longer an issue 
since they have received what other politicians could not deliver previously for their needs. 
It was easy for a secular retired military officer who did not practice Islamic tradition and 
who drank alcohol to lend his appreciation to Erdoğan’s works. Understandably, he 
received double appreciation from more religious residents who piously practised the 
Islamic tradition. Like others before him, he was surely regarded as a successful mayor, but 
he was distinctively depicted as a person who was honest and trustworthy (Cemalettin 2009 
and Aktay 2009). Islam is surely the source of both honesty and trust, but it is far more 
important for the people to have a leader who can implement religiosity into practical 
behaviour. Honesty is important for many Turkish people since they see politicians as 
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corrupt and incompetent. In an interview, an economic analyst described aptly the 
importance of religiosity of leaders for the Turkish society. 
Support for [the] AK Parti is not about their religious agenda or vision but the 
ability to run the government better than others. But at the same time they also keep 
looking at the background of the leadership. If the leadership has a good 
background of Islam they will be keener to support them. Why? Because if the 
leadership is more religious they will think that the leadership will not cheat them. 
Religious people must be honest and not corrupted. In other word religious 
background has boosted the confidence of the people toward the leaderships 
(Appendix A.3.). 
 
At the same time, it is also important not to juxtapose religion with political 
aspiration because “By doing that, they manage to build a relation with people from 
different characters but still they are criticising it. It is good because they can manage to be 
in the middle and make a contact [even] with people from extreme position, [at] left [or] 
right” (Cemalettin 2009). Those combinations between an ability to deliver better service 
and a representation of ordinary people with honesty and trust have attracted many 
followers who did not only lend their support to the party but also joined it.  
For some members, he was the magnet of the party that has encouraged many 
people to become party members and simply involved more actively within the party. Many 
of these people did not come from the same political or social preferences and yet, the party 
welcomed everyone regardless of her or his ideological preferences or positions. On one 
occasion in January 2010 at the party central office, two party members shared their 
thoughts on the party as well as Erdoğan. One member was religious and the other was a 
nationalist and tended to be less observant toward religion. It was unique to see both of 
them sat together discussing many issues related to the party’s programmes. Both claimed 
that the Erdoğan factor was the main reason to join the party and like other citizens, they 
praised him as a trusted leader who can do many good things for a better Turkey (Unsal and 
Rusen 2009). Therefore, in the perspective of the AKP, Erdoğan has practically become the 
focal point to bond the Turkish people from different backgrounds to work together under 
the same umbrella. A group of new female party activists also gave a spontaneous and 
homogenous response that they attended party programme to admire and follow Erdoğan’s 
vision. 
Accordingly, it can be concluded that Erdoğan is a crucial source for the rise of the 
AKP. However, some still maintain that personal representation of Erdoğan is not the only 
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factor that cements differences. Other crucial elements would be the vision offered by the 
party itself. For the nationalist members, the party was seen as offering a commitment to 
work for Turkish people regardless of their backgrounds. My source admitted that the party 
has given a wide opportunity and arena for all members to be actively involved (Denemeç 
2009). In the party headquarters, there are routine and open events for every member in 
which they can acquire more knowledge. In the society, the party representatives are also 
present to help members discussing many local issues. In his opinion, the party has given 
him an opportunity to develop his capabilities and knowledge by which his ambition to 
become a national politician can be realised.      
The party owe to Erdoğan’s vision and that of his colleagues who have started to 
find a better alternative political approach for Turkish politics. Erdoğan repeatedly 
expressed his commitment to open his arms to every citizen by pushing his party to follow 
his commitments as their basic principle. “We are the party of Turkey; we should open our 
arms to everybody,” as he insisted to party members (Heper and Toktas: 166). That 
principle was implemented during his term at office particularly when electing his aides 
and executives from different parties to join the team consisting of people from his own 
party. That principle has further provided an assurance for the nationalist member that the 
party would give him benefits not because of his identity, but instead, his ability to learn 
and work within the party freely. 
In contrast with his nationalist fellow, the more religious member admitted that he 
shared the party’s vision. He was a member of the Millî Görüş, a social basis and backbone 
of the Refah founded by Erbakan in the late 1960s. He is now active in the party as a party 
activist in a district in Ankara. Nevertheless, he found that the vision of the Millî Görüş 
movement was incompatible with the general idea of Turkish people. For him, the Turkish 
society is conservative and does not want to bring religious principles into politics. That is 
why he possesses a different perception toward the movement which he depicted as willing 
to bring the Islamic principles into daily politics. He shared Erdoğan’s idea that Islam 
should only inspire an individual at the personal level. Therefore, he decided to join the 
AKP instead of the SP. 
The AKP has enjoyed a degree of success in gathering different people by having 
Erdoğan as a magnet. His strong and charismatic leadership and attractive vision have 
attracted different people to sit together in a relatively harmonious manner. Differences are 
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resolved which further spurs people to interact more and hence acknowledge their 
diversities. It is true that Erdoğan is not the only factor because his is merely a part of a 
larger new vision and idea shared by the party founders. Therefore, whatever great 
sympathy is addressed toward the role of Erdoğan in putting different preferences into a 
single party platform, it is believed that the Erdoğan factor is somehow overstated by many 
observers. In some media, especially the foreign media, he is frequently portrayed as 
practising an authoritarian style of leadership and blending it with populism. But for some, 
such a portrayal is rather misleading because they believe that the party still plays the 
central role in reaching the Turkish society (Aktay 2009). Many sources confirmed that the 
party has been able to establish a huge and complex oranisation with ood management to 
reach more people in every corner of the country (see Tezcur 2009: 1). To confirm that 
indication, the following section explores more on the way with which the AKP built its 
institution as a part of an internal management process aimed at preventing the tensions 
resulting from moderation.  
 
IV.1.2. Party Institutions 
In the previous section, it was observed that Erdoğan became the centre of the AKP and 
consequently, concerns were raised that he would be too dominant. An expression of 
“Without a strong opposition, the prime minister seems to have been tempted by a 
hegemonic style of leadership” illustrates such cautions (Le Roux 2011). Hasan Ali 
Karasar, a lecturer at the Bilkent University, confirms that the AKP is similar to other 
parties that have a dominant leader. According to him, “The leader is everything. Erdoğan 
plays the role heavily” (Karasar 2009). However, it is also indicated that the AKP is not 
only Erdoğan because the party has its own structures and principles that should be taken 
into account by all members. One of the principles that has been developed by the party is 
consultation. The fact that Erdoğan himself is not unquestionable has urged the party to 
continue to develop the principle (Aktay 2009); hence consultation should become the main 
principle of party.  
Genuinely, consultation is part of Erdoğan’s leadership that has been implemented 
since his early political career in the Istanbul branch of the RP. As alluded to in the 
previous section, he is a kind of leader who is willing listen to others. That is why he has a 
strong advisory group that supports him, in addition to the ministers who stand ready to 
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help him understand particular subjects. A professor of Konya University whose ideas 
published in newspapers are often quoted by Erdoğan on many occasions confirms the 
latter’s willingness to listen to others. From that point, he assures that Erdoğan was and is 
still used to listening to others (Aktay 2009).  
One of the party’s deputy chairmen also explains the implementation of the 
consultation process as follows: that it is true that Erdoğan is the leading figure who 
represents the majority of the AKP’s policies or decisions. It is a good strategy to 
demonstrate to the people that the party is solid. However, before any policies or decisions 
are taken and announced by the chairman, the party have discussed them intensively 
internally. The Deputy explains that  
     
We talk in the party board about all these things. We are expressing whatever we 
feel in that small group face-to-face with Mr Erdoğan; even if he does not like it. If 
you think that it is rightthen he listens. Everybody. Then we vote and then 
whatever is the majority he expresses to the outside and we obey that thing even 
we express that we are against it in the group. That is the way. You know istişare? 
From time to time people think that he is deciding everything. It is good because it 
looks like that is very strong. [It is] one person decision and no-one [is] against it. 
But behind that thing he expresses the result of istişare and everybody thinks that 
everything is through Mr Erdoğan. That gives power to Mr Erdoğan (Denemeç 
2009). 
 
 
Therefore, from the perspective of the party, the appearance of Erdoğan as a strong 
leader is primarily a strategy to maximise his ability to become a public figure to attract 
votes. The party elites understand well that they can maximise his charisma for the benefits 
of the party in line with the fact that the Turkish society admire and need the presence of a 
solid party that can govern effectively. A study conducted by Baslevent and Akarca (2008) 
after the 2002 election confirms that any possibility to form a single and effective 
government becomes a significant factor in supporting the AKP after experiencing years of 
instability with the previous unreliable coalition government.  
However, the party sees the Erdoğan’s factor is a mere strategy because behind his 
public appearance, the party elites practice the process of consultation. During the 
consultation, the party elites have an opportunity to express their ideas in front of Erdoğan 
himself without any difficulty. This is aimed at ensuring Erdoğan’s impeccable public 
appearance and his confidence to speak about the party’s policies. The same practice is also 
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applied in the consultation of government’s policies which involves party members in the 
parliament and in cabinet. To ensure that the process is run efficiently, the party structure is 
developed as such to accommodate the chairman’s role which is also enshrined in the party 
constitution.  
Diagram IV.I. below shows that the AKP has developed three levels of party 
authority. The General Assembly (Büyük Kongre) is the highest institution. It has an 
authority to select the party’s chairman and members of the Central Decision Making and 
Administrative Committee or CDAC (Merkez Karar ve Yönetim Kurulu) as well as 
providing the general direction of the party, including an amendment of the party 
constitution. The General Assembly also provides all party’s provincial branches with 
certain mechanisms in every province to select delegates to attend the Assembly meeting. 
One of the main bases for the selection of the 550 delegates who meet regularly at least 
every three years is regional and the selection of them is conducted through election in 
every province (Party Constitution, Article 62.1). Other criteria for delegation of the 
Assembly is Vice President, Central Decision and Executive Board members, the chairman 
and members of the Central Disciplinary Committee, continuing membership of the 
founders of the party with the Party ministers and Member of Parliaments (Article 62.2 and 
62.3).  
All Assembly delegates will then elect the party’s chairman and also 50 members of 
CDAC. The party’s chairman will become the head of the committee who leads the 50 
members that are elected by the Assembly through a secret ballot. There are also another 25 
reserve members to complete all membership of the committee. They will form a 
supervisory body to control the direction of the party and to call for a General Assembly 
meeting if needed (Article 73). Similar with the process to take decision in the Assembly, 
the CDAC uses the principle of majority by using a mechanism of open voting among 
members (Article 73.4). Meanwhile, to run the party on a daily basis, there is a Central 
Executive Committee or CEC (Merkez Yürütme Kurulu) whose members include the 
party’s chairman and the deputy chairmen, the general secretary and the president of the 
parliamentary group. Differing from other elements, the deputy chairmen are elected by the 
party’s chairman (Article 79) to fill the positions that have own responsibilities over certain 
particular subject.   
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The party constitution clearly provides the party’s chairman with a central role 
within the AKP. After being elected by the General Assembly where he participates with 
other party elites (founders and honorary members), the chairman also leads the CDAC to 
represent the supervisory duties of the Assembly. At the same time, the chairman also leads 
the CEC whose members are from the parliament and the cabinet. To underline his 
authority, the chairman appoints all deputy chairmen to help him manage the party more 
efficiently and they should be loyal to the chairman (Denemeç 2009). Loyalty is important 
for the AKP because after winning the 2002 election to become a dominant power in the 
government, the party needs a strong leadership to overcome the pressures from the 
secularist strongholds (Kumbaracibasi 2009)   
It seems that the party applies two different approaches to accommodate the 
centrality of Erdoğan as the chairman and to to maintain the consultation at the same time. 
In the party constitution, the principle of consultation is not stated as a compulsory 
mechanism to make a decision. It constitutes a mechanism of open-voting based on the 
majority in order to elect the party’s chairman and the members of the CDAC. A similar 
mechanism is also applied to appoint delegates from the provinces. Therefore, consultation 
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can be regarded as an implementation of a leadership approach in relation to other party 
members (or elites) which is not part of visible mandate from the constitution.  
Regardless of its informality, the principle of consultation also plays an important 
role in developing a healthy internal mechanism. It gives confidence to every member that 
decisions are taken through a process that involves all important elements within the party. 
To be involved in the process of critical discussion internally, neither the length of 
membership nor the depth of involvement determines one’s position in the party. Instead, a 
deep knowledge, expertise and professionalism can also be important considerations to get 
involved in the consultation process, regardless of any formal position. An expert in 
economics can attend sessions on economic problems. “The person who has more 
knowledge and experience, like an economist or professor in economics, will be more 
important on certain issues. Different issues will have different discourse” (Appendix A.4).  
It seems that debates and discussions on certain issues are common within the AKP 
albeit conducted in a mixed way alongside the authoritative mode of decision. The party 
structure depicts the centrality of the party’s chairman, yet, the party members in no way 
maintain an ill-perception that the chairman is the only person who decides everything. A 
mid-ranking party activist in Istanbul explains  
For example when there was a case of American soldiers who wanted to have base 
in Turkey, the prime minister was pleased with the proposal but some prominent 
members like Arınç were against it. This decision somehow gives a negative effect 
from the US. We can say that Mr Erdoğan is more powerful but he is not the only 
actor at the party who makes the decision (Appendix A.4.).  
 
The dramatic Turkish parliamentary debate in February and March 2003 over 
allowing US military personnel to use the country for a possible attack on Iraq 
demonstrated both how pragmatically AK Party leaders approached the volatile 
issue, choosing to support US plans after intense negotiations, but also exposed 
lingering divisions between pragmatists at the helm and party moralists (Mecham 
2004: 54). 
 
From the above explanation, it is obvious that the elites accept the consultation 
process in combination with the strength of its chairman. The mid-ranking party activists’ 
attitude is an example of how consistent the perception of party members from different 
levels is toward the combination of the power invested in the party chairman and the 
application of consultation among the party elites. Differences of perception and mixed 
interpretations toward messages from the party can crucially pave the way for contentious 
relations among members.  
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Nonetheless, a homogenous perception on the way the party conducts its power 
relations is critical for the members at the lower and middle levels to encounter their 
opponents. For example, Erdoğan’s powerful role has been recently criticised as a 
deliberate effort to bring Turkey into a South American style of authoritarianism (Hooper 
2011). Related to such a criticism, the party has been accused of suffering from contentious 
relations among its prominent elites because Erdoğan’s idea to introduce a presidential 
system was not a product of a consensus among them.  
However, for the party members to have different ideas is not forbidden and they 
believe that the party has developed consultation as a mechanism to accommodate 
differences. They appreciate it as an effective working mechanism and their leaders have 
demonstrated accordingly. They found it as useful to overcome the nature of the party as a 
coalition of different groups. The outcome for them is that they can experience the party’s 
harmony rather than otherwise. A member of parliament expresses his feeling on this by 
stating that  
 
There is no ideological problem in the party because we look to each other in 
tolerance. Tolerance is very important. We can understand each other by talking. 
Not fighting. Our prime minister always does this. He is our leader and he is always 
going to manage all the people in the party and he is managing all people to think 
about the party and the government (Önen 2010). 
 
Similarly, a young party activist from Istanbul branch maintains 
 
As far I can see there is not much conflict because of ideology. There are not many 
disputes between religious and liberal members. It is from the experience of Istanbul 
branch and according to this perspective there is not so much difference. Nobody 
rejects the idea of not selling alcohol in public or government buildings. So, most 
members from the liberal camp also accept that idea. There is no experience of more 
religious members are rejecting the ideas of liberals because of ideological 
perspectives. There will be discussion so that every member can meet a certain 
point [of agreement] (Appendix A.4.).  
 
In explaining the anxiety toward religious ideas within the party, both have similar 
experience. Fighting or conflict is not a common practice within the party especially on 
such sensitive issues as religion. On the idea to reject selling alcohol in public places, both 
camps within the party retain a similar rational standpoint that selling alcohol in the 
government buildings should be prohibited. Meanwhile, the religious camp understands 
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that people have rights to trade alcohol in their private shops; hence, a ban is seen as 
unwise. 
Consultation is then understood as having conversation and discussion among 
members. Although the chairman has a relatively dominant role simultaneously in the 
party, and within parliamentary group and cabinet, the elites do not hesitate to discuss many 
things directly with him. Erdoğan may be dominant and a difficult figure to persuade, but is 
not immune to criticisms and remains willing to change his mind after receiving many 
inputs.  
If he believes in something, he will speak and persuade others very strongly. And he 
will speak very confidently and even try to persuade all Turkish people about a 
policy that he thinks is right. When there was an issue of military attack on Iraq 
from the Turkish border, he believed in a policy and tried to argue that this was the 
best position for Turkey. But when there were so many criticisms toward his policy, 
he stopped arguing it and said ok I have made a mistake and I would not do it again 
(Cemaluttin 2009). 
 
 
It demonstrates that in some ways, there is a space for compromise and altering 
position as long as a proposed policy is seen in the best interest of Turkey. As a mayor of 
Istanbul then, Erdoğan was not free from questions. Yet today, he remains consistent with 
his previous stance to admit that some of his policies are not as successful as he thought. 
Therefore, despite his domination, there are still avenues to challenge and discuss different 
options which benefit many members.    
At the middle level, an activist in a local party branch also experienced similar 
circumstances that led him to admire the process as ideal in finding commonalities among 
members from different backgrounds. Hence, it is not surprising to observe the way of two 
activists at the Ankara district level having discussion on many issues. Both, Unsal and 
Rusen expressed their opinions freely and without any hesitation when they attended a 
party event in January 2010. Without any imposing gesture, Rusen, a more religious 
activist, spoke eagerly about the importance of religion yet avoided talking about the 
application of formal law based on religion. Despite of his not-too-religious background 
and as his response to Rusen’s points on moderate interpretation of Islam, Unsal 
comfortably listened and gave Rusen more time to share his ideas. He even injected more 
information to support Rusen’s arguments. Thus, this fragment indicated that the 
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internalisation process works in some ways to encourage an open communication among 
members.    
Furthermore, there was no intention from either activist to stop or negate the other’s 
opinion. When Rusen discussed the Islamic interpretation of politics, Unsal remained silent 
and did not try to get involved in the conversation. Nevertheless, when the discussion 
arrived at a subject that is familiar to both of them, the talks turned into more enthusiastic 
conversation. It seems that members with different preferences are able to exploit the space 
the party provides in developing a discourse among themselves. To a certain extent, the 
party has been able to develop a common practice of consultation among members, which 
is relatively new in Turkey’s tradition of political party. It is common, however, to conduct 
undemocratic manoeuvre to maintain the party leader’s position by giving a punishment or 
dismissal to any members who openly challenge the leadership’s policy. A party member of 
the MHP, a nationalist party, explains his situation when he actively criticises his chairman.  
 
It is difficult for me and my fellows to challenge the policy of the leader because he 
is powerful and he can kick out every member who does not support his policy. 
When he visits a party branch somewhere he just says that the local leaderships are 
not legal and suddenly all of the party branch structures are losing their legitimacy 
within the party. It is as simple as that (Karasar 2009). 
 
 
Therefore, the effort to implement consultation and find solution is a breakthrough 
of political behaviour in Turkish politics. The establishment of the AKP itself was a result 
of a breakthrough from a domination of the charismatic leader of the FP and, to some 
extent, subsequently, an attempt to create a more institutionalised party organisation. By 
way of developing the party’s constitution, making it a rules-based party. In contrast to 
other parties, the constitution also allows a restriction of term for the chairman , in addition 
to a commitment that Erdoğan “will obey the rule” and made “the 2011 election his last” 
(Denemeç 2009). 
However, the attempts to establish a more democratic party that are attractive to 
many Turks pose a contradictory challenge. Its success to become a dominant ruling party 
has brought its limits to deliver a political party with internal democratic practices (Tepe 
2005). As a newly established party with a new vision and ideas to accommodate different 
ideas and interests, striking a balance between democratic mechanism and effective party 
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organisation is quite a challenge. The party constitution stated that the chairman is the 
authoritative institution to appoint 12 executive members to fill in the position in the CEC. 
The fact that the chairman is now acting as the leader of the parliamentary group and head 
of government is a clear indication that there is a concentration of power in the chairman’s 
hands.  
Furthermore, there is also an indication that the chairman controls the making of 
party’s electoral list in spite of the clear established criteria i.e. education, an ability to 
speak foreign language(s), knowledge, experience, an ability to attract votes, et cetera 
(Önen 2010) combined with elements of political negotiation and the nature of competition 
among potential candidates in certain provinces (Appendix A.4.). However, in the end, the 
final decision is in the hands of the chairman. While the real criteria remain puzzling yet, it 
is up to Erdoğan to decide on the fate of every candidate in the list. One said that is based 
on his personal judgement (Appendix A.2.). Another said that it depends on the degree of 
religiosity i.e. practising five-time prayers (Karasar 2009). 
  
It is not possible to become MPs without his permission. Every candidate must be 
interviewed by him personally. It is not a complicated interview but at least he can 
meet with all of them face to face and analyse, ok he is religious enough so he can 
be a candidate. So he controls everything within the party (Karasar 2009). 
 
Whatever the reason and mechanism, it seems that it is a deliberate strategy. It is not 
only to appeal to voters but also to make party organisation more effective. In the period of 
growing as a new dominant party with different backgrounds of members, they also must 
negotiate with the secular state institutions in order to deliver successful reforms. Hence, on 
the one hand, it is not perfect timing to build a purely democratic party because the elites 
have to make a lot of political manoeuvres and strike a balance between an idealistic vision 
of more open democratic political life. On the other hand, it continues to counter deliver a 
promise to break the domination of ageing Kemalist leaders and to clear out rampant 
corruption, and to promote the nation-wide expansion of democracy by strengthening the 
rights and freedoms of expression while at the same time limiting the military's power over 
civilian affairs (Toledano 2011). Consequently, the practice of giving more power to the 
chairman is perceived as normal due to the enormity of challenges. A party’s deputy 
chairman argues that the chairman’s authority to appoint members of the CEC from among 
the 50 members of the CDAC and also replace ministers is normal (Denemeç 2009).  
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Moreover, it was thought that such practice can undermine the solidity of the party 
itself. While party members at the middle and lower levels can tolerate the chairman’s 
domination, too much control has led the party elites into difficult situations on certain 
issues. It is reported that the vision of changing the country’s constitution campaigned by 
Erdoğan is part of his ambition to stay in politics. As promised, the June 2011 election 
would be his last parliamentary election and reforming the constitution is considered as his 
pathway to become the first directly-elected president by the voters, and not by members of 
parliament. The constitutional change proposed by the AKP is aimed at transforming the 
Turkish political system into a presidential system similar to the French style by which the 
president will be more powerful than before.  
The problem is that some of his closest aides are not happy with the proposal 
(Hooper 2011). It is reported that Abdullah Gül and Bulent Arınç have shown reservations 
to the proposal while other high-ranking members also expressed their wariness and it 
indicates an unusual opposition within the party (Ayoob 2011). Their concerns were rooted 
in the fact that the idea was not consulted widely enough within the party especially with 
Gül (Kaminski 2011), while others expressed their worries about the presidential system 
because it will evoke opposition due to its embedded character of authoritarianism 
(Cameron-More and Butler 2011) to lead the country into an ‘ugly’ contestation (Hooper 
2011).  
However, some of the party elites still consider the heated debate as normal. The 
party has experienced many internal debates before that were not known publicly and 
different opinions, even ones that reflect personal ideas, are welcome. Yet, some may see it 
as conflict. “It may be seen as boiling, no. It is not boiling. We are talking. We are 
negotiating all these things. Without expressing all these ideas it will not be democracy” 
(Denemeç 2009)     
Nonetheless, the situation seems to be problematic because the party has entrusted 
Erdoğan with growing power but, at the same time, it must be assured that the party could 
still exert an effective control. However, the decision making process is clearly shifting to 
the hand of Erdoğan, a shift that is backed up by the party’s constitution. However, let us 
not forget that the discourse itself can play a pivotal role and, based on the previous 
practices, might lead Erdoğan to reverse from his initial position. As long as there is a 
rational and resilient reservation against his will from within or outside the party, a 
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consensus is still possible. From the party’s point of view, the discourse is not seen as an 
irrecoverable game since the party itself has another strong basis to maintain the loyalty of 
the majority of its members: trust. 
 
IV.2. Trust 
Trust plays a great role in a changing party. It is a factor that encourages the members to 
tolerate many of the party’s decisions and also the party’s elites whose behaviour might 
differ from what the members think or feel it ought to be. Trust is important to maintain the 
members’ positive attitudes so whatever the party decides, it is for the benefit of the party 
itself and not harmful to them.  
The AKP has introduced an ideology of ‘conservative democracy’ which some 
scholars regard as a vague ideology (Tepe 2005; Yavuz 2006). Despite its ambiguity, the 
ideology provides a useful guidance for those who believe in the party. It assures many 
Turks that there is no hidden agenda behind its existence because the AKP will only 
preserve the Turkish legacy in a democratic way. That stance is important for many Turks 
because a more nationalistic and religious appearance in politics is not a desired model that 
will yield success in politics. There is a growing demand in the society that Islamism 
should be represented in politics as the basis for moral ethics. Therefore, religiosity remains 
an important part of the AKP’s ‘ideology’ and plays a great role in building trust from the 
people who join the party. 
It is clear that the party is perceived as the continuation of the RP and the FP in 
different ways. The AKP’s victory in the 2002 election was also a great loss for the SP 
which wanted to bring in all supporters of its predecessors (the RP and the FP). In fact, it 
was the AKP that successfully receive a landslide of around 82 to 87 per cent of the FP 
supporters (Basleven and Akarca 2008: 17). Those votes formed one fifth of the AKP 
overall votes. Although they are not the main supporters of the AKP, the result indicates 
that the element of more religious supporters exist within the party.  
In other words, the party has secured an important element that helped build the 
much needed trust from many Turkish people. That includes religion, which is vital to 
enhance general confidence in the party and its leaders. Once these leaders are seen to have 
strong religious backgrounds and credentials, people are keener to support. 
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Because if the leadership are more religious they will think that the leaderships will 
not cheat them. Religious people must be honest and not corrupted. In other words 
religious background has boosted the confidence of the people toward the 
leaderships. The AK Party is not only a structure of an institution, but it is the 
mentality of the society. The party represents the mentality of the society; so it is 
parallel with the actual demand of the society (Appendix A.3.).  
 
 
It is then not surprising to see many members of the party with backgrounds from religious 
movements. Some of them were active in the Millî Görüş, the backbone of the RP and the 
FP and now of the SP. Many of them express their loyalty to the AKP because of its vision 
for a better Turkey and left the idea of imposing Islamic ideas in politics. They are 
positioned in different party ranks and of course follow the vision offered by the triumvirate 
of Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç.  
As former members of the RP, those who joined the AKP retain some ideals and 
practices that were inherited from the previous party. They understand that the party 
represents their ideas too with some adaptations due to the changing situation. A youth 
leader in Istanbul explained that “We have some ideals now but we also have to think about 
strategy” (Appendix A.4.). It is a clear indication that those with a tie to the RP would still 
keep some of the RP’s ideas but with some alteration to fit into a new condition. Hence, 
they give their trust to the triumvirate and believe that supporting a new model of political 
party is worthwhile.  
The support is important from the party’s point of view because it is an indication of 
toleration, even approval, toward what the party does and will do. One of the examples is 
the willingness to accept consultation as a basic process to decision-making. It requires a 
process of open conversation and discussion to achieve consensus with other members from 
different backgrounds. It is a situation that might be different from that of the RP under 
Erbakan. During his era, decisions always came through him with a very limited space to 
be challenged and it was unlikely to be transparent (Aktay 2009). Within the AKP, the 
process is different and the former members of the RP have to offer rational arguments in 
order to be accepted by others. They also have to be ready to listen and accept their peers’ 
arguments.  
It is not an easy process, indeed, because the liberal members must exercise extreme 
patience to persuade their fellow religious members. Before the establishment of the AKP, 
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there were intensive discussions between the reformists within the FP with the liberal 
figures to find an agreed option. From the liberal point of view, the process was not easy 
either because at some point Erdoğan, Gül and Arınç were not too convinced by the idea of 
leaving some religious ideals to get support from liberals (Yayla 2010). The process to 
arrive at a conclusion, following difficult negotiations and an exigency to moderate each 
other’s idealistic vision was never easy. However, the result of this process was so positive 
that mutual confidence was tenable in the end. 
For members who possessed an association with the Millî Görüş and the RP or the 
FP, the transformation with the AKP was a huge challenge. “I was in the youth of the 
Welfare Party before joining the AK Parti when I was a teenager. There is a huge 
difference” (Appendix A.4.). During his involvement at the RP, efforts to put forth the 
idealist policies were imminent but they did not fit anymore with the current situation. A 
member from the youth wing confirms that the party and its current strategy is the best 
option. The experience of Rusen is also important to be amplified here. As a former 
member of the Millî Görüş movement, he also disagrees with the idea of the movement and 
now lends supports to the AKP leaders to lead Turkey with their strategy. It is a challenge 
for Rosen and his colleague because they have to give up some of their ideals, accept new 
approach and prepare themselves to any criticisms from their former movement.  
To stay in the party and support its leaders’ strategy is part of their trust of the new 
approach. The way they accept the condition that the party is more of a mosaic rather than 
homogenous political entity such as the RP is also part of their sacrifice. They are ready to 
refrain from their ideal vision being implemented through the government policies. They 
realise that imposing the ideals will attract serious opposition from the secularist 
strongholds. When the parliament passed a law to let the students wear headscarves in the 
university in 2008, the Constitutional Court cancelled it and began to consider processing a 
case to ban the AKP and put 71 names in bar, including Erdoğan and Gül. The Court 
argued that the party and the 71 members tried to impose sharia which is against the 
Turkish constitution. Some of the party members contemplated to mobilising thousands of 
their supporters on the streets to protest against the allegations. However, the plan was 
rejected because they knew that a rally would only provoke the military to undertake a 
drastic action and even remove the government (The Economist, 12 June 2008). 
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Refraining themselves from unwanted confrontational actions in defending what 
they believe as an ideal is an example of “self-boundary”. It means that the members have a 
definition of what constitutes a proper action that should be followed and conversely 
understand an improper action that should not be conducted. The understanding of self-
boundary was actually set up from their experience with the fall of Erbakan’s government 
following pressures from the National Security Council on 28 February 1997 and the 
closure of the RP. In this regard, a party advisor describes that, “It looks like they have a 
self-assessment not to exceed the expression of religiosity. So they will not ask for further 
action or position from the party toward religious issue” (Appendix A.3.). By forming a 
self-boundary, they understand that the party will not be able to do more than they expect. 
The party will also ensure that a religious element will not ask for policies favouring their 
ideals. From the party’s point of view, such a stance is considered advantageous because it 
will help the party’s leaders to fend of pressures from potential opposition. 
The mentality of having a self-boundary is also useful in the building of tolerance 
among the religious members vis-à-vis other elements. Therefore, they believe that debates 
among members are never meant to be a problem. Different ideas are seen as positive and 
natural, as opposed to a severe conflict typically illustrated by the media. The members 
from different levels have the same attitude toward the diversity within the AKP and often 
articulate similar expressions toward contestation. Such a practice is seen as normal and 
considered to be a part of “talking” instead of “fighting”. Acceptance of this practice is 
indicative that trust exists among the members who believe that the practice and the party’s 
leadership are not harmful.  
It is also common to see that the AKP’s members do not consider challenging their 
fellows’ opinions asappeared in media as it might be seen as a sign of serious frictions. 
Even though some of them harshly voiced their opposition against the general party’s 
policy, others particularly the leaders would merely see it as an expression of aspiration of 
their constituents. In the case of dissenting opinions among the members toward the 
Kurdish initiative, all comments from interviewed members from within the party simply 
revealed that it was only an expression of their constituents and did not create a big 
problem for the party. The Kurdish initiative was a proposal by the ruling party to end the 
Kurdish problems after years of conflict. But the initiative was faced with opposition from 
two fronts within the party itself, namely: members with nationalist preference and those of 
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Kurdish origin (Hurriyet Daily News, 30 December 2009). The former says that the 
initiative would give a recognition to the rebel organisation (the PKK, Partiya Karkerên 
Kurdistan or Kurdistan Worker’s Party) and undermine years of military fights against it. 
Meanwhile, the latter stood against it due to its slow pace to end the conflict.   
The disputes seemed to be so crucial when depicted by media that was not in favour 
of the ruling party. However, all party members who were interviewed at the height of the 
disagreement reacted calmly to the situation. For them, the situation was a normal part of 
the party’s dynamics. They believed that the party would find a solution by talking with all 
members who were unhappy with the proposal. Their confidence was further cemented 
when the Minister of Interior, Beşir Atalay, arranged a meeting with those who were 
hesitant and the outcome was a new road map for the initiative. The system seemed to work 
as had been anticipated by the party’s members where a problem within the party was 
resolved through consultations. It was a process that many within the party admired. 
Admittedly, not all of the party’s members were satisfied with the way of the party 
leaders handled the issue. Elazığ deputy, Feyzi İşbaşaran, resigned from the party after 
throwing an accusation against the leaders to launch a probe against him (Hurriyet Daily 
News, 27 December 2009). However, his resignation was not massive since only a handful 
of members followed in his departure. The move did not create a concern among the 
leaders and was not seen as a big problem because the majority of the AKP’s members of 
parliament were still in their positions (Denemeç 2009).      
Criticisms and hesitations were visible in many issues and sometimes it led to the 
resignation of a deputy. However, despite its tense dynamics, the party still enjoyed the 
loyalty of the majority of its members. “This party is different because while other parties 
are suffering from division between members the AKP enjoys the trust of their members,” 
explains a political analyst in Ankara (Appendix A.1.). The party leader also received 
similar admiration from the member as he was depicted as a trusted person (Aktay 2009). 
Therefore, it is unusual to have severe opposition from within the party with a huge 
scale of mobilisation to inflict a challenge toward the leaders. Distribution of power and 
rotation among members in strategic positions that are perceived as sources of conflict is 
relatively absent within the AKP. To lose a strategic position is acceptable because the 
decision is made based on the performance with a transparent benchmark. It was explained 
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that the party’s members who lost their positions would not pose a challenge and leave the 
party to protest the decision.  
 
When the party got lower votes in the local election this year, two of the prominent 
members who were acting as ministers lost their positions. It is the result of the 
party’s defeat in Antalya for instance..... But it is reasonable why they lost their 
positions. So there is kind of reason behind the decision and they are still members 
of the party and still working for the party. They are not arguing and then leaving 
the party. They are still loyal because they believe that the party has a vision and 
they support it. They believe in the party so much. It is completely different from 
other parties when a member or some members are losing their positions because 
of punishment from leadership, they feel disappointed and leave the party or at 
least there will be conflicts. Why? Because there is no reason behind the decision 
and the parties are controlled by personal leadership (Appendix A.1.). 
 
There are changes in the party, in the parliament and also in the cabinet. Some of 
the party’s members resigned from the AKP as an expression of protest. It is noted that 
members of parliament such as Zekai Özcan and Murat Başesgioğlu resigned from the 
party due to their hesitation toward the Kurdish initiative. A rotation has also taken place in 
the CEC since 2001. Of the 12 deputy chairmen in 2001, only three of them remain in their 
positions. There were also changes in the cabinet. In the 2011 election, the party leadership 
decided not to re-nominate 167 deputies to compete in the election. With all those changes, 
fluctuation was relatively low because they were conducted rather transparently (Aktay 
2009) and based on merit (Denemeç 2009). It was reported that most of the deputies from 
South Eastern were not re-elected due to the party’s unsuccessful performance in the 
referendum held on 12 September 2010 (Today’s Zaman, 13 April 2011). Rotation and 
promotion are part of the competition among members and whoever can give benefits to the 
party are likely to be promoted. On the contrary, if there is failure or minimum 
achievement, a member can be rotated to other position as a consequence (Appendix A.4.).  
 
In the AK Parti, the leader is not the actual leader, there is another behind him. In 
that sense, the AK Parti is more modernised. Everything is transparent. Everything 
is not without rule. Every rule is official and everybody is very clear with the rule. 
There is a legitimate competition for positions or ranks. Everybody is ready to 
participate in the political competition within the party (Aktay 2009). 
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With all that system and mechanism, the members must understand and observe the 
rules necessary to be promoted or relegated. Even though the chairman is playing a great 
role to orchestrate the changes, there is still a degree of understanding about the rule of 
game. For them, the Prime Minister is undeniably the maestro. Every member who was 
interviewed expressed similar admiration and respect for the chairman’s political 
achievements which had led them to accept and follow the mechanism. It was therefore not 
surprising to find that despite some hesitation, opposition against on the decision making 
process was kept minimal.  
Undeniably, there are concerns about the way the AKP treated its vocal members. 
There were reports and expressions that the party treated its members improperly. One of 
the party members who resigned explained that the party’s leaders wanted to silence him on 
the Kurdish initiative. “It became impossible to resume my duties in a party that silences 
and blackmails deputies who express their thoughts, just like me,” he said (Huriyet Daily 
News, 27 December 2009). His statement indicated that there was a deliberate effort to 
suppress oppositional voice which is against the principle of consultation. He has become 
one of the examples among 11 other similar cases due to his inability to influence party’s 
decisions that tend to be dominated by a small elite circle (Tepe 2005: 74). There was also 
concern that the party has dismissed many members from 11 party’s city centres and 39 
municipal centres without proper explanations. The concern was that the policy to dismiss 
them lacked transparency and only led to a conclusion that the party was restraining to 
function as a fully democratic party (Ibid).  
Officially, the party fervently denied that there were ambiguous decisions because it 
claimed that all decisions concerning members’ disciplinary cases were formally presented 
in writing. Those who become the subject of any decision would receive a formal letter 
confirming that decision. Omer Latif (2010), the General Secretary of the AKP, explained 
that, “In the AK Parti every process is under a legal procedure. Every decision is always on 
the track of legal procedure. We also put every decision into a written document so there is 
no unclear and informal decision.” Again, the party’s officials denied that their actions 
were against the principle of transparency and the rule of law. The efforts to communicate 
with any vocal members who were accused of violating their independence have been part 
of the policy of the party to maintain discipline and order following the process of 
discussion and consultation. The sense of discipline can be seen from the statement that “if 
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we decide something as a party, do not worry about it, everybody is supposed to say 
something similar” (Denemeç 2009).   
From the above statement, it was clear that the party wanted to strike a balance 
between freedom of expression with the basis of consultation and an effective party 
management. At this point, the AKP’s pluralistic character has to meet with the need to 
form a solid support from all party members, especially in dealing with challenges from the 
oppositions in the parliament as well as the military and the court. In that regard, trust plays 
a great role when the party produces policies as represented in the government and also 
replaces members in its structure or cabinet. Disappointments and hesitations are not at all 
absent as a reaction to the party’s decisions that might be against members’ personal 
preference. Yet, the trust in the vision and leaders of the party has undermined the 
rebellious feeling to pose challenges against the party (Appendix A.3.).  
The sense of unwillingness to challenge appeared in efforts made by a member of 
parliament which denied his opposition against the party’s policy in a newspaper (Hurriyet 
Daily News, 7 January 2010). It was an important public clarification because oppositional 
stand point could inflict serious damage if the public accept the media reports as proof of 
the serious cracks, subject to investigation by the party’s authority as violation of the 
party’s discipline. In the end, the party was forced to become firmer with its own decisions, 
upon which discipline was needed in particular circumstances. Therefore, some disciplinary 
actions were deemed necessary to control members’ behaviour and it had been applied in 
many occasions (Önen 2010). 
IV.3. Decomposition and Party Discipline 
Conceptually, decomposition is a strategy for a political party to deal with its members who 
oppose moderation of its ideological standpoint. As Orbell and Fougere (1973) explained, 
the real implementation of it is to dismiss a member who is perceived as disrupting the 
party’s solidity from within by seriously criticising and challenging the leadership’s policy 
or authority. By doing so, the party wants to maintain harmony among members and from 
the perspective of the party’s elites, the absent of internal opposition is important in 
maintaining their success in politics.  
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In the case of the AKP, there are also cases of firing members although the cases 
might not be similar with what Orbell and Fougere have noticed in their studies. Both 
scholars focused on a case of the New Zealand Labour Party that won the 1935 election and 
the party leadership dismissed its militant left wing who accused the Labour government of 
betraying the party’s ideology. A strong opposition from within the party is a threat to the 
government because it revealed the internal conflicts that might affect public confidence 
toward the effectiveness of the party to govern. Therefore, the target of decomposition 
policy is the hard-liner ideologues within the party that do not want to follow new 
interpretation of the party’s ideology when they were in power.  
Applying the concept of decomposition to the AKP, one can see the fitness of the 
context of moderation. The current AKP’s vision is different from that of its predecessors 
and despite its leaders’ background with the Millî Görüş, they have negated their 
background and proposed a new vision of secular politics. The party’s policies are also 
different from that of the RP. The AKP accepts and endorses Turkish accession into the EU 
while the RP opposed the idea, a position similar to that of the Millî Görüş that remained 
suspicious against the Western countries.  
However, the party is relatively absent from the implementation of decomposition 
as imagined by Orbell and Fougere. The main reason for the absence is that the party itself 
does not have any strong opposition toward new interpretation of the party’s ideology. It is 
a party that is unusual to have internal opposition (Kaminski 2011) and the dismissal of 
membership based on ideological reasons in the context of moderation is also absent.  
The party admits that there are members who were dismissed from party 
membership (Latif 2010). Mostly, the cases were caused by the violation of the party’s 
disciplinary code. The General Secretary mentioned a case that has caused a member’s 
dismissal due to his unacceptable behaviour. The unacceptable behaviour he referred to was 
about alcohol consumption that caused a dreadful traffic incident. “That is an unacceptable 
for the party to have that kind of behaviour,” stated the General Secretary.  
Other cases also confirmed that the party practiced a zero-tolerant policy for any 
misconduct. There are reports mentioned that the party dismissed members due to their 
behaviours and most of them are related with immoral acts. In Izmir, the local party 
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authority fired its young member after repeated action to access pornographic internet sites 
(Hurriyet Daily News, 21 August 2009).  The zero toleration toward similar action was also 
demonstrated in the sacking of a party member who was found committing similar 
behaviour by his spouse at the same branch five years ago.  
The two cases demonstrated that the party retained a tradition as a moral guardian 
that prohibits its member to commit any immoral action. Consuming alcohol is not 
forbidden in Turkey and many Turks consume it in public places. However, religious 
people adamantly oppose the circulation of liquor. For the AKP, the issue of alcohol is 
quite problematic because it has a strong religious sentiment and as individual, many 
members strongly oppose the drinking habit and alcohol circulation. Some of the party’s 
authorities at local level have tried to ban or limit the circulation, an act used by many 
outside the AKP to accuse the party as supporting the religious principles. The case of 
pornography also presents a similar situation for the party because pornography is 
forbidden in Islam. It also becomes an issue to be associated with the AKP especially after 
it proposed an adultery bill in 2004. Both issues, in fact, have never been a strong case to 
allege the party as promoter of the Islamic principle because it only privatised alcoholic 
production and limited the area of consumption and the bill was finally withdrawn (Akyol 
2010). 
However, the party does not want to declare religion as the basis for moral criteria. 
The party officials only referred to the party constitution as the basis to examine the 
behaviour. The party’s constitution has provided guidance to define any actions that can be 
categorised as violation of the party’s principles. Article 114.3 stipulates that there is a term 
that can be utilised written as ‘reckless behaviour.’ The term itself can be used broadly for 
any behaviour that is not in favour with the party’s tradition due to its broad definition of 
reckless.  
Another action that is related to the criteria also leads to the expulsion of party 
members. In Van, an eastern province of Turkey, two members of the AKP threw eggs and 
stones at Deniz Baykal, leader of the opposition party. What they did cannot be tolerated by 
the party’s authority even when they claimed to have relatives at the party’s headquarters in 
Ankara (Hurriyet Daily News, 8 April 2010). Local party authority explained that such an 
act was against the principle of respect of human beings. Although Baykal was an 
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opposition leader of the CHP, he must be admired as a brother, a descendant of Adam. As a 
result, the party processed the case seriously and the two members were expelled 
accordingly.  
At the high rank level, cases of dismissal are relatively limited. Most conflicts do 
not seem to end up with formal removal. In the heated debates on the Kurdish initiative, 
some of the AKP deputies in the parliament resigned from the party. They argued that the 
proposal was against the constitutional mandate and put them in a difficult position to 
accept the proposal. Zekai Özcan explained the reason for his resignation as “I resign from 
the AKP because I see that its policies no longer fit my political understanding” (Hurriyet 
Daily News, 12 April 2010). Other members who have resigned because of the initiative 
expressed more than an opposite stand point. The concern is about the way the party treated 
him after expressing his criticisms. “It became impossible to resume my duties in a party 
that silences and blackmails deputies who express their thoughts, just like me,” he told 
media the reason for his resignation (Hurriyet Daily News, 27 December 2009). 
The cases also showed that those who were not comfortable with the party’s policy 
or the way it treats the members preferred to resign rather than staying on in their respective 
position. It is difficult to examine whether or not they criticised party leadership because of 
the ideological preferences. In fact, some of those who left the party criticised the initiatives 
because of its recognition of the Kurdish identity. The idea is to remove the criteria of 
Turks to be a single identity for all citizens in Turkey. From the argument, it seemed that 
they relate to a more nationalistic idea and the Kurdish initiative has passed their limit to 
tolerate ideas that tampered with their nationalistic principles.  
The latest case is on the Golcuk paper that contains pieces of information about a 
high-ranking party member who collaborated with the military to undermine the AKP. The 
party officer, Turhan Çömez, was written in the document found in the Golcuk Naval 
Command which was asked to provide a list of party members who were willing to 
cooperate with the military against the ruling party. The document had a title of 
“Monitoring reactionary activities” and was sent to the Bandırma 6th Main Air Base in 
February 2005. It was said that Çömez would be urged to provide the command in the base 
with a list of the AKP’s members to be asked to destroy the governing party (Today’s 
Zaman, 1 June 2011). The allegation was a serious violation toward the ruling party, and 
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from the party perspective, it was a clear behaviour of breaching the party’s code of 
conduct. The case became a flaring issue since it was connected with the Ergenekon case as 
an effort to topple the government. Soon after the allegation was formally made public, he 
was invited to come for an investigation. However, he stayed abroad as he understood that 
the case was very sensitive and might lead him to jail.  
High level cases as mentioned above have not been processed into a formal 
investigation by the internal party’s institutions. The process of disciplinary allegation is 
stipulated in the Article 113 to 117, which defines such actions as subject to penalty. 
Actions such as attending a meeting that was not authorised by the party, paying less or 
unwilling to pay contribution and conducting reckless behaviour would require warnings 
from the party’s authority. Another provision of disciplinary action is to make a statement 
that is harmful to the party, subject to a penalty in a form of formal reprimand.  
Those actions can be penalised after a warning is given. So, the case of two 
members in Van should be categorised as this disciplinary case. However, due to its 
political sensitivity that related to a high profile opposition leader that might lead the party 
into a difficult position, the case could end up in a direct expulsion. Meanwhile, in the case 
of internet abuse in Izmir, warnings were given many times before the final decision of 
dismissal was made. It is likely that in the case that did not relate to any highly political 
sensitivity, a normal procedure was conducted by firstly giving a notification. Nevertheless, 
the AKP pornographic related case was considered to be beyond reckless and its moral 
basis was included in the principle of universal values. It was then reasonable to put it as a 
serious violation of party principle and the penalty is direct expulsion.  
In the Article 117.1 to 117.9, it is mentioned that there are nine categories for direct 
expulsion or termination of all connection with the party. These include violations against 
the party’s principles and universal norms, the threats to the integrity of the Turkish nation, 
any misuse of the party’s documents, corruption, efforts to manipulate results of elections, 
providing a statement to undermine the party, and violations against the party’s leaders. 
The case of Cömez can be categorised, if proven, as an effort to undermine the party and 
termination of all connection is likely to be taken. Another form of disciplinary decision is 
to give suspension of party membership for a certain period of time. It is related to any 
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member who fails to comply with the party’s decision or has received a reprimand letter for 
more than once. 
It is likely that any allegation toward criticism of the party’s leaders can lead to 
membership suspension. For a high-ranking member, to be penalised with suspension is a 
token of bad record of his or her party membership and is not beneficial for to have such a 
record. The AKP leadership has a record of replacing deputies and ministers not because of 
violation against party constitution. Under performing deputies in the election are subject to 
be ‘penalised’ politically as a consequence of becoming less beneficial for the party in the 
election. As mentioned before, new deputy candidates in the last election would replace 
those who could not give maximum support for the party in the September 2010 
referendum.   
Therefore, some opt for resignation as a better way rather than being accused of 
being too critical which could lead to suspension or even termination of membership. The 
provision of violation toward the party’s leaders enables the party’s authority to take 
necessary action that is perceived as an attack toward them. Hence, even though the party 
will apply persuasive approach, allegation toward members who are openly criticising the 
party and show less willingness to follow the party’s general policy is also likely to be 
taken by the party’s authority. In this context, clarification that a member is not against any 
of the party’s policy is important to avoid any internal investigation.  
The process to investigate internal cases is not simple. It is a process that includes 
several institutions before a final decision is made. The first institution that has authority to 
conduct initial investigation is the Central Disciplinary Board or CDB (Merkez Disiplin 
Kurulu). If a member is accused of violating the party’s discipline, the CDB will work to 
analyse the case and then submit a report to the Arbitration Board for Democracy or ABD 
(Demokrasi Hakem Kurulu). It is a special institution established to assess reports produced 
by the CDB on whether or not a member has complied with democratic principle. After the 
ABD finalises its assessment on the report, it will then produce a recommendation 
regarding the disciplinary report, and together with the report from the CDB, both are 
submitted to the CEC. In the end, the CEC will make its final decision. According to the 
AKP’s General Secretary, the final product of the CEC is a political decision. Nevertheless, 
it is still based on the general principle of the party’s constitution (Latif 2010). 
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The assurance from the party official does not mean that the process is free from 
any political consideration. To some extent, the decision not to follow the internal process 
is an indication of scepticism toward the fairness of the process. The fact is that the party 
leaders, especially the chairman, are still relatively dominant in providing a reasonable 
basis for any decision gives a strong foundation for scepticism. Loyalty is important and 
worries members who want to criticise him because a disciplinary action can be applied and 
their political career will be hampered. Even though it is yet to be verified, reports confirm 
that despite his willingness to listen to others, Erdoğan is relatively sensitive to criticisms 
(Kaminski 2011). He requires the members who work closely with him to be loyal and such 
a demand would affect those who are critical of him or at least sound different in providing 
him with alternative options. Some members seem to have no option other than giving their 
loyalty in order to stay within the party rank or work in the cabinet. However, a high 
demand of loyalty is seen by some party members as uncomfortable and other option of 
being processed by the CDB threatens their career. 
Resignation is then perceived as the best option for those who cannot afford to 
tolerate the need to strike a balance between recognition for plural ideas and effective party 
manoeuvrings. It is common in Turkish party politics to have inter-party movements. 
Members of parliament frequently shift their loyalty to another party. The cause of the 
changing loyalty is the domination of party leadership in a paternalistic way. The party 
leader is surrounded by members who want to win the leader’s sympathy and having the 
sympathy spells an assurance for obtaining a strategic position or responsibility. Therefore, 
there is no need to build a strong relation with society because the source of power lies in 
the leaders’ hands.  
It is the reason why many political parties in Turkey do not have a strong 
attachment with the society they represent. It is also easy to find deputies or high ranking 
members shifting their loyalties to other party after losing confidence of the party’s leader. 
Others would feel better to establish a new party. Other reasons for inter-party movements 
are ideology, constituency service, conflicts in electoral district or self interest (Turan, Iba 
and Zarakol 2005: 3). Nevertheless, the trend of shifting party loyalty through resignation is 
getting less in recent years. It reached its peak in the period of 1995-1999 when almost half 
(47 per cent) of parliament members shifted their loyalty (Ibid: 2). High percentage of party 
mobility was also caused by the closure of political party. In that period, the Turkish 
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authority closed two political parties, including the RP in 1997. The closure of the FP in 
2001 also caused significant movement in the period of 1999 to 2001. Because of the 
closure, all deputies from the disbanded parties automatically had to find new parties and 
they did so by joining an existing or establishing a new one or becoming independent 
deputies. In the case of the RP deputies, most of them joined the FP as its successor party. 
In 2001, deputies from the FP split into two different parties as a result of the establishment 
of two different descendants: the SP and the AKP.  
From the AKP’s point of view, resignation is not perceived as the outcome of 
ideological conflict. It is simply because of the fact that those who resigned from the AKP 
did not get what they wanted or for other pragmatic reasons (Denemeç 2009). A similar 
expression from mid- and lower ranking party members claimed that there was no 
ideological conflict. In fact, to say that there was no case of resignation because of ideology 
is also misleading. The criticism toward the Kurdish initiative is a combination of 
nationalistic views on the Kurdish issue and the way the AKP treated dissenting opinions. 
Resignation has become less significant in recent years, especially after the AKP 
dominated the parliament following its victories in the three consecutive elections. From 
the beginning of its domination in 2002 until 2005, the number of deputies who moved to 
other parties was 38 or only seven per cent (Turan, Iba and Zarakol 2005: 3). According to 
a party’s official, the percentage of the AKP deputies who resigned or were dismissed is 
less than five percent (Önen 2010). So, potential internal conflict due to ideology took place 
on the nationalist side over the Kurdish issue.  
There are examples that the party proposed bills that favoured the objectives of a 
religious group. The lifting of headscarves was an example. Wearing a headscarf was 
prohibited for public servants and other workers such as: judge, attorney, and lawyer. It was 
then extended to the universities. The party together with the MHP, a nationalist party, 
supported and passed the bills to lift of the ban in February 2008. Both argued the ban is 
against the principle of human rights and freedom. However, the law was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court in June 2008 based on the reason that it was against the principle of 
secular state inherited by Ataturk.  
The failure of the lifting did not lead to heavy criticism from the religious groups 
because the party proposed it under the interpretation of non-religious principles. The 
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support for the law itself had triggered accusation to closure the AKP by the Constitutional 
Court. The Court argued that the law was strong evidence that the party consisted of 
supporters of Islam who would undermine secularism. The AKP saved from the allegation 
when the Court failed to reach minimum support from its judges. However, the party was 
reminded of the indictments to close the RP and the FP in 1998 and 2001. Therefore, the 
religious element within the party did not mobilise its supporters to manoeuvre against the 
annulment and tended to stay neutral in every campaign that supported the women’s right 
to wear headscarves.  
Prior to the 2011 election, there was a campaign to elect headscarf-wearing women 
and it gained national attention. And yet, the conservative element within the party did not 
want to support the campaign and remained neutral. In their statements, they even stated 
that the issue was meaningless. "These elections are a vital opportunity for Turkey to create 
the foundations of civilian democracy”, so “Why put that at risk with all this talk of 
headscarves," wrote a columnist in Today’s Zaman that was seen as a supporter of the 
conservative AKP (Birch 2011). For that reason, the party was reluctant to support the issue 
and preferred to focus on its main campaign, the constitutional reform.  
The party’s standpoint on the headscarf issue clearly reflected the pragmatic 
approach of its leader in avoiding any political pressures from the secularist strongholds, 
especially the military and the Constitutional Court. Their concerns toward negative 
reaction became the basis to form a self-boundary that limits the party’s preference. On the 
headscarf issue, the backlash might well become irrecoverable and ruin their targets to 
gradually change the constitution. Therefore, rather than focusing on the meaningless issue, 
the party chose to give more attention to the upcoming election. Winning the majority of 
parliament was an assurance to be able to change the constitution without any consent from 
the opposition or referendum.  
Therefore, the conservatives that formed the religious backbone of the AKP 
refrained themselves. It was a position that reduced the aggressiveness toward the issues. 
The direct impact of this stance was a more compromising attitude to other elements in the 
party. In any social relation, members of the party who are conservative tend to say nothing 
in judging others who possess different attitudes toward what is prohibited by religion. 
“Yes, they are Muslim but to express that they do not like people who drink alcohol is by 
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saying that it is prohibited. They will not do more than that because they also respect 
others’ choice,” said a researcher in Ankara (Cemalettin 2009).  
In that context, decomposition is not useful to apply because those who are 
perceived as religious restrain themselves from any action that might lead to conflict. They 
fear any confrontation with the secularist strongholds that still hold the authority to close 
any organisation including the political party in power. Moderate interpretation of 
religiosity in politics is then seen as a good strategy that benefits them and has enabled the 
party to stay in power for almost a decade.  
Referring back to the case that Orbell and Fougere have focused upon, the party 
leadership does not face significant contenders from within, except from the nationalist 
element and those who have problems with the style of management. It is a general stance 
toward the secularist camps that has forced them to agree on a common attitude: being 
moderate is the only option on the table. The Millî Görüş potentially presents a contending 
vision. However, the vision has already been represented in the SP, so there will be no 
opportunity for the elements of the Millî Görüş movement to criticise the AKP from within. 
The split into the AKP and the SP after the closure of the FP has put the former in a 
comfortable situation since supporters of more religious and nationalistic parties were 
gathered in the SP.              
Therefore, those who join the AKP with the Millî Görüş background or had an 
experience with the RP or the FP are actually members who have changed their ideas 
before or after they joined the party. The change has given a pathway to the AKP to 
establish a homogenous interpretation on conservatism as the party’s ‘ideology’. The 
transformation became a crucial process upon which the party also encourages support 
from its members. Shifting interpretation has become one of the party’s efforts to engineer 
the Turkish society and it has tried to conduct many programmes and activities that can 
give a strong basis for the new conservative vision. Although the commitment is questioned 
suspiciously (Tepe 2006), the transformation is a strategy that will be discussed in the next 
section. 
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IV.4 Conversion and Replacement  
A process to create a new interpretation is vital for the existence of moderating party and 
the process may be painful. It may lead to tension if the party leadership who proposes the 
new idea fails to convince their members that the new interpretation is legitimate and 
beneficial. Carsey and Layman (1999) call this conversion. Conversion is a parallel strategy 
with replacement. It is a pairing concept. The process is related significantly with the 
authoritative position of the party leadership to replace any member who dares to challenge 
new ideas with those who are ready to support. In fact, replacement does not have to relate 
with the ideology itself. The AKP shows that conversion is relatively strong while 
replacement in the party is not significantly related with ideological contestation.  
After its establishment in 2001 and winning three consecutive elections, the AKP 
has been depicted as a party committed to change the Turkish political and social 
landscapes. Many scholars use the term transformation (Cinar 2006 and Mecham 2004), a 
model for Muslim democracy (Tepe 2006), a new thinking (Cavdar 2006), and a re-
interpretation (Kuru 2006) to represent the party’s novelty in the Turkish political and 
social landscapes. Some journalists also use similar terms such as reformation (Bonner 
2004) or even revolution (Margolis 2011) in their writing. From the outset, by detaching 
itself from any religious background and embracing new vision on secular politics the AKP 
has declared its transformation marking a new era.  
Detaching from religious backgrounds means that the party chooses to adopt a more 
conservative democracy as its formal ideology. It is a declaration of its commitment to 
represent the ‘conservativeness’ of the Turkish people and give up any ambitions to impose 
idealistic visions. By doing so, religiosity is perceived to belong to private domain leaving 
individuals to have their own choice to be religious or not. As a result, publicly the AKP 
accepts the concept of secularism and is active in politics to advance the true meaning of 
democracy (Akdogan 2006).  
The ideology of conservative democracy is faced with two different ideological 
fronts. Firstly, it has to challenge the existing interpretation of the importance of the 
element of religion in politics, or at least as the political rhetoric, as shown by Erbakan. 
Some of his visions such as ‘Just Order’ and the idea of the Muslim market are expressions 
of his strong affinity with Islamic ideas in different forms. Secondly, the party is also 
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situated in an opposite position with the secularist strangleholds who want to preserve 
secularism as the legacy of Ataturk. Departing from the legacy, the AKP asks for a 
different interpretation of secularism where the individual is free from any imposition of 
particular forms of secularism (Tepe 2005: 297-300). Hence, it is expected to give wider 
opportunities for all Turkish citizens to practice their beliefs without any fear.  
To win or at least survive the contestation, the party needs support from Turkish 
citizens who are in fact ready to abandon the idea of religion in politics and are seeking an 
alternative party that governs better than the secularist ones. However, as a new party, the 
AKP must first convince the public that its idea is suitable and beneficial for the people. At 
the beginning, it was a difficult process especially when Erdoğan was jailed by the 
Constitutional Court in 1999 and banned from any political activities. One of the party 
founders explained that it was a situation that begged an explanation to the public because 
the new party was not allowed to register Erdoğan as its candidate in the 2002 election. He 
stated, “Many ask me about the future of the AK Parti because our leader is not allowed to 
compete for election. But, we explain to them that it is not a problem because the party is 
not only him” (Denemeç 2009).  
Explanation was crucial because prior to the AKP, the social basis of conservatism 
in the society was represented by the RP and the FP. Both parties were seen as having some 
ideals for society and, as a result, many members of society believed in their campaign, 
despite the fact that the FP had tried to ease some of its programmes and expressions from 
religion.  The Constitutional Court banned the FP on the allegation that the party functioned 
as home of anti-secularist elements. So, the initial challenge for the AKP was to convince 
voters from different elements of society that it had the potential to become an obvious 
alternative party. In order to counter the religio-nationalistic language, the party supported 
the proposal on EU accession. In contrast with the RP and the SP, the AKP accepted the 
role of the IMF in supporting the Turkish economy, a sign of acceptance to the integration 
of domestic market to the international markets.   
Indeed, introducing opposite ideas is a difficult task and the party has to prepare a 
strategy to convince the public that it has the capability to lead the country to a better 
situation. The party launches campaigns on issues that may lead the voters to choose the 
AKP, as a party of and for the people and not an ideological one or one for certain groups. 
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This was reflected in such jargon as “to place individual at the centre of all policies” and 
acceptance of the Turkish society ‘‘with all its colours, its points of commonality and 
difference” on the basis of “state based rule of law” (Insel 2003: 305-6). By introducing the 
focus on the individual and the rule of law, the party wants to protect “people from 
behaviour that offends religious people” because they have rights to become a religious 
individual, and as a citizen, to affect the “decisions concerning public life” through a 
democratic process (Ibid).  
The success to win three consecutive elections is a complex combination of several 
factors. However, the new outlook of the party has played a great role in attracting many 
voters, especially better economic conditions, is also crucial (Baslevent and Akarca 2008). 
The party successfully appeared to become a supporter of Westernization, while the 
secularists are now seen as opposing the West. For the AKP, getting closer to the West 
should be undertaken by accelerating the accession process of EU membership. On the one 
hand, it is a strategic manoeuvre to challenge the secularists because the party defines itself 
as a follower of advanced economic life like the European countries. Moreover, it would be 
beneficial for the party because the democratic West is perceived to protect the individual’s 
rights and freedom to practice personal beliefs. Therefore, opposing the AKP has becomed 
problematic for the secularist strongholds since public may perceive the latter as obstacles 
of democracy.     
Despite its advantage in discourse against the secularists, the AKP still has to deal 
with the fact that the main public discourse remains largely influenced by the discourse of a 
more religio-nationalistic interpretation. Changing the religious voters’ state of mind is a 
huge challenge but Erdoğan’s charisma and the emergence of a new social class who are 
ready to accept the party’s vision help ease the challenge. Those two advantages were 
meaningful in winning the 2002 election but more actions are needed if the party wants to 
dominate the Turkish politics by winning popular support.  
What the party has been doing is to provide suitable environments for those who 
join the party and also programmes that could attract potential supporters. These efforts are 
important because in order to attract and maintain supporters, the AKP has to change the 
way former supporters of the RP understand the role of religion in public life. It has more 
than 80 per cent of supporters of the FP and most of them have inherited the influence of 
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the RP as well. In the context of moderation, especially those who have religious 
preference, transformation is vital to create more loyal supporters.  
The first effort is related to the way the party creates a different environment. 
Rusen, former member of the Millî Görüş, described the movement’s intention to apply 
idealistic visions into politics as narrow-minded. Similar thought were also expressed by a 
former member of the RP who manages the youth branch in Istanbul. According to him, the 
RP was full of ideals and it encouraged its members to try to realise those ideals in politics. 
A research conducted by Esra Erdoğan (2006) also shows that women activists from the RP 
have changed their ideas after joining the AKP. Another case of a young party activist who 
is also a member of an Islamic organisation is also interesting in which the AKP is seen as 
presenting an opportunity rather than as a target of suspicion. 
The experience of Rusen is also an interesting case in describing the changing of 
understanding of the role of religion in the public sphere. During his membership in the 
Millî Görüş, he had to attend meetings as part of the movement’s programmes. During the 
congregation, it was common to hear sermons on religious aspects and one of the important 
understandings was that religion should play a great role in society and in order to be 
effective it should be applied by authoritative institutions. More concrete implementation is 
the application of sharia in a formal way that is accommodated as positive rule or canon. 
He is not too happy with the interpretation of implementing religious principles into formal 
regulation under state authority. When he joined the AKP, he did not find any imposition of 
ideals into reality and what he found was the situation that the party was a place for 
individuals with religious piety to work and give contribution to society. Therefore, the 
party was only a place to gather and exchange ideas about how to make a better society. In 
the party meetings, there was no agenda of religion and what was discussed was real 
agenda to tackle social and economic problems. In the lower level organisational structure, 
party meetings usually discussed problems in the neighbourhood and what the party could 
do. It is important to identify neighbours who have problems and usually the party will 
arrange a visit to hear the problem. If the party cannot solve it entirely, at least it has given 
its attention. However, it does not stop in a visit because every problem should be written 
and gathered together as a formal report to party structure at a higher level. If there is a 
chance, party representation in parliament or high rank level will be able to come to that 
neighbourhood to meet with the community and it will be brought into higher level to be 
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considered as input for regulation. It is not surprising that the party claims that it has the 
reports on problems of society in every corner of the country and even “if there is a 
member of the community who passed away, we also know about it” (Önen 2010). 
From the experience of Rusen, it was reasonable that the idea of formalising 
religious principles did not have any place in the AKP. The party agenda is mainly to deal 
with the problems of society and how to help solve them. As a secular party, there is no 
activity related to religious congregation, even in a small group meeting.   
The youth leader shared the experience of his membership with the AKP. It was not 
completely different in the sense that he could still preserve his idealistic vision based on 
religion. He mentioned that alcohol was still unacceptable. Nevertheless, the party has 
given him a new understanding that ideals inspired by religion should not have to be 
imposed in a direct way. He explained that “Nobody rejects the idea of not selling alcohol 
in public or government buildings. So, most members from the liberal camp also accept that 
idea” (Appendix A.4.).   
In the case of alcohol, the party taught him how to deal with the issue more 
carefully by underlining that opposing alcohol should not have to be based on religious 
understandings. It could be rationalised by saying that it is unhealthy and it is not correct 
that state institutions support the practice especially to the public. Therefore, the maximum 
involvement that the government can do is to stop the state from sponsoring any company 
that produces alcohol. The government can also limit the area in which trade and consume 
it. In the end, it is free for individuals to sell or to drink and it is not the domain of the state 
to authorise it. It is an example of how the party has given a new understanding by 
underlining the importance of strategy in dealing with reality. The result is a different 
stance of party members, at least in the case of the youth member in Istanbul, in dealing 
with the alcohol issue.  
A research conducted by Erdoğan (2006) for her degree in Sabancı University, 
Istanbul, is another example of the transformation of the AKP members in the experience 
of being a member. In her research, she shows that women activists of the AKP who were 
also members of the RP previously find that different environments have directed their 
understanding on certain issues. The research is mainly focused on the issue of EU 
membership which is vital as the oppositional discourse of the RP and the AKP. During 
their membership with the RP, activities were mainly dominated by congregation in which 
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religious interpretation is disseminated. From the congregation, they understood that the 
EU is not a better option for them since it is perceived as a group of Christians. It means 
that the EU will not favour the interest of Turkish people who are Muslim in majority. 
Therefore, there is no benefitin joining the group with that characteristic.  
When they joined the AKP, the discourse of the EU changed dramatically because it 
supports the EU accession. At first, it was difficult to understand the background behind it 
but what made them more comfortable to explore the reason of its proposal is the absence 
of congregation. Absence of congregation means there will be no imposition of particular 
interpretation. Hence, they will have more space to explore reasons behind it. For example, 
the party officials explain that the EU should not be perceived as a Christian club and 
automatically it is not a threat to the Turkish society. The absence of religious discourse has 
lifted religious interpretation as well and it is able to reveal rational objectives of the EU. 
For instance, the EU is perceived to have a better economic situation and a model of 
providing better service and freedom of individual expression, including practicing 
religious beliefs freely. Joining the EU means more job opportunities for the Turks to work 
in the European countries and of attracting investment that helps to increase the economic 
growth. Moreover, protection for individual rights can be further obtained as demonstrated 
by the case of the headscarf which was brought to the European Court on Human Rights in 
The Hague (BBC News, 10 November 2005). Although the case was rejected by the Court, 
Europe can be seen as an alternative solution in resolving domestic issues. So, the discourse 
has changed from ‘threat’ to ‘opportunity’, and for the women activists, the promise of 
opportunity is more convincing than a perilous Christian club.   
The absence of congregation has provided opportunities to place emphasis on the 
individual’s interest without any pressures. For women activists, it is an opportunity to give 
more emphasis on the existence of individuals. Unlike their experience as members of the 
RP, they can act and think as individuals rather than associate themselves with a collective 
interpretation.  
There is also another case to demonstrate a new nuance of the AKP that has 
influenced members in developing a novel way of looking at the reality. A youth member 
who has graduated from university explained that the party has given more rooms and 
opportunities for religious group activists. He is still a member of an Islamic movement and 
actively recruits new members from schools and universities and conducts activities in the 
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movement’s accommodation. He encouraged his fellow members of the movement to join 
the party or at least to become actively involved in the party’s programmes. One of the 
programmes that is useful for youth is Siyaset Akademisi or Political Academy that gives a 
useful tool to deepen youth’s understanding on many new issues. He joined the programme 
together with a group of young activists from the movement and consistently persuaded 
them to come again to the next session of the programme. 
When he was asked to explain his motivation to actively persuade his colleagues to 
come to party programmes, he responded that joining the party has given him opportunities 
to see the real world. Unlike the movement, the party has presented him with new realities 
to be dealt with. Previously, he thought that the party would not give him any benefit 
because it has no religious agenda. Additionally, it was not attractive for him since he 
believes that religion is important in life. In his mind, without any religious guidance and 
focusing only on politics, the party will place emphasis on worldly motives and undermine 
morality to achieve a political triumph.  
In fact, his involvement with the party has given him a confidence that the AKP 
would be beneficial to the Islamic movements in Turkey in particular and the whole society 
in general. From the movement’s point of view, the party has created a better environment 
for religious movements to work without creating any suspicion from the security 
apparatuses. He said that previously, the place where he lived was closely monitored and 
the presence of the apparatuses was apparent in the surrounding neighbourhood. The 
decreasing scale of security presence is part of the party’s efforts to ease civil rights and is 
beneficial for religious life. Today, the movement is no longer worried to undertake any 
activities at the very same place. The fear of being monitored and taken into custody has 
gone. The people also benefit from such conditions and one of the direct impacts is that 
they can ask permission to build a mosque through easier procedures. Therefore, the 
presence of the AKP in Turkish politics and its significant role in the government is 
crucially critical for the development of civil rights in which Muslim communities also 
accrue the benefits.  
Nonetheless, the nature of the AKP as a secular party does not affect the level of 
support from Islamic organisations. He believed that supporting the party is seen as an 
obligation for Islamic organisations. The Islamic movements including the one in which he 
is a member, should give their votes in the ballot box and do not leave the party to stand 
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alone in the political arena. More than that, they should also actively support the party’s 
programmes. For him, the AKP’s commitment to secularism which seems to be far from 
religious principles does not constitute any problem. Therefore, the transformation toward a 
secular party does not automatically reduce the movement’s attachment to the party. In 
politics, according to him, the most important thing is how to bring benefits for the people 
and it does not necessarily relate to any religious preference.  
The case of the young activist shows that being a member of an Islamic organisation 
does not automatically lead them to have political preference based solely on religiosity. It 
is however completely different from other cases of youth members of other Islamic 
organisations. Two youth members of the Gülen movement showed different thinking in 
looking at politics. Although they do not possess a strong willingness to be active in 
politics, they still used religious principles as a benchmark to evaluate the way politicians 
behave. For instance, they are hesitant to support the AKP because, according to them, 
influenced by material wealth, the leaders of the party have lost their integrity in practicing 
humbleness and modesty as taught by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Thus, it 
will be difficult for the AKP leaders to commit with those principles since they are seen as 
too tolerant to the material extravaganza. All these had forced them not to choose the party 
as their representative in politics. 
A new trend in how members of Islamic organisations look at politics seems to 
emerge as reflected in their stances towards the AKP.  Although coming from an Islamic 
organisation, the young activist in the AKP can still enjoy a flexibility to join a political 
party. More than that, he even could ask other members to attend the party’s activities. 
There is no religious reason for the involvement except that the party has brought benefits 
for society which in turn also put Islamic organisations in an advantageous position.  
In fact, bringing benefits into society is not the only factor that attracts members of 
Islamic organisations to change their view about politics. The party has committed to 
educate its members at every level. The programme aims at strengthening the knowledge 
and skills to work for the party especially in making effective and intensive communication 
with the voters. At the central level, for example, one the popular activities for the younger 
generation is Siyaset Akademisi launched in February 2008. It is a programme offered by 
the AKP to train its young or new members to deepen their knowledge of politics. The 
programme is also open to the public with a pack of themes on several political issues for 
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certain period of time. Hayri Çağır (2009), a coordinator of the programme, explained that 
the programme is open to every citizen without any discrimination and aimed at giving 
insights on politics from a variety of sources, and not solely from the party’s officials. It is 
also a manifestation of the party’s commitment to educate all members or supporters and 
also citizens, so they can embrace better political circumstances in the future.  
I had a chance to attend sessions of the programme and those sessions were 
conducted in a good manner. The committee set up the sessions that keep up with the 
schedule and also provided refreshments for participants. Two of the sessions observed in 
the party’s central building were on liberalism and public speaking. The session on 
liberalism was taught by a prominent scholar known as a liberal defender, Prof. Attila 
Yayla from Gazi University. Another session for public speaking was conducted by a 
young professional from a private company. The two sessions gave an impression that the 
party wants to provide an open forum for many Turkish citizens to learn useful skills and 
knowledge. The session on public speaking was more interesting when the speaker 
demonstrated his skills to the audience. The party also arranged various similar activities 
for local party representatives on different subjects ranging from complex issues such as 
foreign policy, economic and social policies to practical skills such as leadership, 
communication, and body language (Hale and Özbudun 2009: 48).  
The impact on party members is obvious. Some of the participants have expressed 
their gratitude to the party because they have acquired more knowledge and understanding 
on different issues. One of the attendants expressed his desire to be a good politician for 
better Turkish politics in the future after following the programme. He added that Turkey 
should have been in a better situation if all parties can do similar commitment as the AKP. 
At some points, his expression shows that the party’s programmes have achieved its 
intended impact on attendants. In general, they want to educate the Turkish citizens on how 
to embrace politics in a better way and if they are committed to the party, they would be 
willing to work with strong commitment.  
It is reported by Hale and Özbudun (2009: 46) that one of the different characters of 
activists of the AKP is their desire to work with passion and commitment. They give the 
impression in their activities as having strong ideological and emotional attachments. In 
fact, as many have shown, not all of the party members are working for ideological 
preferences. As demonstrated in their explanations, these members have transformed some 
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of their understanding on the role of religion in politics. Some of them, as in the case of the 
youth leader in Istanbul, might not give up totally his commitments to religious belief. 
However, he knows that politics is not a place to impose his beliefs on others and it has to 
be conducted in a different way according to the state’s law. One of the significant changes 
is that they do not want to use religious principles in condemning others’ behaviour.  
To some extent, the party has succeeded in transforming some of its ideological 
elements. Most of the supporters of the RP and the FP have expressed their commitments to 
work in a democratic way and uphold the Turkish conservatism. Prominent party leaders 
who have experienced the severe impact of the Court’s decision to close the RP and the FP 
may possess a new attitude to restrain themselves from making any confrontational gesture. 
However, self-restraint is not the only attitude monopolised by the party’s elites. It has been 
transferred to many lower party activists who had a similar experience with the influence of 
the RP and the FP through the party’s education programmes. As a result, it is now a 
common understanding that religion is part of individual’s belief and some have given up 
ideas of the implementation of formal shari’a as part of the public law. 
From the observation of the party’s education programmes and the discussion with 
some members with experience of the RP and the FP, it can be concluded that the 
expression of ideological preference has been moderated. It is now a new vision of a better 
Turkey with enhanced democracy for every citizen that has driven a strong commitment of 
the AKP’s members. It is also a vision that has attracted members from different 
backgrounds to work for a better Turkey. With that vision, the AKP tries to become a 
melting pot for the Turkish people regardless of their ideological preferences. The party’s 
education programme has become a significant instrument of the transformation. The 
circumstance has helped the party to run a project of normalising democracy in Turkey 
(Insel 2008 and Aktay 2009) that is also known as ‘quiet revolution’ (Tepe 2006). 
In Carsey and Layman’s term, the AKP’s effort to change is beyond what they refer 
to as an objective of preserving the authority of the party’s elites. According to them, the 
objective of transformation of party’s members to follow leaders’ interpretation of party 
ideology is to put the party’s members under their control. With a new but legitimate 
understanding, they are able to ask party’s members to give their loyalty to the party. As a 
result, an effective authority can be obtained resulting in a solid party. Therefore, the 
objective of this strategy is not far from maintaining a leadership that can monopolise the 
160 
 
 
party’s authority with legitimate interpretation. Therefore, it is understandable that they 
also offer a parallel strategy with conversion which is known as replacement.  
Still, according to Carsey and Layman, in order to maintain party solidity, replacing 
those who oppose the new interpretation of the party’s leaders is essential. The reason is 
simple: the opposing members will challenge the leadership by accusing them of betraying 
the original party’s ideology. However, in the end the party’s leaders will secure their 
position by using their authority to expel their opponents. In this context, the 
implementation of replacement is based on conflict of interpretation on ideology. 
In the case of the AKP, replacement is also part of its policies. It takes place in three 
different arenas: party structure, parliament and cabinet. As a leader of those three arenas, 
the party’s chairman has a legal authority to promote any party member to fill the positions 
in the party and cabinet. He has power to control the selection of party candidates to 
represent districts in parliamentary elections. In that position, the strategy of replacement in 
the context of moderation can be implemented rather easily.  
However, several rotations of members from those positions showed how difficult it 
is to determine if a rotation of a party member is motivated by their opposition toward the 
party’s notion of moderation. Most replacement cases are simply related to poor 
performance or failures to bring benefits for the party. Recently, there is also a suspicion 
that the party’s leader is trying to change the composition of deputies in the parliament. To 
win the 2011 national election, there were reports that the party chairman tried to put 
candidates who support him to replace deputies known to be long loyal supporters of 
Abdullah Gül. Nevertheless, the effort to replace a number of deputies was not related to 
the ideological matter. It was part of Erdoğan’s effort to strengthen his idea to change the 
Turkish constitution from a parliamentary to a presidential system. In order to achieve the 
goal, a solid party manoeuvre in parliament is essential especially if the party failed to 
secure its majority above minimum requirement to change the constitution without 
consulting the opposition. For some, the manoeuvre is part of Erdoğan’s ambition to 
control the parliament through his trustworthy people who support the constitutional reform 
proposal.     
The problem with such a manoeuvre is that not all of the AKP’s elites support the 
proposal. Two of its prominent leaders, Gül and Arınç, are not happy with the proposal. 
The Speaker of the parliament also expressed his reservations toward the idea (Aliriza and 
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Koenhemsi 2011: 2). Arınç, the Deputy Prime Minister, prior to the 2011 election 
assertively stood for a parliamentarian rather than a presidential system. In that case, it is 
difficult to claim firmly that the manoeuvre to replace significant numbers of the party’s 
deputy candidates is a reflection of ideological contradiction. The contending elites are in 
fact not representing any ideological position in challenging the chairman’s idea of 
constitutional reform. The main reason for the disagreement is based on the elites’ own 
self-restraining attitude and worry that the proposal would provoke unnecessary backlash 
for the party. Therefore, the current status quo is preferred than a move that might provoke 
new chaotic situation.  
Thus, it can be said that the current disagreement is not based on ideological 
tensions, but rather focused on certain issues with some tactical consequences. Firstly, there 
is an element of personal ambition to secure future political position in 2014. Secondly, in 
order to achieve that, more obedient party deputies in the parliament should be installed and 
consequently, a selection of deputies is required (Associated Press 6 May 2011). The 
process can be conducted efficiently because Erdoğan has a legitimate power which is 
useful to select candidates of party deputies. As a result, disagreement also broadens to 
‘faction like’ conflict because a monopolised selection process has been conducted at the 
expense of some deputies who have close ties with Gül or Arınç. However, it is too early to 
conclude whether or not such a situation is a pure competition for power whose objective is 
to undermine political adversaries. From the members’ point of view, internal power 
struggle is not a phenomenon that should be denied because disagreement is natural and 
also legitimate. For them the struggle is part of the process to find solution and will not 
bring the party into chaos and disagreement and is perceived as normal as it is focused on a 
certain issue (Appendix A.4.).  
The AKP has shown that conversion is quite a successful strategy to transform the 
members’ point of view. The ‘ideological’ element, especially those who have experienced 
being members of the RP or the FP, within the party has been brought into a realm where 
understanding the reality is important. That attitude is in line with the commitment of the 
party’s leaders with the RP and the FP backgrounds to ‘take off their clothes’ or to change 
and leave the history behind. The closure of the FP in 2001 could be a critical factor in 
shaping the attitude. Yet the party is also consistent in sponsoring programmes that 
strengthen a common understanding about the Turkish politics. However, from the 
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experience of some party members, the absence of ideological imposition is also crucial in 
the development of individual political preference. Having enjoyed a more open political 
life, they are now able to expand their knowledge on several issues from more diverse 
sources. The impact is to accept the party’s programmes even though they are completely 
different with that of the the RP or the FP. Through the party’s programmes and 
approaches, there is now a common parallel attitude between the party’s elite and those 
who are at the lower levels. However, the result is quite different from what Carsey and 
Layman have predicted that conversion will be paired with replacement policy. The policy 
is related to the effort of creating a more homogenous party by removing members who 
oppose moderation ideas. In the AKP, efforts to replace a number of ministers and the 
party’s deputies in the parliament are related to power competition rather than to any 
ideological opposition. 
The AKP has shown that the absence of rigid ideology has given more opportunity 
to gain more support from various elements of society. It gives more space for members 
with different preferences by institutionalising the principle of consultation. Even though it 
has been implemented in combination with the dominant leadership in hierarchical party 
structure, personal appeal and vision that meets the objectives of many Turkish people it 
remains significant in attracting supporters and maintaining loyalty of the party’s members. 
The vision has compelled members to think that the party’s leaders would not lead them 
into a difficult situation. This has become their source of trust. 
With moderation of ideology, the need for rule enforcement upon oppositional ideas 
based on diverse ideological interpretation becomes less significant. Offering different 
proposals on certain issues has become the norm; hence dismissal of members based on 
differing ideological interpretation is also minimal. Less ideological conflict is quite 
obvious since consultation can offer different elements to discuss. Additionally, the 
existence of self-boundary, especially among those who are categorised as the religious 
element within the party, has prevented any dramatic response to issues related to religious 
beliefs or demands. As a result, the AKP benefits from the combination of those 
circumstances and continues to receive support from its members. In other words, the party 
has developed the character of a party with strong party institutionalisation based on 
procedures written in the party constitution, although it tends to accommodate the powerful 
figure of its leader. Hence, the party applies leadership and trust based on leadership 
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charisma and vision combined with appreciation to contribution to the success in elections. 
Disciplinary action in decomposition strategy is then based on the impact to the party in 
general to electoral success and appreciation will be given if members’ ideas are beneficial. 
In that regard, conversion is more relevant to direct members with strong religious 
preference parallel with the party’s vision. Therefore, the application of alienation is not 
relevant in the case of the AKP. 
The situation is certainly different from the case of the PKS in Indonesia. On the 
one hand, the PKS formally upholds Islam as its ideology, but on the other, the party tries 
to appeal for more support in elections, even from public with no ideologous preferences. 
As a result, the party has to face a problematic situation, especially on how to interpret the 
aspects of moderation with its pragmatic character of political manoeuvring in front of 
Islamic principles. The subsequent chapter will examine the problematic circumstances 
which the party has to deal with and where ideological aspects are proven to be crucial in 
the struggle of interpretation that leads the party to apply different strategy in its 
moderation process. 
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Chapter V 
 
Managing Moderation of the PKS 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter, the AKP was described as a party which allows its members 
space for debate and discussion as well as the opportunity to work for the benefit of the 
party. It gives different groups within the party, such as religious, liberal, and nationalist 
groups, as well as those from a particular ethnic background, the chance to work for the 
party with a universal vision suitable and comfortable for every group. This is a result of 
the absence of an ideological preference meaning that the AKP is able to implement more 
lenient procedures to punish or sanction members who breach the party constitution. At the 
same time, the party has managed to develop a strategy to persuade members to adapt to a 
vision which enables the party to develop a more sympathetic public opinion. 
This chapter will explore the way in which the PKS has managed the impact of 
moderation, which is dissimilar to the AKP. It is proven that the PKS has not suffered from 
division as has occurred with several other parties in Indonesia. The party’s solidity is 
inherited from the Tarbiyah Movement as a network of members, who, after the movement 
transformed itself into a political party, were ready to work as an effective political 
machine for elections (Permata 2008: 26). Despite its efforts to become a moderate party, 
the strength of the network is still preserved in the PKS, and, even though there are tensions 
within the party, and also some splinters, in general, the majority of its members still work 
for the party.  
As an Islamic political party, the way of managing its members is different to that of 
the AKP. Leadership and trust combined with alienation and decomposition are the 
common strategies to anticipate the impact of moderation. It can be seen in the strategy of 
developing loyal cadres through the ideological doctrine of a solid group in pursuing an 
ideal vision (jama’ah) and legitimacy of obtaining religious understanding. However, 
because the moderation of the PKS still preserves an ideology, decomposition strategy 
plays a great role in controlling members’ behaviour but in a different application from the 
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AKP. The definition of breaching party’s rules is not simply based on organisational 
aspects, but it also refers to Islamic principles. Hence, in the party structures and 
constitution, the twofold bases of disciplinary action are obviously exhibited as an 
interpretation of breaching party rules allowing the party to implement sanctions for 
disloyal members. Another distinctive strategy is alienation that is absent in less ideological 
parties such as the AKP. In the PKS, strong feeling of in-group as part of sacred 
community (jama’ah) makes it effective for the party leader to develop serious 
consequences of breaching the party’s procedures or having a position too hostile to its 
decisions.   
 
V.1. Party Leadership  
In the case of the PKS, the notion of a small, influential group directing the party’s policy is 
also relevant, especially in the context of Indonesian party politics, which is characterised 
by the dominance of a small number of political leaders. The indication has been noted in 
classic studies of political parties from Ostrogorski and Michels, who mention the existence 
of small but significantly powerful elites within a political party as the key factor in an 
internal dynamic power relation. According to this analysis, any direction of a political 
party will be led by this small elite group, which constitutes an oligarchy within the party. 
In modern political party dynamics, the existence of this influential small group is still 
apparent, as when Robert Dahl explains the phenomenon of polyarchy in the American 
democratic system (Dahl 1989).  
 However, to locate the influential group in the PKS is not as simple as pointing at 
the party president as the head of the executive body as shown in the case of the AKP. The 
head of the party is a position which has the most significant power in the majority of 
Indonesian political parties. In both PDI-P and Golkar, for instance, the party’s general 
chairman is the most influential figure in the party. Strategic policies in both parties need to 
gain their consent before they are implemented, and, at elections, they are likely to be the 
party’s candidate for president. In the case of the PKS, however, it would be quite 
misleading to identify the party chairman as the holder of power. When the movement’s 
party was founded in 1998 under the name of PK, the party chairman was a relatively 
unknown figure. The first president, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, was a civil servant researcher 
and PhD graduate from an American university, with no record of strong relations with any 
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of the Middle Eastern Islamic movements. His profile is unlike that of the second president, 
Hidayat Nur Wahid, who graduated from the University of Madinah and is better suited to 
represent the Islamic appearance of the PK, and then the PKS. With Ismail’s sound 
attachment to science rather than religious subjects, there was a question of how effective 
his authority was in leading the party to work with other leading figures with advanced 
religious attachment to the party. 
The president of the PKS, after the transformation of the PK in order to participate 
in the 2004 election, seems to have limited power in that the president always refers to 
other institutions in making crucial party decisions. In deciding whether the party should 
support a particular presidential candidate or not, for example, the president has to wait for 
a decision from the Shura Assembly and negotiations are undertaken by the head of the 
Assembly. When President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono replaced Suharna Surapranata 
with an academician as Minister of Research and Technology in the cabinet reshuffle of 
October 2011, the decision was taken by the Assembly, rather than by the DPP (Dewan 
Pimpinan Pusat or Council of Central Committee) as the executive body (the Jakarta Post, 
20 October 2011). Therefore, identifying the power holder in the party needs more careful 
examination.    
 For the purpose of analysing the role of the party leadership in managing the impact 
of moderation, a clear definition of power holders and relations within the PKS is essential. 
The following paragraphs in this section are intended for that purpose and, in order to do 
so, the explanation will be based on the formal approach analysis through the examination 
of the party constitution and structure, as well as an analysis of elite – cadre relations. The 
analysis corresponds with the conceptual discussion of party management, especially on 
power relation, in Chapter II, which states that both party structure and party dynamic are 
important. However, in the PKS, it is important to give more attention to the party dynamic, 
which can be defined as the relationship between cadres (elite and cadres).   
Unlike the AKP, which gives a significant role to the party’s chairman, the PKS 
does not have a strong individual leader. Hence, the analysis of party structure is important 
as the party developed a disciplined organisational structure and has had a strong 
commitment to the formal political process since the beginning of its involvement in 
politics (Diederich 2002: 107 and 105). From the organisation of party structures, we can 
identify the decision making process clearly, especially the role of institutions such as the 
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Shura Assembly, the DPTP (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat or Council of Central Boards)  
and the DPP (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat or Council of Central Committee), along with the 
Presidency and its executive structures. Meanwhile, the analysis of inter-cadre relations is 
also essential to describe the power relations between cadres, especially the elite’s exercise 
of power in relation to the party’s cadres at different levels. The first part of the analysis, 
then, will focus on the party structure in order to locate the power holder within the 
organisation, which will be useful for the second analysis of the power dynamic.  
 
V.I.1. Party Structure 
As shown in Chapter III, the party emerged from an underground Islamic movement 
(Tarbiyah movement) with a strong organisation and control to coordinate its members at 
each level. Although the party is seen as the result of a transformation (Damanik 2002), the 
PKS still inherited the movement’s basic character which emphasises the quality of cadres 
through a careful recruitment and training process. The transformation into a political party 
in 1998 did not automatically change the organisational character of the movement into that 
of a modern political party. Following the policy decision to integrate the structure of the 
movement into the PKS in 2005, the character of the movement is embedded within the 
structure of the party. It means that the leader of the party is also the leader of the 
movement and vice versa. Similar conditions also apply at different levels, such as the 
leader of the movement in a particular province will be likely be the leader of the PKS in 
that province. The head of a local party branch at a provincial level, for example, should be 
someone who has reached the required level of membership to lead the branch. The party 
also has a strong educational character by giving more attention to the internalisation 
process for members. The message to be internalised is the Islamic teaching, which is also 
similar to that which cadres had received during the movement era. For that purpose, the 
party has set up a special division to take care of all internalisation processes, known as 
divisi kaderisasi or the division of cadre regeneration. In addition, the party also runs 
regional coordination management adopted from the organisation of the Tarbiyah 
Movement dividing Indonesia into different areas of coordination. During the movement 
era, these coordination areas were known as area dakwah.  
According to the party constitution published in 2008 (MPP 2008), the Shura 
Assembly is the highest ranking institution in the PKS. The function of the Assembly is 
similar to the concept of ahlul halli wal-aqdi as the forum for selected members to 
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represent the people. The term relates to the interpretation of representation of a community 
by selected and trusted individuals who have the wisdom and specialisation to discuss 
issues wisely in the Sunni tradition going back to the writings of al-Mawardi and al-Farra. 
In the Indonesian context, it is not a unique case since other Islamic organisations such as 
Nahdlatul Ulama also applied the concept for a long time (van Bruinessen 1991: 190). The 
PKS’s constitution assigns the Assembly, as the highest institution in the party, the 
authority to decide strategic policies as well as in guiding all party institutions and cadres. 
The example of strategic policy as mentioned in the constitution is that the Assembly has 
the authority to change the party’s constitution, the party’s platform, and basic and strategic 
plans of the party (Party Constitution, Article 11, verses 2c, d, e). 
The Assembly also has the authority to select members of the party’s central 
committee, which functions as an executive body, as well as other strategic institutions 
such as the MPP (Majelis Pertimbangan Partai or Central Advisory Assembly) and the 
DSP (Dewan Syariah Pusat or Central Sharia Council). For the PKS, the DPP, led by a 
president does not have the authority to decide strategic decisions in relation to major 
political events such as elections or coalitions. The president as the head of the executive 
body only has the authority to declare the party’s presidential candidate in elections as well 
as the party’s direction after elections to join coalition to form a government as decided by 
the Assembly. It is an authority that is written in the party’s constitution as stated in Article 
11, verse 2l. In practice, the last two elections have shown the Assembly’s role in making 
decisions regarding political coalitions because the Assembly has the authority to decide on 
the presidential candidate to be supported by the party. In two presidential elections, the 
party has supported three different presidential candidates, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – 
Jusuf Kalla after the defeat of Amien Rais – Siswono Yudhohusodo in the first round of the 
2004 election, and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono again in the 2009 election, but this time 
with Boediono as his running mate for vice-president. The recent cabinet reshuffle which 
reduced the number of PKS ministers in the cabinet demonstrates the centrality of the 
Assembly in deciding the party’s position with regard to the policies enacted by the 
President as the head of cabinet. In that case, the President of the PKS had to wait for a 
definitive decision by the Assembly before producing a final decision in reaction to the 
reshuffle. This is the mechanism that has been maintained since the beginning of the party 
starting from the PK in 1998 and continued by the PKS until recently.  
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The Assembly is a forum for members who have outstanding capacity in 
understanding the Islamic principles. For this reason, only expert members (anggota ahli) 
can be elected as members of the Shura Assembly, as they are seen as having religious 
insight, mandate and influence (Party Bye-law, Article 7, Verse 1f). Members of the 
Assembly will serve for at least 5 years in lunar system and their membership is arranged to 
accommodate a wide range of members; it is mentioned in the party’s constitution that the 
Assembly may consist of a minimum of 51 members and a maximum of 99 (Party Bye-law, 
Article 7.2). Despite this regulation, which allows for the number of members of the 
Assembly to vary, in practice the institution has always had the maximum number of 99 
seats from the beginning. It is relatively unknown who decides the number, but from the 
authority obtained from the party’s constitution, it is the Assembly itself which decides. It 
is believed that the figure is arranged to reflect the Assembly as a collective forum for 
experts and senior cadres. With that composition, the party hopes that the collective 
character of the Assembly will give its decisions a significant degree of legitimacy, so that 
all cadres will trust any decisions. The degree of trust among cadres toward the Assembly 
can be seen from their common perception that the Assembly ‘will not cause us any 
difficulties and damage’ and that it ‘knows what is best for the party and all of its cadres’. 
Such expressions are important to maintain the party’s solidity when it produces 
contentious decisions.  
Members of the party must hold the status of expert member for five years before 
they are eligible for election to the Assembly. The membership is important in the party 
because those who are included in the category will be regarded as elite members of the 
party, or at least perceived as respectable members. In the party’s levels of membership, 
expert member is almost the highest level attainable, ranking above two other levels of 
middle member (kader madya) and senior member (kader dewasa). There is only one 
category above it, which is premier member (anggota purna). The four categories of 
membership are known as core cadre (kader inti) that is known as full member of the party. 
This is categorised as full membership because the party also has a different category of 
membership, which is for supporters (pendukung). The two categories of membership are 
differentiated by different rights and obligations. For example, the former have rights to 
vote for candidates for the Assembly as well as an obligation to fulfil the party’s tasks to be 
in the party’s structures.   
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In the Assembly formed in 2010, an election was arranged to choose 65 electable 
members, all of whom were expert and premier members. All of them had an equal 
opportunity of being elected in a process known as internal election for the Assembly. The 
65 candidates were elected by those who have the right to vote (the core cadre), while the 
supporter members did not participate in the election.  There were 195 candidates for the 
election selected from around 1,000 expert members, and they had to compete for 65 seats 
from 33 provincial electoral areas (Vivanews, 21 February 2010). Each core cadre has the 
right to choose a candidate from the province where he or she resides and candidates will 
be chosen from the votes they get using the first-past-the-post system. Therefore, a cadre 
will choose a candidate who lives in the same province to represent cadres in that province.  
The 65 members of the Assembly represent a category of regional representation 
based on provinces, distributed according to the number of cadres who reside in each 
province (Vivanews, 22 February 2010). West Java has the largest number of seats in the 
Assembly, followed by Jakarta and Central Java. West Java has 12 seats to represent the 
region while Central Java and Jakarta have six seats each. Jakarta has only six seats even 
though votes from members abroad are counted for the capital. Its number is not too 
significant compared to its position as the focal point of the party because its three 
suburban cities (Tangerang, Depok, and Bekasi) are administratively under the coordination 
of Banten and West Java. The other significant region is East Java, which has four 
representatives in the Assembly.   
In the Assembly, there are also 32 members who are not elected by core cadres. 
These members are selected by the Assembly after the 65 members are elected because of 
their expertise in areas such as law, politics, governance, education, economy, etc. In 
addition, the Assembly also has another category, which is permanent member. This is a 
membership status granted to the former head of the Assembly as well as the current head 
himself. Hilmi Aminuddin, who developed the movement from the early 1980s, leads the 
Assembly and was automatically granted the status of permanent member. His membership 
is also similar with Salim Segaf al-Djufrie, the Minister of Social Affairs from 2009 to 
2014, who was also granted permanent membership after his service as head of the 
Assembly in the early period of the PKS. 
The last election for the Assembly was held on 21 February 2010 in all provinces 
including those who live abroad. There were approximately 37,435 core cadres registered 
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who had the right to give their preference to an individual candidate. As in a normal 
election, expert members compete for seats in each province, which functions as an 
electoral area and, using a simple first-past-the-post system, the candidate who gets most 
votes in each electoral area wins the seat. However, unlike other political parties, the PKS 
internal election does not feature campaign activities from the candidates or intensive 
lobbying to attract votes. It seems that every cadre who has the right to vote already has the 
necessary information on candidates so that he or she can vote without any doubt despite 
the absence of campaign activities (Appendix B.11.).   
The Assembly is regarded as a collective forum in which every member has the 
opportunity to speak and express their ideas. The right to speak in the Assembly is 
combined with the obligation to be heard by others (Appendix B.10.). In this context, the 
Assembly gives a free opportunity to discuss and debate every available option of a 
particular decision to be made. Having the opportunity to speak and be heard, the Assembly 
acknowledges the mechanism of contesting every idea emerging in the Assembly’s 
meetings. Therefore, it takes a long time to make a decision because the meeting should 
allocate equal opportunity for every member to speak. 
Nevertheless, collectivism is not the only aspect of the Assembly because it is 
important to look at the head of the institution. The head of the Assembly is also called 
Muraqib ‘Amm. As formally stated in the party’s constitution, the head of the Assembly 
only leads the meeting and has the final decision if the Assembly is equally divided on an 
issue. However, he also has the authority to propose party committees in the DPP and two 
other important institutions (the MPP and the DSP). That authority makes the head an 
important person in the Assembly. With that authority, the leader is not just a leader who 
facilitates the assembly’s meeting but also a person with a considerable role within the 
party.  
 
V.I.1.1. President and the DPP (Council of Central Committee) 
Since the inauguration of the political party, the movement decided to use the term 
president for the party leader. The purpose of using the term is to de-sacralise the term itself 
after 32 years of authoritarian rule under President Soeharto during the New Order era 
(Abidin 1999: 135). During this era, Soeharto was a powerful president unrestricted by 
control from legislative and judicial bodies, until he became the target of reformation forces 
in 1998. The PK wanted to adapt the spirit of reformation to impress upon the public that it 
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had no relation to the old regime and to settle its character as a party that is dominated by 
youth (Diederich 2002: 105). As a party founded in the reformation era, dismantling the 
meaning of president is an important message to the public that the party promises 
significant change for Indonesian politics.  
The president is responsible for running the functions of the party as well as the 
project of dakwah. The former is related to functions as an ordinary political party dealing 
with many strategic issues such as economics, politics, security, and social policies. At the 
same time, the president also has to manage its most important mission of spreading the 
message of Islam, both internally and externally, under the project of dakwah. Internally, 
the importance of this project can be seen in the existence of training and cadre division to 
organise training for all members by providing structured programmes and material. The 
implementation of the programme is overseen by area coordinators who cover more 
territorial functions to cover some provinces. Hence, the area coordinators play a great role 
in helping the president to handle coordination in different areas and may thus be seen as 
his deputies. Constitutionally, then, the president has a strategic position in the party since 
he has access to the whole function and coordination of the party. He has direct command 
of all of the party’s structures involved in the coordination of all territorial projects of 
dakwah as well as political functions as a party through the divisions in the DPP.  
However, despite this strategic position which allows him to represent and act for 
the party externally, the president is restricted in his ability to manoeuvre on certain issues. 
One of the restrictions is to make decisions on issues related to the presidency and its 
cabinet such as elections, coalitions, power sharing, and strategic governmental policies. 
This is simply because it is the domain of the Assembly to decide the party’s standpoint 
and negotiation as mandated by the party constitution (Constitution, Article 11, Verse 2l). 
The article only gives the president of the party the right to present recommendations to the 
Assembly. However, as a member of the Assembly, the president can give opinions during 
its sessions. The President (and the General Secretary) is automatically a member of the 
Assembly because all members of the DPP must be chosen from those who are elected in 
the Assembly (Party Bye-law, Article 18).  
In fact, the constitution only mentions the president as part of the DPP that is 
supported by the general secretary and treasurer with all of their responsibilities and 
authorities. The DPP has an obligation to implement all of the decisions made by the 
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National Summit and the Assembly. Therefore, the DPP is an operational structure to 
ensure that all of the party’s policies are implemented, especially to run training for cadres 
in accordance with manhaj tarbiyah or method of training (Party Constitution, Article 14, 
and Verse 3b). The DPP does not have exclusive authority to decide its political 
representation in the House of Representatives and candidates for provincial governorships 
because these decisions are held by the DPTP. The fact that the Council holds the authority 
to formalise them cannot mask the authority of the DPTP (Bye-law, Article 19). The DPP 
only has the authority to decide candidates for provincial representatives, so that it has to 
share the power of executive at the national level with other institutions in the DPTP. The 
DPP’s secondary status is also reflected in its regular report to the DPTP every six months 
(Bye-law, Article 14), more specifically, it has to prepare a regular financial report for the 
Head of the Assembly (Bye-law, Article 19).        
Other than that, the DPP has the authority to coordinate all the party cadres in the 
legislative and executive bodies (Bye-law, Article 19). With that authority, the President is 
usually free from all political positions in either the House of Representatives or the 
Cabinet. In the PKS, there is a tradition that a member will withdraw from the parliament if 
selected as President and vice versa. The President has to withdraw from his position if he 
is selected as a minister. The three presidents of the PKS (Hidayat Nur Wahid, Tifatul 
Sembiring and Lutfi Hasan Ishaaq), as well as the previous president of the PK (Nur 
Mahmudi Ismail), have not held any political office. They never occupy different positions 
in order to to focus on their duties as president. It is also a message to the public that the 
President of the party is a professional working for the party to avoid any conflict of 
political interests embedded in different positions, such as minister. Nur Mahmudi Ismail 
gave up his position to Hidayat Nur Wahid after becoming Minister of Forestry in 1999. 
The tradition was followed by Tifatul Sembiring, who took over the position when Nur 
Wahid became the chair of the People’s Consultative Assembly in 2004. He himself 
withdrew in 2009 when he was invited to become Minister of Communication and 
Information and he finally was replaced by Lutfi Hasan Ishaaq, the current President of the 
PKS. 
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V.I.1.2. The MPP (Central Advisory Assembly) and the DSP (Central Shari’a  
Council) 
Constitutionally, both institutions are positioned parallel with the DPP and structurally have 
important roles in the decision making process. The leaders of both institutions are 
automatically included in the DPTP as the highest-ranking institution to make strategic 
decisions when the Shura Assembly does not have an agenda to arrange meetings. 
However, both institutions also have different roles which make them less significant in 
terms of their political influence.  
In concept, the MPP has the legislative function of preparing the party’s rules and 
guidance. Interpreted from the results of the National Summit or meetings of the Shura 
Assembly, the MPP transfers them into documents which can be read and distributed to all 
members. Most of its energy, then, is focused on preparing and socialising the document of 
the party’s platform, which was finally published in 2008.  
In practice, the MPP acts as a supervisory institution for the DPP, giving advice, 
recommendations and consultations for the implementation of the party’s guidance 
(Constitution, Article 13). It may give its assessment of the implementation of the platform 
and guidance and present recommendations to the DPP as well as to the Assembly. 
Constitutionally, that function is quite significant, especially when the DPP leads the party 
in a different direction. Nevertheless, the supervisory function of the Assembly constrains it 
to act more passively with regard to the daily political dynamics and its recommendations 
will not have any direct outcome on the party’s direction.   
Despite its position of supervising the DPP, the MPP faces problems in getting 
involved in the daily politics of the party. One of the main reasons for the obstacle is 
because of its nature as an advisory institution, as a result of which, most of its members 
are senior cadres who have previously served the party in honorary positions. Hence, there 
is an anecdote that the MPP is humorously referred to as ‘Mantan Pengurus Pusat’ or 
former central committee members (Appendix B.10.).          
Compared to the MPP, the DSP plays a greater role in the party since it fulfils a 
judicial function. The DSP as an institution defends the party’s morals, dealing with cases 
that need a legal response according to Islamic principles. Difficult situations need religious 
judgement by using principles of ushul fiqh as a method of assessing them in accordance 
with Islamic values. Therefore, it is common for the DSP to release statements to describe 
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the party’s position according to its Islamic interpretation. For example, the DSP released 
the party’s statement on the case of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, which became a controversial 
issue in 2007 - 2008. 
However, the DSP as an institution not only produces statements but also articulates 
its position toward shari’a. As an Islamic party, it is quite unique that the PKS does not call 
for an implementation of shari’a law in Indonesia. Through the DSP, it makes it clear 
constitutionally that state law is still acknowledged by the party. The DSP is significant in 
the implementation of this acknowledgement since it has a function to review the 
implementation of aspects of shari’a in the state’s laws (Bye-laws, Article 23). The article 
shows the willingness of the party to implement shari’a law in Indonesia, but it is the 
review of the substance rather than replacing all of the state’s laws by shari’a. The article 
also shows the PKS’s commitment to work within the the constitutional framework to find 
opportunities to incorporate aspects of shari’a into the state’s law. The support of the PKS 
for the anti- pornography law in 2008 is one example of the party working within that 
framework. 
While the PKS tries to find compromise with the state’s laws, the party attempts to 
implement shari’a internally. The way of implementing it is by giving the DSP authority to 
adjudicate in all cases of the party’s cadres violating sharia law (Bye-laws, Article 23, 
Verse 3.e). It is widely known that the DSP has the authority to impose severe punishments 
on cadres who break shari’a law and some of them are officially dismissed for severe 
violations of sharia. These include senior cadres such as Syamsul Balda and Yusuf 
Supendi, who were expelled from the party for different reasons. Unfortunately, the 
verdicts for cadres found to be in breach of the shari’a are not published to keep the 
reasons for their dismissal secret; hence, the party can protect their names from disgrace 
(Appendix B.17.).   
 
V.I.1.3. The DPTP (Council of Central Leaderships) 
It is undisputed among the party’s cadres that the Assembly is the most powerful institution 
in the party after the National Summit. However, the Summit only meets once every five 
years and, therefore, lacks the flexibility to deal with short term issues, while the Assembly 
has more regular meetings every six months, so that it has the ability to respond more 
quickly to short term and strategic issues. Therefore, it has the authority to provide strategic 
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decisions in response to the dynamics of the Indonesian political system, especially before 
and during the electoral process for legislative and presidential elections.  
However, the Assembly is still somewhat inflexible when it comes to the decision-
making process, which should involve all members of the Assembly. The six-monthly 
schedule also gives rise to problems when there is a need for prompt strategic decisions. 
Therefore, it is necessary to find an institutional mechanism to deal with making immediate 
decisions. In response, the PKS introduced an institution to represent all the authoritative 
institutions of the Assembly and the DPP, called the DPTP (Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat 
Pusat or Council of Central Leadership). As mentioned in Article 12 of the party’s 
constitution, the institution consists of six of the most important persons representing 
institutions at the national level; these are the head of the Assembly, the DSP, and the MPP, 
as well as the President, the General Secretary and the Treasurer. Led by the head of the 
Assembly, the DPTP has all the authority of the Assembly, in terms of representing and 
supervising the implementation of its decisions. In the party structure as seen in Diagram 
V.1., the DPTP is located between the Assembly and the governing bodies, reflecting its 
strategic position above all strategic institutions. 
The DPTP’s important role in the party can be seen in its constitutional 
considerations, especially in Article 12 of the party’s constitution, and Article 14 of the 
bye-laws. In the former, the DPTP is assigned to comply with all decisions of the Assembly 
and supervise all of their implementation. The DPTP is also authorised to decide the party’s 
political position when the Assembly is not able to do so. The institution also gives 
recommendation to candidates who will be supported officially by the party in provincial 
elections, as well as selecting candidates to represent the party in the House of 
Representatives.. Its supremacy over the governing bodies is also reflected in its authority 
to recommend the structure of the party and its committees to be decided at the Assembly’s 
meeting. The DPTP itself has no set time period for its meetings, which gives it the 
flexibility to arrange critical decisions without being constrained by the party’s 
constitutional clauses. In Article 14 of the party’s bye-laws, it is mentioned that the DPTP 
can meet at least once every three months. This means that the DPTP can arrange meetings 
at any time when needed. With its flexibility and the involvement of important figures, the 
DPTP is the most strategic institution in dealing with daily political dynamics. However, its 
authority has a direct implication on the political roles of others, in particular as it lessens 
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the President’s role. The PKS, then, has limited the role of the party’s President, so that he 
is not a central figure.   
The role of the Assembly as well as the DPTP confirms the commitment of the PKS 
to implementing a collective approach to politics. The party’s structure indicates the 
determination to avoid any possible opportunity for one person to have a powerful authority 
without any control. One reason suggested for developing a collective approach is due to 
the party’s lack of influential figures that are widely known to the public (Appendix B.6.). 
In the case of the DPTP, although it has a higher position than other governing bodies, it 
cannot intervene in the decisions of the DSP. The DPTP also has limits to its ability to act 
as a powerful institution because the nature of its composition as a collective institution 
makes it difficult to accumulate power. Hence, to take a strategic decision, it needs the 
consent of representatives of different institutions.  
There is also another significant reason for that approach, which is the centrality of 
Hilmi Aminuddin’s role. As the head of the Assembly, he is also the representative of that 
body in the DPTP. Moreover, he was also chosen as the head of that collective leadership 
institution.   It is, then, interesting to focus on his role not only as the head of the Assembly 
but also as the head of the DPTP as both institutions have the power to make any strategic 
and critical decisions for the PKS.  
 Having two strategic positions on the two institutions, there must be a notion that he 
is more than a mere head of the institutions. To understand the nature of his role in the 
party, we have to be aware of the basis of the party itself and his contribution to the party’s 
roots. As a continuation of an underground Islamic movement, the importance of his 
involvement is significant because he was the founder of the movement and trained most of 
the party’s elite in the movement’s early stages. Moreover, even today, there is no figure in 
the party who can substitute for his ability to guide all cadres in politics with an appropriate 
approach (Appendix B.6.). He is still the central figure for all cadres to listen to and follow 
in implementing the general vision of the movement’s sacred mission of dakwah in politics. 
Hence, obtaining both strategic positions is a manifestation of admiration for his great 
contribution to the movement while, at the same time, providing general guidance and 
direction in politics.  
Therefore, the party’s structure is also a reflection of Aminuddin’s informal status 
in front of its cadres. It is explained that the collective approach of the party is a reflection 
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of his unchallenged position in front of all cadres as a catalyst for the complex nature of the 
cadres, especially those at the elite level (Ibid). Hence, the position of the party’s President 
as part of the collective leadership of the Assembly and the DPTP is an indication of the 
subordinate position of the person in that position before Aminuddin, at least informally.  
The party’s structure indicates the importance of Aminuddin’s role in the party.  
Further examination, then, is needed to find out the power relations between political 
figures in the party, which will be provided in the following section. To get a clearer picture 
of the relationships between cadres the subsequent section will explain relations between 
members of the elite, as well as between the elite and lower cadres and vice versa. The 
description is important to find an explanation of how leadership in the PKS is developed 
and maintained to strengthen the solidity of its cadres. It is proven that the leadership plays 
a large role in minimising the impact of moderation introduced by the party leadership. 
    
V.I.1.2. Party Leadership and Party Dynamics  
Despite his reluctance to engage in public life and occupy a political position, it is 
important to note the pivotal role of Hilmi Aminuddin as the head of the Assembly and the 
DPTP. He is central to the Tarbiyah movement as its initiator in the early 1980s. After its 
declaration as a political party in 1998, his major role can be seen in strategic political 
decisions and negotiations, especially in support of presidential candidates in national 
elections and deals for power sharing in cabinet through coalition. Therefore, examining his 
role as a figure who is able to represent the PKS in its strategic affairs is important, 
especially the relation between him and all cadres. It is also a question that may be 
addressed toward all of the elites and cadres in the party to examine the actual relation 
between them beyond their nature as members of a political party.  
Those inquiries are important for the party since the PKS has sucessfully 
maintained its solidity after efforts to be seen as more moderate in the last two elections. 
Instead of suffering from conflict or even split, the PKS only suffered from tensions among 
some of its members. The impact of the tension itself is believed to have influenced the 
party’s electoral performance, especially in big cities when some critical members were not 
eager to maximise the efforts to maintain or get more voters (Hidayat 2010). Nevertheless, 
despite confusion among some of its cadres, supporters and sympathisers toward the 
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messages delivered by some of the party’s elite, the party still enjoys the loyalty most of its 
cadres.    
 One of the answers for the continued solidity is that the leadership still receives the 
loyalty of most cadres, whether at the elite, middle or lower level. At the elite level, the key 
figure is Hilmi Aminuddin himself as the founder of the Tarbiyah Movement before acting 
as the head of the Assembly. He spent most of his time in the early 1980s training large 
numbers of young people in Islamic understanding brought from the Middle East. It is 
believed that the influence of Ikhwanul Muslimin was embedded in his ideas and 
interpretation of Islam and he also adopted the Ikhwan’s training methods, even though the 
real connection between the two sides still remains unclear. His long efforts to build the 
new network of youngsters were rewarded after almost 20 years when the movement 
revealed its identity to gradually become an increasingly, influential political party.  
 After his hard work in building the network, his meritorious service was then 
rewarded by the party, most of whose elite he had previously trained. Although he showed 
his reluctance to accept any political position, his colleagues honoured him with the 
leadership of the Assembly after a short period of Salim Segaf al-Djufrie’s leadership. 
However, the party elite’s admiration of Aminuddin is not merely an appreciation of his 
dedication in training most of them. There are also aspects of their mutual relations that 
encourage them to respect him. From the interview with a senior cadre, there is an 
impression that Aminuddin is adept at maintaining the loyalty of his aides. Before the 
foundation of the party, he was able to support the growing network, which needed more 
funds to coordinate the spreading of cadres to remote provinces. He was able to utilise his 
network with sources of funding in the Middle East and used it to support new cadres from 
that region, who had just finished their studies in the Middle Eastern universities, to run the 
network (Zein 2010). For new graduates, the offer was significant before they had any 
settled position and stable income. Therefore, they worked for the movement and gave their 
time and skill for the projects set up by the movement.  
That relationship was maintained until the cadres were able to find an income to 
support themselves. However, in many cases the elite were in a difficult situation because 
they had to give up most of their time to work for the movement and train different groups 
of recruits in different places without asking for payment. Many of them lived in very 
modest conditions. For those who worked for the movement on a full time basis, financial 
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support was given. While it is too simplistic to conclude that they are now loyal to 
Aminuddin because of his previous efforts to provide financial support, nevertheless some 
of them express their admiration of him by not challenging his ideas and opinions, 
especially as he is also able to talk dominantly but calmly (Appendix B.6.). In other words, 
his efforts were really appreciated by the party’s elite when he showed his spirit to work 
seriously for the movement. He, then, became the source of spirit for the senior cadres in 
the early period to work tirelessly and his speeches always inspired them (Zein 2010).   
 Therefore, in reality, the relations between Aminuddin and the party’s elite are 
about giving an appropriate reaction to his opinion and ideas. When he has a wish, the elite 
cadres respond appropriately without challenging him. A scholar explains that when the 
transformation process to declare unity between the PK and the PKS was being prepared, 
some of the senior members asked him to explain directly to Aminuddin about the legal 
consequences of conducting the declaration, which was not in accordance with the law. He 
remembers that none of the senior members were able to convince Aminuddin and nobody 
was eager to continue challenging his ideas, even though they knew that his plan was not 
right (Appendix B.11.). Aminuddin’s argument was that opposing the state’s law where 
necessary is part of jihad and that the movement does not have to be afraid of it, a similar 
attitude to challenging the New Order regime when they managed the underground 
activities. However, after receiving inputs and arguments based on interpretation of the law 
and the state administration with less strict emphasis on religion and the movement’s 
perspective, he withdrew his insistence on making the declaration at that time.  
Before the movement was transformed into a political party, his profile was difficult 
to unveil, even for the majority of members of the movement. There are layers of 
generation in the movement which have filtered the information about him as the leader of 
the movement. As a person, he does not represent a strong figure able to attract mass 
support since most of his track record is unknown publicly, except that he is the son of a 
prominent member of DI/TII, an armed movement in the 1950s which sought to establish 
an Islamic state in Indonesia that was crushed by the government. Although it was formally 
destroyed, some of its followers were still trying to attract young Muslims to join its 
underground movement until recent years.  
However, his studentship in Medina has made him an important person in 
transferring the ideas of Hasan al-Banna to Indonesia as part of a wider process of 
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transferring ideas from the Middle East to Indonesia (van Bruinessen 2011). He was also 
the person who was actively trained in the first and the second generations of the Tarbiyah 
movement from one house to another in the early 1980s. As an alumnus of a Middle 
Eastern university, his links to the Islamic movement in that region are quite strong and 
proved significant in providing the support which allowed the movement to expand. 
Finding financial support was one of his strengths in developing the organisation of the 
Tarbiyah movement. Due to his significant role in initiating the movement and his ability in 
mastering the idea of the Ikhwan’s training through many classics and contemporary Arabic 
literatures, his position as the Assembly’s focal leader is reasonable. Therefore, the 
members’ admiration of him is basically centred on his role as the initiator and main source 
of the movement’s ideology. 
   The indication of his exceptionality in the party is confirmed through a careful 
reading of a clause in the constitution saying that he has the authority to make a final 
decision when there is no definitive decision or deadlock. As explained in the previous 
section, the clause is a legitimate basis for him to choose one option alone without 
considering the number of supporters of any other option, even though voting is also 
acceptable. However, this authority does not merely grant Aminuddin legitimacy to wield 
absolute power because he has to listen to all members’ opinions and if there is no deadlock 
the authority cannot be applied (Appendix B.10.). Formally, the mechanism in the 
Assembly is to find acclamation before moving onto voting (Bye-law, Article 13, Verses 3 
and 4). If the voting mechanism cannot produce a definite conclusion, the head of the 
Assembly has the legitimacy as determinant to give preference to a particular option (Bye-
law, Article 13, Verse 5 and 6). 
 The practice is quite unusual in a democratic system since it does not give a 
quantitative measure for an application of the authority. In the case of the PKS, authority to 
give a final decision is in the hands of Muraqib ‘Amm (the informal term for the head of the 
Assembly) if decision cannot be reached collectively or through a vote. Therefore, the final 
decision is not at the hands of the entirety of the cadres but a small number as a collective 
representation. In certain conditions, the final decision will be handed to a single person, 
the head of the Assembly, especially in a deadlocked situation if there are equal votes for 
different alternatives.  
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 According to a senior member of the party at a local level, the clause giving 
Amnuddin the authoritative position to take any decision is based on the experience of 
choosing which presidential candidate to support in the 2004 election (Appendix B.9.). The 
process to decide on Amien Rais as the party’s presidential candidate in the first round of 
that election was quite difficult and the meeting had to be cancelled many times due to 
fractious opinions between those in support of Rais and Wiranto, a retired military General. 
It is said that at the time the Muraqib ‘Amm had no authority to take the ultimate decision 
in a deadlocked situation and it took several meetings before Rais was, eventually chosen 
as the party’s candidate.  
The difficult situation before the decision was made was quite traumatic for the 
party and it occurred because there was no authoritative decision maker who can give a 
final decision in such a situation. This was the main reason for changing the clause 
regarding the authoritative decision, which is now entrusted to the leader of the Assembly. 
Some cadres have criticised the change because it gives the leader an uncontrollable 
authority. The critique was also based on the abolition of limitation in the Assembly 
leadership in terms of time or certain periods (Ibid). Before the National Summit in 2005, 
the party’s constitution limited the period of the Assembly leadership to only two terms, or 
a maximum of ten years. In the constitution published on the party website in 2005, Article 
9 clearly mentions that the maximum period for the head of the Assembly, the MPP, the 
DSP and the President is two terms only. After the amendment, the constitution does not 
specify any limitation of period. Thus, it can be interpreted that a party cadre could lead the 
Assembly for more than two terms.  
 In fact, formally, there is no mechanism within the party that can be used to control 
the head of the Assembly, except the Assembly itself. The Assembly has the authority to 
discuss crucial issues faced by the party and may recommend a decision to be accepted and 
legalised by the leader. However, the leader may reject or change the recommendation. The 
uncontrollable authority of the leader seems to be similar with the ultimate authority of a 
king. Uniquely, as mentioned before, most of the members are not in the position to oppose 
the authority because their basic standpoint is that the highest leader will be wise enough 
and will not lead them into difficult situations.  
However, the elite cadres ensure that the leader of the Assembly cannot exercise a 
power-grab under his leadership (Appendix B.10.). His role during the Assembly’s 
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meetings is usually to facilitate all members to explore a number of options that the party 
can consider and, then, to categorise and focus them into a strategic policy. He also wants 
all of the Assembly’s members to express their argument personally at the meeting. To 
express his humble position toward politics, he is reluctant to live in Jakarta, preferring to 
stay away from it. He resides in Lembang, Bandung, to represent his unwillingness to deal 
with political activities intensively and leave the majority of them to the party’s elites 
(Ibid). In that point, admiration from the majority of cadres is inevitable because he is seen 
as a person with less political ambition to represent the party’s attitude.  
More than that, he has the admiration of cadres because he is capable of translating 
the party’s ideology into a general vision which can be understood and practiced using 
simple words. At several major events of the PKS, he had a particular time to speak to 
cadres and explain the party’s direction and it was one of the most awaited moments for all 
those in attendance. In this regards, a member of parliament from the PKS admitted that he 
is the only person who has the capacity to interpret the party’s vision with a holistic 
approach (Appendix B.6.). He added that there are no other figures in the party, at the 
moment, who have the ability to expand on his understanding of civilisation and wide range 
of reading. Hence, he holds the exclusive role as the person to ask and discuss, even though 
many senior cadres have a similar capacity in Islamic knowledge. In many cases, it is 
difficult for senior cadres to equal his wide range of knowledge on many occasions since he 
can provide arguments which are not easy to challenge (Appendix B.11.). As a result, they 
tend to refrain from challenging his arguments.  
On one occasion, an expert member of the Assembly was asked to meet with 
Aminuddin by a number of senior cadres (Ibid). He was asked because none of the senior 
cadres were able to convince him not to declare the merger of the PK with the PKS before 
the bill of elections and political party were formally approved. The PK had to merge with 
another party or change its name after its failure to pass the electoral threshold in the 
election of 1999. The merger with the PKS, which was itself established by a number of 
members of the Tarbiyah Movement, was finally declared in July 2003; hence it was no 
different from the PK. To convince the head of the Assembly, he had to argue from an 
academic perspective and challenge him without hesitation because Aminuddin was so 
confident in the declaration regardless of the absence of a legal framework.     
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The hesitation of many senior cadres to confront Aminuddin reflects their stance 
towards him. He is not only the person who holds the most strategic position in the party, 
but also has the admiration of the party’s elite due to his capacity. Moreover, he is able to 
manage the party’s elite with their different characters and views, which has made him the 
person to resolve differences among senior cadres (Appendix B.6.). With that exceptional 
position and capacity, he is able to obtain the trust of the elite as the legitimate guide and 
leader of the party. Although the middle and lower-rank cadres do not have the chance to 
meet him more intensively except through his appearances at party events, the respect is 
also reproduced through the network of training (halaqah or usrah). In the end, respect is 
the common attitude toward him and hinders any rebellious attitude against him.   
He also has the power to control and arrange the personnel in the party, as well as 
its direction. As the head of the Assembly, he now enjoys the privilege as the leader 
without any time limitation after the amendment of the party constitution in 2005. The 
previous constitution mentioned clearly that the Muraqib ‘Amm could only serve for two 
periods only. However, the amendment eliminated this clause, making the position of 
Muraqib ‘Amm secure as long as members of the Assembly agree. However, given the 
special relationship between him and the party’s elite finding any contender for the position 
is difficult. 
There is also a mechanism to set high-rank cadres to be less critical and keep their 
loyalty. Political positions, mainly in the parliament, are used to keep them obedient to the 
party leadership. As explained by one of the critical members who was expelled recently, 
some of the elite are not ready to give up their positions in the House of Representatives 
(Zein 2010). He added that it is not about supporting the truth, but, in practice, they need 
financial income to support them. Losing that privileged position is not easy for those who 
do not have a fixed income. And one of the considerations of recommending a cadre for a 
position in the legislative is to reward those who have worked hard for the movement.        
 Some of them who are unhappy with the direction of the party and the leadership 
were put in a difficult position. According to one member of the local party elite, at least 
one member in the House of Representatives is not happy with the recent situation 
(Appendix B.9.). However, he does not have the strength to be critical since his wife was 
selected as a member of the DPP. It would look very odd if he were to criticise the party 
while his wife holds an important position. This situation is a starting condition for the 
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implementation of alienation, which will be explained further in the next section. 
Nevertheless, the point here is that the head of the Assembly was able to arrange the 
selection of senior cadres to the DPP or even to the Assembly through formal and 
legitimate mechanism.   
 It is difficult to find cadres who are willing to challenge him because there is a norm 
within the movement that ketaatan (obedience) is one of the most important values as a 
member of the network or jama’ah. A senior cadre explains that even his close colleague 
who did not like the recent situation could do nothing because of the doctrine of obedience 
towards the leadership (Zein 2010). Actually, the doctrine is utilised by the Muraqib ‘Amm 
to accumulate power. It is a collective doctrine, which is accepted by all of party cadres as 
part of the party’s basic values. Collectively, the doctrine works successfully to keep the 
party’s meetings tension-free since they realise their position as part of a group. 
Individually, it inspires the cadres to refrain from any actions that may lead to conflict, 
either with other party members or the party’s directions or policies.  
For example, the decision to establish a political party was not accepted by all the 
members of the movement and, during discussions and meetings among the movement’s 
elite, there were numbers of members who were against the option (Mashadi 2008). The 
case of Central Java province also reflects the readiness of cadres to accept decisions at a 
national level. In the province, more than fifty percent of core cadres were against the 
option to establish a party in the survey before the decision to transform the Tarbiyah 
Movement into a political party in 1998. However, when they learnt that the result of the 
survey showed that, overall, the membership supported the establishment of a political 
party, they accepted the decision and worked happily even though they did not originally 
support it as expressed in the survey (Harris 2008).    
 It is quite unusual that those who opposed the decision were not eager to challenge 
it and accepted it without any reserve. In the context of Indonesian politics, the case of the 
PKS, whose decisions are accepted quite easily without any dramatic challenge, is quite 
unique. In other political parties, challenging a decision interpreted by a faction or small 
number of elite figures within a party may create opposition and lead to severe conflict.  
Unlike other parties in Indonesia that have a highly dynamic process to elect their 
leader, the president of the PKS is usually discussed through a relatively efficient and 
smooth process without drama or conflict. The succession process, such as from Hidayat 
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Nur Wahid to Tifatul Sembiring in 2005 and now to Lutfi Hasan Ishaaq in May 2010, is 
usually efficient since the president served as acting president before being formally elected 
at the National Summit. Hidayat Nur Wahid enjoyed a peaceful transfer of power from Nur 
Mahmudi Ismail in 1999 under the PK. A similar process also took place in the transition 
process from the PK to the PKS when the leader of the newly established party, 
Almuzammil Yusuf, was replaced as leader of the PK.   
The process shows, to some extent, the unique character of the party’s cadres who 
are not ambitious for political positions. As the head of the Assembly explains, In the PKS 
there is no race to run for positions. It is more focused on the distribution of roles. So, the 
PKS does not have any clamouring for positions, it is more effective to think about how to 
distribute roles to every cadre effectively and efficiently (Republika, 21 June 2010). For the 
party cadres, a position in the party is not an arena for competition because it is more 
important to work for the party. Positions in the party are perceived as mandates rather than 
political achievement as the party is only a medium for spreading the teaching of Islam 
(Appendix B.12.). A similar attitude is applied to address the process of leadership 
succession, as the President of the party is not actually decided by all the participants in the 
party’s National Summit. The real process to assess and examine the future leader of the 
party is conducted before the Summit and the Summit is a mere declaration of the new 
leader whereas other sessions are for discussing other issues (Appendix B.4.).  
In the PKS, one of the most critical situations is to decide on candidates for 
president and vice president, as shown in the last two presidential elections in 2004 and 
2009. Unlike other parties, whose national party meetings can be tense affairs, for the PKS, 
the National Summit is a medium for socialising the party’s political directions and 
announcing the name of the President. The selection process takes place in the Assembly, 
leaving national meetings such as the Summit as ceremonial activities for the local branch 
representatives. Examining the selection model in the PKS, some scholars, such as Bahtiar 
Effendy, a political scientist from the State Islamic University, admire and respect the way 
the party chooses its leadership because it shows that democratic process can be cheap and 
stable.  According to them, it may become a positive alternative to Indonesian democracy 
where a similar process is expensive and fractious (Kompas, 20 Juni 2010). However, 
despite the admiration for the process, there is also anxiety because it is perceived as a 
closed process (Fealy 2010). It is difficult to access the dynamic of the Assembly’s 
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meetings since they are usually closed to non-members. For cadres, although they do not 
know the detail of process, they still believe that the process is legitimate. According to a 
low-ranking cadre in Semarang, the process is acceptable because it is conducted by 
trustworthy figures. She said, ‘We believe that the knowledge of our leaders is greater than 
ours and their considerations are far deeper and extensive. So, in the name of God, if it is a 
collective decision, we will just follow” (Appendix B.3.).  
The cadre’s stance indicates the consent of cadres towards the collective process 
within the PKS. Although the process is perceived as being not transparent, it is still 
considered as legitimate because those in the party’s institutions are also trustworthy. As a 
result, cadres from middle and low-ranks tend to accept every decision made by the elite, 
despite their insignificant direct involvement with the process. For the low-ranking cadres, 
the only involvement with the elite at a national level is through election of the Assembly 
members. All core cadres have the right to vote for their favoured representative to 
represent their region. The electoral system has developed the sense of ownership since the 
institution reflects the willingness of the party to encourage wider representation based on 
provincial and professional bases. Besides that, the internal election also has a positive 
impact in developing a balance of power within the Assembly, since the result of the 
election cannot be controlled by anyone, including the Muraqib ‘Amm. In the view of a 
member of parliament, the election has given opportunities for expert members with a wide 
range of views. As a result, any manoeuvre to dominate the Assembly is difficult to 
implement easily.  
However, for critical cadres, although the process in the party has been made as 
democratic as possible, the head of the Assembly is still perceived as a dominant figure 
who strongly influences the policies and decisions of the party. A senior member in a local 
branch explains that every major decision of the party has to be accepted by him after 
discussions in the Assembly’s meeting (Appendix B.9.). Moreover, according to him, in the 
election of the Assembly, a candidate has to get his recommendation before formally 
following the electoral process. In this structure of mechanism, the Assembly will be 
stuffed with figures that are in favour with the leader’s ideas. Nevertheless, this kind of 
view is not accepted by other members of the elite. The last internal election in 2010 has 
shown a different tendency whereby the proportion of elected members in the Assembly 
has risen to 65 and as a result, it gives an opportunity to remove members who are not in 
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favour with core cadres in general. It is said that there was a trend that those who had closer 
relationships with Anis Matta, the General Secretary, were not significant compared to the 
total membership of the Assembly (Appendix B.10.). Therefore, for those who want to 
reduce the influence of the General Secretary, who has served since 1998, the composition 
is better as there will be more senior cadres who can show their ability in front of the cadres 
in general and the head of the Assembly himself.    
As a collective forum, the party has a problem in that it lacks a public figure that 
could attract the public to support the party. In the context of Indonesian political culture, 
the role of the leadership is indicated as a significant factor (Liddle and Mujani 2007) in 
appealing to the public in the electoral process. For the PKS, the lack of such a figure has 
the effect of focusing on the development of a strong ideology rather than an influential 
person. Islam as the ideology of the party encourages all cadres to spread its teachings in 
order to develop a better society in a process known as dakwah. According to Sembiring, 
the President of the party until 2009, the party developed from the strong commitment to do 
dakwah as a life-long project. As a sacred mission, it needs commitment and sacrifice that 
can subdue the role of individualism within the project. The significance of Islamic 
preaching, even in the form of a political party, has led every individual within the party, 
and the movement before, to lessen their original identity if they come from a certain 
Islamic cultural basis or organisation (Machmudi 2008). In this regard, a member who has 
grown up within a more traditional-rural social context will not have the opportunity to 
show off the tradition. Therefore, there is relatively limited opportunity in the PKS to 
develop strong influence based on an individual who can attract significant numbers of 
cadres solely due to personal appeal.     
In the implementation of the dakwah project, admiration for a cadre is based on his 
or her contribution to the spreading of Islamic values in society.  Since the beginning, the 
major method of the spreading is to recruit new cadres and train them in small groups with 
Islamic understanding.  Therefore, the cadres do not inherit the tradition of competition in 
pursuit of political achievement and tend to avoid individual ambition in politics. One of 
the examples of this attitude is when the movement prepared the announcement of the PK 
in 1998. At first, there were no members who were willing to be the president of the party 
for different reasons (Mashadi 2008). Finally, the party chose Nur Mahmudi Ismail, a 
relatively unfamiliar figure, to lead the party. The appointment of Ismail confirmed the less 
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significant role of individualism. The PK, then the PKS, developed a basis for loyalty based 
on ideology and the principles of jama’ah (a group with a sacred mission) rather than 
admiration for the personality of the party leader, including the Muraqib ‘Amm or the 
President.  
Ideally, the ideological character of the PKS should work if all mechanisms within 
the party are guided by Islamic values. It is perceived that collectivism is one of the basic 
mechanisms in party meetings as the implementation of the principles of shura. In fact, 
some of the senior members are quite critical since there is a tendency to pursue particular 
agenda in the party. The fractious discussions surrounding the presidential candidacy in the 
2004 presidential election showed that the party’s ideological vision was confronted by 
pragmatic concerns. In that election, the Assembly had two options to choose between; 
Wiranto, a retired military general, and Amien Rais, a former leader of the large Islamic 
organisation, Muhammadiyah. The critical members were suspicious of the hidden agenda 
to support Wiranto which was encouraged by Anis Matta and supported by Hilmi 
Aminuddin (Mashadi 2008). It took a series of meetings before the Assembly chose to 
formally support Rais. It was a difficult process because at that time there was no clause in 
the party’s constitution that the head of the Assembly could take the final decision. The 
supporters of Wiranto argued that supporting the general provided a better chance of 
winning the election (Hamzah 2011). The argument was countered by some senior cadres, 
including Hidayat Nur Wahid, who were concerned at the preference of the party’s votes 
for a more Islamic agenda. Moreover, the manoeuvre was perceived as an alarming 
indication of a more pragmatic approach which may undermine the party’s project of 
dakwah (Appendix B.9.).  
 In addition, there are also recent concerns about the role of the Muraqib ‘Amm, 
which has become more centralistic in terms of requiring that all decisions taken have his 
agreement or at least his recognition. The anxiety is based on his role as head of the 
Assembly as well as the DPTP. In the first institution, there is an issue surrounding the 
decision to remove the limits on the period for which he can serve. The Muraqib ‘Amm’s 
period of office was originally limited to two five-year terms, but following the change, he 
can stand for election every five years for life. In addition, there is the problem of his 
influence on all decisions taken by the Assembly. Similar concerns also arise in his latter 
position where all decisions must be accepted by him. Uniquely, there is a clause in the 
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explanation of the constitution mentioning that the meetings of the DPTP must be attended 
by its head and in the case that he is the only member of the institution who attends the 
meeting he is authorised to make any decisions (Appendix B.10.).  
 The problem for those who have concerns about his centrality is that they have to 
challenge the authority of the Muraqib ‘Amm who enjoys the loyalty of most of the cadres. 
As mentioned before, the majority of the cadres do not have any problem with the 
mechanism of the decision making process, even though they do not have any access to the 
process. Nevertheless, critical cadres undeniably exist and the party’s elite are aware of 
their existence. A senior member estimates that the total number of critical cadres is 
approximately around 20 per cent. However, the rest are still loyal to the system, so that it 
is not easy to break down the system, which has been in place since the foundation of the 
movement. Another reason for the loyalty to the system is that togetherness is better than 
seceding from a group which is still held together very strongly (Appendix B.10.). Most of 
them believe that decisions taken by shura are better than considering any individuals’ 
opinions or perceptions. It is also believed that the comments of the critical cadres will not 
affect the majority of cadres since the party has a strong legitimacy in running usrah or 
halaqah (small group training for all cadres) as the major method of the internalisation 
process. Through usrah groups that are run weekly for all members at every level, all 
cadres are solidified and provided with official information about the party. That system is 
too strong to be destroyed and individuals find it difficult to expand their influence to 
infiltrate the usrah system.    
 However, concern is actually spreading among some other members of the elite 
who are not categorised as critical. They are still loyal to the party and all of its systems 
including the central role of the Muraqib ‘Amm. Their concern is mainly toward how to 
contain the impact of manoeuvres conducted by the General Secretary which are admitted 
to be damaging the image of the party for the public. The aggressive statement about open 
party that was started in the National Meeting in 2008 until it was fully accepted in the 
National Summit in 2010, the location of events in both Bali and the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, the 
depiction of Soeharto as hero and national guru in campaigning for the 2009 election, are 
examples of the confusing image that has influenced the PKS’s performance. It is admitted 
that Anis Matta has a vision beyond other members’ understanding (Appendix B.10.). 
However, his actions have given the impression that he does not share his vision and 
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manoeuvres with others. Therefore, he is now being depicted as representing a faction 
within the party that wants to drive the party in a more pragmatic, moderate direction.  
 For some cadres in the DPP under Tifatul Sembiring, there was the option of 
discussing Anis Matta’s pragmatic vision with him and his colleagues. However, the 
problem is that he and his team make statements and manoeuvre without prior coordination 
with the rest of the party heirarchy. Under Sembiring’s presidency, they sometimes tried to 
initiate political moves, but members of the DPP including the president himself worked to 
contain their moves. In the case of the rehabilitation of Soeharto, Sembiring at first showed 
his reluctance to accept Matta’s concept before he later changed his mind and accepted it. 
His acceptance might be based on the wider consideration of making the party solid. 
According to a senior member, Sembiring was upset with the announcement, not only 
because of Soeharto’s previous image, but also because it was published without being 
discussed first (Zein 2010). Other members in the DPP during the Sembiring period also 
tried to contain Matta’s moves if they were considered unnecessary, at least by giving a 
report to the President. 
 Matta and his team have more room to manoeuvre under the current President 
Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq because he is perceived as a close colleague with similar vision. Not 
only that, there is a rumour that the recent DPP reorganisation, where some of the previous 
members of the DPP were replaced by more pragmatic and less ideological figures, was 
carried out by those who are in favour of Matta’s vision. (Appendix B.9.). Some of the 
ousted figures were transferred to the MPP, including cadres who tried to block Matta’s 
moves. One of them admitted that he did not have any problem with Matta personally and 
he would continue to have good communications with him. However, because of his 
position at the MPP he could do nothing to prevent any further impact except developing a 
better system for the party in general (Appendix B.10.). As a result of these changes, Matta 
faces fewer restrictions on his manoeuvres and the support of Muraqib ‘Amm allows him 
and his colleagues to work with ease. Recently, after the cancellation of the award of 
national hero to Soeharto, Anis Matta expressed his disappointment and stated that there is 
no problem with Soeharto’s possible honour as national hero. He still hopes that in the 
future he will be awarded the honour as a symbol of reconciliation (Eramuslim 2010).          
 However, Matta’s ability to control the DPP is not the end of the game. A 
calculation made by a senior cadre shows that the influence of Matta’s team in the 
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Assembly is less now as a result of the internal election in 2010. Despite being supported 
by the head of the Assembly, ‘the supporters’ of his vision are less than a third and might 
be defeated quite easily if there was a discussion leading to a vote (Appendix B.10.). Some 
of his team also performed quite badly in the election to the Assembly. Hence, there is a 
hope that other members can reveal that his vision and direction could be less productive 
while other, in contrast, can perform better.  
 Cadres who are loyal to the party but concerned at the recent more pragmatic 
approach are using a different approach compared to more critical members in containing 
the impact of moderation. Disappointment toward pragmatism is not always followed by 
severe criticism which leads to tension and conflict. They might be upset with the recent 
developments, but, for them, unity is more important than being critical and running the 
risk of being expelled or alienated. For those who are critical they have already suffered the 
double disappointment of the National Summit at the Ritz-Carlton Hotel and the official 
statement on the openness of the party. For loyalists, the statement is not acceptable 
because there was no mention of it on the agenda for the Assembly meeting in the Summit. 
However, to publish a counter announcement is also less productive compared to what the 
critical members have done. The loyalists believe that severe criticism will create confusion 
among cadres in the middle and lower-ranks, which is perceived as being unproductive for 
the party and its project of dakwah.    
 The tendency toward moderation can be referred to the classification of party 
activists introduced by May. Support for a moderate approach is more apparent at the elite 
level and it will be supported without significant opposition from low-rank cadres. The 
controversy of moderation in the case of the PKS indicates that the elite have been split into 
different responses. The first response is to accept the project and support it under the 
slogan of democratic achievement which translates in the party’s phraseology as the victory 
of the dakwah project. To obtain this objective, getting closer to the voters’ preference is 
essential including being more moderate and less conservative. More pragmatic and 
younger cadres who graduated from public universities are more in favour with this project.  
The second response is to reject the project completely. The reason is that it will 
mean the activities of the party and all the cadres are less guided by Islamic principles. 
There are too many considerations that have to be made in order to win an election. For 
them, getting less support at the elections is preferable to leaving the party’s Islamic agenda 
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behind. Some of them are now critical toward the democratic system which is perceived as 
a failure to acknowledge Islamic principles. For them, it is better to stay away from politics 
if it is still not in accordance with Islamic values. However, involvement in politics is 
possible as long as it is on an individual basis and in an emergency. Meanwhile, the third 
response basically understands the vision of moderation and can accept it to a certain 
degree. However, if it is conducted in an extreme way they are also against the practice. 
They are more than happy to maintain the identity of Islam, while at the same time the 
party works to solve problems in society through politics. Hence, there is no need to 
struggle to win national or local elections since the party offers values and good deeds for 
the people.  
    The second response is usually supported by those who are referred to as ‘old 
soldiers’, who were very active at the beginning of the movement and are now senior 
members. After assessing the way the party is conducted, they found that there was some 
intolerable misconduct. Dialogue is difficult since organisational approaches, such as 
alienation and decomposition, are being implemented to respond to those who are too 
critical. More explanation of the implementation of these approaches will be provided in 
the next section. The third group is less ideological since most of them are in the upper-
middle level. They are mostly loyal to the party and the new approach in politics; however, 
they have a different interpretation of moderation. Hence, they are still committed to the 
party and ready to work for the party in any condition.   
 Therefore, the responses vary in the PKS, so that it is better to consider the elite in 
the PKS as a non-solitary unit of analysis, which will respond in the same way. It is also 
difficult to look at the middle-level cadres as more ideological because many of them are 
also still loyal to the new approach as it is perceived as part of a transformation process, so 
that they will be less critical of the elite’s direction. The key for them is how to avoid the 
principle of obedience without being critical of any wrongdoing even it comes from the 
party. Therefore, for those who are in favour of the principle of listening to the party and 
working for it, this is the only option to take. Some of them understand the situation that the 
party is still in the process of transformation and it is moving towards maturity (Appendix 
B.8.). He admits that there are problems during the process. However, it does not mean that 
cadres should just criticise and leave it without being involved and trying to fix it. There are 
cases where middle level cadres are less willing to work for the party due to its confusing 
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direction. For them, it is better not to do anything, either helping or criticising. In one 
province in Java, a local middle level cadre admitted that he is getting tired of supporting 
candidates for local election who have very bad track records of misdemeanours such as 
corruption (Agus 2008). The most difficult part is how to meet their constituents or 
potential voters during canvassing activities and then having an argument with them about 
the candidates. 
What corresponds to the Orbell-Fougere indication is that the majority of critical 
cadres come from the middle-ranks, who have experienced the ideological internalisation 
process for longer. This is due to the doctrine of sami’na wa’ atho’na, which is greater than 
other considerations in examining the moderation. Therefore, cases of middle-ranking 
cadres who are critical are also quite limited. The limits of critical mid-level cadre to 
express their feelings are related to their ability to put information and direction in usrah 
accordingly, without being taken for granted. It is likely that most of the attendees at the 
KIK (Kajian Islam Kontemporer or Contemporary Islamic Studies) gatherings at the 
Bangka Mosque in 2008 were hundreds of cadres in the middle-ranks who were not afraid 
of warnings from the party to avoid such activity. A small number of them agreed to attend 
smaller gatherings to discuss the recent development of the party and tended to accept an 
option of creating a new training network which is similar with the network built in the 
early 1980s. 
 It is easier to explain to cadres in the party’s lower levels or at least sympathisers 
who can sometimes be informed by a language of instruction rather than discussion and 
brainstorming. It is true that for low-ranking cadres, there is no consideration to discuss the 
multi-faceted political aspects of campaigning activities. For them, working for the party is 
simple: they do what they have to do and listen to the instructions, and they are happy to do 
it. They have no political ambition to become a cadre at a higher level as the reward for 
their efforts. Therefore, in terms of accepting the moderation project, it is an attitude that 
comes from their readiness to follow any direction from the party leadership. Their way of 
thinking toward the leadership is simple; that they will not lead the cadres into difficulties 
or wrongdoing, and they also believe that their leaders know better than they do. Following 
them is, to some extent, not an option, but a natural attitude among lower level cadres in the 
PKS. Their attitude basically corresponds with the existence of trust among cadres that give 
their consent to the party’s structure and its mechanism of decision-making process, 
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regardless of the relatively closed and dominated process. The next section will discuss the 
attitude of cadres that is also playing a significant role for the party in managing the impact 
of moderation.  
   
V.2. Trust 
As explained previously, following the leader’s order is significantly important for the PKS 
because the order is perceived as legitimate to comply with religious principles. However, 
it has to be considered that the relation between the leader and the cadres is not a mere top 
down relation without any dynamics. It is also important to notice that respect for senior 
cadres is also a result of an intensive relationship within a community bounded by a strong 
collective awareness. The party owes a lot to an effective and solid basis of its internal 
training to produce such consciousness that has brought all of cadres of the Tarbiyah 
Movement to have the same consciousness of brotherhood and sisterhood under the banner 
of Islam. 
This feeling is proven to be significant in building a strong character as a 
community that has the common idea to spread the Islamic vision among Indonesian 
society. There is a belief in the party that Indonesia needs such vision to initiate a better 
Indonesian society that essentially needs a solid group for its implementation (BPK DPP 
PKS 2008a: 15-9). The cohesiveness actually tried to materialise by developing a solid 
network throughout Indonesia in the form of the Tarbiyah Movement, the basis for the 
PKS. It is then understood that the party controls a significant number of cadres bounded 
by Islam and their activism in politics is far from pursuing political gain.     
The belief that the party will bring all cadres to a better society has also developed a 
positive attitude among them. The attitude is applied in both directions: horizontal towards 
their colleagues and vertical toward senior cadres and the party’s elites. There is a common 
belief among cadres that the party elites are trustworthy to lead the party towards achieving 
the Islamic vision in a political arena that is seen as an integral part of Islam. For them, trust 
has brought them into a solid party and it makes them difficult for external forces to 
influence or even to split. A former lawmaker from the party said that, “If [there is] trust, 
chance for external provocation is difficult to influence us” (Ula 2008). 
It is proven that trust saved the Movement from critical moments on previous 
occasions. One of the moments was when the idea to establish a political party was 
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introduced for the first time raising concern among cadres following the fall of Soeharto. 
As explained before, majority of cadres finally accepted it after it was decided by the 
Movement’s leadership, even though there were some who were not fully complacent with 
the decision. To prove their support, the party’s representations were established in almost 
all provinces as evidence that they were in line with the decision without any significant 
hesitation.  
There are several other situations that put the cadres into difficult positions to deal 
with related policies (supporting government’s policy to raise gasoline price in 2005) or 
supporting candidates for national and local elections (supporting non-cadre candidates). 
Despite several difficulties, the PKS is relatively successfulin maintaining support from the 
majority of its cadres. One of the obvious indications is the absence of a new party to 
accommodate those who are disappointed with the party’s policies. “Yes, there will be a 
splinter if it happens in another party. [But] there is no such idea.” (Appendix B.10.). 
Hence, even when Yusuf Supendi, a founder of the PK and also a former member of the 
Assembly and the DSP, filed an allegation toward unjust dismissal from the PKS and at the 
same time claimed that the party had become corrupt, there was still no massive 
mobilisation to organise splinter groups.  
Trust among members and also toward leadership is vital in this context, especially 
when the PKS has become more pragmatic as part of the moderation policy. Changing the 
image in front of the publicis is a risk for ideological party because it will create uncertainty 
among members as well as the public. The PKS also suffered from internal tensions when a 
number of members conducted gatherings to discuss the new direction. When the party 
deliberately maximised the pragmatic strategy to offer more inclusive messages 
(conducting the National Summit 2005 in Bali, hosting a similar event in 2010 in Ritz-
Carlton Hotel, Jakarta, and inserting more nationalistic character into the party’s events) 
questions among members were relatively widespread. However, trust plays an important 
role when members, especially at lower level have an assumption that the party leadership 
will not take any benefits from such policy.  
Theoretically, trust will lead individuals to have confidence in any conditions kaid 
down by the trusted person. The first thing that arises from the trustor is a positive attitude 
toward any behaviour or argument, so that criticism and conflict is less likely to be the 
reaction. It is even more trusted if the argument for any change of interpretation toward 
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certain aspects of ideology can be justified based on the ideology itself. When the 
argumentation of new interpretation is conducted by a person who has authority or capable 
of rationalising the reason, positive attitude and acceptance is more apparent.  
In the case of the PKS, there are many expressions from cadres at every level that 
typically represents such a position toward the party’s leadership. One of the 
implementations of the new direction is to support candidates who have more opportunity 
to win elections (local or national). At national level, the latest election shows that the PKS 
has declared its intention to support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as its presidential 
candidate even before he chose the candidate for vice president. At local level, either 
provincial or regent/municipal, there were difficulties in corresponding the ideological 
principles with the record of the candidates. For the PKS, it is important to support a 
candidate who has the ability to win election but at the same time is relatively free from 
corruption.    
In Jakarta, questions emerged when the party decided to support Adang Daradjatun, 
a high-rank police officer whose institution has relatively the lowest level of public 
confidence (LSI 2010). In other cases, the PKS supported Sukawi Sutarip as mayor of 
Semarang who, for some residents, was perceived as having a bad reputation in governing 
the city in his first period. In the daily conversation with ordinary citizens in years after the 
local election the image of that reputation was still apparent, even though at that time there 
was no legal action yet taken by law enforcers. These two cases represent the strategy of 
the PKS to penetrate higher political level which is part of the interpretation to implement 
the phase of musyarokah or getting involved with the society.  
At the lower level, cadres who worked to promote the candidate from door to door 
had only insignificant concern with the decision and they did not have a chance to get 
closer with the candidate. A party activist in North Jakarta explained that she knew the 
candidate from the local party leader. She said, “We know Mr. Adang from our leaders. 
Then, we also check his profile and we are confident with our leaders. Choosing Mr. Adang 
is not a random action and we trust our leaders..... By God’s will, we hear and we follow” 
(Appendix B.2.). 
Another woman activist also explains, “At the beginning there is [scepticism] because 
we do not know him personally and there was no explanation. However, after having an 
explanation, thanks to God, the suspicion has gone. Our leaders have chosen the right 
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person” (Appendix B.7.). A similar situation was also faced by another activist in Semarang 
where the party supported Sukawi Sutarip. However, despite the controversy and hesitation 
from some cadres, most cadres in Semarang supported the decision.  
 
Actually there is a problem within the cadres in supporting Mr. Kawi, but because it 
has become a collective decision..... Disagreement can be managed by every 
individual and also the party itself. By God’s will, it will not become a big case.... 
Other colleagues and I [will] hear and follow. If we are critical it is conducted 
according to our capacity because we believe that the knowledge of our leaders is 
above us and their considerations are far deeper and extensive. So by the name of 
God, if it is a collective decision we will just follow (Appendix B.3.). 
 
It is clear that cadres are trying very hard to understand the reason behind a decision. 
Questions and criticisms toward particular decisions are not absent among them; however 
most cadres applied positive attitude to think that the party’s leadership will not lead the 
party and all of its cadres into a harmful situation. The most important thing for them is that 
decision does not violate the holy project of dakwah. As long as the reason behind any 
decisions is for dakwah, most cadres will understand and define it as a legitimate 
manoeuvre. This attitude is a reflection of a positive attitude that is clearly meaningful for 
the PKS because being more moderate means that they have to deal with other political 
powers to negotiate. With less significant political power in the parliament due to a 
relatively small portion of its representatives, nationally and locally, negotiation to deal 
with more pragmatic objectives is undeniable if the party wants to have more roles in the 
policy making process.  
In Semarang, some cadres were angry and criticised in a formal meeting with the 
local party leader and the central board had to send special envoy to ease the situation 
(Appendix B.14.). In the middle level, there were also expressions of disappointment that 
also influenced their enthusiasm to conduct political canvassing for the Central Java 
provincial election. In Jakarta, cadres did not accept the decision to support Adang 
Daradjatun comfortably. Questions and criticism were common after the announcement. 
Nevertheless, the potential opposition did not significantly happen and the party still had a 
relatively strong support from the majority of cadres. In the PKS, cadres could suppress 
their anxiety after being informed and explained to by the party’s leader.   
In the lower level, anxiety is not too significant and can be managed quite 
comfortably. The cases of female party activists in Jakarta and Semarang are obvious in 
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supporting decisions made by the leader. Giving trust to the party’s leader is significant to 
avoid the potency of being critical because they understand that they do not have enough 
capacity to comprehend the situation, so that they entrust all of the process to the leader. By 
having such attitude, the only adequate response is to ‘hear and follow.’ They also 
understand that the party’s elites are also their trainers in the weekly training. It is then 
understandable that they do have less intention to challenge the decisions. For the cadres, 
deeper understanding in religion is a guarantee to be a wiser person and obtains more 
wisdom. In that context, religiosity and piety are seen as the source of wisdom. Therefore, 
having such a quality is also a legitimacy to take the position to produce political decisions. 
It is, then, not their right to challenge any decisions, except to ask for explanation, because 
the decisions are perceived as taken based on religious understanding.    
However, it is unique to notice that most of women party activists interviewed in the 
research are not in the position to challenge or question the leaders any more than asking 
for explanation. For them, explanation is enough to satisfy their concern. A female activist 
from Semarang explained, “At the beginning there is [a doubt toward a decision] because 
we do not yet know the candidate. But, after getting the explanation, thanks God, the doubt 
is vanished. Our leaders have chosen the right [candidate].” For male activists, the situation 
is slightly different because there is a feeling that criticism is more related to men and more 
particularly students as noted by one female activist. However, for them different opinion 
toward decisions is not a big problem because it is normal in working for religious 
missionary (Appendix B.2.).  
According to most informants, the key to develop harmonious internal relation is to 
understand. It is a duty for all cadres to understand the importance of jama’ah or group. 
However, they understand that the group is not an ordinary one because it refers to the truth 
that they believe in collectivity. Therefore, having a strong attachment with the PKS is a 
reflection of their commitment to the truth, a religious truth. The consequence is that they 
have to admire the group and put other interest aside. If cadres understand the principle 
then severe frictions and differences will be insignificant. A low-rank activist said, “I think 
[it is] our understanding, understanding toward jama’ah” (Anonymous 2008).  
A mid-rank cadre explained that the materialisation of this principle is to follow any 
decision taken by the party because it is a representation of what the Prophet Muhammad 
had taught before. He says, “We learn from the history of prophecy, Muhammad (PBUH) 
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in his working of Islamic teaching implemented ‘to hear and follow’, a system of following 
the group which is following decision taken by leaders according to the mechanism of 
shura. [It is] sure that they want to consider carefully [every decision]” (Appendix B.12.). 
As an example he refers to his case when the party decided to support Adang Daradjatun. It 
was very hard for him because he hates police officers very deeply. However, “When it is 
decided that the provincial board choose Mr. Adang to become candidate for governor, at 
the same day I was compelled to like him, to love police officers. Because it has become a 
decision, I have to give my ultimate commitment to him. I have to fight for him.”   
That is the commitment of cadres to face a decision, even though the decision is 
against his or her preference. In a group committed to the truth, the truth will be the 
ultimate basis for making a decision. Thus, the decision represents the truth because it is 
taken by the wise. That is the reason why the process works through recognition of non-
individual preference of cadres, but it is represented by small number of wise people in a 
small institution called shura (BPK DPP PKS 2008b: 1-8). Shura represents a principle that 
can be implemented in every level of decision making in the party. However, the principle 
is the same in that all cadres have to hear and follow it. The cadres also believe that those 
who are in the position to take decision will conduct the process wisely and carefully. The 
result is an attitude to hear and follow, not to discuss and complain, even though it might be 
contradictory to individual preferences. 
Positive thinking is very important in this context because contradiction, especially in 
political activities, is common. Political decision is likely to raise controversies or at least 
differences due to different preferences. The case of supporting a candidate in local 
elections is one of the examples when the party has to consider more practical preference in 
winning elections rather than preserving more religious principles. However, the risk of 
frustration and disappointment is relatively manageable in the PKS because there are cases 
that cadres are ready to accept decisions although it is against their individual preferences. 
They believe that their leaders are individuals to believe not to criticise. They have to think 
positively toward their leader’s preferences. “Positive thinking,” explained some high-
ranking party cadres.    
In lower or middle level, this attitude is effective to moderate suspicion among cadres 
who work for the party. It is related to a horizontal relation with other colleagues at the 
same party level. There were occasions where suspicions emerged due to imbalance 
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activities conducted by different cadres. Some conducted tasks more than others or 
sometimes their colleagues did not appear at all during party events. For a mid-rank cadre 
in Jakarta, the situation is common when some cadres feel uncomfortable toward others 
who did not appear on some party occasions. “Suspicion among cadres is not absent. 
However, the feeling does exist for a short time only because it is only due to 
miscommunication. Because a cadre is absent. It is then known that the cadre is handling a 
task in another place. We always give understanding to our colleagues so that we become 
more mature. If we can reach that attitude we can have a positive attitude toward others” 
(Ibid). 
Similar attitudes can also be found among high-rank cadres. In this level, potential 
conflict is more apparent because they are situated in a more strategic position to develop 
the party’s decisions and direction. It is well known that current party direction is mostly 
directed by Anis Matta, the General Secretary from 1998 until today. Some cadres 
expressed their reluctance to support more moderate manoeuvres and they chose to 
organise un-official gatherings to express their disappointment, even though it might end 
their relationship with the party. For those who are still in the party structure, the situation 
is easier because positive attitude is still more dominant in examining the new direction.  
A PKS lawmaker says, “.... but sometimes I agree with Anis and his friends. There is 
also a blessing in disguise too because for groups that want to get closer to us it may 
become a message. The PKS is starting to be inclusive; it is not fundamentalist anymore.... 
I see that his thinking is far beyond ahead” (Appendix B.10.). Hence, according to him, 
there is also awareness that the direction also damaged the party’s image which is actually 
similar with what has been criticised strongly. However, despite the similar understanding, 
the willingness to strongly oppose such direction is relatively insignificant among high-
rank party cadres.   
Another criticism is on the issue of prosperity that has been widespread among 
certain party’s elites. Some of them have been accused of becoming wealthier after 
occupying strategic political positions, either in executive or legislative bodies. For those 
who are still loyal, this issue is not relevant for consideration because the party has 
developed a system to impose all cadres to follow party standards on this issue. One of the 
systems that has been developed is to make an automatic income deduction from party 
representation in the public institutions. The party decided that all of its lawmakers must 
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share from their income as a result of occupying political positions under the name of the 
PKS. The party decided the percentage of the share in each level from national to local 
level. There are also other obligations that must be fulfilled in relation to welfare, such as 
alms.   
According to a former lawmaker for the PKS, the system in the party on welfare is 
very strict and also transparent. For him, the implementation of the system is important 
because it is the key to develop trust among cadres (Ula 2008). Based on this system, there 
is no need to accuse someone as a materialistic person. If the person has paid all of his or 
her obligation to the party, there should not be any problem and envy toward particular 
cadre should not exist among other cadres. The only difference among cadres is their 
religious practices or habits. If a cadre practices the Islamic tradition more than others, 
then, their colleagues will appreciate him or her more than others. Therefore, there is no 
need to feel uncomfortable with others’ wealth which could disturb personal relationship 
among cadres. If there is any wrongdoing by cadres, the party will examine them, not as 
cadres but as an individual. By having such attitudes, the majority of cadres tend to avoid 
any criticisms of personal behaviour of certain cadres. 
 
On our colleagues who have decadent behaviour, it is God who has his own 
calculation. Ibn Taimiyah also had similar attitude. He spent almost half of his life 
being detained by Abbasiyah sultanate. But, when the Sultan declared holy war it 
was him who stood in front. People asked him why you obeyed an order from 
someone who detained you. The order is his business with God, my business to 
answer the call is also my business with God too. Most of us think as simply as that. 
(Appendix B.12.) 
 
For those who are critical, thereis a tendency of dishonouring the recommended 
behaviour as a Muslim. One of the criticisms from cadres who gathered in Bangka is that 
some cadres, especially in the high-rank level, behave immodestly, especially in wealth. At 
the same time, they also condemn them as moderating the party’s political standpoint. For 
them, this behaviour is not acceptable and they tend to confront it seriously, even though 
the consequences are clear in a cadre party like the PKS. In contrast, the loyal cadres tend 
to accept it without any resistance. All cadres, especially in the middle and low-rank, tend 
to avoid any anxiety because they believe that their leaders are wise enough, based on their 
religious understanding and practice, to deal with all the contagious effects in politics.   
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Some cadres at high-rank level are aware that these criticisms are relevant. They are 
still in the position to support the current party leadership with the new direction which has 
positive aspects. However, on the other hand, there is also tendency of damaging the 
party’s image in front of its voters. “I think the version of Anis is correct because he has 
certain access, but our version says that it produces damage in general,” explained a high-
rank cadre (Appendix B.7). Hence, there is also awareness that the direction has two 
different effects. With that awareness, some cadres are able to draw a distinction with the 
supporters of the moderation policy. “They have their own responsibility, I have my own. 
That is it, so we are not moving forward, but we are not falling apart either,” he continues 
(Ibid).  
In the perspective of party solidity, the attitude to have positive thinking is 
significantly important because it has made the majority of cadres think in favour of party 
interest. It may explain why many cadres do not take drastic action similar the Bangka 
gathering or the KIK. Drastic action is against the ultimate goal of a united network as a 
group of truth (jama’ah). It is the truthful goals that have influenced them to take dedicated 
consideration to uphold the goals. A senior party cadre remarked that deviation is normal in 
struggling with the holy ideas of Islamic vision; therefore there is no need to react 
exaggeratedly (Abu Ridho 2008). Although there are feelings of discomfort toward recent 
events, most high-rank cadres consider refraining from confronting it, but rather to follow 
and obey. For them, it most important to stay in a group rather than mobilising opposition 
or splinter groups that will create more damage to the unity of a truthful group. 
Hence, although some of the high-rank cadres are aware of the negative effect of the 
current moderation, the common awareness to fight for the goals of the group rather than 
mobilising an opposition is still strong. “We have values that bind the party because the 
awareness is very strong,” explained a high-rank cadre (Appendix B.10.). Because of the 
existence of this awareness, there will be no movement within the party to confront the 
party leadership. Besides the awareness, the cadres also keep calm regarding any 
wrongdoing because there will be authoritative institutions to handle the problems such as 
the DSP and BPDO. Thus, if there is a cadre who stays in his or her position, either in the 
party or in the parliament-cabinet, it means that the person does not have any problem and 
the cadre has to fulfil all obligations required by the party’s system.  
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There is also another source of trust in the party as expressed by some cadres. 
According to them, there is a legitimate explanation of all policies that have been taken so 
far. In the case of being moderate in recent years, even with some confusion among cadres, 
many of them understood the new direction. When asked about the difference between the 
PK and the PKS, a cadre said that she actually missed period during the PK era before 
changed into the PKS to participate in the 2004 election. According to her  
 
If we miss the situation, there is a feeling. However, our market now does have its 
own demand. For example at the inauguration we want to show the public that an 
ordinary person can recite [Holy Qur’an], someone who does not wear veil because 
it might be a strategy. It is a way to declare that we are accepted not only in an 
exclusive environment but also in wider society (Appendix B.12.). 
 
This expresses that cadre at grass-root level understood the reason of the changing 
current direction. She still missed the period before entering the party era when they were 
active in the Tarbiyah Movement. However, the feeling can be undermined because the 
leadership was able to give convincing arguments to all cadres. For those who trust their 
leaders, the arguments are reasonable, so that they are eager to support it. In the case of 
being more moderate, the party argued that moderation is a strategy to penetrate different 
segments of society. To justify the argument the party published a special book to explain 
why it is important to enter political domain (Takariawan 2009). The book was written by a 
member of the Assembly who had a good reputation among cadres who argued that there 
are different orbits of dakwah. After developing an understanding on Islamic teaching 
through an underground movement and the efforts to integrate with social life, it is now the 
opportunity for the movement to enter the political arena. The leap to political orbit has to 
be accepted by all cadres with the awareness to accept all of the consequences. It is then 
that the term of the transformation is known widely among cadres in order to comprehend 
the recent situation.  
The majority of cadres interviewed for the research expressed similar awareness in 
understanding the current situation and are using it as a legitimate basis to support all of the 
party’s decisions. In practice, a clear argument is also provided to reduce confusion and 
anxiety among cadres. In the case of supporting certain candidates in the elections, locally 
and nationally, the party argues that all support to candidates has been legalised with a 
formal agreement with candidates to secure long term political cooperation. That is the 
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argument mentioned by the local party leader in Semarang and also Jakarta to explain the 
decisions to support candidates from non-cadres, despite their reputation as a cadre party, 
especially in Jakarta where they gained popular votes in the capital in the 2004 national 
election.  
Therefore, many problems following their activities in politics dealing with 
elections and political negotiation such as coalition and policy making processes can be 
framed under the transformation’s point of view. It has strengthened their position toward 
growing criticism from its own cadres. They party’s leader will argue that severe criticisms 
can be understood as a normal consequence of being active in politics. It is also the same 
language of low-rank cadres who said “...... but we believe it is normal in this mission” 
(Appendix B.2.).  
Another example of providing legitimate explanation is a short piece of writing 
written by Anis Matta. The title of a short chapter, ‘Managing disagreement toward shura’s 
decision’, signifies his argument for all cadres in managing dilemma toward decision 
produced by the Assembly or other decision through the legitimate mechanism of shura 
(Matta 2010: 82-6). Basically, he does not deny that there will be disagreement or even 
opposition on the decision taken by shura, especially after transformation into a political 
party, which also happens in the PKS. However, the most important aspect of his argument 
is that all cadres should learn to have an attitude of sincerity. Sincerity is the most difficult 
test for all individuals in the movement and the failure to manage disagreement toward the 
decisions of shura determines the survival of cadres in the party. If a cadre fails to manage 
that situation and tends to develop an oppositional position, it will not be tolerated and the 
person will be perceived as the one who falls in the holly mission of dakwah. Again, the 
message here is that all cadres should undermine their personal interests or analyses or 
arguments without strong bases. They should also admire the mechanism in the party as a 
representation of a truthful group. “It is more important to maintain the unity of the group’s 
line rather than to win an argument, even though the argument itself is correct” (Ibid: 85).      
These attitudes that are deeply embedded in the cadres can explain why there is no 
significant mobilisation of opposition. They are aware that the party represents their 
ultimate mission to disseminate Islamic vision. Violation on norms and rules is possible, 
but they believe that the party has a system to handle it. In the political era, they also 
believe that to argue differently with the party’s decisions is inappropriate. Being too 
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critical is not virtuous due is its hostility toward the frame of understanding of jama’ah and 
the mechanism of shura. The cadres also understand that undermining their individual 
arguments to confront the party’s decisions is more important than arguing and debating. 
With all those sources of trust which are awareness, working system, legitimate 
explanation, and appropriateness, the PKS can contain more damaging impact after 
introducing a more moderate approach in the Indonesian political system. The majority of 
cadres from every level still work for the party, despite confusions on several policies and 
directions as an impact of dealing with more pragmatic considerations. Criticism does 
occur among cadres and in some occasions tensions also happen, even in a formal party 
meeting. However, there is always a working system and existing norms that prevent 
potential oppositional movement toward party leadership and they contribute to the 
existence of deep-rooted trust among cadres toward their leadership. 
For the PKS, the existence of trust is an integral part of its characteristic of a party 
as a group that upholds a holy mission to broaden the influence of Islam in the Indonesian 
society. To achieve that mission, all energy of all cadres should be arranged by a solid 
system that is known among them as manhaj dakwah or method of mission to spread Islam. 
Under the method, all cadres who are basically different in terms of knowledge and 
capacities as well as personal characteristics are bound into a single perspective. In 
reference to the 10 principles of the movement’s membership, trust has been set in the tenth 
place. The principles themselves are adopted from ideas of Hasan al Banna, the founder of 
Ikhwanul Muslimin, who has become the main inspiration of the Tarbiyah Movement 
(Machmudi 2005: 69-84).  
It is interesting to see that, in the context of political activism, to obey the leader is 
also part of the principles. If trust is positioned as the tenth principle, to obey the leader is 
the sixth principle after understanding, sincerity, deed, struggle, and sacrifice. In relation to 
particular situations resulting from the impact of moderation in politics, those principles 
have developed a strong basis for the individual’s interest as secondary after the objectives 
of the movement. It can be assumed that the party’s cadres should be sincere in working 
hard with high degree of sacrifice as the main ethics led by a trustful leadership. The result 
is a majority of cadres who agree with the party’s leadership as the foundation to prevent 
acute tensions within the party.   
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Different reactions toward the party’s decisions are acknowledged as explained by 
cadres themselves. Fury and confusion are the most common initial reactions toward the 
party’s moderation. Nevertheless, the party calls all cadres to refer to the ethics in order to 
deal with the situation following the moderation. Those who abide by those ethics of 
membership, differences, confusions, or disappointments are not problematic since they are 
able to manage their personal reaction accordingly. If they are successful, the party will 
acknowledge them as devoted cadres.  
At this point, there is still a problem since the boundary of being a loyalist is based 
on the ethics and, to some extents, the definition of being an authentic cadre is to obey or 
not. In practice, there will be an opportunity to express their personal reaction toward the 
party’s decisions. To protest or argue differently is not perceived as a permanent reaction, 
so it can be tolerated. However, if it becomes a permanent standpoint, the party will no 
longer tolerate it. In the case of a gathering in al Hikmah Mosque in Bangka, there was a 
period of omission before severe action took place, especially towards its focal organisers. 
When the gathering was initiated for the first time, the PKS was administered by Tifatul 
Sembiring and the severe action itself was taken under the new leadership of Luthfi Hasan 
Ishaaq.  
Actions toward cadres who do not wish to stand for the party will be arranged in a 
different mechanism that is also crucially important to maintain the solidity of the party’s 
cadres. When ethical preference is not convincing to drive cadres to be loyal deliberately, 
the impact of action will become the imposing factor to restrain them from any further 
oppositional positions. The awareness of that situation is also realised by some cadres, even 
by those who are not critical. A party cadre in the lower level explained, “There might be 
some critical cadres, but they are not courageous enough. It may be because they do not 
want to be labelled. For example, they want to speak differently, but because all of the 
cadres argue on A meanwhile he or she is alone with B. It needs courage. Therefore, it is 
because they are not courages enough” (Appendix B.3.). 
There is a mechanism for those who are reluctant to follow the party’s order and 
courages enough to confront. They will be treated accordingly based on the principles of 
the organisation as written in the party’s constitution. It is a mechanism that may hinder 
cadres from being extremely critical or even against any decision. In social relationship, 
they feel discouraged because being critical will isolate them from other cadres. However, 
208 
 
 
there are also severe consequences in confronting the leadership and their decisions. 
Excessive criticism can be perceived as an expression of disloyalty and it can be considered 
as a violation of religious values that is unforgivable. In practice, the party could take 
serious action toward cadres who are perceived as disobeying the party’s decisions in the 
form of dismissal, which will be discussed in the next sub-chapter. 
For the PKS, the ethical force works effectively since it has been embedded through 
the mechanism of training. The party has various medium to deliver information to its 
cadres according to its objectives. There is a continuous effort to convince all cadres about 
the current situation and maintain their trust in the party’s leader. In the case of the PKS, 
the most effective mechanism is the training (halaqah of usrah) where it can be used 
exclusively by the party to deliver official messages, information, clarification, instruction, 
etc. Through an extensive reach in the training, the party can make an intensive contact 
with all cadres in which interpretation of information can be conducted by both sides: party 
leader and cadres.  
Differing with severe treatment such as dismissal, trust is less traumatic and the 
example of the PKS confirms the effectiveness and convenience of its application in a 
critical situation. No wonder that the party can exercise its programmes quite effectively to 
reach the grass-roots by conducting an effective political canvassing, despite many 
obstacles that need to be tackled. More importantly, the party’s leader can develop a solid 
party because the majority of the party’s cadres are not influenced by internal criticisms 
which can be answered officially through the weekly gathering.  
 
V.3. Alienation 
The previous sections explained that the party leadership and structure combined with trust 
have developed the PKS into a solid party. The two variables are important to encourage a 
positive attitude among cadres in addressing decisions made by the leadership. The party 
structure has been developed in accordance with cadres’ understanding of Islamic values, 
especially shura. Therefore, the existence of the Assembly as an implementation of the 
shura principle with a collective approach to the decision making process is perceived as 
legitimate. The consent towards the party’s structure is also based on the fact that senior 
cadres who obtain positions in the structure are seen as capable. With a sophisticated level 
of membership based on understanding and practice of Islamic teaching, the party 
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leadership and elite are perceived as trustworthy people to represent them. Hence, although 
there is an indication of dependency on a particular figure, the common attitude of the 
cadres is to trust and believe their leaders.  
Despite the solidity of the party, there are also cases of resentment and anxiety 
towards the party’s moderate direction. Most of the suspicion is directed at the pragmatic 
approach due to the party’s willingness to get more votes in the elections. Those who were 
not able to take a positive attitude to the new direction tended to criticise strongly and 
organised gatherings to mobilise confused cadres. After the resentment reached its height in 
2008 with the existence of the KIK, the FKP and other expressions including online blogs, 
the criticism was channeled into two different forms: writing articles in a particular online 
forum and organising an alternative training network. However, these efforts were 
relatively unsuccessful in mobilising mass opposition to the party and the party still enjoys 
the loyalty of the majority of its cadres. 
In dealing with the criticism, the PKS conducted two different approaches: soft and 
severe approach. The first approach deals with the effort to put cadres in certain condition 
in order to increase their understanding of the recent situation, while the second approach 
relates to the stricter decision such as dismissal from the party’s membership. The two 
approaches are actually part of the party’s organisational rules, which warn its cadres that 
oppositional attitudes are not acceptable and will lead to disciplinary action in the form of 
sanctions.    
In the study of party moderation, discussing sanctions and their implementation is 
very important because it is one of the party’s instruments to deal with the impact of 
moderation, especially those who are critical and defiant. Clearly, every party wants to have 
a cohesive party to control every member in the party structure as well as in the parliament 
or government. As a party with ideological weight, cohesion is more important in 
maintaining the party’s existence following a change in party direction that is vulnerable to 
internal criticism. Depending on members’ loyalty by maximising ethics in relation to 
leadership is not the only strategy because there is always potential for a situation which 
will influence members to question organisational policies. Therefore, the party needs an 
instrument to control all of its members to behave accordingly by applying sanctions.  
Unlike ethics, which encourage inner motivation to follow the party line, sanctions 
deal with the consequences of deviant behaviour with a more tangible impact. A party 
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member will be punished if his or her behaviour is categorised as being against the party’s 
principles. From the party’s perspective, the implementation of such sanctions follows the 
‘rule of anticipated reactions’ when party members understand that there will be sanctions 
imposed by the party’s leadership if they oppose them (Damgaard, n.y). To avoid the 
punishment, party members will not defy the party principles in calculation of getting a 
political benefit (promotion or re-election).  
In the context of the PKS, a blatant political interest is relatively rare because it is 
replaced by a religious motive of gaining a reward from God, rather than pursuing a 
strategic political position. Hence, the effectiveness of sanctions in terms of damaging 
one’s future political career (such as promotion or re-election) might be irrelevant. 
However, in the process of moderation, managing cadres’ reaction is proven to be effective 
in deflecting more critiques and opposition when the punishments are related to the 
character of its communality as a collective group. It is found that from sanctions stated in 
the PTPS (Peraturan dan Tata Cara Penjatuhan Sanksi or Regulation and Protocol of 
Sanctions) document, there are two different categories of sanctions that may have a direct 
impact on the membership; syar’i and organisation. The former focuses on scrutinising 
members’ behaviour according to Islamic principles. For example, a light breach of syar’i 
is mentioned as inappropriate etiquette and the sanction for this violation is a written 
warning. The latter is organisational violation, which is more related to party discipline 
according to party rules. Both have three levels of sanctions which are mild, moderate and 
severe. Table V.1. describes both violations and the sanctions in relation to the basis and 
the level.  
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Table V.1.  
Bases and Level of Violations and Sanctions 
 
Bases of 
Violation 
Level of 
Violation 
Example Sanctions 
Syar’i Mild Inappropriate conduct  Written warning 
 Moderate - Innovation (but not leading to 
association of others with Allah) 
- Less effort to carry out group 
prayers 
- Close illicit relations with members 
of the opposite sex 
- Defamation  
- Spreading rumors  
- Threatening other(s)  
- Ignoring family’s rights 
- Underestimating obligation on 
possessions 
- Failure to fulfill a promise or 
obligation  
- Announced admonition 
- Severe admonition 
- Transfer to new post 
- Excommunication 
- Fine 
- Penalty (1 - 3 months) 
 Severe Mortal sin, serious crime that can be 
penalized with hudud (theft, robbery) 
and qishas (murder) 
- Penalty (3 - 6 months) 
- Suspension or downgrading 
of membership 
- Boycott 
- Dismissal from the party 
Organisational Mild - Failure to fulfill official mandate 
from the party  
- Not giving contribution 
deliberately or without acceptable 
reason  
Written warning 
 Moderate - Damaging the party’s image 
- Pronouncing, positioning and 
acting against the party constitution 
- Absence from usrah (routine 
training) without acceptable reason 
- Failure to fulfill official mandate 
from the party  
- Insubordination to a party decision, 
rule, policy, or standpoint 
- Announced admonition 
- Severe admonition 
- Transfer to new post 
- Excommunication 
- Fine 
- Penalty (1 - 3 months) 
 Severe Insubordination to a party decision, 
rule, policy, or standpoint 
- Penalty (3 - 6 months) 
- Suspension or downgrading 
of membership 
- Boycott 
- Dismissal from the party 
 Source: Peraturan dan tatacara penjatuhan sanksi (PTPS) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (regulations and protocol 
of sanctions, Prosperous Justice Party), accessed from http://dsp-pks.org/ptps.php on 24 June 2011. 
 
The approaches of applying sanctions will be examined in two different sections 
related to the conceptual framework of managing the impact of moderation for the PKS. 
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The softer approach is categorised as alienation strategy and the more severe approach is 
classified as decomposition. In this section, the focus of explanation will be on the 
alienation strategy, while decomposition will be described further in the following section.   
Alienation is related to sanctions that diminish the relation with the party removing 
one from any formal tasks as well as from halaqah or usrah. The strategy is related to the 
effort to put a significant distant between the party and cadres who violate the syar’i or 
organisation. Isolation is an effort to alienate members from their community with an 
opportunity to be restored after a certain period. After a member has served their 
punishment there will be an opportunity to be readmitted as a full member ready to follow 
the party line.  
From sanctions mentioned in the PTPS, there are different forms of distancing or 
alienating members. The sanctions are excommunication, penalties, suspension, and 
boycott. Although the sanctions are applied for different levels of misbehaviour (mild, 
moderate, and severe), they are similar in substance; that is, to put a recalcitrant member 
outside the training network. Excommunication (al hajru) is implemented by cutting off all 
communication with a defiant member for a certain time. Penalties are given to a member 
by removing their membership rights for a fixed period: one to three months, or three to six 
months. Meanwhile, suspension is related to stopping one’s membership, with all of its 
consequences, such as losing the opportunity for promotion or standing in elections. The 
most severe sanction in this category of alienation is to stop all relations with a recalcitrant 
member in terms of communication, as well as economic or business relations.    
It is quite difficult to find any documents confirming official verdicts on alienation 
of a certain cadre. There is a principle of protecting a cadre’s reputation after a decision has 
been made and announced to members (Appendix B.17.). Based on that principle, the 
verdict on a member will not be published openly. However, there is a mechanism for 
informing core cadres in order to alert other cadres not to take similar action. In some cases, 
information on certain verdicts will not be given to all core cadres to protect his or her 
reputation among members. According to a local level cadre, most of the cases related to 
party sanctions can be categorised as syar’i rather than organisational. The cadre from 
Jakarta explained that all cases related to breaching of Islamic principles or syar’i are 
handled by the DSP (or similar institution at local level) (Appendix B.13.). For this kind of 
213 
 
 
sanction, there will be no dispute because all of the verdicts will be decided in accordance 
with the principles mentioned in the Qur’an or Sunnah (the Prophet’s traditions).  
For organisational violations, the PKS established an institution to handle breaches 
of this kind after the National Summit in 2005. The special institution, called the BPDO 
(Badan Penegak Disiplin Organisasi or Organisational Discipline Enforcement Body), 
only operates at the national level. The foundation of the institution is an indication of an 
anticipation of more problems after the electoral process in 2004 when the party started to 
apply its moderation strategy. Since the BPDO’s establishment, all violations related to 
organisation will be processed through this body, especially for cases at the national level. 
At the local level, local party committees (DPW for provincial or DPD for regent/municipal 
level) are responsible for any organisational breaches, including the local party head, 
general secretary, and treasurer. 
It is believed that cases of organisational violation are very rare (Ibid). Most cases 
are related to shari’a, such as business disputes, unlawful marriage, being together with a 
non-mahram (no legal relation), or using orphan donations for private purposes. It is quite 
common for cadres to know the verdict on defiant cadres, the announcement is usually 
made through an informal party training gathering (halaqah or usrah) when the group 
trainer (murabbi or naqib) explains the cases. Hence, the mechanism to socialise the verdict 
is informal by using verbal explanation conducted by a wise person in a group. The purpose 
of this mechanism is to protect accused cadres from unwise accusations from other cadres, 
because everything has been discussed and decided by trustworthy institutions. It is also 
important that the information is distributed by the trainer to find hikmah (wisdom) in such 
cases and allow members of the group to discuss it wisely. By doing so, the party wants to 
prevent tension among cadres, especially if the person is relatively well known with a good 
reputation. In essence, it is better to discuss or announce an allegation calmly in small 
groups rather than discuss or debate it in public.  
The party has built instruments and mechanisms to prevent tension. In the PTPS 
document, there is a procedure to process violations, either through the DSP or BPDO. The 
party set up an institution of Lajnah Hisbah to receive and file cases. The files are then sent 
to the Majlis Qadha to process the allegation, and the Majlis will pass a verdict. The Lajnah 
Hisbah itself acts as prosecutor against the accused member. If the member in the case is 
not happy with the verdict, he or she can file an appeal to be discussed at a higher level. 
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The Majlis will then conduct a session to hear the appeal and may strengthen, revise or 
cancel the previous verdict. In the case of cancellation, there is an obligation for the party to 
rehabilitate the accused member in front of other cadres. However, the verdict of the appeal 
session can also be cancelled by the DSP if there is new evidence in the accused’s case.  
The principle of protecting an accused member’s reputation is strongly implemented 
by the party. In the case of a severe violation that leads the party to dismiss a member, the 
PKS officially refuses to declare the verdict. This was the case with Yusuf Supendi, who 
was dismissed from the party due to a severe violation. According to a party official, the 
case was processed accordingly and the decision made in October 2009 (Widjaya 2011). 
The party still strongly holds to the principle, even though Yusuf Supendi made his case 
public and announced that several party leaders are corrupt or act unlawfully.  
The case itself revealed some issues regarding the implementation of sanctions. For 
party officials, the case was very clear and it was processed legally via the party’s internal 
mechanism. There is no doubting the process because it was conducted by a professional 
qualified to investigate the allegations against him (Hamzah 2011). There was also an 
opportunity to present his case in front of the internal judiciary panel after giving two 
letters of notification. However, due to his reaction not to respect the verdict, his 
membership was dismissed, even though he had a good reputation of supporting the 
movement since its foundation. His reputation as a member of the Assembly led the party 
not to announce the case in public and only a small numbers of core cadres were informed 
of the details of the case. 
The key issue in the case of such violation is that the party has another principle of 
granting the accused the opportunity to accept the verdict, with the possibility of regaining 
his or her status if they do so. The possibility of the accused member regaining their status 
depends on their reaction to the verdict and the level of it. If the decision is categorised as a 
severe violation, dismissal will be the ultimate punishment and there is relatively little 
chance of regaining one’s status. In contrast, if the case of violation is moderate there is the 
possibility of rehabilitation and the party could readmit him or her into the party. 
Excommunication and restriction for one to three months are examples of the sanctions. 
The sanctions might extend to restrictions for three to six months and a boycott, which are 
categorised as severe sanctions of alienation.  
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For these sanctions, before being expelled from the party, accused members will be 
given the opportunity to think about the sanction and contemplate the situation. The aim is 
that they are able to amend their behaviour and make serious efforts to obey the 
punishment. If they follow the party line during the implementation of alienation, they 
might be rehabilitated into the party. It is unique to look at those sanctions that have a 
similar character of cutting off relations with all members of the party. Excommunication 
means banning any verbal communication with the convicted member. It is different from 
boycott, because the latter means not only verbal exclusion, but also other relations such as 
business, contract, etc. All party members categorised as core cadres will automatically be 
warned not to have any dealings with the convicted members. 
One of the difficult situations they face is that they will have no opportunity to 
obtain a political position in the party structure as well as being banned from doing 
particular tasks. It is still possible, though, to attend training (halaqah or usrah) during the 
conviction period, so that the group and trainer have a chance to give supervision and 
advise. Dismantling from party tasks means that they have to hand over all of their trainees 
(mad’u) if they have any. The trainees will be temporarily transferred to other groups. It is 
quite common among members to refer to the transferred members, informally, as ‘rawat 
inap’ or overnight patients undergoing treatment (Wibisono 2008).    
The process of transferring all trainees under convicted members is conducted very 
smoothly. There was one case where a transferred member did not realise that his trainer 
was guilty and he was transferred from Jakarta to Bogor due to that verdict. Therefore, the 
party treats the judicial process carefully without harming the network and the convicted 
member will not be denounced in front of his or her trainees to prevent any negative 
perception and to preserve his or her honour. It is a crucial process within the party to 
minimise any tension or questions, especially from the trainees, who have a close relation 
to the trainer. Transferring the trainees away from a convicted member is also strategic for 
party solidity in terms of cutting the relations between members when there are moral and 
organisational problems. By doing so, the party can secure the loyalty of other cadres and 
maintain their uncontaminated understanding by keeping them away from potentially 
negative reactions to the verdict. 
Basically, the party does not want to punish its members and only does so when it 
has to be implemented. In principle, the aim of the action is to seek as natural rehabilitation 
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as possible. Punishment is perceived as the worst alternative of action to deal with defiant 
members. As with the leadership of other parties, the PKS wants to see all its cadres follow 
the party line and transfer its political vision to all of its cadres. The process of transferring 
such understanding is not an easy one. As acknowledged by many of the party’s elite the 
danger of changing is opposition to the idea of change itself. Transforming the movement 
into a political party was a huge shift in paradigm. The movement, originally, was a 
paradigm of educating people by using less vulnerable tools of approach to society. 
Political activity is in contrast to approaching society with dakwah and its more apparent 
religious message. At the same time, most of the elite in the movement period enjoyed a 
more comfortable situation because most of them were capable of preaching a religious 
message to people, rather than conducting negotiations or debating in the political process 
within state institutions. 
However, the decision to establish a political party has to be accepted, including all 
of its consequences. In this critical phase, a key concept that was widely disseminated 
among members was that the movement was experiencing a process of transformation. 
Almost all party members, especially in the higher and middle-ranks, mentioned the term to 
express their understanding of any possible turbulence during the process. The narrative of 
transformation is crucial for enabling members to analyse the situation when some of the 
prominent members and others are expressing their criticism or, at least, confusion at the 
new political situation. The narrative has been mentioned consistently by cadres from the 
elite to middle levels as an expression to understand the situation of growing criticism and 
disenchantment after 2004.   
Based on that understanding, the high-rank cadres at the local or national level 
handled members with critical questions or expressions and misapprehensions very 
carefully. They understand that working for the party is not about pursuing political interest 
in general and the discussions with most cadres during the field research reflected similar 
feelings. There is no economic gain in terms of salary or material compensation for 
supporting party activities. Therefore, if a cadre is critical or refuses to work, the party will 
not impose any punishment. Punishment is not the first option for the party, even though 
there is the possibility of imposing punishments on defiant members (Ibid).   
Difference of opinion is welcomed and there is even the principle that, so long as 
they are obeying all party decisions, the party still tolerates different opinions among its 
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members (Appendix B.13.). In the case of local elections, there are several cases where 
local party decisions were challenged by cadres, some of whom are prominent in their 
region. One local party leader explained his difficult situation when the PKS decided to 
support a candidate for mayor, only to face criticism and questions (Rifa’i 2008). He had a 
moment to resign because of harsh criticism from his closest colleagues as well as some 
middle-ranking cadres in the local branch. Some of them even sent a formal letter signed by 
many middle-ranking cadres expressing their grievance at the decision (Appendix B.14.). 
He described that even though he had authority in the structure and training network 
(usrah), arranging formal party decisions to impose sanctions is not an option. The only 
advice he received from the provincial level was to be patient (shabr) and submissive 
(tawakal) to God. Following the turmoil, the local party did not produce any sanctions 
related to the situation. In another case, opposition also emerged in the local election for the 
position of governor of Jakarta in 2007 when the party decided to support a police general 
rather than its own cadres. Complaints were common during the selection process as well 
as after the official announcement of Adang Daradjatun as the party’s candidate for 
governor. A similar approach was taken by letting those who were not in favour with the 
decision disagree without facing any sanctions.  
In principle, expressing a different opinion on a party decision is a problem 
according to the party’s constitution. However, the local party leadership prefers to leave 
them rather than imposing any punishment. The limit of giving or not giving out 
punishment is whether the critical members try to advertise their complaint and mobilise 
other members to take a similar standpoint. So, if the objection is only a matter of personal 
point of view without trying to mobilise more support the party will not impose any 
punishment. The party will take proper action when such criticism is expanded into 
mobilisation of cadres against a party decision or advertising the criticism in public. 
Another reason for increasing the severity of punishment is for a deliberate act against a 
party decision (Yusra 2008). 
To handle individual critical and defiant cadres, the party, in general, tries to isolate 
the cadre from all party activities. It is not only to release him or her from all party tasks, 
but also transfer all cadres under his supervision in usrah to other cadres (Wibisono, 2008). 
After isolating the cadre, the party asks the trainer (naqib) of the cadre to discuss the 
situation as well as supervising his or her opinions. The process will be undertaken within 
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the activities of the routine training (usrah). If the cadre changes to a more positive 
standpoint, the party, through the training, will begin the process of rehabilitation until the 
local party leadership entrusts the cadre to do some tasks. However, the previous criticism 
or defiance is still written in the party’s formal record, which can be used as a reference for 
his or her future career in the party. 
The party is not bothered with individual or personal defiance because the impact 
on other cadres is relatively limited. In the case of refusing to support the local electoral 
candidate, the party does not mind criticism as long as most of the party’s cadres support 
the decision. In fact, in the case of Jakarta, the party realised that there was significant 
support for the decision and that is more important than dealing with a small number of 
recalcitrant cadres (Appendix B.13.). With the support of the majority of cadres, the 
manoeuvre to support Daradjatun in the local election could be conducted effectively and 
its manoeuvre during the electoral campaign was supported by all of the party units.    
There is a good example of dealing with such individual defiance and defining the 
limits of whether sanctions are applied or not. As explained by an upper middle-level 
provincial branch officer, when the local party in Jakarta conducted Caring Camp in 
Cibubur (a district in east Jakarta) one member came late with his group. Due to his record 
of criticising the party on certain occasions, the local party leadership was anxious that the 
group was late at his suggestion. The camp itself was obligatory for all cadres in the 
province, so any efforts to interrupt the programme could be categorised as a form of 
protest. To clarify the case, the party asked him to attend a session with all of the local 
party committees. The session itself was arranged to get information from the cadre directly 
and the situation was clarified when the reason for the group’s late arrival was found to be 
unrelated to dissent against the party. Having found that there was no basis of dissent, the 
party did not impose any sanctions because being invited to attend the session is itself part 
of the party’s warning system.  
The PKS has drawn the boundaries for applying sanctions to its members by 
defining protest toward the party’s decision and influencing or mobilising other members as 
the indicators. As long as any critical action is personal without affecting other members, 
the party will regard the cadre as a case for treatment leading to alienation, and not apply 
any sanctions for dismissal. It seems that the reason for this policy is whether personal 
opinion has shifted into mass mobilisation or not. If the situation is affecting other 
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members, it means that the party will lose its control of the cadres. Losing control of its 
cadres is not acceptable for a party that emphasises the solidity of its cadres. 
If the cadre is unwilling to change his or her opinion as a personal standpoint the 
party will also be reluctant to reinstate their membership. Ikhsan Tanjung was one of the 
movement’s prominent members at the time of the PKS’s establishment, but he ignored the 
decision and consistently criticised the party’s decision and direction. As a result, the party 
relieved him of his party tasks including transferring all of his trainees. With no 
responsibilities in the party and no trainees, he found himself in the position of having no 
involvement with any of the party’s activities. The party cadres had no reason to have any 
contact with him. On some occasions, a number of cadres met to consult him informally on 
many issues including discussing the political situation. Nevertheless, in general, the party 
does not consider him as an important figure in its political activities.  
It is quite unique to look at Tanjung’s case because he did not try to mobilise other 
cadres to support his standpoint. His reason for this has been described by another as a 
commitment to the movement, as he does not want to completely severe his relations with 
it (Zein 2010). To express his criticism, he withdrew from his position as deputy 
chairperson of the movement not long after the declaration of the PK in 1998. However, his 
criticism of the transformation did not lead to his dismissal. His situation is quite similar to 
that of Abdul Hasib, head of the Al Hikmah foundation, who hosted the gathering of the 
KIK (Kajian Islam Kontemporer or Contemporary Studies of Islam) in al Hikmah mosque. 
Until last year, he was mentioned as regularly attending training despite his approval for 
critical cadres holding gatherings at al Hikmah mosque located at his foundation in Bangka, 
southern Jakarta. He spoke once at the gathering and talked about the importance of being 
committed to Islamic principles in every activity, including politics. He also mentioned the 
deficiency of relationships among cadres, especially in regard to information or commands 
from party elites.  
The organisers of the gathering itself asked for permission to arrange the gathering 
in response to concerns among members and give them a place to share and discuss. Tizar 
Zein was one of them and he was asked to lead the gathering as a loose forum of social 
relations. On some occasions, these gatherings were a place for expressing different points 
of view on the party’s policies and stance. There were also expressions of criticism toward 
the elite’s behaviour, especially on welfare and Islamic practices. The speakers claimed that 
220 
 
 
some of the elite have been more permissive toward welfare, which, according to them, is 
not a pure reflection of the moral principles inherited from the Prophet and his companions. 
The forum itself was the extension of previous restlessness among senior cadres at 
the recent development of the party in early 2008. Those with similar concerns attended a 
meeting in Bogor to discuss the recent situation more extensively. Many of them agreed to 
send a direct message to the head of the Assembly, Hilmi Aminuddin, as an expression of 
their concern. Not all of the attendees at the gathering were pleased to go and, from nine of 
them, six were warmly welcomed by Aminuddin himself in Lembang, northern Bandung, 
on 28 March 2008. One of the guests explained that their mission went well and they were 
able to read their written advice and one gave a spontaneous speech on the principles of 
Islam (Zein 2010).  
After the meeting, only two of them remained determined to criticise the party. Both 
then continued to discuss the recent situation. After a series of small group discussions with 
some other senior cadres who had similar apprehensions as them, they agreed to arrange the 
KIK gathering. They knew the risk of arranging such activities. It was mentioned by one of 
the committees when a visitor of the gathering asked about the possibility of having similar 
gatherings in his area. He simply said, “Are you ready for the consequences?” Unlike other 
critical senior cadres who are simply individually critical to avoid being completely 
alienated, those who arranged the gathering faced more severe sanctions. The offence can 
be categorised as a severe one, so the ultimate possible sanction is dismissal.  
However, before the dismissal was applied, there was a period where the DPP 
refrained from any severe acts. It was a period of waiting for deliberate consciousness to 
leave critical positions. During that period under the leadership of Tifatul Sembiring, 
tensions were apparent and the gathering gained momentum and found more supporters. 
From just holding a series of gatherings, the momentum for the forum to become a more 
significant pressure group came when the party’s lawmakers preferred to modify their 
position regarding the BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia or Bank Indonesia 
Liquidity Assistance) inquiry in the House of Representatives in 2008. The assistance was a 
huge bailout package to help the banking system avoid collapse in 1998, but it was later 
found that the majority of the banks submitted fake assets to obtain the support. The party’s 
position was seen as a failure to push parliament to uncover the scandal, which encouraged 
critical cadres to call for a meeting with the PKS lawmakers. The lawmakers agreed to meet 
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and one of them then called the group the FKP (Forum Kader Peduli or Forum of 
Concerned Cadres). The meeting was eventually cancelled, with each party accusing the 
other of being behind the cancellation (Giri 2008).  
The group, which was later known on as the FKP, pushed to arrange a more 
massive movement. They asked the attendance of the KIK gathering to attend a two day 
intensive gathering in TMII (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah or Beautiful Indonesia Miniature 
Park) in East Jakarta. The gathering was held during the month of ramadhan in September 
2008 and it was attended by around a hundred cadres. Most of them were middle-ranking 
cadres who were already experienced in activities of dakwah during the Tarbiyah 
Movement period. Two of them expressed their disappointment at the party because it had 
become too political, while another explained that some of the elite in his neighbourhood 
were now rarely seen in the mosque for early morning prayers (fajr).   
Similar to the two days’ training activities in the party, there were speeches from 
senior cadres and they conducted night prayers (tahajjud) before early breakfast in 
preparation for fasting during the day. The speakers discussed the recent condition of the 
party. On that occasion, some of them denied the accusation from the party’s elite that they 
were critical because they were only upset, having lost significant roles in the movement 
after it was transformed into a political party. That is a typical allegation aimed at the 
critical cadres which is used to accuse them in public when the case was brought to court 
and covered in the media (Vivanews, 18 March 2011). In the end, the organisers tried to 
expand their influence and activities throughout Jakarta and its suburban area by inviting 
key persons from each area.  
It seems that there is limited room available to relieve the tension between the two 
sides. Two prominent leaders of the gathering then continued the momentum by arranging 
small-group discussions on a routine basis. This was very similar to the training supervised 
officially by the party. However, this small group activity was to contemplate the recent 
situation by exploring verses in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s addresses. Sometimes other 
critical members also attended to share their thoughts with the audience and evaluate the 
current situation. The reason for carrying out such activity is that the only way to contest 
the downgrading of the party is by cutting their ties with it (Mashadi, 2008). The small 
group activity then became the root of the establishment of a completely independent new 
network.          
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At the same time, the party tried to be patient. According to a middle-ranking party 
official, during the period of Tifatul Sembiring’s presidency, the party leadership tried not 
to be harsh to them (Hartono 2011). There were no official sanctions imposed, in the hope 
that those who attended the KIK gatherings would change their mind and come back to the 
party. However, despite its relaxed approach, the development of the critical cadres was 
still under the radar of the leadership. The party’s organ dealing with the discipline of 
cadres also conducted an assessment of the activities that were not under their control. The 
mechanism of asking for clarification was held and it was admitted by one of the initiators 
of the KIK gathering. The party arranged a session to clarify his position, but he did not 
attend, as, according to him, it was not an appropriate mechanism for tackling the main 
issue. On one occasion, he attended a session in the DSP and expressed his opinion. One of 
the statements he mentioned in that session was that “There are calls for maintaining what 
is right, but there is no call for forbidding what is wrong” (Zein 2010) as an expression of 
consistent disapproval.  
The party, then, had no other choice but to apply sanctions. These sanctions were 
due, not to the criticisms of the party, but to the impact beyond the party’s control. As 
mentioned before, the indicator of imposing severe sanctions is the existence of efforts 
against the party’s decisions. It is a common value that all cadres have to obey and honour 
the party’s directions and refrain from activities against it. Mobilising hundreds of cadres is 
an act of rebellion, especially conducting training outside the official network. On 12 
November 2008, the official sanction was released to isolate four prominent cadres. By this 
sanction, it was then illegal to have any relation or contact with them. Unfortunately, it is 
difficult to obtain the official letter of the verdict and, if it is accessible, there will be no 
terms mentioning the breach very clearly. There will be only a general statement that the 
person is in breach of party statutes and has acted against party norms. As explained before, 
the reason for only stating general allegations is to avoid disgracing accused cadres. This 
kind of official verdict has been criticised by one of the accused cadres by saying that it is 
not a proper verdict because of a lack of clear information on the article(s) or section(s) that 
one has been accused of violating (Mufied 2010).  
The verdict itself is widely applied and for the prominent leader of critical cadres, 
being cut off from the wider Tarbiyah community is apparent. The majority of cadres do 
not wish to break the party’s rules because they will be in trouble if they do so. They 
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understand that if they become more critical and express different opinions, there is a risk 
of being treated differently to loyal cadres by the leadership or, at least, being labelled as 
disloyal by other cadres at a relatively similar level. As a cohesive community bound by a 
similar vision of dakwah, brotherhood and sisterhood among cadres is relatively strong. 
Therefore, being alienated from the party as a community is unimaginable for most cadres 
and conforming to party rules and ethics is more beneficial than being dismissed. It is not 
surprising to hear the expression, “Are you ready for the consequences of being critical?”, 
delivered to cadres who wish to act or say differently to the party’s leadership. It is the 
rationale of the ‘rule of anticipated reactions’ that works in the PKS to prevent any 
opposition from the cadres. As a result, only those who have no hope of any change are 
willing to attend the gatherings or meetings critical of the party. Only cadres who can bear 
to face the consequences will be courageous to act and speak differently. Therefore, those 
who criticise and oppose the party’s leadership are from the elite and mid-ranking level and 
it is difficult to find oppositional views from the lower-ranking cadres.  
Dealing with sanctions is quite hard because they may lose their income. Some of 
the alienated cadres have small businesses and many of their costumers are the party’s 
cadres. After the verdict against him, one accused cadre was shown a text message stating 
that it is not allowed to buy goods from him or to use his services anymore (Zein, 2010). It 
was also mentioned that a workshop in a municipality in West Java had to be cancelled 
because the trainer was one of the formally alienated cadres. The other alienated cadre 
complained that his daughter’s wedding party was boycotted by other cadres because of a 
message saying that cadres are not allowed to attend it (Mashadi 2008). However, it is quite 
difficult to accurately verify conditions after the verdict.  
Further developments have shown that, despite the sanctions, some of the party’s 
members still try to contact cadres who are being isolated or alienated. Some of them 
agreed to join an overnight gathering in Depok in July 2010. At the gathering, the size of 
the audience was significantly less than for the KIK gatherings, with only around 30 people 
in attendance. The small numbers who attended the gathering was due to obstacles in 
building a solid vision to appeal to different individuals, the most important one being what 
action to take in the future (Giri 2010). A lack of vision had actually been noted during the 
last gathering of the KIK. One attendee felt that there was an effort to use those who 
attended the forum to create pressure on the party’s elite. Since then, he did not attend any 
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future gatherings, though he kept coming to the ‘illegal’ small group training. Another 
attendee of the gathering in Depok said that he just wanted to know the direction of the 
defiant group. Despite the difficulties in building a solid vision, the new network was still 
trying to build a stronger appeal to critical cadres in different provinces. It is noted that a 
similar overnight event was also arranged secretly in Bandung, the capital of West Java, 
and it was attended by critical, mainly middle-ranking, cadres (Yusuf 2011).    
Nevertheless, the coordinators of the new training network do not have an ambitious 
target of replacing the existing network. For the coordinator of the new network, the legacy 
of the Muslim Brotherhood is universal at the moment and every Muslim has a right to be 
inspired and to apply it. Whether this effort will be acknowledged by others is another 
problem (Zein 2010). Unlike the PKS, the new network seems to support the idea of 
avoiding democracy since it can be used to undermine Islam. One of the problems with 
democracy is the principle of majority that can be used as a basis of truth in the form of 
law, while, in Islam, the truth is based on revelation rather than the views of a majority of 
the people. Based on that standpoint, they do not support any involvement in politics such 
as what the PKS is doing. Perhaps, this view has emerged as a reflection of the experience 
of the PKS, whereby the pragmatic approach is more apparent than the ideological 
approach. It seems that those who arranged the new network have become fed up with the 
party and, even though there is an opportunity for rehabilitation, and a return to the party, 
they are not eager to do so. By developing such a network, it is clear that they have made a 
definite break with the party and, even without an official verdict, they have already 
decided to excommunicate themselves.  
Currently, they are creating a community to assemble the remnants of the KIK 
gatherings. Unlike the KIK gatherings, which criticised the party directly, the community is 
more relaxed in creating warnings for every Muslim and reminding their supporters of 
Islamic principles for their daily life. They use a virtual magazine, Eramuslim, to express 
their vision and most of the preachers who write in it are known as former cadres, critical of 
the PKS. Some of the articles tend to discuss the party and its activities, but this time with a 
series of studies on the Islamic movement. The community of its readers, then, is known as 
the KEM (Komunitas Eramuslim or the Eramuslim Community). One informal critical 
leader acknowledged that the KIK was not effective in terms of gaining positive results 
because the outcome of both opposite sides was tensions (Zein 2010). For that reason, a 
225 
 
 
more reactive approach was denied and they adopted a similar approach to that applied at 
the beginning of the Tarbiyah movement.  
As described in the theoretical perspective, alienation occurs when there is a 
condition or environment sufficient to force an individual or group to withdraw from a 
certain situation. This theoretical approach gives more attention to the individual or group 
who becomes the object of negative impact. Therefore, alienation is commonly associated 
with the object that is suffering the impact. In Marxist terms, those who are alienated from 
the capitalist system are mainly labourers, who do not have access to capital except as part 
of the workforce. Meanwhile, in modern politics, alienation occurs when people do not 
have access to the political process, which is decided by an oligarchic group at the centre of 
power.  
In the case of the PKS, there is a sense of a deliberate mechanism implemented by 
the leadership to force its dissident members to stay away from the party system for a 
while. Therefore, alienation is a process undertaken by the party leadership, as the 
authoritative institution, to generate the benefit to it of decontaminating its ranks of rogue 
elements. The action is applied in order to prevent their influencing other cadres. 
Misguided cadres who deviate from the party’s line are perceived as a problem and the 
most effective way to contain the problem is to alienate them for a while. In this way, the 
party can maintain cadres’ loyalty, while, at the same time, there is a hope that the critical 
cadres will change their attitude toward the party’s line. 
This action is designed for members who are still controllable. It means that the 
party hopes that the person will change their point of view and understand his or her 
wrongdoing. In this situation the verdict is given to members with a relatively small scale 
impact on other members. In different cases, more severe alienation is applied; not only 
excommunication, but also cutting all business or professional relations. For those who 
spent most of his or her time with the Tarbiyah Movement, alienation is a very difficult 
situation to deal with. Only those who are brave enough are eager to confront such a 
situation. Mostly, they already have a back up in terms of financial or community resources 
to support their daily life. If there is no financial or social support, the situation might be 
different (Appendix B.11.).  
The situation is more complicated when a cadre’s spouse is still in favour with the 
party, even though he or she is already annoyed with the recent situation. Facing that 
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situation, there is no alternative other than to soften his or her stance. However, a gradual 
withdrawal from party activities is possible, without leaving the party at all or stays to 
support the party (Appendix B.9.). In that position, if there is a task given from the party he 
or she will accept it apathetically in order to avoid being recognised by the leadership as a 
recalcitrant cadre. It is more difficult for cadres who are in the parliament because they are 
supposed to support the party at all costs.      
For cadres in the position where it is impossible to release their loyalty, there is a 
danger of putting themselves into a more passive position. More than that, there is also the 
possibility of adopting a stance whereby they stay away from politics. This is a deliberate 
position taken by cadres who think that the party has been steering in a different direction 
and that some of the elite have behaved immorally. Others might think to reduce their 
activities due to the political decision. While the former is more ideological, the latter is a 
result of exhaustion from continuously carrying out political manoeuvres. These two 
indications have been noticed in several locations, even though they have not significantly 
affected the party. The indication is that cadres deliberately absent themselves from the 
party’s activities or routine training (halaqah or usrah). By doing so, they have taken an 
action of self-alienation because the isolation is self-inflicted without any sanction from the 
party. 
The phenomenon of self-alienation has shown that reaction toward the party’s 
manoeuvre is more complex than simply a matter of being loyal or disloyal. In fact, 
between the two extremes, there is a range of attitudes among cadres creating a spectrum of 
stances. At the more critical pole, those who attended the ‘illegal’ gatherings have different 
reasons and backgrounds. It can be an effective mobilisation at first, but becomes less 
cohesive when the manoeuvre is beyond their expectations. As a result, some of them 
prefer to retreat. A lack of vision on what to do next is crucial at this stage. Within the 
prominent critical cadres, there is also no cohesion. For example, from the nine people who 
attended the discussion in Bogor, as mentioned previously, only six agreed to meet Hilmi 
Aminuddin directly, while from those six, only two were eager to establish a new network. 
Therefore, using the term factionalism to look at the critical cadres is an exaggeration of the 
real situation. It is also applied to those who are loyal to the party. It seems that the claim of 
a solid party is difficult to challenge. In fact, within the cadres who are loyal, there are also 
cadres who, for different reasons, are less eager to support the party. Case by case 
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examination is more relevant in this context because it is common to see different opinions 
in different cases among the elite (Appendix B.11.).  
 
V.4 Decomposition 
Unlike alienation as a process which allows for the restoration of the accused members’ 
loyalty and secures other members from their influence, decomposition does not give any 
chance for a rethink, contemplation, or retaining one’s previous status in the PKS’s 
membership. Decomposition is a direct action against cadres who do not obey party 
decision or commit a severe violation of the party’s principles. In the PTPS document, it is 
mentioned that the meaning of severe violation is ‘insubordination to the party’s decisions, 
rules, policies, or standpoints, which could be penalised by direct dismissal from party 
membership. There is also another category of severe violation that can be penalised by 
similar action, which is violation of Islamic principles. Actions that can be categorised into 
severe syari’ah violations are ‘mortal sins, serious crimes that can be penalised with hudud 
(theft, robbery), and qishas (murder)’.  
In similarity to other actions against violations, the party also set up a mechanism to 
tackle these actions through a series of investigations and assessments of individual cases. 
The Lajnah Hisbah collects evidence regarding the cadre’s behaviour and files the case for 
assessment by the Majlis Qadha. The Majlis then produces a decision after hearing the 
evidence and asking the accused cadre to explain the case. The decision will be released 
later and it is made official by the DPP of the party if it is a case of organisational violation 
and by the DSP if the case is related to shari’a. 
To describe definite figures related to the decisions is not easy because, as 
mentioned previously, the party has a policy of not publishing decisions regarding 
disciplinary cases involving its cadres. The verdicts are not for public consumption and are 
kept for internal information announced through weekly training (usrah). Therefore, it 
would not be surprising if there was a case of a cadre who does know about any sanction 
imposed on his trainer (murabbi or naqib). Only after being transferred to another training 
group, would the cadre understand why the party transferred him or her to another group 
due to the trainer’s dismissal from the party. 
Because of the closed policy in handling party discipline and implementing its 
verdicts, it is also quite difficult to reveal details of the process of investigating and 
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assessing disciplinary cases. However, despite its secrecy, there are some notions about the 
process that represents two different positions. For cadres in the party structure, the process 
is seen as credible and handled by professionals, so that cadres are not expected to doubt 
the whole process and the verdict itself (Hamzah 2011). That kind of expression is issued as 
a response to the disappointment uttered by particular cadres who faced sanctions. 
Although it is a response to a specific case, there is a range of dissatisfaction about the way 
of the process of disciplinary decision is taken. It is noted that one cadre expressed his 
feeling that the process did not give him a fair opportunity to defend himself and clarify his 
case (Mufied 2010). Another expressed his regret at finding that his case against a senior 
cadre should be withdrawn from official investigation (Budi 2008), while a third refused to 
attend a session due to different interpretations of who should handle his case (Zein 2010). 
Apart from those negative expressions, the cadres in the party’s structure tend to have 
confidence in the official process because it is handled by trustworthy and professional 
scholars in syari’ah and law as well as an understanding of the case itself (Hartono 2011). 
The policy of dismissing party members is said to be implemented more explicitly 
under the leadership of Luthfi Hasan Ishaaq when he replaced Tifatul Sembiring in 2010 
after acting as interim president in late 2009 (Appendix B.11.). The previous President 
seemed to avoid direct confrontation with cadres who are critical and less supportive of the 
party standpoint, even though the DPP had already obtained a constitutional mandate to do 
so after the establishment of the BPDO. He used a metaphor to describe them; he only 
described them ‘as passengers on a ship who are producing smoke by burning some part of 
the ship, which has disrupted other passengers’ (Ibid). His policy also tended to contain the 
influence of the critical thinking by asking cadres in general not to attend gatherings where 
the party was discussed critically, as they were regarded as illegal and so unworthy to 
attend. In contrast, the current President has been more decisive in handling the cadres who 
have a different political position. The case of Saiful Islam Mubarok is clear evidence that 
the party under Ishaaq’s leadership is more firm in this matter. 
The case of Saiful Islam can be categorised as an organisational violation according 
to the PTPS because he was seen to be insubordinate regarding a party’s decision. The case 
is a result of the process to find a cadre to replace the national parliamentary seat which 
was previously occupied by Suharna Suprapranata. As he was appointed a member of the 
cabinet in 2009, he had to transfer his seat in the House of Representative from Electorate 
229 
 
 
Region 1 in West Java. To replace him, the PKS decided to appoint Arif Minardi, a leader 
of the worker’s union at Dirgantara Indonesia Co. rather than Saiful Islam, under the 
mechanism of PAW (Pergantian Antar Waktu or interim replacement). From the party’s 
perspective, the decision was not a problem because, according to the head of the 
Provincial Party Board, Taufik Ridlo, Suharna was appointed by the PKS. The appointment 
was a policy decided by the party; therefore any consequences due to the appointment 
should be decided by a party policy as well. Arif Minardi was chosen to replace Suharna 
because he had more knowledge and experience of labour issues as he was the head of a 
trade union (reference).  
However, the decision was challenged by Saiful Islam, who argued that as he 
collected more votes than Arif Minardi in the 2009 national election (around 19,000 votes 
compared to Arif’s 16,554 (Cetro 2009)) he was more popular with voters, a fact which 
should be considered in the decision to choose a replacement for Suharna. For that reason, 
he refused to withdraw his candidacy to make Arif Minardi’s candidacy possible. For the 
party, the refusal could be categorised as insubordination and, if referred to the party’s 
constitution and its code of sanctions, the penalty for such behaviour is instant dismissal.  
As mentioned before, the detail of the process of handling such a case is an internal 
issue which is not made public. However, it is certain that the clarification process on that 
case is conducted for the related cadre only and the party seemed to be trying to contain the 
problem as far as possible. It is likely that if the party tried to keep the case for internal 
consumption, there would be a fundamental reason. However, similar to most disciplinary 
cases within the party, there was no official announcement in order to keep the real process 
and issues discussed in disciplinary related institutions (the BPDO, Lajnah Hisbah, Majlis 
Qadha and in higher level, the Assembly and the DSP).  
In the perspective of party management, expelling cadres is common since the 
party’s line must be accepted by all party cadres. If the reason is rational, the case will be 
accepted quite readily by other cadres and supporters, and even the public. There are cases 
in the PKS where members were expelled for immoral behaviour such as gambling or 
corruption. In March 2011, for example, the party, through its disciplinary organ, the 
BPDO released an official letter confirming the dismissal of Darmawan Duming, a member 
of the local parliament in Gorontalo Province (Antara, 13 March 2011). The decision was 
taken after the PKS formed an investigation team and processed the case according to 
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formal procedure. Other cases of expulsion are believed to be related to corruption, such as 
when two cadres in Jember, West Java province, were expelled (Antara, 6 April 2011). For 
both cases, there was no reaction towards the decisions and they were accepted without 
question. 
The problem in the case of Saiful Islam is different because there is an aspect of 
protesting against the party’s decision. The suspicion, according to critical members, is that 
the party had conducted an unwise and undemocratic approach toward its own cadres. This 
suspicion was made more dramatic since his forum of worship (sholat bersama) in 
Bandung had reduced in numbers significantly. For critical members, the loss of his 
followers had a strong relation to the fact that the PKS’s cadres were recommended not to 
attend any of the defendant’s activities as part of the process of alienation as well as 
dismissal. To give support to Saiful, some critical cadres tried to mobilise groups of people 
from Jakarta to attend his night worship sessions (Zein 2010).   
It seems that the policy of concealing the actual process and basis of a case to keep 
the honour of a defendant or other alleged cadres has raised some questions, especially for 
those who do not have clear and valid information. This was the case with Yusuf Supendi 
when the PKS expelled him from the party in October 2009. He signed the declaration of 
the PK foundation in 1998 and was seen as a prominent cadre in the Tarbiyah Movement. It 
is known that he studied in Madinah at the same time as Hilmi Aminuddin and became a 
close friend and aide in the expansion of the movement from the beginning. Among cadres, 
Yusuf Supendi was widely known for his extensive knowledge of shari’a and perceived as 
a spiritual figure as he was also appointed as a member of the DSP.  
The case of Yusuf Supendi is actually not a new case because it has been widely 
known among cadres in 2008 when the research was conducted in Jakarta and it was 
believed that he had been under investigation since becoming a member of parliament from 
2004 to 2009. Similar to other cases, it was difficult to confirm the actual reason behind the 
decision to remove him from his positions. After he finally opened his case publicly and 
brought it to court, controversy emerged in the media since he also spoke about various 
issues regarding the PKS’s activities and his suspicions that some of the party’s leaders 
were guilty of inappropriate behaviour. Officially, the party had issued a decision in 
October 2009 after years of investigating Supendi and asked for clarification or 
confirmation. On one occasion, he was accused of defrauding an orphan fund collected by 
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the PKS, rumours of which had previously circulated among party cadres; an allegation 
which he denied (Vivanews, 4 May 2011). One mid-ranking cadre stated that he knew that 
Yusuf was involved in such activity (Hartono 2011) and others expressed their conviction 
that the handling of the case in the BPDO and the DSP had been carefully conducted 
(Hamzah, 2011).   
It seems that the party decided to expel him due to misconduct for misusing the 
orphan’s fund, which may be categorised as a serious crime in the shari’a. If the case is a 
violation of shari’a principles, there should be less controversy, such as if it refers to the 
case of gambling described before. However, controversy can flourish when the public, in 
this case the media, perceive the case as a conflict between a cadre and the party leadership 
with aspects of an undemocratic approach. The party is officially consistent in its policy of 
not publishing the verdicts and its reasons in public in order to veil the real misdeed of the 
accused member. 
The case was made more confusing when critical cadres offered their support by 
inviting him to speak at an event conducted by a group of cadres known as the FKP, linked 
to the gatherings in Bangka, known as the KIK. The event, which took place in a mosque in 
the Pramuka area of East Jakarta, was a reception to welcome the holy month of Ramadhan 
in 2008, and his speech itself contained no direct criticism of the party leadership, except 
stressing aspects of a democratic Islamic approach within an organisation. By inviting him 
to the event, his case of shari’a violation became mixed up with questions of abuse of 
power. It is likely that the decision to expel him from the party was related to the closer link 
between him and the FKP as a member of parliament from the PKS, and members of the 
central party board accused him of political manoeuvring rather than contemplating and 
amending his behaviour (Hamzah 2011). If it is true, the decision is consistent with the 
principle of not mobilising and influencing other cadres as a boundary between individual 
protest and manoeuvre to mobilise protest or criticism. 
To clarify the case of dismissal due to efforts to mobilise personal critical views 
toward party leadership the case of M. Haekal Mufied might be representative to describe 
the limit. He was a member of the local Sharia Council in Jakarta dismissed by the party 
after sending a text message warning cadres to be careful with instructions from the party 
leadership regarding cases in the House of Representatives. The text itself, according to 
Haekal Mufied (2010), said: 
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“Distribute!!! Open letter from Brother Haekal: Honoured brothers Mahfudz S, 
Fahri H and Andi R. Become the heroes of dakwah and do not become traitors to 
this nation...! Do not fear instructions from “Lembang”, but fear the judgement in 
the afterlife. Conclude the case of Century. God is the Greatest....!”  
 
The case of Century is widely known in the country as the government wanted to 
bailout the bank under the consideration of stabilising Indonesian economy in general from 
the risk of systematic impacts on the banking system (the Jakarta Globe 2 March 2010). For 
many lawmakers, the policy taken in November 2008 was a fatal error because it was taken 
without careful judgement and led to suspicions that it had become the source of fraudulent 
actions. The former Vice President at the time of the policy even claimed it as a robbery 
(the Jakarta Globe 9 January 2009). A similar case that was conducted in 1998, when BLBI 
(Bank Indonesia Liquidity Assistance) also became the concern of critical cadres who were 
at the beginning of the gathering in Bangka and tried to have a dialogue with the PKS 
parliamentary party over their suspicions at the party’s unwillingness to take serious action. 
The text was part of the effort to pressurise PKS lawmakers to open up the case. In the text, 
there is a warning about any instruction from Lembang, which refers to the residence of 
Hilmi Aminuddin, the head of the Assembly and the DPTP.  
The warning itself is a reflection of concern at Aminuddin’s role in the political 
process in parliament. Some critical cadres believe that he played a significant role in 
influencing the process. The party’s shift in political position in 2005 with regard to the 
government’s increase in gasoline prices was also linked to his ‘instruction’ (Mashadi 
2008). The PKS was one of the political parties that did not strongly oppose the 
implementation of the price rise and the party’s change of position was a dramatic 
manoeuvre just before the final session in the House of Representatives to discuss the 
policy. However, suspicion of the party’s leadership was significantly reduced in early 
December 2009 when the PKS faction supported the decision of parliament to declare that 
the bail-out policy on Century Bank was a problematic policy that warranted further 
investigation. It was a tough political position because the party had an agreement to obtain 
four ministerial posts in Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s new cabinet following the 2009 
election.   
Apart from the political context as the background of the Mufied text, the party was 
not happy with his manoeuvre. Referring to the principal of allowing personal political 
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views but banning any effort to influence other cadres, the party took the drastic decision to 
dismiss Haikal Mufied, even though he had a strategic position in the party as secretary of 
the provincial Sharia Council. Mufied published the official letter, saying that it was 
officially released as provincial party decree 01/KEP/AI-PKS/I/1431 under the heading of 
‘dishonourable dismissal.’  
From the cases above, it seems clear that the party’s dismissal of members will be 
based on the principal written in the constitution and its supporting document. The 
violation of shari’a principles is commonly accepted without any doubt, but it can be more 
controversial if it is related to more a political dimension of organisational issues. The case 
of Yusuf Supendi is basically a shari’a case, but it becomes problematic when aspects of 
organisation are attached to represent the misleading or undemocratic approach of the PKS. 
Meanwhile, the case of Saiful Islam is a clear example that organisational violation of the 
party’s decisions can be devisive on membership, even though he did not mobilise any 
cadres against it. 
The most obvious case of expulsion due to conducting more significant mobilisation 
and influencing wider cadres can be referred to the prominent cadres who arranged the 
gatherings in Bangka in 2008. Mobilisation and affecting wider cadres are the 
characteristics of such manoeuvres. After conducting several gatherings, in large and 
medium open forums, they try to conduct smaller training sessions analogous to what the 
Tarbiyah Movement and the PK, then PKS, were doing. It was a clear breach of the party’s 
organisational principle, which has very strict coordination of such training. Although they 
have changed their approach not to challenge the party leadership overtly and directly, their 
next focus is still unacceptable by managing an online media of Eramuslim with its reader 
community (the KEM). The decision was taken to expel them from the party, which is a 
clear sign that such manoeuvres are not acceptable according to the party line. After years 
of tensions, the decision to cut their ties with the party was taken when efforts to mediate 
between the two parties failed to produce a better outcome. At least four prominent cadres 
in the case were convicted and were fully dismissed at the end (Zein 2010). 
What makes these cases of criticism and mobilising cadres so sensitive is that they 
potentially undermine the authority of the party leadership. In the principle of 
decomposition in the context of party moderation, such action is crucial to protect the 
solidity of members who might not be interested in the issues. As has been noted by Orbell 
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and Fougere, decomposition is a strategic decision to dismiss members of an ideological 
political party who are still holding on to an earlier interpretation. For an ideological party 
wanting to win electoral votes, changing its interpretation is significant to obtain more 
voters and, according to them, it is usual that the party leadership will preserve its position 
when it has succeeded to gain more voters and maintained political benefits from it. It is 
logical for the party, then, to dismiss members who are protesting the new political position 
by saying that it betrays the authentic interpretation of party ideology.  
For some reason, criticism from some cadres in the PKS is quite similar to the 
situation described by Orbell and Fougere. The party’s new, more pragmatic, direction in 
order to place it at the centre of the Indonesian political arena is perceived as a violation of 
their movement’s vision of dakwah. Actually, the narrative of party officials is still the 
same by upholding the issue of ‘partai dakwah’ and winning election is also the winning of 
dakwah. Therefore, there is a different interpretation of achieving the success of the 
dakwah project. The party officials say that the project of the PKS is to grab a chance to 
lead the nation and give a better alternative for a better result. Dakwah is perceived as a 
vision to lead the country with capability and quality to benefit all of society and politics is 
part of the implementation of it. Offering the best cadres for the country to give their best is 
the way to lead the path to the vision (Matta 2011). This kind of vision is certainly different 
with the interpretation of some members who are saying that the political project is too 
pragmatic and has a negative impact on the party and its cadres.  
These two opposite points of view are certainly difficult to resolve when party 
officials use the approach of transforming the party to face the new reality of politics. 
Activities of the new phase of ‘mihwar dauli’ in politics are significantly different with the 
approach of ‘mihwar tanzhimi’ when the focus of the movement was mainly to train its 
cadres. The criticism from party officials of critical cadres mainly focuses on the inability 
of critical cadres to embrace the new reality and to relinquish their perception of the old 
reality as the only way to guide the movement (Wijaya 2011).   
For Orbell and Fougere, the reason for dismissing critical members is rational in 
that winning elections is clear evidence that the new interpretation is successful. Based on 
that point of view, the leadership should maintain the winning perspective by preserving the 
approach to win votes. In that situation, a different interpretation of party ideology will be 
perceived as an obstacle to retaining the support of voters. Expelling members with a 
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dissimilar vision who are critical of the authoritative interpretation is the best way to ensure 
party members support the new approach. The principle is stated in the decomposition 
theory, which says that losing defiant elements is better than losing political benefits.  
In the case of expulsions from the PKS, the principle in keeping political benefits is 
less important since the party has already set up principles of violation that could lead to 
dismissal. Moral bases are still preserved by the party by using the shari’a principles as the 
main reason for imposing sanctions equal with organisational principle. Therefore, immoral 
party members can be dismissed as a direct consequence of breaching Islamic principles, 
quite apart from the unintentional political impact When Arifinto, a lawmaker from the 
PKS, was caught by a journalist looking at pornographic images contained in his gadget 
during a general session of the House of Representatives, the DSP imposed personal 
sanctions and urged him to withdraw from his position in parliament as well as in the 
Assembly. The case was a humiliation for the party as an Islamic party to see its cadre 
engaged in such immoral behaviour in public. However, the sanctions and pressure for him 
is not an intentional effort to compensate for the negative impact of the case. Rather, it was 
an automatic response toward the misbehaviour; therefore it is less political than Orbel and 
Fougere suggest, even though it might be admired by the public.       
However, more political aspects are seen in the case of organisational violations. To 
dismiss cadres who are defiant is more important than keeping them in the party. As 
expressed by the former president of the party, Tifatul Sembiring, those who are critical are 
producing ‘smoke that may suffocate other passengers in the ship’ while they are still 
passengers who should be taken care of by the crew. It is difficult to handle them because 
they are still members of the party and may use their influence in front of other cadres to 
get sympathy. It is believed that one reason for fewer votes in Jakarta and its suburb cities 
in the 2009 election was caused by the existence of critical cadres who were reluctant to 
support the party campaign (Hidayat 2009 and 2010). It is not surprising that the newly 
appointed President has taken a more drastic approach toward those who are perceived as 
conducting insubordination toward the party leadership, including senior cadres who have 
contributed significantly to the foundation of the movement before the party era.  
In the perspective of decomposition theory, removing those who oppose the party 
line is a simple way to purge defiant elements from the party. The case of New Zealand 
cited by Orbel and Fougere is an obvious example that the opposition element then 
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established a new political group to challenge the main party in election. The case of the 
PKS is rather different in this context because there is no oppositional element lead by 
critical cadres. Their challenge toward the leadership is, rather, individual contestation as 
an expression of their devotion to the movement itself. Therefore, their motive is less 
political and, as a result, there has so far been no manoeuvre to establish a new political 
party to challenge the PKS. This is also confirmed by one of the expelled critical cadres, 
who stated that they do not have any intention of establishing a political party (Zein 2010). 
Despite challenging the party in the electoral process, some of them prefer to challenge the 
party by establishing new training networks using similar methods and principles to those 
implemented by the movement since the early 1980s. 
 Decomposition is proven to be effective in solidifying the party, since defiant 
elements are either no longer active in the party or give up their efforts to harshly criticise 
the party. Others will also think to do the same and choose to keep their criticism within the 
realm of a personal point of view, which is still tolerated (Appendix B.15.). Other critical 
cadre also decides to stay in the party with minimum activity as long as he is not perceived 
as defiant, in order to save their family’s life and their position in the party. He tried to 
avoid being nominated by the party at the national election by asking for a lower rank of 
candidacy to avoid current confusion (Appendix B.9.). As a result, the party now enjoys a 
more comfortable internal situation, allowing it to implement its activities without 
significant opposition. The only concern for the party leadership is the influence of expelled 
cadres who are still influential to some extent by using online media. However, for a solid 
party, which has a relatively high degree of control over its members, the PKS could direct 
them not to have close contact with external influences.  
Another concern is to contain issues released by ex-cadres in public as some of 
them try to bring their cases to court and unveil the party's internal information. Yusuf 
Supendi is an example of a former cadre who tried to bring his expulsion case to court and 
spoke with journalists about the party’s internal affairs. For some, his actions can be seen as 
the beginning of division in the PKS. In fact, the division has already been made by the 
party drawing a clear separation between them and the defiant cadres. As a consequence, 
any strong criticism now comes from outside rather than from within, which makes it easier 
to tackle by saying that they are not part of the party anymore. Nevertheless, from the 
perspective of the party leadership, external criticism is now perceived as insignificant and 
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harmless compared with before. With cadres who are trusting toward the party leadership, 
not only because of the figures but also the belief that it is a trustworthy system, such 
external information and influence is now easier to contain.  
 It is then clear that the PKS has distinctive strategies in dealing with moderation 
with the AKP by preserving Islam as an ideology. It is proven that the existence of religious 
principles has obliged the PKS to apply two different principles at the same time. Both are 
written clearly in the party constitution and also reflected in the party structures by having 
two different routes of disciplinary examinations. The organisational aspects are 
represented by the BPDO to deal with party discipline while infringements on Islamic 
principles will be handled by the DSP. Hence, the party represents two different authorities, 
secular and religious, but both are under the control of a collective body, the Shura 
Assembly. The combination of both authorities has given the PKS effective control of its 
cadres since the party represents their religious vision. So, those who are in the party 
structures, especially in the high ranks, are seen as most trusted and authoritative people 
due to their extensive understanding on Islam.    
 In this regard, room for debates on better options of policies will be monopolised by 
those who obtain the status of a trusted person. Hence, it is understandable that the party 
leadership ask for selective opportunity for discourse among members to emphasise the 
importance of respect to decisions rather than criticism. Trust, then, plays a great role in 
this context in the belif that those who are in the party structures are capable in handling 
many issues and the members’ role after the decision is taken is to accept and support. The 
effective control is also strengthened by the fact that all members are bound to the party as 
a big family under the banner of jama’ah, so punishments can be produced in different 
ways through decomposition and alienation. Decomposition is a definite strategy and it is 
even more effective by underlining the right of membership dismissal under the reason of 
preserving all members from precarious ideas and attitudes. With the existence of 
ideological preference, it is also obvious that the party can also alienate critical or 
uncontrollable members that may lead them into difficult situations. The effect can be 
positive in terms of generating the psychological effect on members not to infringe any 
principles, but it is also revealed that some members tend to conduct a self-alienation 
strategy to hinder any disciplinary action and maintain the membership status.  
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Chapter VI 
 
Final Remarks: The AKP and the PKS in Comparison 
 
 
 
 
In discussing political parties that are guided by a strong ideology, the question 
arises as to whether their role in the political process can be compatible with democracy. 
Strong ideologies often seem to be unsuited to the principles of a democratic system. 
Ideology usually asks for loyalty and devoutness toward ideals from its adherents. From the 
opposite side, democracy gives the opportunity for individuals to express their preference 
without fear of sanction from political authority. The electoral process enables the 
electorate to vote for parties or candidates that it expects to benefit from. An ideological 
party finds it difficult to accommodate popular demand and compete for votes in a system 
where elections are conducted on a regular basis. The discussion of an anti-system party 
originating from Sartori’s study of Fascist and Communist parties is an obvious example of 
the problematic existence of ideological parties in a democratic system. The problematic 
situation cannot be resolved unless the party embraces a moderation process (moving 
toward the centre in Sartori’s term) aimed at gaining acceptance among a large section of 
voters. 
The case of Islamic parties, or at least parties with a strong background of Islamic 
preference, is significant in this context. Different from Communist parties who are losing 
their ideological attraction, parties with Islamic preference still manage to have a 
significant appeal in Muslim societies. Recent examples of them are in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Morocco where Islamist parties managed to gain more votes than other political parties. In 
Egypt, the party of Muslim Brotherhood even had to compete with another Islamic party 
with a more conservative interpretation. Despite the success, it is still difficult to find clear 
evidence that Islamic parties can gain sufficient popular votes in elections and become 
dominant political players in a democratic system over a relatively long period. There is 
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also a fear that their victories will mean an imposition of a strict Islamic interpretation and 
consequently isolation from international markets, including investment.   
It is, thus, reasonable to focus on the AKP as it has been successful in winning three 
consecutive elections as a model for Islamic parties in Muslim countries. Soon after 
Ennahda gained support among Tunisian voters in the first democratic election in Tunisia, 
October 2011, it declared its preference for the Turkish ruling party as a model. In fact, this 
claim is still dubious due to the nature of the AKP itself. The AKP has maintained its 
dominant position in Turkish politics for almost a decade with three consecutive national 
elections. It has attracted popular support and has also respected the rule of law as required 
by democratic principles. The case of the PKS makes the claim more uncertain because it 
represents the challenging situation if a party intends to preserve Islam in a democratic 
system. The PKS can also be considered as a party that is trying to survive in politics by 
accommodating popular preference rather than attaching itself to a strict ideological 
interpretation. The PKS’s involvement in three consecutive national elections since 1999 
and also hundreds of local elections is evidence that it has a strong willingness to base itself 
on democratic principles. Therefore, both have the elements of moderation according to 
Sanchez-Cuenza and Schwedler’s versions.  
What makes the AKP and the PKS interesting in comparison is their different 
degree of moderation. The AKP abandoned any formal ideological preference based on 
Islam and replaced it with a more ‘vague’ ideology of ‘Conservative Democrat.’ The actual 
meaning of the AKP ideology may become a debate among scholars, but the vagueness of 
conservative democracy has given opportunity for individuals with different political 
preferences to come and work together. It has also been possible for the party to maximise 
other aspects to generate public support through the personal charisma of the party leader, 
the party’s vision, and also programmes.   
While the AKP declared its commitment to make a distinct distance from its 
predecessors, the RP and the FP, the PKS initiated serious attempts to change its image 
after it started to participate in the electoral process. After a relatively poor result in the 
1999 election, there was an understanding of the need to respond to popular sentiment in 
order to survive. The 2004 election confirmed that its initiative was productive as the party 
became the seventh most popular party in Indonesia with less religious appeal and jumped 
to four in the 2009 election to become the most popular Islamic party. The success 
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persuades the defenders of the initiative to move forward and reinforces the party’s more 
inclusive approach. However, unlike the AKP, the PKS has suffered from conflicting 
interpretations over how far moderation can be acceptable in reference to Islamic 
principles. The different interpretations within the PKS indicate that moderation will be 
likely to lead to internal tensions as the party becomes more moderate. Though the PKS 
seems to suffer from various internal problems such as threats of a split, the PKS seems not 
to have suffered a major negative impact. In general, the party still has the support of its 
cadres across the country and the tension itself is relatively concentrated in the big cities.  
The AKP, in contrast, does not have intense tensions or conflicts based on 
ideological preferences. Most conflicts related to party and government policies and the 
role of ideological preferences is negligible. A particular policy has led some party deputies 
to resist because of their nationalistic point of view. However, in fact, the reaction is not a 
solely ideological reaction. There is also a dimension of criticism toward the way the party 
leadership deals with their views. Therefore, the AKP faces relatively less ideological 
conflict compare to the PKS. 
The difference between the two parties’ internal situations is due to the fact that 
they have experienced a different route of moderation. The AKP has started to abandon the 
ideological position of its foundation. It is not a sudden outcome though; the process of 
developing new interpretations of politics had started already as a learning process. The 
parties’ founders had experienced the dynamics of the RP and the FP before these were 
closed, so that abandonment is not an abrupt decision. On the contrary, the PKS had a 
different starting point. The PKS did not have a strong commitment to a serious moderation 
policy from its foundation. It is a party that was established directly by an underground 
Islamic movement, known as the Tarbiyah Movement which had expanded its influence 
among the educated young in the big cities. It is true that the party leaders tried to 
withdrawn the discourse of Caliphate in the party’s political vision at the outset. However, 
it was the result of elections and the opportunity to gain more support in elections which 
was the most significant and influential factor that persuaded party leaders to take the 
policy of moderation more seriously. In Wickham’s terms, the AKP can be categorised as 
abandoned moderation and the PKS tends to fit with revisionist moderation.   
From the case of the AKP and the PKS, different implementations of moderation 
influence the way both parties generate loyalty among party members. In the case of the 
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PKS, preserving ideology during the moderation process put the party in a difficult 
situation searching for the compatibility of moderation with Islamic principles. Lack of 
sufficient explanation of its political manoeuvres as implementation of moderation, either 
in electoral or decision making process at state level, was apparent and it influenced the 
cadres’ loyalty. For some cadres, insufficient explanation can be interpreted as failure to 
comply with the principles of Islam as the party’s leading ideology. As a result, the party 
suffered from continuing internal criticism and tensions in debates on the legitimacy of its 
political programme which also corresponds with the criticism of the appropriateness of the 
elites’ attitude to represent the party in several public institutions. In contrast, the party 
leadership used the interpretation of the party’s ideology also to respond to its critics. 
Therefore, both sides applied similar attempts to undermine each other. However, the party 
leadership was in a better position to apply legitimate interpretation to dominate cadres’ 
understanding and applied sanctions toward its opponents, including sanctions against the 
infringement of Islamic principles. Hence, for the PKS ideology is still the point of 
reference for every member, either to support or oppose the party leadership. 
In this regard, it is concluded that the PKS practises moderation without abandoning 
its ideology. The reason for the moderation may be partly based on Islamic interpretation, 
as claimed by the party elites, but it is difficult to deny that it is also partly driven by the 
motivation to win elections. With a mixed basis of moderation, political achievement such 
as winning elections and supporting the Government as part of a coalition is interpreted as 
the success of dakwah, a sacred mission inherited from the Tarbiyah Movement. Therefore, 
it is difficult to deny that the party needs ideology to legitimise its actions in politics as it 
tries to use it as the final point of reference, even though in practice the real pressure is to 
gain as many votes as possible in elections. In fact, ideology is still crucial for the PKS 
because it is a tool to maintain the loyalty of members and in certain situations to determine 
members’ loyalty. 
It is a different situation for the AKP in the Turkish political system. There is a real 
pressure from secularist strongholds to abandon any ideological reference to Islam. 
Therefore, the reason for working without strong reference to Islam is a deliberate attempt 
to avoid the pressure. Abandoning any reference to Islam is a pragmatic effort in order to 
survive in politics and the real challenge for the new party is to explain that without it there 
is also opportunity to achieve political success. It means that there is no deliberate attempt 
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to impose or even promote principles of religion in public life and the political success is a 
result of ability to deliver services and produce policies to meet public demands. The key 
element for the AKP to succeed is having a vision and leadership that are attractive to the 
public. Religiosity is part of public’s evaluation of the personality of the party leadership 
rather than an attachment to the party as ideological preference. But the party could face a 
potential conflict especially from those elements within the party that still have a strong 
attachment to Islam. The challenge for the AKP, then, is to explain to its members that 
certain aspects of religiosity can work with secularism to reduce potential internal conflict.  
Therefore, with different grades of moderation, the two parties face different 
potential problems. Abandoning a strong attachment to Islam, the AKP has had to convince 
internal religious elements to accept its political vision and leadership. Besides that, the 
party has also needed to develop internal party mechanism and suitable institutions to 
accommodate a variety of backgrounds of its members, as it has become a virtual secular 
party that is open to all Turks. But the relationship between members with different 
political preferences can trigger internal conflict.  
As distinct from the AKP, the PKS has to face the problem of defining its policies 
in relation to moderation. Moderation has become a problem in the party because there are 
various interpretations regarding the implementation of moderation itself. It is typical of 
internal tension within a party that is trying to change its interpretation as a basis for 
political action. To deal with it, it is crucial to develop a legitimate interpretation and to 
force it as an effective basis for loyalty and mobilisation. For the PKS, the struggle to find a 
legitimate interpretation is shaped by those who hold positions of power in the party 
structure.  
Theoretically, there are various strategies applied by moderated parties in dealing 
with the impact of moderation which relate to party leadership, trust, conversion-
replacement, and decomposition. The application of these strategies to the AKP and the 
PKS shows different application of each strategy. For the AKP, all of the strategies are 
applied, except the conversion that does not have any relation with replacement. 
Meanwhile, the PKS tend to apply alienation in spite of conversion-replacement to combine 
with the other strategies of leadership, trust and decomposition.  
On party leadership (also related to the character of party institutions), the AKP has 
stressed the leadership of its chairman. Erdoğan became a significant factor to attract 
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supporters to join the party and members admired him for his vision for a better Turkey. He 
was also perceived as an honest person due to his religious background. Nevertheless, 
Erdoğan also posed mixed challenges for the party.  He helped the party to gain popular 
support, but the AKP had to accommodate his role by legalising it in the party constitution. 
He controls three branches of power: the party itself, the parliamentary party and the 
cabinet. On the party executive board, he has the right to choose his closest aides. However, 
to balance his formal influence the party also implemented mechanism of consultation so as 
to enable alternative policies to be discussed.  
The absence of strict ideology has given the party the chance to give space to 
discussion within the party. Every member has a relatively equal opportunity to express 
ideas without fearing expulsion. Therefore, the AKP is able to build loyalty as members 
believe that the party has offered oppotunity to express their political activism. There is a 
widespread conviction that the party leadership will improve their circumstances despite 
the shift in ideological direction. The shift is not perceived as a threat to members’ beliefs 
since it is linked to the tradition of conservatism among the Turks that is also coherent with 
current political trends. Therefore, the leadership’s ability to convince religious elements 
has clearly reduced potential conflict given the fact that the majority of the RP and the FP 
supporters now support the AKP. They are relatively happy with the new direction and see 
it as an opportunity rather than a threat.  
There is a significant factor that makes the AKP’s members able to accommodate 
the new direction, especially among the higher-rank members. They understand that they 
have to refrain from any confrontation towards secular strongholds which are perceived as 
a threat to the party’s existence. With that mentality, they have developed self-discipline to 
define appropriate and inappropriate political actions to maintain the AKP’s position in 
order to prevent severe actions from secular strongholds. They can refrain from actions to 
challenge secular strongholds on issues related to religion such as the prohibition of the 
headscarf in education. Although some members are not genuinely happy with that 
position, staying in the party and supporting the current vision of the party are still 
perceived as the best option rather than leaving it. It can be said that the political 
environment has significantly shaped the way the AKP’s members define themselves and 
locate themselves in the current political context. 
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The PKS faces a different style of leadership. There is no charismatic leader 
because it has developed, rather, from the solid network of an underground Islamic 
movement. The movement, known informally as Tarbiyah Movement, created a network to 
internalise the understanding of Islamic teaching and recruited members carefully. This 
remained secret from the 1980s to the fall of New Order in 1998. Given the nature of the 
movement it was difficult for a leader to develop a personal charisma. Most members were 
interested in the message of Islam with strong emphasis on purification as well as the 
method of the movement itself. Therefore, the movement emphasised the importance of the 
mission of Islam, using particular methods of teaching, rather than focusing on the 
influence of a particular person.   
However, despite its strong emphasis on collectivism, the Tarbiyah Movement did 
give prominence to the movement’s foremost founder, who is now acting as the head of the 
Shura Assembly. The structure of the parties established by the movement, since the PK 
and then the PKS, gave authority to Hilmi Aminuddin to direct general and strategic 
policies. Although he is only the leader of a collective body, he does appear to have 
informal authority and can influence many of party’s decisions including the endorsement 
of the moderation policy. Therefore, it is logical that recent criticisms are also aimed to 
Hilmi Aminuddin himself who was accused of leading the party against the Islamic 
principles. 
In general, the party leadership is able to maintain the loyalty of the majority of its 
members by utilising the understanding of principles of amal jama’i, taught in the weekly 
training sessions for members. This requires a member to become a single “brick on a wall” 
and a good member is one who behaves in accordance with such a role. The result is an 
embedded attitude of obedience toward the party leadership which becomes a strong basis 
of solidity for the party. With such an attitude among members, the party can mobilise its 
members quite easily. When other parties in Indonesia are still having the problem of 
building an organisational cohesiveness based on strong values or ideology, the PKS has 
shown its ability to go through many difficult moments by utilising the obedience of 
members.    
The attitude may also be linked to an understanding that the system in the party has 
worked well. For members, it is inconceivable that the party leadership will drive the party 
and its members based on personal interest. They understand that the party works for the 
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vision of dakwah. Hence, every single activity within the party is perceived as connected 
with party and its religious values and whoever is in the position of leadership will also 
commit to its mission. Therefore, the obedience comes from the understanding that the 
party is not merely a group of politicians who are working for their own interest but for the 
dakwah.  
This is also strengthened by the fact that those who obtain strategic positions within 
the party are seen by members as the authoritative persons. As long as the elites can be 
categorised as wisdom cadres due to their understanding of Islam, they will be entitled to 
hold higher positions and automatically have a privilege to be admired due to their 
extensive knowledge. Therefore, the party leadership is a strong element that enjoys 
submission from all cadres according to the principle of obedience toward leadership and 
with the basis of implementation of religious principles, trust among cadres is incalculably 
significant to build strong awareness. Obedience and trust will endure as long as the party 
leaderships are able to maintain legitimacy by giving religious as well as strategic 
explanation toward their decisions. With the admiration from all cadres toward the 
leadership and system, the party could minimise the potency of internal conflict. 
For the PKS, the existence of a clear ideology has constituted a basis for legitimacy. 
As long as the party leadership is able to explain party policy in accordance with ideology, 
party members will accept new directions, including moderation. Therefore, support for the 
leadership mainly depends on its ability to produce a clear interpretation for members as it 
can be challenged by critical members. In that situation, different interpretation within the 
party is possible and it may lead to a contest in interpretation between the party leadership 
and critical members. Carsey and Layman noted that the confrontation to win the loyalty of 
the party’s members will be secured by those who have the legal authority to make 
decisions. It means that the party’s leader is in a better position to resolve the tensions in 
order to assume the loyalty of members. The case of the PKS demonstrated that its internal 
tensions had been reduced significantly by the dismissal of critical and disloyal members.  
In terms of dealing with opposition, another comparison with the AKP can be made 
in the case of defining those who are not in favour of the party’s policies or decisions. 
When it is decided what internal opposition is, the party can withdraw the defined 
member’s rights to attend weekly routine training (halaqah or usrah) or discharge them 
from any organisational tasks. The party’s actions can become more serious if there is no 
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genuine effort to accept the party’s decisions that may led to isolation from any relation and 
communication with all of the party members. It may also lead to imposition of sanctions 
depending on the level of infringement. In the PKS, the definition of violation is based on 
two different aspects which are moral and organisational. The former is developed from the 
principles of Islam which has a clear definition of actions and related sanctions as well. 
Meanwhile, the latter is related to organisation and leadership that has a dimension of 
interpretation in defining action that may categorised as degrading the party’s image and 
leadership. At this point, as noted before, the party leadership has the advantage of giving 
definition of legitimate interpretation on ideology that should not be violated.     
Therefore, the PKS applies the combination of sanctions on cadres who refuse to 
adapt their individual preferences to the intrinsic values of trust and obedience. The 
sanctions are related to the implementation of a mechanism that will be applied to cadres 
who are defined as extensively critical. The principle is clear that collective decision should 
become the ultimate goal of the party. Hence, having different opinions on the party’s 
policies is perceived as a violation of religious principles. The party has defined details of 
behaviours that can be categorised as violation in the party’s constitution including details 
of sanctions that can be imposed to the dissidents. However, in practice, the PKS applies 
flexible implementation of the sanctions. The party still tolerates different opinions as long 
as they are expressed individually. More stringent sanctions will apply if criticisms are 
shown to be able to influence other members. It is proven that firm actions have influenced 
many members who do not want to lose their connection with the party. In the case of the 
PKS, decomposition strategy that is particularly applied in a party in moderation as noticed 
by Orbell and Fougere is conducted effectively to protect ‘positive’ outcome in electoral 
process.  
In addition to the decomposition strategy, the case of the PKS indicates the 
application of alienation strategy. Alienation is part of the strategy to deal with members 
who do not adhere to the party’s decisions. However, it is a different strategy from 
decomposition because the party still hopes that they will change their attitudes. The 
strategy also aims to protect other members from their influence by discharging critical 
members from organisational tasks. It includes dismantling all training groups under 
supervision of critical members,in order to minimise the effect of oppositional opinions. 
More harsh action is taken against those who are completely confronting party decisions 
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without any hope that they will alter their position. Another consideration for more severe 
action is if there is the potential to circulate different opinions and mobilise more members 
into opposition. This is the demarcation to differentiate between members who are likely to 
be forgiven or who will be dismissed from the party membership.  
Alienation and decomposition strategies are effective to undermine the willingness 
to oppose or criticise the party’s decisions. It is effective in the case of the PKS due to the 
nature of the party as a collective group. Hence, members are tied closely with the group 
defined by Islamic brotherhood, so that any exclusion from the party is seen as a severe 
punishment. As a result, many party members try not to be categorised as critical members. 
They know the consequences and because of that they do not want to behave contrary to the 
party’s policies. The PKS does not give opportunity for members to comment freely in 
public, especially if it is an expression of criticism or dissent after a decision was made. 
The policy to restrict comments protects the party from internal conflict also because many 
members will refrain from any expressions that may lead to accusations of not supporting 
the party. Therefore, both sanctions, alienation and decomposition, play a great role in 
preventing internal criticism and opposition in the PKS. 
Nevertheless, there is a danger of excessive implementation of alienation and 
decomposition strategies that may lead the party leadership to be unchallenged and without 
criticism of its policies. Despite the effectiveness of making political decisions without 
much challenge from within, the party might not be able to examine different ideas among 
the party’s elites or wider members in order to formulate better options. This lack of 
discourse among the party elites is also acknowledged by some members who are loyal but 
still maintain a certain level of criticism. There is a need of having more space for discourse 
as proven from an expression such as ‘discourse is needed as a mechanism to find better 
options because there are no false decisions, but only good or better decisions.’ 
It will be more difficult for those who are willing to be loyal but at the same time 
expressing their eagerness to get more opportunities to build a tradition of discourse within 
the party. As mentioned before, the idea is not to challenge any religious principles or 
breaching loyalty. It is more related to the opportunity of getting better options if there is 
more space to have wider discourse among members. There is also a willingness to have 
more stringent supervision of cadres’ behaviour in politics that can potentially damage the 
party’s image among the public. However, the structure of the decision making process and 
248 
 
 
also the relation of tutor – trainee do not give opportunities to the realisation of such ideas. 
For the last aspect, the origin of the PKS as an Islamic movement that focused on intensive 
Islamic teaching has maintained the relation of giving more admiration to the high-rank 
members who also function as their religious tutor.  
The role of the head of the Shura Assembly as Muraqib ‘Amm is more exceptional 
because he has the most distinctive role in building the movement from the very beginning 
and developing it carefully until it became a significant political power. It then became 
difficult to challenge his opinions and argue any issues because many of the party elite 
admire him. Only those who are strong or courageous enough to challenge his position with 
arguments will be able to influence him. Those who fail to reassure him and even dare to 
criticise him directly will face severe consequences. However, the head of the Assembly is 
not always the ultimate dominant figure since he also urges collective decision making 
process in the Assembly.  
Having the courage is essential for members to deal with the consequence of being 
critical because being alienated is also an unpleasant experience. Restriction to have any 
relation with those who are officially alienated is strict and may have economic 
consequences losing business with many cadre colleagues. It may also lead to the loss of 
close friends who suddenly dissociate themselves from the dismissed cadres. For those who 
are not strong enough to face such consequences the only option is to remain passive or 
resign from party activities. There are cases of self alienation from the party politics as an 
expression of discontent or at least to lessen their support to the party’s politics. Hence, the 
only remaining association with the party is the attendance to weekly party gathering 
(halaqah or usrah) to maintain their relation with the original vision of spreading Islamic 
vision. In cases of strong disciplinary action, there will be restrictions on attending the 
congregation as well as having a group of members to teach. 
Refraining is the best option for some until the new direction emerges to replace the 
current approach. The consequence is that they will not work for the party with full 
commitment which is not in the party’s best interest and tend to apply a self-alienated 
position. However, it has to be considered that the number of those who commit to work 
for the party is still high compared to critical members and the self-alienated. Many of 
those who are dissatisfied with the current situation continue to work for the party to limit 
the possible damage to the party, even within the elite circle as well. They work within the 
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party system and try to maintain good relation with the party’s leader and all elites. They 
have a more optimistic point of view and leave all consideration of misbehaviour and 
misdeeds of some party elites to God.  
It is a different situation with the AKP because the party gives a space to every 
member to express their feelings without any fear of being dismissed or given sanctions. 
There is a promise that the party members will not be punished because of representing 
demands of their constituents, especially for deputies in the parliament. However, it is not a 
free ticket to express whatever they think because the party also requires them to act as a 
collective group as well. However, different from the PKS where dissent can have serious 
consequences, the members of the AKP who are not in favour with policies of the party 
may declare publicly to leave the party voluntarily. As a party of coalition from different 
backgrounds, it is quite easy to leave and find other political parties that are more suitable 
to their preferences. Therefore, there is no need to pressure party members to follow the 
party’s leadership based on ideological understanding.  
In the AKP, the definition of being dismissed or replaced is defined by performance 
and the ability to maintain popular support. If a member fails to perform, there is a potential 
action to withdraw from his or her position. In this context, ideology has less of a function 
in defining loyalty of party members, even though the party has “Conservative Democrat” 
as a formal ideology which actually functions as identity. For the AKP, it is more important 
to persuade its members to perform rather than look at degree of understanding on the 
ideology. Therefore, the definition of violation toward the party’s principles is emphasised 
on organisational dimension as written in the party constitution.  
However, the party still has ethical aspects by imposing certain moral aspects. One 
of the examples is to reject any actions involving pornography by using internet facilities at 
the party’s office. The case is quite similar to the PKS when one of its legislators was 
forced to withdraw after accessing pornographic pictures during a parliament session. He 
had left his parliamentary responsibilities but the party continues to retain his membership 
despite the detrimental impact caused by his actions. In contrast, the AKP shows more strict 
position on this by rejecting membership of any person who has committed such 
transgression because such attitude is damaging to the party’s image. The PKS maintains 
the lawmaker’s membership because the misdeed was processed under religious 
consideration rather than organisational. The treatment is an authoritative action because it 
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is written in the constitution that mandates the party to form a special body to deal with 
religious matters, the DSP. Hence, the constitution of the PKS contains two different 
principles rather than one which are organisational and Islam as a reflection of preserving 
ideology.      
It is obvious that abandoning a strong attachment to an ideology created a tricky 
task for the AKP’s leaders. They have to deal with former supporters and members of the 
RP and the FP regarded as having more ideological credence. It is a huge task to explain 
and propose a new direction toward them and it is defined as efforts to transform party 
members and its supporters to embrace a new approach in politics. The main message of 
the transformation is to separate religion and politics to accept politics as a secular arena. 
With this approach, religious congregation as a method of transferring interpretation on 
certain ideology as implemented by the RP is replaced by training on professional skills 
and non-religious topics. By offering the training combined with organisational style, the 
party developed more individual character of membership. It is one of the characteristics of 
the AKP that has developed its image as a secular political party as a result of 
transformation. At that point, it is reasonable to understand why there is no need to obtain a 
certain level of ideological understanding in order to gain higher level in the party’s 
structure.   
In more direct words it can be concluded that both the AKP and the PKS have given 
different tendencies to implement strategies to manage the impact of moderation. In the 
leadership, both parties emphasised the role of the party’s leader as one of the main factors 
to maintain members’ loyalty. However, each party implements a different style of 
leadership. The AKP depends on a more charismatic leader who plays the role of party 
chairman to control the parliament and the cabinet. In contrast, in the PKS the role of party 
leader is to act behind the scenes as the head of the Shura Assembly but he holds also a 
strategic position to supervise general party’s direction and manoeuvre in politics. 
Meanwhile, the President runs the party’s organisation to implement mandates decided by 
the Assembly. In this case, moderation does not give any preference on particular style of 
leadership. It is not a unique case exclusively influenced by moderation process because 
other parties, other than the AKP and the PKS, can also operate under similar conditions. 
However, there is a tendency that having an ideology will result in relatively less available 
space for free expression because popular demand is not the only determinant factor in 
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formulation of policies within the party. Meanwhile, less significant ideological preferences 
will give more opportunity to represent popular sentiments as an implementation of 
principle to serve the people.   
The AKP and the PKS parties also enjoy a high degree of trust among the party 
members. It is also an important strategy to minimise opposition to moderation. For a less 
ideological party such as the AKP, the vision and personal charisma combined with the 
party’s programmes are more significant than an attachment to ideology. There is also a 
conviction that lessening an ideological weight is better in the current political 
circumstances of Turkish politics that makes demands on a strict ideology less significant.   
In contrary, an ideological party such as the PKS depends on its ability to convince 
its members that the moderation policy is part of the sacred mission which is legitimate to 
be supported.  Unconvincing explanation has initiated internal criticism but supports from 
prominent party elites as well as a strong commitment to the sacred mission have left the 
opposition in a difficult situation. A strong belief on ideological interpretation by legitimate 
party elites is also crucial to maintain the loyalty of the majority of members. Therefore, 
ideology plays a great role to make members not oppose the party leadership’s new 
direction. It is believed that moderation is heading toward righteous direction in accordance 
with the ideology. The case of the PKS has given an indication that trust based on 
ideological interpretation is more durable because it encourages followers to be loyal as 
long as moderation is legitimate justified by legitimate persons. The willingness to maintain 
ideology has also encouraged the party to sustain the method of congregation as a process 
to transfer official interpretation, which is not needed in the party that has abandoned 
ideology.    
It is also proven that the absence of ideological preferences in the AKP has changed 
the nature of decomposition strategy. If the party needs to take action against its member, it 
is more related to disciplinary issue rather than dismissing party members because of 
opposition to the party’s interpretation of ideology. There is a case of members’ dismissal 
that is related to values that can be categorised as moral which is categorised as part of 
tradition in society. Hence, this is not the case of an ideological party because dismissals 
are based on evaluation of criticism toward the party’s leadership and its interpretation of 
the party’s ideology and the definition of violation also depends on interpretation of 
principles of ideology itself. It can be concluded that decomposition is more difficult to be 
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found in a party that has been moderated and reach the level of abandoning ideological 
preference. Meanwhile, a party that is still in the process of moderation but still uphold 
ideology will face internal ideological disputes that may lead to dismissal of critical 
members because of different interpretations.  
In the strategy of conversion and replacement, the party that applies moderation to 
abandon ideology has to place emphasis on transformation strategy in order to gain more 
popular support, including those who have strong ideological preferences. Once the reason 
is accepted then a party will get support from different backgrounds, not only from 
particular groups. The AKP and the PKS show that it is crucial to hold positions in the 
party’s structures in order to monopolise rightful interpretation which is significant to 
control members’ attitudes.  
It is noticed that alienation is also a significant strategy to prevent internal 
opposition because of the nature of the party as a collective and communal group. It is an 
effective psychological pressure for members to refrain from any action or behaviour that 
can be perceived as insubordination. Alienation means to lose contact with the community 
and there is a fear that it is difficult to maintain previous status as well as reputation among 
other members, that forces members to maintain their loyalty rather than being critical or 
initiating discourse. As a result, being alienated as well as decomposed from the party are 
not the best options for members of a moderated party with ideological preferences. 
However, the party without ideological preferences is relatively free from the 
implementation of alienation. 
    The cases of the AKP and the PKS suggest that different implementation of 
moderation can signify the variation of strategies in managing the impact of moderation. It 
can be concluded that the former applied moderation to make a substantial transformation 
by abandoning ideology, while the latter has not transformed its ideology substantially to 
implement more pragmatic adjustment of moderation. In Wickham’s definition, the AKP 
has reached the condition to abandon any ideological preferences, so that it does not apply 
any strategies related to ideology, such as dismissal of membership due to ideological 
conflicts and alienation. In contrast, the PKS still holds an ideology so the moderation is 
still in the level of either revision or postpone, even though it has initiated several efforts to 
accommodate popular sentiments.  
253 
 
 
The outcome is obvious that the AKP can develop an organisational approach more 
significantly compared to the PKS. One of the strong indications of an organisational 
approach is the definition of violation of the party’s rule. The AKP defines the violation 
according to the principles of organisation, while the PKS develops two different categories 
of violation which are violation on shari’a and organisational principles. The difference 
indicates that substantial moderation will lead a party to non-ideological character. Hence, 
to achieve this stage of moderation, a party and its members should abandon any 
ideological preferences. In its internal perspective, the consent toward the abandonment can 
be achieved by providing a series of party programmes to convince those who still have 
strong relation with any ideology. However, the AKP has distinct social and political 
contexts that stimulate the motivation to develop a substantial moderation, especially given 
the strict interpretation of secularism of Turkish state. On the contrary, there is a space for 
ideological expression in democratic Indonesia to allow the PKS to maintain Islam as its 
formal ideology.   
In that case, to put the AKP as a model for other Islamic parties in the Muslim 
world is rather debatable. There is still a big question mark on the readiness of the Islamic 
parties to abandon or at least transform Islam to suit the popular sentiments due to 
participation in electoral process. The case of the PKS is one of the examples of a 
problematic situation because the party has to deal with two different aspects at the same 
time: winning elections and preserving its ideology or to make a balance between votes and 
shari’a. The strategies to manage the impact of moderation in the PKS indicate that 
ideology still plays a great role in maintaining members’ loyalty. It is probably premature 
to conclude that the PKS model of moderation is unsuccessful due to its stagnation in the 
last election. However, democracy gives opportunities for the party and also the public to 
evaluate their preferences. Thus, the moderation process has to be seen as an ongoing 
process. In the future, the party may offer different approaches in politics which may be 
acceptable to the wider public. The two cases, the AKP and the PKS, signify the challenges 
of Islamic movements to find a suitable ‘transformation’ that suits the local context. 
Participation in the electoral process requires significant adjustment and also creates 
complexity that they have to deal with.   
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